State of Internet Access in Lebanon: From Fiber Optics to Starlink Skies

Lebanon’s internet landscape sits at a crossroads between promise and struggle. Once a regional pioneer in early internet adoption, the country now contends with aging infrastructure, economic turmoil, and slow reforms. Despite ambitious plans to roll out fiber-optics and the allure of new satellite services like Starlink, everyday connectivity for Lebanese citizens is often defined by slow speeds, high costs, and frequent outages. This report provides a comprehensive look at the state of internet access in Lebanon – from the current infrastructure (DSL, fiber, mobile data, Wi-Fi) and major service providers, to government policies, the impact of the economic crisis, the advent of satellite internet, and efforts to bridge the digital divide.

Internet Infrastructure: Fixed Broadband, Mobile Networks, and Wi-Fi

Fixed Broadband (DSL and Fiber-Optic): Lebanon was the first Arab country to introduce the internet in the 1990s, yet among the last (in 2006) to offer DSL broadband over its copper telephone network en.wikipedia.org. DSL spread rapidly but was hampered by limited capacity in exchanges – as of 2015, only 78 of ~300 central offices had upgraded VDSL equipment en.wikipedia.org. To modernize, a national fiber-optic rollout began in the late 2010s. The Ministry of Telecommunications launched a “2020 Digital Telecom Vision” plan in 2015 to replace copper with fiber and deploy VDSL2+ and FTTH (fiber-to-the-home) by 2020 en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. By mid-2018, Ogero (the state-run fixed network operator) commenced a 40-month project to connect homes and offices via fiber. About 35% of the fiber project was completed by end of 2019, with projections to reach most households by 2022 the961.com. However, the economic crisis that erupted in 2019 drastically impeded progress. A severe shortage of dollars and budget cuts to Ogero halted the import of fiber equipment in 2020 the961.com the961.com. Ogero continued deploying remaining stock, but once those supplies are exhausted the build-out will freeze until funding resumes the961.com. As a result, fiber-optic broadband is still far from ubiquitous in 2025 – limited mainly to select areas of Beirut and some urban centers – while many Lebanese outside the fiber footprint remain on older ADSL/VDSL connections or fixed wireless links. Fixed-line broadband speeds have improved modestly in recent years (median download speed rose from ~8 Mbps in 2020 to about 12.5 Mbps by early 2024 freedomhouse.org), but they remain far below global averages and the network often struggles to maintain even these speeds the961.com the961.com. The global average fixed broadband download is around 73 Mbps (Feb 2020), whereas Lebanon’s was only ~8.1 Mbps at that time the961.com. Despite the introduction of fiber in a few neighborhoods, Lebanon still ranked a lowly 142nd worldwide in fixed broadband speed as of May 2025 al-monitor.com.

Mobile Internet (3G/4G/5G): Mobile connectivity is a critical part of Lebanon’s internet access, especially given the delays in upgrading fixed lines. The country’s two mobile network operators – Alfa and Touch (both state-owned duopolies) – launched 3G UMTS services in late 2011, and rolled out 4G/LTE starting in 2013 en.wikipedia.org. While 4G coverage expanded through the late 2010s (as part of the Broadband 2020 plan), pledges to achieve nationwide 4G coverage by 2018 fell short en.wikipedia.org. By 2019, 4G was available in major cities but coverage in rural areas remained spotty, and many remote users were still stuck on 2G/3G networks freedomhouse.org freedomhouse.org. Notably, 5G technology has not been deployed commercially in Lebanon as of 2025. Aside from limited pilots (for example, 5G and public Wi-Fi were only present at Beirut’s airport terminals in 2019) en.wikipedia.org, there has been no nationwide 5G rollout amid the ongoing financial crisis. Mobile internet speeds, however, tend to outpace fixed-line speeds in Lebanon. The median mobile download speed was about 30–35 Mbps in 2023–2024 freedomhouse.org datareportal.com, placing Lebanon 79th globally for mobile data speed as of 2025 al-monitor.com. Nearly all mobile subscriptions (over 97%) are now on 3G/4G networks (with 2G being phased out) datareportal.com datareportal.com. In fact, the government decided in 2022 to shut down 2G and parts of 3G by 2025, which could disconnect some 230,000 legacy users in rural areas who haven’t upgraded phones freedomhouse.org. This plan is intended to conserve resources and bolster the 4G network capacity, but it also risks widening the digital gap for low-income and remote populations until they obtain 4G devices freedomhouse.org.

Wi-Fi Hotspots and Public Access: Public Wi-Fi access in Lebanon is relatively limited. There have been attempts to expand free Wi-Fi hotspots in public spaces – for instance, a plan to install Wi-Fi in major public parks was announced in the 2010s – but most such initiatives stalled or never materialized en.wikipedia.org. As of 2019, free Wi-Fi was available mainly in Beirut’s airport and a few select locations, but not widely across cities. In practice, most Lebanese rely on private home or office Wi-Fi (fed by DSL/fiber) or on their mobile data, rather than on public hotspot networks. Some cafes, malls, and universities provide Wi-Fi, but there isn’t a comprehensive government-driven public Wi-Fi program in place. The Beirut Digital District (BDD), launched in 2012 as a tech hub, offers high-speed internet within its campus for member companies en.wikipedia.org, and a few municipalities or NGOs have set up community internet centers. However, for the average user, public Wi-Fi is scarce and certainly not a substitute for personal broadband. This means that reliable connectivity is largely confined to those who can afford home broadband or mobile data plans – highlighting the importance of improving those services.

Major Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Lebanon

Lebanon’s telecom sector is characterized by a hybrid of state-owned providers and private ISPs, all ultimately dependent on the state-controlled infrastructure. The government, via the Ministry of Telecommunications and Ogero, holds a monopoly over the international internet gateway and backbone; all licensed ISPs must purchase bandwidth through Ogero’s network freedomhouse.org. As a result, the market’s competitiveness is limited and the state exerts tight control over pricing and operations. Below are the major players:

