Government Control and Censorship of Internet Access

North Korea’s government maintains strict control over all internet usage, allowing access to the global Internet only for a small, elite group with special authorization businessinsider.com en.wikipedia.org. The vast majority of citizens are barred from the global web; instead, they are limited to a state-run domestic network. Even for the few permitted users (such as top officials, state researchers, and propagandists), online activity is heavily monitored. All chats, emails, and web content are filtered and surveilled by the state on domestic networks businessinsider.com. Authorities also block foreign websites – for example, in 2016 North Korea began blocking Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and many South Korean sites to curb the spread of outside information en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. Attempting to bypass these controls is extremely dangerous: those caught using unauthorized connections (such as Chinese mobile networks near the border) face harsh punishments blog.telegeography.com. In short, North Korea’s leadership tightly censors internet access as part of a broader information blockade, ensuring that citizens only see state-approved content.

Domestic Intranet (Kwangmyong) vs. Global Internet Access

North Koreans do not have free access to the World Wide Web as known elsewhere. Instead, the government operates a closed domestic intranet called Kwangmyong (“Brightness”) that serves as an internal substitute for the global internet businessinsider.com. Kwangmyong is a nationwide network with its own websites, online services, email, and search engine, but it is completely isolated from the global Internet. Content on Kwangmyong is curated and censored by the state – it includes domestic news outlets, educational resources, science and technical databases, and propaganda sites, all approved by authorities en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. As of the mid-2010s, Kwangmyong was estimated to host on the order of a few thousand internal websites (roughly 1,000–5,500), providing information and services for North Korean users en.wikipedia.org. By contrast, North Korea has only a few dozen websites accessible on the global Internet, and these are mostly government-run propaganda or information sites (in 2016, a leak of North Korea’s DNS indicated only 28 .kp domain websites were reachable from abroad) en.wikipedia.org.

Only a very small elite – select government and military leaders, trusted academics, state hackers, and foreigners – are permitted to access the global Internet in North Korea businessinsider.com en.wikipedia.org. The country had merely 1,024 IP addresses allocated for Internet use (for a population of ~25 million), underscoring how few people can go online globally businessinsider.com. Even for these users, the experience is tightly controlled; their activities are monitored and subject to censorship (for example, connections for North Korean users often run through China to allow easier monitoring and filtering) en.wikipedia.org. Meanwhile, the general population can only use Kwangmyong, which, while offering e-mail, news, digital libraries, and even a few e-commerce or social networking features, is essentially a siloed intranet with no uncensored outside content businessinsider.com en.wikipedia.org. This dual-network system allows the regime to promote digital literacy and limited online services domesticallywhile preventing ordinary citizens from reaching the open Internet. In summary, Kwangmyong vs. Internet in North Korea represents a stark divide: a tightly firewalled national network for the masses, versus highly restricted true Internet access for the privileged few.

Major Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Market Share

North Korea’s telecom and internet market is dominated by state-controlled entities and a few joint ventures. For fixed-line and broadband Internet services, the primary (and essentially sole) ISP is Star Joint Venture Co., a joint venture between North Korea’s Ministry of Post and Telecommunications and Thailand’s Loxley Pacific en.wikipedia.org. Star JV has government sanction to provide modern internet services and took control of the country’s internet address allocations in 2009 en.wikipedia.org. In practice, Star JV handles the limited international bandwidth and connectivity for institutions and the small number of internet-approved users. Prior to Star JV’s formation, any global internet access in North Korea was extremely rudimentary – it was available only via a satellite link or through direct connections via China for certain government departments en.wikipedia.org. Today, Star JV remains the gatekeeper for global internet connectivity in North Korea, though its “market” is tiny given how few people are allowed online.

In the mobile sector, there are three telecom operators offering cellular service, all under state oversight. The largest and first was Koryolink, a 3G mobile network launched in 2008 as a joint venture between Egypt’s Orascom Telecom Media and Technology and the state-run Korea Post and Telecommunications Corporation​ world.kbs.co.kr koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. Koryolink held a 4-year exclusivity on mobile service until 2012 and grew rapidly at first – it reached about 1 million subscribers by 2012, 2 million by 2013, and 3 million by 2015​ world.kbs.co.kr. By mid-2017, Koryolink had roughly 3.9 million users (about 15.5% of the population) on its network blog.telegeography.com. However, after Koryolink’s exclusivity lapsed, the government introduced a second carrier, Kang Song Net, in 2012 as a state-owned competitor​ world.kbs.co.kr koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. Kang Song Net also runs a 3G network and was created to give the regime more direct control; it allowed users to pay in North Korean won (as opposed to Koryolink, which charged in foreign currency for some services) and offered slightly cheaper rates, making it popular among local subscribers​ world.kbs.co.kr. In 2015, a third mobile operator called Byol (“Star”) was launched​ world.kbs.co.kr koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. Byol initially provided wired internet connections for foreign residents in Pyongyang, but it later began offering 3G mobile service for domestic users (reportedly serving government, military officials, and citizens)​ world.kbs.co.kr. Byol is also believed to be a joint venture, involving Thailand’s Loxley Wireless, indicating another foreign partnership in the telecom space koreajoongangdaily.joins.com.