• Ogero: Ogero is the state-owned fixed network operator and by far the most critical ISP in Lebanon. It operates the national fiber-optic backbone and the copper telephone network, effectively acting as the wholesale provider to all others and also serving retail customers. Ogero provides fixed DSL and fiber subscriptions directly to end-users and controls Lebanon’s three submarine cable landing stations (Tripoli, Jdeideh, Beirut) that connect the country to the global internet freedomhouse.org. With this role, Ogero is the dominant fixed broadband ISP – it “distributes internet to all providers, while acting as the dominant ISP itself” en.wikipedia.org. In terms of market share, official data isn’t published, but Ogero’s extensive infrastructure and low-cost legacy plans historically made it the largest single broadband provider. Ogero’s service quality has been a mixed bag: it has enabled most of the DSL coverage nationwide and spearheaded the fiber rollout, yet its aging infrastructure and funding woes have led to frequent breakdowns and slow speeds in many areas. Notably, in spring 2023, Ogero employees went on strike over eroding salaries, which disrupted both fixed and mobile internet services across regions (since mobile operators rely on Ogero’s links) freedomhouse.org. The strikes and maintenance lapses have caused scheduled internet cuts and outages countrywide freedomhouse.org freedomhouse.org. Ogero’s financial constraints (due to the currency collapse) also forced it to drastically revise prices in 2022–2023 (discussed under pricing below).
• Alfa and Touch: These are the two mobile network operators in Lebanon, owned by the government (formerly managed by Orascom and Zain respectively under contract). Alfa and Touch hold a duopoly over mobile voice/data services, with roughly equal market share splitting Lebanon’s ~4.7 million cellular subscriptions datareportal.com datareportal.com. They provide 2G/3G/4G coverage and mobile internet bundles to customers. In effect, no other telecom companies are licensed to offer mobile service, making Alfa and Touch the only choice for cellular connectivity. Both companies have faced the same challenges of the crisis – fuel shortages to run cell towers, rising operational costs, and the need to hike tariffs. Service quality on Alfa/Touch’s networks is generally decent in urban centers (when powered), but rural coverage issues persist. Also, the capacity of 4G networks has been strained by increased load after 2G/3G networks began shutting down freedomhouse.org. There have been instances of network outages; for example, in mid-2023 Alfa experienced a mobile internet blackout for many customers due to a glitch in Ogero’s backbone network smex.org, underscoring the interdependence of all providers on the state infrastructure.
• Private ISPs: In addition to Ogero, Lebanon has dozens of licensed private ISPs and DSPs (Data Service Providers). As of 2020, 114 ISPs were licensed, though the vast majority are either defunct or very small en.wikipedia.org. The market is effectively dominated by a handful of companies:
  • GlobalCom Holding – a major telecom conglomerate that owns IDM (IncoNet Data Management) and Cyberia, two of Lebanon’s leading ISPs en.wikipedia.org. IDM was formed from a 2002 merger of IncoNet and Data Management (early ISPs founded in the 1990s), while Cyberia (founded 1996) was acquired by GlobalCom. These brands serve many fixed broadband subscribers via Ogero’s network and also offer wireless broadband services.
  • Terranet – one of the first ISPs (1999) and a top private provider, often paired with its sister company Cable One (a data service provider). Terranet/Cable One have been significant players and are owned by a group linked to a former mobile operator investor en.wikipedia.org.
  • Sodetel – a part-government-owned ISP (joint venture with Orange France) that has provided internet services since the dial-up era. Sodetel also operates the older Libanpac brand and, being partly state-owned, it historically had certain privileges like an international gateway (though now all traffic routes through Ogero) en.wikipedia.org.
  • Cedarcom (Mobi) – Cedarcom, founded in 1997, pioneered wireless broadband (WiMAX) in the 2000s and offers services under the Mobi and Lynx brands en.wikipedia.org. They provide fixed-wireless and mobile broadband solutions and were known for launching Lebanon’s first mobile broadband network prior to 3G’s arrival.
  • Other notable ISPs/DSPs include Connect and Waves (which are newer players, one established in 2013 and another acquired by a consortium en.wikipedia.org), Moscanet (by Pesco Telecom) en.wikipedia.org, TRI Networks/Capital Outsourcing, and some specialized providers like SatMENA (licensed in 2019 to offer satellite internet) en.wikipedia.org.
  It’s important to note that all these private ISPs ultimately rely on Ogero’s infrastructure for international bandwidth and often for domestic fiber backhaul freedomhouse.org. They differentiate themselves through customer service, last-mile delivery (some operate local wireless links or neighborhood cable networks), and pricing packages. However, their ability to compete on price is constrained – internet retail prices are set by the government, and ISPs cannot freely lower prices without Telecom Ministry approval freedomhouse.org. In practice, many private ISPs serve areas that Ogero doesn’t cover well or cater to corporate clients with premium services. Some also collaborate with building owners or local “cable providers” to extend connectivity into neighborhoods.

Market Share & Competition: Precise market share figures are not published, but Ogero plus a few private ISPs under GlobalCom and Terranet/Cable One likely account for the bulk of fixed broadband subscriptions en.wikipedia.org. The lack of a fully independent regulator (the Telecom Regulatory Authority created by law in 2002 never became fully functional) means competition has been limited. Lebanon’s telecom law intended to liberalize the sector, but the government still maintains monopoly control over key segments and revenue. As Freedom House notes, the state “maintains a monopoly over the internet backbone and over fixed-line and mobile service, exercising tight control over ISPs” freedomhouse.org. Indeed, private ISPs have long complained that Ogero is both their supplier and a competitor (a structural conflict), and have accused the government of favoring certain entities. This environment has also given rise to informal ISP alternatives: in many locales, especially where Ogero’s DSL was slow or absent, enterprising individuals set up unlicensed “cable internet” distributions. These informal providers buy capacity from Ogero or a licensed ISP (often an E1 line or other feed) and resell it via local Wi-Fi or cable networks to neighbors. While technically illegal, they became widespread, earning nicknames akin to “generator mafias” (a parallel to the private electric generator operators) smex.org. Such gray-market ISPs carve up neighborhoods amongst themselves, face little competition within their turf, and often deliver underperforming service at high markups – yet residents in underserved areas have had no choice but to rely on them smex.org. This dynamic underscores how the market’s structure and regulatory gaps have affected service quality: consumers either go with one of a few sanctioned providers (whose performance depends on Ogero’s backbone condition) or resort to unsanctioned local operators if the official network doesn’t reach them.

Pricing Structures: Internet pricing in Lebanon has historically been high, and the recent economic collapse initially made it artificially cheap (in dollar terms) before resulting in drastic price hikes. For years, broadband and mobile tariffs were set in Lebanese Pounds at a fixed exchange rate (LBP 1,500 to $1). When the LBP began to lose value in 2019, telecom prices remained at the old peg, suddenly making services extremely cheap in dollar terms – but also financially unsustainable for providers. By mid-2022, the government addressed this by re-pegging telecom tariffs to the Central Bank’s Sayrafa rate (a floating exchange rate closer to market value) freedomhouse.org. This caused an overnight jump in prices by several-fold (it “quadrupled the price of mobile data” in 2022) freedomhouse.org. For example, in 2022 one gigabyte of mobile data cost around $3 on average – ranking Lebanon 169th out of 233 countries for mobile data affordability freedomhouse.org. After the tariff adjustments, that cost effectively increased even more. By early 2023, a basic mobile plan of 1.5 GB per month, which previously was only a few tens of thousands of LBP, shot up to 530,000 LBP (around $35) after the exchange rate reset freedomhouse.org. Such increases put mobile internet beyond the reach of many users (for context, $35 for 1.5 GB is extremely expensive globally, and Lebanon’s median income had plunged). On the fixed-line side, Ogero’s DSL packages also became markedly more expensive in local currency. In August 2023, the government approved an Ogero proposal to raise fixed broadband tariffs roughly seven-fold smex.org. The basic DSL/fiber plan (previously 80 GB at 4 Mbps for LBP 60,000) jumped to LBP 420,000 smex.org, and a 100 GB plan rose from LBP 90,000 to 630,000. Higher-end unlimited packages went from 900,000 to 6.3 million LBP smex.org. Even after these hikes, Ogero’s director noted the new prices, when converted at prevailing rates, were actually 25% lower in USD terms than pre-crisis 2018 prices, due to the Lira’s massive devaluation today.lorientlejour.com. Nonetheless, for the Lebanese earning in local currency, the increases were painful – a journalist recounted paying $20 equivalent to a local reseller for subpar internet, only to find that switching to Ogero after the hikes would cost over $45 for similar service smex.org. Private ISPs generally align their rates with Ogero’s official tariff (often they literally sell the same government-set packages). Some offer premium plans (business fiber, etc.) quoted in USD. As of 2025, typical home internet plans cost on the order of $15-$30 per month for a few dozen Mbps and limited GB quotas (or roughly LBP 1–2 million, depending on the exchange rate). For mobile, an entry-level prepaid data bundle (1 GB) might be around $3–$5, while heavier users pay $20+ for a few tens of GB the961.com. These prices are high given Lebanon’s income collapse – by end of 2022, about 75% of the population was living on less than $14 per day freedomhouse.org, making internet subscriptions a serious burden. In summary, Lebanon’s internet costs are among the steepest in the region when adjusted for purchasing power, and the pricing structure (government-controlled, pegged to volatile exchange rates) has introduced instability and inequity in access.

Service Quality: Both fixed and mobile services have suffered in quality due to underinvestment and electricity shortages. Complaints of slow speeds, high latency, and downtime are common. In a 2022 index, Lebanon ranked only 74th of 110 countries on overall internet availability, affordability, and readiness freedomhouse.org. While pockets of the country (e.g. parts of Beirut) now enjoy fiber connectivity at tens of Mbps, many other areas still deal with old copper lines that sync at only 1–4 Mbps. Upload speeds for DSL are often under 1 Mbps. Mobile 4G performance also varies – in strong coverage areas speeds can be good (20–40 Mbps), but many users experience much lower speeds or network congestion, especially as 3G towers go offline and more people crowd onto 4G. One positive development is that median fixed broadband speeds increased by ~36% during 2024, likely due to incremental fiber deployments and network fixes, rising to about 12.8 Mbps by January 2025 datareportal.com. But reliability is as important as speed: frequent power outages (see below) mean that even a high-speed fiber connection can drop when the local exchange or cell tower loses electricity. Overall, Lebanese ISPs are struggling to maintain service quality in very challenging conditions, and the user experience can be frustratingly inconsistent.

Government Policies, Regulations, and Reforms Affecting Internet Access

Government policy has a hand in virtually every aspect of Lebanon’s internet access – for better or worse. Key features of the policy/regulatory environment include state ownership, centralized control, delayed reforms, and recent emergency measures:

• State Monopoly and Regulatory Framework: By law, all telecom infrastructure in Lebanon is owned by the state. The Ministry of Telecommunications and Ogero oversee the backbone, international gateways, and fixed voice/data networks, while the mobile operators are 100% state-owned (the government took back their management in the early 2000s after initially licensing private operators in the 90s) en.wikipedia.org. A 2002 telecom act (Law 431) envisioned creating a privatized entity (Liban Telecom) and an independent regulator (Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, TRA) to liberalize the sector en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. In practice, these reforms stalled: the TRA’s board was only appointed in 2007 and it never gained full authority, and Liban Telecom was never fully implemented, leaving Ogero and the two mobile firms under direct government control en.wikipedia.org. To this day, the government exercises tight technical and legal control – for example, it can order internet shutdowns (though hasn’t recently) and it requires licensing of ISPs which it can revoke freedomhouse.org. All spectrum (for mobile or wireless ISPs) is allocated by the state, and VoIP services were technically illegal under old laws (though that ban is not enforced now) freedomhouse.org. In summary, the regulatory climate has been described as “chaotic” and outdated by observers, with laws not fully enforced and authorities often overlapping smex.org smex.org. Efforts to privatize or corporatize parts of the telecom sector have been periodically floated – especially as Lebanon seeks foreign investment. In 2023, the government signaled interest in reviving the privatization effort to satisfy IMF reform demands today.lorientlejour.com. However, such moves face political obstacles and concerns over selling strategic assets cheaply. For now, the state’s priority is shoring up telecom revenues (one of its few cash generators) rather than introducing more competition.