All three operators – Koryolink, Kang Song Net, and Byol – now coexist and compete in a limited telecom market. Precise market share figures are hard to obtain due to state secrecy, but trends indicate that Koryolink’s share of local North Korean users has declined as Kang Song Net and Byol gained subscribers. Many North Koreans switched from Koryolink to Kang Song Net after 2012 because Kang Song’s service was payable in local currency and had better voice quality​ world.kbs.co.kr. Koryolink today still serves a large number of users (including virtually all foreigners and many elite locals) and provides the only legal mobile internet access for foreigners in the country nknews.org en.wikipedia.org. Kang Song Net and Byol, on the other hand, cater exclusively to North Korean residents and do not offer international calling or internet to their users​ world.kbs.co.kr. As of 2020, estimates put the total number of mobile subscribers in North Korea at roughly 6 million (about 18% of the population), though the actual number of unique users may be lower due to some owning multiple phones koreajoongangdaily.joins.com koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. In sum, North Korea’s ISP and telecom sector is small and state-dominated: Star JV handles the scarce internet connectivity, while Koryolink, Kang Song, and Byol share a growing mobile phone market – with the latter two eroding Koryolink’s early monopoly as part of the regime’s strategy to keep foreign stakes and influence in check​ world.kbs.co.kr.

Infrastructure Development and Coverage (Urban vs. Rural)

North Korea’s telecom infrastructure has seen gradual development, with a noticeable gap between urban centers and rural areas. In Pyongyang (the capital) and other major cities, there is relatively better connectivity: fiber-optic cables link key institutions, and cellular networks have dense coverage. For example, by 2011 Koryolink had built 453 mobile base stations covering Pyongyang and 13 other major cities, 86 smaller cities, and along 22 highways​ world.kbs.co.kr. This network footprint, by then, covered over 92% of North Korea’s population (though only about 14% of the land area, concentrated in populated zones)​ world.kbs.co.kr en.wikipedia.org. Pyongyang in particular enjoys the most developed telecom infrastructure – most government ministries, universities, and larger enterprises in the capital are interconnected by high-speed fiber lines en.wikipedia.org, and residents of Pyongyang have far greater access to phones and intranet services than elsewhere. In wealthier hubs like Pyongyang (and the special economic zone of Rason in the northeast), mobile phone ownership rates are high – on the order of 70% or more among adults in their 20s–50s koreajoongangdaily.joins.com koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. These urban areas also host internet-access facilities for the elite (e.g. cyber rooms for officials or labs at universities) and Kwangmyong intranet kiosks in libraries and educational centers.

In contrast, rural areas and smaller towns have much more limited infrastructure. Many remote villages have no landline telephone network and rely on the expanding cellular network as the only means of communication reuters.com. The mobile operators have steadily extended coverage outside the cities: surveys of cell tower deployments show that cellular signals now reach deep into rural regions, with new base stations appearing in remote counties that had no coverage just a couple of years prior reuters.com. By 2022, an estimated 6.5–7 million North Koreans (over a quarter of the population) were using mobile phones, not just in cities but also in countryside areas where network coverage has become available reuters.com reuters.com. Many cell towers in rural locales are equipped with solar panels, indicating efforts to power the network in areas with unreliable electricity reuters.com. However, having signal coverage is not the same as internet access – outside of elite circles, rural users can typically only make calls or use approved intranet apps; they do not have true Internet connectivity. Moreover, the penetration of devices and services remains lower in rural communities. Phone ownership is still largely concentrated among the relatively wealthier or better-connected individuals (such as traders in local markets or provincial officials). Those in remote farming villages or impoverished regions often cannot afford mobile phones or computers at all, and many such areas suffer from frequent power shortages that hinder the use of digital services. The government has made a point of rolling out communications infrastructure to all provinces – for instance, fiber-optic lines were laid to nearly every county by the early 2000s (often via mass labor campaigns) en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org– but the quality and usage of that infrastructure remain far higher in urban centers. In summary, North Korea’s backbone network (fiber and cellular) does span the country and is steadily growing, but a digital divide persists between connected cities and under-connected rural areas in terms of both availability and actual use of internet-related services.

Speed and Pricing of Internet Access

Internet access in North Korea is not only rare – it’s also slow and extremely expensive by global standards. The country’s public telecommunications are generations behind modern norms: the nationwide cellular system until recently was limited to 3G technology (introduced in 2008)​ world.kbs.co.kr, meaning data speeds are relatively low (on the order of a few hundred kilobits to a few megabits per second at best). Unlike neighboring South Korea – where gigabit broadband is common – North Korea has virtually no consumer broadband. Fixed broadband subscriptions per capita are effectively zero, since home internet for citizens is prohibited blog.telegeography.com. Only government offices, some universities, and foreign compounds have direct internet connections, often via old fiber links or even dial-up-like connections in the past. A South Korean analysis noted that the North’s total web traffic footprint has been minuscule – at one point, less data than the Falkland Islands generated en.wikipedia.org– underscoring the extremely limited use of high-bandwidth services. In short, the average North Korean does not experience modern high-speed internet at all; they are restricted to the much smaller Kwangmyong intranet, whose performance is constrained by outdated infrastructure and government bandwidth throttling.

For those few who can access the global Internet (mostly foreigners and a handful of elites), pricing is a major barrier. North Korean telecom providers charge exorbitant fees for internet service. For example, Koryolink’s official rates for visitor mobile internet (3G), when first offered in 2013, were reported at 75 euro for a USB modem and $150 USD for a SIM card, plus steep data charges northkoreatech.org. Data packages cost €150 for just 2 GB of data and up to €400 for 10 GB, with an additional monthly fee for the SIM northkoreatech.org. At those prices (hundreds of dollars for a few gigabytes), using the internet is a luxury only foreigners or the very wealthy could even consider. Even today, internet access for embassies or enterprise use in Pyongyang typically runs through special contracts that are likely very costly. Mobile phone service for locals, while more affordable than these foreigner rates, is still expensive relative to incomes. Koryolink’s plans historically required payment in foreign currency once a user exceeded their small allotment of minutes/data, which put it out of reach for average citizens​ world.kbs.co.kr. The introduction of Kang Song Net helped lower some costs by allowing fees in local won, but ordinary North Koreans still spend a significant portion of their income to purchase phones and prepaid minutes. In practical terms, many citizens access mobile services by sharing phones or using informal markets to top up credit. The Kwangmyong intranet is freeto use at libraries, schools or other public terminals, but owning a computer or smartphone to access it privately is expensive. Additionally, the government’s control means that speed is deliberately restricted – for instance, even if 3G data is available on a phone, authorities often disable or limit internet functionality on consumer smartphones koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. Most North Korean smartphones have their Wi-Fi and mobile data capabilities crippled to prevent unauthorized browsing koreajoongangdaily.joins.com, so users cannot make full use of the hardware’s speed. All these factors result in a situation where North Korea’s connected few experience relatively slow connectivity at a very high price, and the vast majority experience no true Internet at all. By comparison, in free markets abroad internet access costs have plummeted and speeds have risen dramatically; North Korea stands out as one of the most expensive and bandwidth-starved places for internet service due to its isolation and policies.

Growth and Expansion of Fiber Optic Networks

Despite its isolation, North Korea has invested in building a fiber-optic communication backbone over the past few decades – primarily to improve domestic communications and support its controlled intranet and telephone systems. With assistance from the UN in the early 1990s, North Korea established a fiber optic cable factory in Pyongyang (1992) and laid its first large fiber line by 1995, running about 300 km from Pyongyang to Hamhŭng on the east coast en.wikipedia.org. This initial trunk line became the template for further expansion. In the late 1990s, Kim Jong Il’s government undertook massive nationwide infrastructure campaigns, during which fiber-optic cables were extended to provincial cities and counties across the country en.wikipedia.org. Tens of thousands of soldiers and workers were mobilized to dig trenches and install fiber cables as part of broader public works projects en.wikipedia.org. By the early 2000s, most major hubs (and many county seats) were interconnected by fiber, replacing earlier copper lines for long-distance communication. This provided a foundation for the Kwangmyong intranet and the mobile phone network’s backhaul. In essence, North Korea managed to create a national fiber backbone that links key institutions (government ministries, universities, research centers) and cities. The country’s telecom switching system was modernized in parallel, with digital exchanges set up alongside the fiber rollout en.wikipedia.org.

On the international front, North Korea long relied on outdated or indirect links, but has recently expanded fiber connectivity beyond its borders. Prior to 2010, the country’s external internet access was largely via satellite uplinks (e.g. through partners in Germany) or through a few highly controlled lines into China en.wikipedia.org. In late 2010, a major improvement came with the activation of a dedicated fiber-optic link from Pyongyang to China, provided by China Unicom, which became North Korea’s primary gateway to the global Internet en.wikipedia.org. This high-capacity connection to the Chinese internet backbone significantly increased bandwidth (though absolute bandwidth figures remain secret) and reduced reliance on slower satellites. For several years, China Unicom’s route was the only internet pipeline out of North Korea. Then in 2017, a second international fiber route was opened via Russia – the Russian telecom company TransTeleCom (a subsidiary of Russian Railways) began routing North Korean internet traffic through a fiber-optic line that connects North Korea with Russia’s far east en.wikipedia.org. This Russian link (reportedly running from the northeast city of Chongjin across the border to Vladivostok) provided a redundant path for connectivity and reduced North Korea’s dependence on China en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. Today, North Korea’s international internet access is handled through these two main fiber links – one through China and another through Russia – giving the regime a bit more resilience and bargaining power for its connectivity en.wikipedia.org.