• Pricing and Tariff Policy: The government sets telecom tariffs by decree. As noted, ISPs cannot independently alter prices without ministry approval freedomhouse.org. This centralized pricing model has historically kept internet prices high to maximize state revenue, effectively treating the telecom sector as a cash cow. In mid-2022, recognizing the sector’s imminent collapse due to hyperinflation, the government approved two major decisions: (1) re-price all telecom services based on the Sayrafa exchange rate (drastically raising LBP prices), and (2) begin phasing out 2G networks as a cost-saving and modernization step freedomhouse.org. These decisions, described by one NGO as “disastrous solutions” at the time, immediately increased mobile and internet bills multiple times over freedomhouse.org. For example, some prepaid mobile rates jumped 250% in early 2023 when the official rate was adjusted freedomhouse.org. While the tariff hikes improved operators’ finances, they drew public ire and likely contributed to a decline in internet usage – the number of internet users in Lebanon actually fell by 2.6% between January 2023 and January 2024 freedomhouse.org, a rare reversal that analysts attribute to affordability issues and people emigrating or disconnecting. The government has defended the increases as necessary to keep networks running (since fuel, equipment, and maintenance all must be paid in hard currency). It’s worth noting the telecom minister and prime minister even considered more extreme price jumps in 2023 freedomhouse.org, but backed off amidst criticism. Going forward, any pricing changes will likely be tied to the parallel exchange rate movements – which introduces uncertainty for subscribers, as their phone and internet bills could fluctuate month to month with currency values.
• Investment and Modernization Initiatives: Various government-led projects have aimed to improve internet infrastructure. The Fiber-Optic rollout initiated under Telecom Minister Boutros Harb in 2015 was a flagship initiative (as discussed, it was slowed by the crisis). Additionally, there were programs to upgrade the mobile network (e.g. Lebanon 2020 Broadband Plan targeted full 4G coverage and even trialing 5G). While 4G expansion progressed, it did not meet its 2018 full-coverage goal en.wikipedia.org, and plans for 5G were put on indefinite hold once the economy crashed. Another policy move was the establishment of the Beirut Internet Exchange (IXP) in 2007 to allow local ISPs to exchange traffic domestically en.wikipedia.org. Notably, Ogero refused to participate in the IXP initially en.wikipedia.org, which diminished its effectiveness – an example of how policy intentions (improving network efficiency) sometimes faltered due to turf battles. In terms of e-government and digital strategy, the Lebanese administration did articulate a Digital Transformation Strategy 2020–2030, updated in 2022, which recognizes the need for robust internet access nationwide. By 2025, the new Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has been championing digital transformation as a pillar of reform. In June 2025 he framed it as a “national project” to modernize governance, fight corruption, and rebuild the economy arabnews.com arabnews.com. This includes joining international digital cooperation organizations and implementing foundational projects like a national digital ID system arabnews.com arabnews.com. Crucially, President Aoun emphasized that strong digital infrastructure and updated regulations are critical for success arabnews.com arabnews.com. While these statements don’t immediately fix the internet, they signal high-level political will to prioritize the ICT sector as part of Lebanon’s recovery.
• Telecommunications and the Economic Recovery Plan: Given that telecom has historically contributed substantial revenue to the state, it features in discussions with international donors and the IMF. An IMF rescue package (long under negotiation) is expected to include telecom sector reforms, potentially such as establishing an independent regulator, adjusting tariffs to cost, and even privatizing some assets agbi.com agbi.com. In late 2023, Parliament passed a law to partially dollarize telecom revenues (allowing Ogero and the mobile firms to charge in USD or equivalent) to stabilize funding. There is also talk of finally launching Liban Telecom to merge Ogero with the mobile operators, which could then be offered for private investment. However, these policy steps are slow to materialize amid political paralysis. In practice, the most impactful “policy” in recent times has been the ad-hoc crisis management: e.g. providing diesel fuel from the army’s reserves to keep telecom sites running during blackout emergencies, or calling in the army to potentially operate Ogero exchanges when staff strike freedomhouse.org freedomhouse.org. Such measures reflect a sector in survival mode, awaiting more systematic reforms.
• Legal and Security Regulations: The internet in Lebanon is also shaped by laws concerning security and censorship. While this report focuses on access, it’s worth noting the 2018 e-transactions law and existing statutes empower the government to intercept communications and request user data retention by ISPs (often criticized by digital rights groups). Moreover, during times of unrest, the authorities have considered shutting down applications or networks (for example, briefly in 2021 there was a proposal to ban VoIP calls to protect telecom revenues, which was withdrawn after backlash freedomhouse.org). In 2024, when conflict flared on the southern border, contingency plans (like using Starlink as backup) were weighed by officials to maintain connectivity smex.org. This shows that geostrategic and security considerations can directly influence internet policy – e.g. security agencies initially blocked Starlink equipment from entering Lebanon over concerns of unmonitored communication smex.org (more on this in the satellite section). Overall, the government walks a line between wanting to control telecom for revenue and security, and recognizing that better connectivity is needed for economic and social development.