Internally, the fiber network continues to grow modestly. The state likely prioritizes connecting strategic facilities (like military, scientific, or industrial sites) with fiber for secure high-speed communications. There are indications that fiber-to-the-home or fiber broadband for the public is nonexistent, but within government and research circles, gigabit-speed fiber connections are used (for example, between the Korean Computer Center, universities in Pyongyang, and data centers). When North Korea upgrades its mobile network technology (as with the move to 4G), it is leveraging the fiber backbone for backhaul traffic between cell towers usakoreainstitute.org. Overall, fiber-optic infrastructure in North Korea has expanded from a single pilot line in 1995 to a nationwide grid today, and it underpins both the country’s internal communications (phones and intranet) and its tightly controlled links to the global internet.

Mobile Network Coverage and Penetration (3G, 4G, 5G)

North Korea’s mobile network has seen significant growth in coverage and user numbers over the past decade, although it lags behind in technology. The country’s modern cellular era began with the introduction of 3G service in December 2008 (Koryolink’s launch)​ world.kbs.co.kr. Since then, the 3G network has expanded to cover virtually all populated areas. By 2020, the 3G network covered about 94% of the population (though only about 14% of the country’s territory, focusing on cities and transport corridors) en.wikipedia.org. This means most North Koreans live in areas where mobile signal is available, even if many cannot afford phones. As noted, upwards of 6–7 million mobile subscriptions are active, equating to roughly 25% of citizens having a cellphone (some sources estimate around 18–25% penetration) reuters.com koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. These phones are used heavily for domestic calls and text messaging – over 90% of recent defectors surveyed reported using their phones daily when in North Korea, mainly to contact family or to conduct business in the informal markets reuters.com. The network supports basic data services, and there is a limited mobile intranet/Internet access service available (primarily to foreigners and elite users) via Koryolink’s data plans en.wikipedia.org. However, for the typical North Korean user, the phone is a tool for voice communication and possibly government-approved apps, not open internet browsing (internet functionality is disabled on most local handsets by software) koreajoongangdaily.joins.com.

Technology generations: North Korea remained on 3G (third-generation) mobile technology far longer than most countries. While much of the world moved to 4G LTE in the 2010s, North Korea only began the transition recently. Reports in 2021 indicated the country was preparing to upgrade from 3G to 4G en.wikipedia.org, and by late 2023 it started deploying a 4G network in parts of the country en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. The 4G rollout appears to be limited so far – one of the domestic operators, Kang Song Net, was observed broadcasting a 4G signal (likely LTE) near the DMZ, confirming that 4G service is being tested or activated nknews.org nknews.org. North Korea is reportedly using second-hand Huawei equipment from China to implement its 4G network en.wikipedia.org, a sign that international sanctions and costs have forced it to rely on used or black-market hardware. This belated embrace of 4G is aimed at improving network capacity and data speeds in response to growing consumer demand for mobile services nknews.org. Even so, the regime remains cautious – experts note that authorities likely limit full 4G capabilities or rollout breadth to maintain control, ensuring they are always a step behind the cutting edge nknews.org nknews.org. As for 5G, North Korea has shown interest in next-generation wireless tech, but it currently has no 5G service. Kim Jong Un highlighted 5G technology research as a priority task in 2020​ world.kbs.co.kr, indicating that the government wants to eventually develop 5G capabilities. However, given the technical and sanctions challenges, 5G in North Korea remains purely aspirational for now – it might take several years or more before any 5G network could be deployed.

Mobile penetration and usage trends: Under Kim Jong Un, mobile phone adoption has risen rapidly. From near zero mobile users in the early 2000s, the country now counts several million devices in use reuters.com. Penetration is especially high among urban youth and market vendors, who rely on phones for trading and communication koreajoongangdaily.joins.com koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. Interestingly, a 2017 study estimated that 69% of households owned at least one mobile phone en.wikipedia.org– though this figure may be skewed by sampling and likely applies more to urban areas. Nonetheless, it signals how commonplace cellphones have become in daily North Korean life. The network currently handles primarily 3G voice and text, but with the advent of 4G, users with newer smartphones might soon enjoy faster connections for approved apps (such as state-sanctioned streaming of educational content or e-commerce on the intranet). There is no indication of international roaming – North Korean networks are closed loops; Koryolink, for instance, has no roaming agreements, and foreigners must buy local SIMs if they want service in country blog.telegeography.com en.wikipedia.org. Also, domestic users cannot make direct international calls or access foreign websites; the mobile networks enforce the same isolation as other mediums. In summary, 3G cellular service now blankets most of North Korea and is used by perhaps a quarter of the population, 4G is just beginning to roll out in late 2023 to address increasing demand for data, and 5G remains a future goal on the distant horizon. The expansion of mobile connectivity stands out as one of the few high-tech growth areas in North Korea, albeit tightly controlled and a generation behind the rest of the world.

Foreign Partnerships in North Korean Internet Services

Given its limited resources and technical base, North Korea has historically relied on foreign partnerships to develop its telecommunications and internet services, albeit under strict oversight. One of the earliest partnerships was with Thailand’s Loxley Pacific in the 1990s: Loxley helped establish the first mobile network in the Rajin-Sonbong (Rason) economic zone and later partnered in the Star Joint Venture ISP that manages North Korea’s internet gateway en.wikipedia.org. Star JV, founded around 2009, is a collaboration between the North Korean government (Ministry of Post/Telecom) and Loxley, and it effectively controls North Korea’s connection to the global Internet, as well as allocation of IP addresses en.wikipedia.org. Another major foreign player has been Orascom of Egypt. Orascom’s subsidiary CHEO Technology teamed up with Korea Post & Telecom Corp to launch Koryolink in 2008, bringing in capital, infrastructure, and expertise to build North Korea’s 3G mobile network​ world.kbs.co.kr koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. Orascom invested hundreds of millions of dollars into Koryolink, installing base stations and possibly using equipment from international vendors (such as Huawei). In the initial years, this partnership was crucial in jump-starting mobile service – Orascom reported subscriber growth and built the core network, while the North Korean side provided regulatory control and market access​ world.kbs.co.kr en.wikipedia.org. However, over time the relationship became strained: North Korea’s launch of rival state-owned carriers (Kang Song Net, Byol) and restrictions on profit repatriation led Orascom to write down its investment. Today, Orascom’s role is diminished (it reportedly lost management control of Koryolink), but the infrastructure it provided remains the backbone of the cellular system​ world.kbs.co.kr​ world.kbs.co.kr.

Other foreign partnerships include the Byol network’s ties to Loxley (Thailand). Byol, introduced in 2015, is said to be a joint venture between the government and Loxley Wireless, indicating Thailand’s continued involvement in North Korean telecom ventures koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. Byol initially focused on providing internet service (likely via Wi-Fi and fiber) to expatriates in Pyongyang, again showing how foreign entities were tapped to improve North Korea’s limited internet offerings​ world.kbs.co.kr. On the infrastructure side, China has been a key partner. The primary internet feed from 2010 onwards has been through China Unicom, meaning North Korea’s global internet access is technically provided via a Chinese state-owned carrier en.wikipedia.org. Chinese firms have also reportedly supplied a great deal of hardware: Huawei and ZTE (China) have been sources of telecommunications equipment. In fact, North Korea’s nascent 4G upgrade uses second-hand Huawei LTE gear smuggled or imported despite sanctions en.wikipedia.org. Russian assistance came into play with TransTeleCom offering the second internet connection in 2017, under what was likely a government-level agreement between Pyongyang and Moscow en.wikipedia.org. Additionally, Russian technology may be present in some network management or cybersecurity areas, though details are scant.

Beyond telecom operators, foreign partnerships extend to content and training. For example, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), founded by foreign donors, has provided computer science education (with limited supervised internet access for research) through international faculty. And North Korean IT companies have some cooperative projects with foreign firms (often covertly) for software development. However, international sanctions in recent years have made formal partnerships more difficult. Orascom’s venture got caught in sanctions issues, and most Western companies are barred from providing advanced telecom equipment. Sanctions and the regime’s paranoia have thus shifted North Korea toward more reliance on countries like China, or illicit procurement, for its internet development reuters.com. In summary, foreign partners – notably Egypt’s Orascom and Thailand’s Loxley in mobile telephony, and Chinese and Russian state carriers in backbone connectivity – have played vital roles in bootstrapping North Korea’s internet and communications. The state has welcomed outside technical input when it served its goals, but always under conditions that Pyongyang retains ultimate control. As a result, some partnerships (like Koryolink) have soured over time when the foreign side’s interests diverged from the regime’s priorities. Moving forward, North Korea is likely to continue leveraging friendly nations (China, Russia, possibly others) for incremental improvements to its networks, given that purely domestic development of such complex infrastructure remains challenging under isolation.