In sum, Lebanon’s regulatory scene is one where old frameworks meet new challenges: A monopoly structure trying to adapt to modern tech, emergency fixes supplanting long-term strategy, and a stated commitment to digital advancement that must overcome years of institutional inertia. The coming years’ policies – especially with regard to competition (e.g. allowing Starlink or other alternatives) and infrastructure investment – will significantly impact how quickly Lebanon can improve internet access for its citizens.

Impact of the Economic Crisis on Internet Infrastructure and Access

Lebanon’s ongoing economic crisis (since 2019) has been devastating for its internet infrastructure and the ability of citizens to stay connected. The crisis, marked by a >95% currency collapse, banking breakdown, and fuel shortages, created a perfect storm of challenges:

• Power Outages and Fuel Shortages: Reliable electricity is the lifeblood of telecom networks. Since the national power grid now provides only a few hours of electricity per day in many areas, both central telecom facilities and cell towers must run on diesel generators for extended periods. Starting in 2020, diesel fuel shortages and soaring prices frequently knocked out telecom services. In early 2022, the situation became dire enough that large parts of the country experienced telecom blackouts freedomhouse.org. Generators at Ogero exchanges and mobile sites simply couldn’t be kept running 24/7. NetBlocks, an internet monitoring organization, documented widespread internet outages in January 2022 tied directly to the energy crisis freedomhouse.org. Rolling electrical blackouts have thus “curtailed internet access” severely freedomhouse.org. Rural areas, which endure longer power cuts than Beirut, are most affected – many villages get only 3-4 hours of mains electricity per day freedomhouse.org. When backup generators fail or run out of fuel, entire towns can be cut off from phone and internet. The Bekaa Valley and northern Lebanon have seen mobile networks go down so often that residents at times resorted to picking up signal from Syrian cell towers across the border freedomhouse.org. This stopgap is problematic (roaming on Syrian networks is expensive and raises security concerns), but it illustrates the lengths people went to just to get a mobile call or WhatsApp message out during outages freedomhouse.org.
• Operational Challenges for ISPs: The economic freefall left telecom operators without the funds to maintain and upgrade networks. With revenues eroded by inflation (until tariffs were adjusted) and much of their costs in hard currency, Ogero and the mobile firms struggled to afford fuel, spare parts, and staff salaries. By 2022, generator fuel accounted for an estimated 7% of telecom sector expenses (a huge proportion for an industry that normally relies on grid power) freedomhouse.org. Ogero’s head warned repeatedly that exchanges would shut down permanently if diesel wasn’t secured. Indeed, there were instances of localized internet blackouts when Ogero facilities ran out of fuel – parts of Nabatiyeh in the south went offline in January 2021, parts of Aley in Mount Lebanon in early 2021, etc., which was unprecedented before the crisis en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. The crisis also hit staff: the value of telecom workers’ salaries plummeted. Technicians often couldn’t afford the commute or to support their families, leading to low morale and resignations. This culminated in multiple labor strikes. Notably, OGERO workers struck in March 2023 and again in spring 2024 demanding wage adjustments freedomhouse.org. The strikes knocked out services in various regions (as technicians walked off, repairs halted and some exchanges were intentionally taken offline in protest) freedomhouse.org. The government’s response – threatening to send the army to operate telecom centers – reflected how critical and desperate the situation was freedomhouse.org freedomhouse.org. Even after strikes ended, maintenance backlogs meant slower internet speeds and more frequent cuts. In short, the crisis stretched networks to their breaking point: equipment was pushed beyond normal service intervals, backup links weren’t purchased or fixed due to cost, and any redundant capacity built in the good years quickly got eaten up.
• Quality Degradation: Users experienced noticeable drops in quality during the worst crisis years. According to Speedtest data, Lebanon’s internet speeds actually decreased during the 2020–2022 period freedomhouse.org. For example, by May 2023 median fixed broadband download had sunk to 8.3 Mbps (down from earlier years), while mobile was around 31.5 Mbps freedomhouse.org. Latency also likely worsened whenever traffic had to reroute due to outages. Beyond speed, the uptime was a major issue – many customers saw their internet go out daily when the neighborhood generator was off or an exchange shut down. In some remote towns, people effectively had only a few hours of connectivity per day matching the few hours of electricity. This not only frustrated casual users but severely impacted businesses, students’ online learning, and critical services. In one vivid example, during the 2024 Israel-Hamas war spillover in southern Lebanon, telecom infrastructure was damaged by bombings and a technician was even killed trying to repair a tower freedomhouse.org freedomhouse.org. Students in affected areas struggled to continue online classes due to poor coverage freedomhouse.org. The crisis, compounded by security events, thus made internet access tenuous and uneven.
• Affordability Crisis: While initially the currency collapse made existing plans very cheap (if you had dollars), the subsequent price corrections have made internet unaffordable for many locals. After the mid-2022 tariff hikes, a significant number of households had to downgrade or cancel services. Lebanon’s internet penetration, which was about 89% in 2022, dipped to 86.6% by January 2023 freedomhouse.org – indicating that tens of thousands of people went offline. This decline is partly due to emigration, but also reflects families cutting internet to save money or individuals who can no longer top-up mobile data as before. A large portion of the population fell into poverty and had to prioritize food, fuel, etc., over data. By the end of 2022, a typical Lebanese earning in local currency would have to spend an untenable share of income on a basic internet connection. For instance, the average monthly fixed broadband package was $18.53 in 2022 freedomhouse.org, which doesn’t sound high in dollars, but consider that $18.53 was more than the monthly minimum wage equivalent at black market rates at one point. Mobile data was even more extortionate relative to income; 1 GB for $3 is trivial abroad, but in Lebanon $3 could be a day’s wage for those making only LBP and when the LBP was very devalued freedomhouse.org. The result is a widening digital inequality – wealthier households or those with diaspora support can afford unlimited 4G plans or fiber, while poorer households have to ration their data or rely on slow, shared connections. Many university students reportedly would wait for overnight off-peak hours or seek free Wi-Fi spots (like campuses or cafes) to download course materials, due to limited mobile data. The crisis essentially turned what used to be a moderately expensive service into a luxury for many.
• Coping Mechanisms: In the face of these hardships, Lebanese citizens and the telecom companies adopted various coping strategies. The mobile operators reduced the number of active cell sites at times (turning off some towers to save fuel, leading to coverage holes). Ogero began power rationing at exchanges – deliberately shutting down certain telephone exchanges during off-peak hours to conserve fuel and rotate resources freedomhouse.org freedomhouse.org. On the consumer side, people purchased backup batteries and UPS units for their home routers, formed community groups to collectively pay for a neighborhood internet line, or as mentioned, pointed their phones to catch cross-border signals. A notable trend was some tech-savvy users obtaining satellite internet kits (like Starlink) informally through Lebanon’s diaspora or black market. By 2022–2023, there were reports of a few Starlink units operating covertly, despite being officially unlicensed, used by businesses or NGOs to ensure connectivity amid blackouts nowlebanon.com nowlebanon.com. We will elaborate on satellite solutions in the next section, but it’s telling that Lebanon’s crisis created a demand for independent connectivity solutions as a lifeline.

In summary, Lebanon’s economic meltdown dramatically reversed years of telecom progress. What was once a steadily improving infrastructure fell into disrepair, with daily connectivity no longer taken for granted. The impact is both immediate – in the form of slower, less reliable internet – and long-term, as the halt in investments means Lebanon risks falling further behind technologically. The past five years illustrate that without a stable economy, even basic internet access can crumble, underscoring the importance of economic recovery for the digital future.

Satellite Internet in Lebanon: Starlink and Beyond

Satellite internet has increasingly entered the conversation in Lebanon as an alternative and backup to traditional networks. Historically, satellite internet played a minimal role – legacy VSAT services existed for enterprise or remote uses (e.g. some NGOs and media outlets kept satellite links as redundancy), but they were expensive, slow (older generations), and tightly controlled. In the late 2010s, one local company, SatMENA, was even licensed to provide satellite internet in partnership with Ogero en.wikipedia.org, though this was not a consumer-facing service and had limited impact. The game-changer has been the emergence of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite broadband – namely SpaceX’s Starlink constellation. Starting around 2021, Starlink’s promise of high-speed, low-latency internet beamed from the sky began to attract interest in Lebanon, particularly as the country’s connectivity woes deepened.

Starlink’s Arrival and Government Stance: In the past, importing any telecom terminal required approval, and there was initial resistance from Lebanese authorities to Starlink. Security agencies in 2023 reportedly blocked the entry of Starlink equipment (dishes) out of concern that users could bypass Lebanese networks and monitoring, potentially “evading oversight and unlawfully accessing citizens’ data” smex.org. The parliamentary Media and Telecom Committee also voiced strong reservations when Starlink was proposed as a contingency during regional conflict in late 2023 smex.org smex.org. The core of these objections were legal and sovereignty issues: Lebanese law requires that all international bandwidth enters through the state (Ministry/Ogero), and there was no framework for a private foreign company to directly serve end-users with no local control smex.org smex.org. Additionally, granting Starlink exclusive entry was seen as potentially anti-competitive unless other satellite providers were also invited smex.org. However, despite these concerns, momentum in favor of Starlink picked up by 2024 and 2025. The caretaker Telecom Minister (Johnny Corm in 2023, and then Minister Charles Hajj in 2024-25) began actively exploring Starlink to improve Lebanon’s connectivity resilience smex.org smex.org. The turning point came in late 2023 when conflict on the border raised fears of terrestrial network outages – Corm suggested Starlink as a backup for critical connectivity smex.org. By mid-2025, Minister Hajj moved forward with formalizing Starlink’s presence in Lebanon smex.org. Starlink representatives, including its Global Licensing Director, held meetings with Lebanese officials in May 2025 to work through legal registration smex.org. The Lebanese government gave initial approvals – by June 2025 it was reported that security clearance had been obtained and the Cabinet was expected to give final authorization for Starlink to operate agbi.com agbi.com. Even the Lebanese President got involved: in June 2025, President Joseph Aoun had a phone call with Elon Musk, during which Musk expressed deep interest in Lebanon’s telecom sector and desire to have Starlink “establish a presence” in the country al-monitor.com. President Aoun welcomed Musk’s interest and assured that Lebanon would provide all possible facilitation within the legal framework al-monitor.com al-monitor.com. This high-level endorsement indicates that Lebanon’s leadership sees Starlink as part of the solution to its connectivity challenges (and possibly as an investment opportunity). Thus, as of mid-2025, Starlink is on the verge of officially launching in Lebanon pending final governmental approvals, a remarkable shift from just a year prior when it was essentially banned.

Availability and Adoption: Assuming the final green light is given, Starlink’s satellite coverage already exists over Lebanon’s skies (the constellation covers most of the globe). In fact, Starlink lists Lebanon as “coming soon” on its availability map, and neighboring countries have started service – Jordan approved Starlink in early 2024 (live by April 2025), and Oman approved it in March 2025 al-monitor.com. Lebanon would likely follow that timeline, with service possibly starting in late 2025. Even before official approval, a small number of Starlink kits made their way into Lebanon illicitly. Tech enthusiasts and some businesses procured Starlink dishes through third countries or via the Lebanese diaspora. Because Starlink wasn’t licensed, these units had to be kept low-profile to avoid confiscation, and they technically violated the law. However, anecdotal reports suggest that a few dozen units might have been active, primarily to support NGOs, banks, or critical infrastructure that needed backup internet. The adoption rate upon official launch will depend on cost and marketing. We can expect initial Starlink subscribers in Lebanon to be businesses, expats, and institutions rather than mass-market consumers smex.org smex.org. This is because of the price point and the current context: Starlink’s hardware kit costs $350–$500 (one-time for the dish and router) and the service subscription is between $42 and $56 per month for a standard plan smex.org. There’s also a higher-tier plan offering 500 GB of data for about $111 per month smex.org. These prices, while reasonable by international standards for unlimited high-speed internet, are steep in Lebanon’s economic climate. They put Starlink out of reach for most ordinary citizens – for many Lebanese, $50 is a significant portion of monthly income. Thus, Starlink will likely be adopted by those who absolutely need reliable connectivity and can afford it: tech companies, banks, media outlets (to upload content regardless of local outages), academic institutions, maybe some government agencies, and wealthier individuals or remote workers who are paid in dollars. In the long run, as the technology scales and if prices drop, more consumers could come onboard. But initially, Starlink is seen as a way to connect underserved areas and provide redundancy, not necessarily to replace mainstream ISPs for everyone.

Performance and Potential Benefits: Starlink’s appeal is the performance it offers independent of Lebanon’s terrestrial woes. It can deliver broadband speeds of 50–200 Mbps down and ~20–40 Mbps up, with latency around 20-40 ms – essentially comparable to or better than a good 4G or fiber connection. For rural areas that currently have maybe 1 Mbps DSL (or no service at all), this is revolutionary. It could instantly bring high-speed internet to mountain villages, remote farms, or disaster-struck zones without waiting for fiber optic cables to be laid. It also serves as an emergency backup: if fiber backbones are cut (say by conflict or vandalism) or exchanges go dark due to fuel outage, a Starlink dish could keep a municipality’s communications online. Recognizing this, the former telecom minister explicitly pitched Starlink as a primary backup to ensure connectivity if war disruptions occurred smex.org. Another advantage is bypassing the local loop problems – Starlink users connect directly via satellite, so they aren’t affected by local exchange congestion or ISP throttling. This very advantage, however, is what worried authorities about losing data control. Still, if integrated properly (perhaps via a licensed intermediary), Starlink could significantly raise the bar for internet quality in Lebanon’s outlying regions. The country’s geography – small but with many rural settlements in hilly terrain – is actually well-suited for satellite coverage, because laying fiber to every village is costly and slow, whereas a dish on each house could do the job quicker.

Regulatory Conditions and Competition: The Lebanese government is cautious to not let Starlink undermine its telecom revenues or domestic companies without some return. Parliament members have argued that if Starlink comes, it must be under conditions that ensure the state gets a share of revenues and maintains security oversight smex.org. One idea floated is creating a local company or joint venture for satellite internet, where the state holds a significant stake (e.g. 40%) and Lebanese workforce is involved smex.org smex.org. Minister Hajj, however, was inclined to push Starlink through possibly as an exclusive arrangement, which raised eyebrows about transparency smex.org smex.org. In response, seven major Lebanese ISPs (including IncoNet, Terranet, Cable One, Globalcom etc.) signed a letter in early 2025 objecting to Starlink’s introduction without a “carefully planned and gradual approach” smex.org. They fear Starlink’s competition could poach their enterprise clients and better-paying customers, potentially slashing their revenues by an estimated 25% and reducing the state’s telecom income by ~27% smex.org smex.org. These ISPs urged the government to allow other international satellite companies too, to avoid a SpaceX monopoly and negotiate better terms for Lebanon smex.org. This pushback demonstrates that while Starlink is promising, it’s seen as a threat to the existing telecom ecosystem. The government will likely set some licensing fees or profit-sharing scheme if/when Starlink launches commercially. There might also be regulations on who can subscribe (initially perhaps only businesses or those who get permission – though enforcing that is hard if hardware is freely sold). As of June 2025, the expectation is that the Council of Ministers will finalize a framework where Starlink can operate legally in Lebanon, likely via a local partner company or under Ogero’s oversight, by the end of 2025 smex.org. Security concerns (like where user data will be routed, stored, and how to prevent abuse) are being discussed, since Starlink traffic would bypass Lebanon’s traditional surveillance points smex.org. One solution might be to require Starlink to route connectivity through a gateway in a friendly nearby country (Qatar has been mentioned as a possible hub) smex.org. These details are still being ironed out.

Other Satellite Providers: While Starlink dominates the spotlight, it’s worth noting there are other satellite internet options emerging. OneWeb, a UK-based LEO satellite company, is deploying a network that could cover the Middle East, though its focus is more on business and government connectivity. Amazon’s Project Kuiper is another LEO entrant on the horizon (likely post-2025). Regional players like YahClick (by Yahsat, UAE) have offered geostationary satellite broadband in Lebanon for years – for example, some remote schools or military outposts use such VSAT links. However, those services have high latency (~600 ms) and require large dishes, so they never gained popularity outside niche uses. If Lebanon opens up its market, we could see competition: perhaps Gilat Satcom or others might partner to sell satellite internet. But realistically, Starlink’s technology lead and aggressive expansion mean it could capture the nascent market quickly. Neighboring countries have shown mixed approaches: some fully embrace Starlink (e.g. Yemen’s government in Aden licensed it in 2024, though Houthi authorities in the north ban it al-monitor.com), others are cautious (e.g. Turkey hasn’t approved Starlink yet; Iran bans it but tens of thousands of dishes operate underground al-monitor.com al-monitor.com). Lebanon seems to be moving from the cautious camp to the embracing camp. Notably, Jordan’s example – where Starlink got licensed and went live in April 2025 – may provide a blueprint for Lebanon al-monitor.com. Jordan likely negotiated conditions for local involvement and perhaps revenue share, which Lebanon can replicate.