Satellite Internet Access in North Korea

Satellite internet in North Korea is virtually non-existent for the general public, and even for most institutions it is a method of last resort. Historically, before fiber-optic links were established, North Korea did use satellite links for its limited internet connectivity. Up until around 2010, the country’s primary internet connection was reportedly a satellite link via a ground station in Germany, which provided a slow and expensive connection for the few government offices online en.wikipedia.org. Even today, North Korea is believed to maintain some satellite communication capability as a backup and for special uses – for example, certain military or diplomatic communications might be routed via satellite if land lines fail en.wikipedia.org. However, the average North Korean citizen has absolutely no access to satellite communications, and possessing unauthorized satellite transmission equipment would be a grave crime. The regime works actively to jam foreign satellite signals (such as foreign radio broadcasts) and would quickly locate illicit satellite phones if someone tried to use them 38north.org 38north.org.

For foreigners and diplomats in North Korea, satellite internet is technically possible but tightly controlled. Embassies in Pyongyang likely use secure satellite links for their own communications, which are permitted under diplomatic norms (North Korea cannot easily monitor those, which is why embassies rely on them). Apart from that, a few international organizations or foreign-run hotels have in the past provided internet via satellite networks under agreement with the government. For instance, before the fiber line to China was reliable, the internet access for guests at Pyongyang hotels was sometimes via satellite connectivity managed by foreign telecom firms. There are global satellite service providers that list North Korea in their coverage (e.g. some VSAT companies advertise solutions for North Korea), and theoretically one could set up a satellite terminal to get internet in remote parts of the country globaltt.com globaltt.com. In practice, however, such connections require government approval and oversight – no private citizen or company in North Korea can independently install a satellite dish to access the internet. The cost of satellite internet is also prohibitive: equipment and service could cost thousands of dollars per month, far beyond the means of any North Korean outside of government or elite circles. And critically, any unusual radio transmission can be detected by the state’s security apparatus. Satellite phones and modems emit signals on known frequencies that North Korean authorities monitor and jam; using them covertly is extremely risky 38north.org. Past defectors and activists have tried smuggling in satellite communication devices, but with limited success due to these detection measures.

As of now, no known commercial satellite internet service (like SpaceX’s Starlink) is operating in North Korea. Starlink’s satellites do overfly the region, and a recent analysis noted that new low Earth orbit satellite constellations (which can beam internet directly to ordinary smartphones or small terminals) could one day present a challenge to North Korea’s information blockade 38north.org 38north.org. For example, the planned AST SpaceMobile network or similar systems might theoretically allow a North Korean with a regular smartphone to connect to the internet via satellite if they had the right subscription and a view of the sky 38north.org. However, there are significant hurdles: the user would still need to acquire and register for the service (which is nearly impossible from inside North Korea), and the government would undoubtedly treat any unapproved satellite communication as espionage. Moreover, while these technologies remove the need for a large dish, the regime could still jam or triangulate signals if they detected unauthorized connections 38north.org. In essence, North Korea’s geography and governance make satellite internet extremely difficult to deploy. The state could use satellites to improve nationwide coverage for intranet or future 5G backhaul, but so far it has chosen fiber and terrestrial wireless solutions, likely because they are easier to secure and monitor.

In sum, satellite internet in North Korea remains very limited and mostly under official use. Known providers of satellite services (like Inmarsat, Thuraya, Iridium) are technically accessible in the region, but using them requires permission that is typically only granted to foreign entities. The pricing for such services is very high – for example, satellite phone calls can cost several dollars per minute, and broadband terminals cost thousands of dollars – and the North Korean government actively disrupts unauthorized signals. Until there is some drastic change, ordinary North Koreans will not have access to internet via satellite, and those few who do have satellite links (diplomats, etc.) will keep them low-profile. The most intriguing future possibility is that new satellite technologies might eventually crack open this isolation by enabling more clandestine connectivity, but at present, North Korea’s regime has effectively kept the skies closed to uncensored internet access.

Digital Divide and Initiatives for Remote Regions

North Korea faces a pronounced digital divide – not only between urban and rural populations, but also between the politically-connected elite and the general public. As noted, in Pyongyang and a handful of other cities, a relatively large share of people use mobile phones and have exposure to digital services, whereas in the countryside many still lack access to basic telecommunications. For example, mobile phone subscription rates in affluent areas like Pyongyang are over 70% among some adult age groups, but nationally only around 18–25% of people have a phone koreajoongangdaily.joins.com koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. This means millions in rural villages or poorer regions remain offline and disconnected. There is also a generational divide: younger North Koreans, especially in cities, are more adept with devices like smartphones and tablets (albeit offline ones), whereas older and rural folks may have never used a computer. The information disparity is a conscious result of state policy – the regime deliberately restricts access to ensure loyalty, which means those in Pyongyang (often the elite class) are trusted with a bit more connectivity (like intranet access in universities or mobile service), while those in remote areas are kept in an information vacuum aside from state media. Additionally, income plays a role: a black-market trader or a well-off family can afford a mobile phone and solar panel to charge it, whereas a subsistence farmer in a rural cooperative might not. This creates an economic digital divide where market participants in provincial towns leverage phones for business, while isolated farmers remain disconnected.