Outlook: If Starlink indeed begins operating in late 2025, Lebanese users in even the most disconnected corners could theoretically get online with speeds and reliability never before possible there. It won’t be a silver bullet for the entire internet crisis (since economic accessibility remains an issue), but it adds a new layer of resilience and competition. For instance, banks or hospitals might keep a Starlink unit as backup to ensure they stay online if landlines fail. Rural municipalities might jointly fund a Starlink connection to provide public Wi-Fi in their village square, thereby leapfrogging the absent DSL infrastructure. Over time, this could pressure local ISPs and the government to improve services and pricing – a positive competitive pressure. However, there are also concerns to monitor: data sovereignty (as raised by MPs, who worry about Lebanese user data ending up directly in foreign servers) smex.org, and the impact on the telecom economy (loss of high-paying customers could shrink Ogero/Alfa/Touch revenues that the state relies on). Ideally, a balance will be struck where satellite internet complements the terrestrial network – serving areas it cannot reach and providing redundancy – without hollowing out the core business. In any case, the very title of this report, “From Fiber Optics to Starlink Skies,” reflects how Lebanon is now looking both underground and skyward to solve its connectivity conundrums.

Challenges in Accessing Affordable, Reliable Internet

Despite the various technologies and providers available, Lebanese users continue to face numerous challenges in obtaining affordable and reliable internet. These challenges span economic, technical, and structural issues:

• High Cost vs. Incomes: Affordability is the top challenge for many. As detailed, Lebanon’s internet prices (especially post-2022 hikes) are extremely high relative to average incomes. By one ranking, Lebanon was near the bottom (169th out of 233) in the world for mobile data affordability in 2022 freedomhouse.org. The situation likely worsened after tariffs rose further. For someone earning in Lebanese Pounds, a basic home DSL subscription could eat a sizable chunk of their monthly wage, and a heavy mobile data user could easily spend more on 4G recharges than on food. With around 3 in 4 Lebanese living under the poverty line by 2022 freedomhouse.org, internet access becomes a luxury for many families. Some have resorted to downgrading to slower plans, sharing connections with neighbors, or relying solely on limited mobile data instead of a fixed subscription. This digital affordability gap means that internet usage is effectively stratified: wealthier or dollar-earning households enjoy fiber and large data caps, while poorer households may only intermittently access the internet (e.g., using free messaging on Wi-Fi when available, etc.). Efforts to introduce social tariffs or subsidized plans have not materialized, largely because the state itself is financially strapped.
• Frequent Service Disruptions: Reliability remains a serious issue. Users across Lebanon experience unexpected outages ranging from a few hours to days. These can be due to power issues, technical faults, or even intentional shutdowns during maintenance. In 2023 and 2024, it was not uncommon for Ogero exchanges in certain areas to go offline “until further notice” because the generators ran out of fuel or needed repairs. Mobile coverage black holes have expanded – for instance, parts of the north reported being without Lebanese mobile network for weeks, forcing residents to stand on hills to catch distant signals. Such disruptions greatly hamper those who depend on connectivity for work or education. Students in rural areas lost out on online learning opportunities because their neighborhood had no internet for long stretches freedomhouse.org. Even in Beirut, one could wake up to find the home internet down because the local central office was taken offline overnight to conserve energy (a measure that Ogero undertook during the strike period) freedomhouse.org. This unpredictability undermines trust in the system – many Lebanese joke that you need multiple backups (DSL, a 4G dongle, and maybe a neighbor’s Wi-Fi) to ensure you’re not cut off. Businesses have had to invest in redundant connections (for instance, a fiber line plus a wireless link from another ISP) and backup power to keep connectivity. All of this adds cost and complexity, again easier for large firms than for ordinary people.
• Urban-Rural Digital Divide: There is a stark geographical disparity in internet access within Lebanon. Major cities like Beirut and Tripoli enjoy the highest speeds and the earliest upgrades (e.g. fiber rollout started in parts of Beirut first). Meanwhile, many rural villages still lack even a fixed telephone line infrastructure – as of 2016, around 300 villages had no internet access at all due to absence of the phone network in those localities en.wikipedia.org. Those residents must rely on patchy mobile coverage or nothing at all. The economics of private sector involvement also exacerbate this: informal ISPs (the “cable” distributors) focus on neighborhoods where enough customers can pay to make it worthwhile, often leaving remote, poorer villages unserved. The government’s concept of universal service (ensuring telecom access for all regions) was introduced in 2008 in theory en.wikipedia.org, but never properly implemented. Thus, rural Lebanese are doubly disadvantaged – they have lower income on average and worse connectivity options. Even when they do get service, it might be an old 3G connection or a slow DSL line over long copper distance. This divide has real socio-economic impacts, as rural communities find it harder to participate in the digital economy, online education, or access e-services that the government is trying to develop.
• Infrastructure Decay and Bottlenecks: A challenge underlying reliability is the aging and overburdened infrastructure. Lebanon’s core networks – both fixed and mobile – have seen years of under-investment in capacity expansion. Internet traffic demands have grown (especially with more video streaming, etc.), but upgrades stalled. Many DSL exchanges are running at full capacity, meaning new applicants can’t get a port or the speeds are throttled. The international bandwidth into Lebanon, while sufficient on paper thanks to submarine cables, isn’t fully utilized because of internal distribution issues (until fiber links between cities are completed, some regions can’t tap the full capacity). The telecom equipment itself has suffered from lack of spare parts; for instance, when a major fiber cut or hardware failure occurs, repairs can be delayed if Ogero lacks the replacement parts in stock and has no dollars to import them quickly. The lack of redundancy is also a challenge – e.g., if one submarine cable goes down, Lebanon has two others, but within the domestic network, if one route fails, traffic can’t always be rerouted effectively due to incomplete fiber rings en.wikipedia.org. These structural weaknesses mean the network is fragile; a single point of failure can knock out entire districts. Overcoming this will require significant capital investment in infrastructure, which is difficult in the current fiscal crisis.
• Bureaucratic and Governance Issues: Some challenges are more institutional. The slow pace of decision-making and corruption in the telecom sector have historically hampered improvement. For example, right before the crisis, there were allegations that powerful figures interfered in the fiber project for their own interests, causing delays the961.com. Public tenders and projects can stall due to political bickering. Until recently, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority was not empowered to enforce quality standards or push competition. Consumers have little recourse or protection – there’s no strong consumer telecom rights body ensuring they get refunds for downtime or fair contract terms. This means accountability is low: if an ISP provides subpar service, users often have nowhere to escalate their complaints in a meaningful way. Additionally, policies like the ban on VoIP (though not enforced) and historically high international call rates pushed people to seek unofficial alternatives (like VPNs or illegal international lines), reflecting policy-induced challenges.
• Digital Literacy and Inclusion: While Lebanon’s population is quite tech-literate overall (with a high percentage of young educated people), there are segments – particularly older adults and marginalized groups – who have less access not just to internet, but also to the skills and devices needed. The economic crisis also affected this: many households that could once afford multiple devices and broadband for their kids might now have just one smartphone shared among members. This limits how effectively they can use the internet (for example, it’s hard for multiple children to do online classes on a single phone with a tiny data plan). So, the quality of access (device type, consistency of connection) is a challenge in itself, beyond just having a line or not.
• External Shocks and Force Majeure: Lebanon’s internet infrastructure also faces challenges from external events – from wars (the threat of infrastructure damage by conflict as seen in 2024) to natural disasters. The Beirut port explosion in August 2020 damaged some telecom facilities and caused temporary outages in parts of the city. There needs to be more resilience planning for such shocks. Satellite internet is one answer to that, but building redundancy into ground networks is also key. Currently, one could argue Lebanon is under-prepared for a major disaster in terms of keeping communications up.