The North Korean government has undertaken some initiatives to improve access to digital resources in remote regions, but these efforts focus on the controlled intranet and educational content rather than open internet. One major push has been the expansion of Kwangmyong intranet services to provincial universities, libraries, and “information centers.” Throughout the 2010s, the state installed intranet terminals and local networks at county science halls and schools so that students and researchers outside Pyongyang could query technical databases and view curated content. For instance, the Kwangmyong network offers scientific and technical journals, e-libraries, and learning resources that are used in remote education programs en.wikipedia.org. Telemedicine and distance learning systems have been developed as part of Kwangmyong, which gained importance during the COVID-19 pandemic – doctors in rural hospitals could consult with specialists in Pyongyang via the intranet, and some remote classes were conducted over the network en.wikipedia.org. Likewise, the government launched a high-profile “Sci-Tech Complex” in Pyongyang (2015) – a modern library and exhibition facility with dozens of intranet computer terminals – and has encouraged provincial branches of this complex to disseminate knowledge through intranet access.

Another development helping bridge the divide is the proliferation of local Wi-Fi networks (intranet only) in the late 2010s. Because upgrading the nationwide mobile network beyond 3G was slow (due to sanctions and cost), many institutions set up Wi-Fi hotspots connected to the fiber backbone to allow fast data access on phones and laptops for approved content reuters.com. U.S. researchers found that these Wi-Fi networks have sharply expanded, especially around universities and research centers, giving people in those locales wireless access to the Kwangmyong intranet and its databases reuters.com. Importantly, these Wi-Fi nodes do not provide open Internet – they are a way to connect to the closed domestic network – but they improve the quality of intranet access in remote or underserved areas (for example, a scholar in a provincial city can download scientific materials over a local Wi-Fi intranet connection instead of needing a hard copy) reuters.com.

Additionally, North Korea has produced a number of locally-made (or rather, locally assembled) devices like tablets and smartphones that are intended to spread digital access in a controlled way. Tablets such as the “Achim” or “Myohyang” have been distributed in some schools; they come pre-loaded with educational software and e-books but have no external networking capability. Such devices help familiarize people outside Pyongyang with computing and the intranet while keeping them within the walled garden of state-approved content koreajoongangdaily.joins.com.

Despite these efforts, the digital divide remains significant. People in remote northern provinces or mountain villages have far less access to information than those in Pyongyang. The government’s initiatives are designed to propagate knowledge that is useful for economic development (like agricultural advice, scientific know-how) without compromising political control. Power outages and infrastructure limitations also mean that even when a rural school has computers, they might not be usable at all times. International organizations have occasionally offered assistance to improve IT infrastructure in the provinces (for example, the UNDP’s past help in building fiber links), but geopolitical issues have limited such projects. A crucial point is that “improving internet access” in North Korea’s terms means expanding the domestic intranet and telecommunication for development, not opening access to the global Internet. In summary, the state is working to extend its controlled networks to all corners of the country – through intranet, mobile coverage, and digital educational tools – in order to alleviate the internal digital divide without loosening censorship. These measures have connected many remote regions into the national information network (Kwangmyong) for the first time, inching North Korea toward a more digitally integrated society, albeit entirely on the regime’s terms.

Future Trends and Government Initiatives

North Korea’s leadership has repeatedly emphasized the importance of science and technology for the nation’s future, and this includes cautiously advancing its internet and communications capabilities. Kim Jong Un has made visits to software and handset factories and has touted the need to develop North Korea’s IT sector. One clear trend is the continued expansion and upgrade of the mobile network. After years of delay, the move to 4G LTE is now underway – as noted, by end of 2023 the first 4G services were deployed en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. In the coming years, we can expect the 4G rollout to extend at least to major cities, greatly enhancing data speeds on the domestic network (for permitted services). The government will likely advertise this as a major technological achievement. Simultaneously, North Korean research institutions will pursue 5G technology, as it’s been listed as a priority in state plans​ world.kbs.co.kr. While true 5G might be a long way off, the inclusion of 5G R&D in the 2020 “frontal breakthrough” tasks shows an intent to not fall too hopelessly behind the global curve​ world.kbs.co.kr. We may see experimental 5G equipment tested at universities or a showcase 5G network in a part of Pyongyang in the next decade, especially if sanctions relief or clandestine imports allow access to necessary hardware.

Another initiative is the continued development of the Kwangmyong intranet’s content and services. North Korea has been steadily enriching its intranet: by adding more websites (online shopping sites grew to 22 by 2021, for example), launching services like the Manbang IPTV streaming service, and introducing an electronic payment system for e-commerce en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. The government will push further integration of daily life with this intranet – expect more e-government services, educational portals, and state-approved social networking features to appear on Kwangmyong. These allow the regime to harness the benefits of digital services (such as efficiency and educated youth) without opening the door to foreign influence. The rise of cashless payment apps and digital currency in North Korea is also tied to this trend – recent reports show an uptick in mobile payment usage via domestic apps, which the state encourages as part of modernizing the economy en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. All such apps run on the closed network.

On the infrastructure side, North Korea will seek to increase its international bandwidth and stability. The addition of the Russian internet link in 2017 was one step en.wikipedia.org. In the future, the country might try to negotiate additional routes or bandwidth upgrades with China and Russia to support growing internal demand (particularly as more students and scientists come online internally). There is even the possibility of North Korea leasing a connection to a submarine fiber-optic cable someday (for instance, via Russia’s Trans-Siberian network reaching the Pacific) to further improve connectivity – though any such move would be carefully calculated to avoid dependency or vulnerability. Enhancing domestic fiber capacity is also ongoing; new buildings and economic zones in North Korea are likely being hooked up with fiber connections. For example, a large **“Internet Communication Bureau” headquarters was reportedly under construction in Pyongyang in 2018 en.wikipedia.org, which suggests an effort to centralize and manage increasing network traffic and perhaps host domestic servers for intranet and internet services. This could be part of a plan to build a domestic cloud or content delivery network to improve Kwangmyong’s performance and storage.

Cybersecurity and control measures will also be a big part of future developments. As more North Koreans get smartphones and access to digital content, the regime is actively upgrading its surveillance tech. Every legal smartphone in North Korea now comes with a proprietary operating system (a fork of Android) that logs usage and can report or block content deemed unauthorized en.wikipedia.org koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. Going forward, we can expect more sophisticated filters and perhaps AI-based monitoring on the intranet to detect any attempt to skirt rules. The state will likely invest in hacking and cyber warfare units (which it already has) not just for external attacks but also to counter any internal dissidents who might try to use the internet covertly. In essence, the government’s initiative is to modernize the network while perfecting its censorship apparatus. As one analysis put it, the regime’s paranoia ensures that even as technology improves, they will keep it one step behind the outside world to maintain control nknews.org nknews.org.

On the international scene, if geopolitical conditions evolve (e.g. diplomacy with South Korea or others improves), North Korea might cautiously increase cooperation in ICT. For instance, there were once inter-Korean plans to lay fiber optic cables across the DMZ and connect North and South Korean networks for the Kaesong Industrial Zone; such projects could be revived in a different political climate. Also, should sanctions be eased, North Korea might invite foreign telecom investment again to upgrade to 5G or expand broadband – similar to how Orascom was involved earlier. The use of foreign satellites for communications could be revisited if North Korea launches its own satellites (the country has attempted to put “communications” satellites in orbit, though none are known to provide internet service).

In terms of social impact, as phones and intranet reach more people, some gradual changes are inevitable. The spread of smartphones has already introduced a generation of North Koreans to semi-digital life (using cameras, video players, educational apps, etc.). This trend is likely to continue, and the leadership will have to balance reaping the economic benefits of a tech-savvy population with the risk that greater connectivity could undermine information control. There is speculation that over time, the growing presence of devices might create public pressure for more access. Indeed, North Korea’s own researchers acknowledged that wider smartphone use could eventually loosen the regime’s tight grip on information, despite all the built-in surveillance koreajoongangdaily.joins.com. The government’s approach will likely be to allow incremental growth of internet-like services but within a tightly fenced garden.

In conclusion, North Korea’s internet and communication future will be characterized by cautious modernization. Key trends include upgrading mobile networks (4G now, exploratory 5G later), expanding the domestic intranet’s reach and content, improving infrastructure through foreign links and fiber upgrades, and strengthening cyber control. All of these are driven by the state’s dual desire: to not fall too far behind technologically (which could impede economic and military competitiveness), while ensuring the regime’s absolute control over information. Therefore, one can expect North Korea to inch forward with internet development, but always on its own terms. The average North Korean in five years may have a faster phone and more digital tools – yet still will be largely cut off from the World Wide Web, surfing a state-run network under the watchful eyes of the government.

Sources: North Korea Tech Blog; 38 North (Stimson Center) reuters.com 38north.org; Reuters reuters.com reuters.com; KBS World Radio​ world.kbs.co.kr​ world.kbs.co.kr; JoongAng Daily koreajoongangdaily.joins.com koreajoongangdaily.joins.com; Wikipedia (Internet in North Korea, Telecommunications in North Korea) en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org; Business Insider (AP) businessinsider.com businessinsider.com; TeleGeography blog.telegeography.com blog.telegeography.com.