In summary, Lebanese users navigate a landscape where internet is both precious and precarious. They pay a lot, often for suboptimal service, and live with the anxiety that the network could go down at any time. The challenges are intertwined – the economic collapse aggravated technical faults; the technical faults in turn hurt economic opportunities (creating a vicious cycle). Addressing these issues will require holistic measures: stabilizing the power supply, overhauling infrastructure, introducing subsidies or tiered pricing for low-income users, and improving governance in the telecom sector. Until then, users will continue to cope as they have – with ingenuity and patience – but the digital divide may widen and Lebanon risks lagging behind in the digital age.

Initiatives for Digital Inclusion and Expanded Access

In the face of the challenges detailed above, various initiatives and efforts have been made to promote digital inclusion and extend internet access to underserved communities in Lebanon. These range from government-driven projects to private sector and civil society interventions. While the overall impact so far has been limited, they provide a foundation to build upon:

• Government and Donor Programs: The Lebanese government’s national vision (as expressed in the Digital Transformation Strategy 2020-2030) includes goals for inclusive connectivity – ensuring that all citizens can access online services. One tangible element is the plan for a national digital ID and e-government services, which implicitly requires bringing people online across the country arabnews.com arabnews.com. The Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) and other agencies have worked with international donors on programs to improve digital infrastructure in public institutions like schools and municipalities. For example, there have been collaborations with the World Bank and UNDP to equip some public schools with computer labs and internet connections, aiming to bridge the educational digital divide. The Lebanon Digital Acceleration Project, backed by the World Bank, is one such initiative focusing on expanding broadband and e-service delivery (though its progress is slow given the crisis). Additionally, the concept of “telecenters” or Internet community centers in rural areas has been proposed. Back in the early 2000s, the Professional Computer Association (PCA) launched the “PiPOP” (Internet Point of Presence) initiative to establish self-sufficient internet access centers in rural Lebanon pca.org.lb pca.org.lb. The goal was to work with NGOs, municipalities, and universities to create community internet hubs with affordable access and to improve computer literacy outside the big cities pca.org.lb. While ambitious, this project saw only modest implementation; a few pilot centers were created, but sustained funding was an issue. Revisiting such models now could be valuable – for instance, a municipality could host a Wi-Fi center powered by solar panels and a satellite link, providing free or low-cost internet to residents for essential use.
• Beirut Digital District (BDD) and Tech Hubs: The Beirut Digital District is a public-private initiative that has created a zone in Beirut with state-of-the-art connectivity, aimed at fostering startups and the digital creative industry en.wikipedia.org. BDD provides subsidized high-speed internet, co-working spaces, and an ecosystem for entrepreneurs. While BDD itself mostly benefits companies in the capital, it indirectly contributes to inclusion by nurturing tech solutions and potentially services that can reach wider communities. For instance, startups working on e-learning, telehealth, or fintech in BDD can create products that help rural populations overcome access barriers. The success of BDD has inspired talk of extending similar “digital parks” to other regions (e.g., Tripoli or Saida) so that talent doesn’t have to relocate to Beirut. If realized, these tech hubs outside Beirut could act as local connectivity anchors with good internet that then radiates into the surrounding communities.
• NGO and Grassroots Efforts: Lebanon has an active civil society in the technology and education space. Organizations like SMEX (Social Media Exchange) have been vocal about digital rights and access. SMEX not only conducts research (such as mapping outages and advocating against unfair telecom practices) en.wikipedia.org, but also provides digital literacy training which indirectly improves inclusion (people are more motivated to get online if they understand the benefits and how to stay safe). Another example is the NGO Mowgli Foundation’s “Net@” project in the 2000s that trained youth in IT and provided them with refurbished computers and dial-up connections – a program that could be modernized for broadband. During the pandemic lockdowns in 2020, some NGOs and diaspora groups stepped in to help students who lacked internet by donating mobile data vouchers or equipment. There were campaigns where Lebanese abroad crowdfunded to pay for a year’s worth of internet for families back home hit by economic hardship. While these are stop-gap measures, they highlight the social recognition of the digital divide problem. We also see community-led networks in a few cases: tech enthusiasts in a town might set up a long-range Wi-Fi link from a nearby city to get their village connected, sharing costs among households. Such community networks operate in a legal gray area but showcase local initiative to solve connectivity gaps.
• International Aid and Private Sector Initiatives: Recognizing that internet access is crucial for development, some international aid programs incorporate connectivity components. For example, UNICEF and UNESCO in Lebanon have considered programs to connect schools and learning centers to the internet as part of improving educational outcomes (especially for refugee children who need online resources). The European Union in some of its support packages for Lebanon’s infrastructure has included telecom rehabilitation, particularly after the Beirut blast and during the recent crises. Additionally, corporate social responsibility programs from telecom companies have tried to help – both Alfa and Touch have had limited campaigns where they offer free data on certain days or zero-rate educational websites during exam periods, etc., to ease access for students. Alfa notably launched a “rural coverage program” years ago to expand mobile service to the last uncovered villages, which improved basic connectivity in a handful of locations (though data speeds remained 2G/3G).
• Future Inclusion Projects: Looking ahead, inclusion efforts may get a boost from new technologies. For instance, TV White Space (TVWS) or other alternative wireless solutions could be piloted to provide broadband in rural Lebanon using unused TV frequencies – a concept that worked in parts of Africa and could be explored by the TRA or universities in Lebanon. Likewise, if Starlink or similar satellite ISPs were willing to collaborate, one could envision a subsidized scheme for remote schools or clinics (e.g., a humanitarian program providing free satellite internet units to the most underserved communities). On the policy side, if and when the Telecom Regulatory Authority becomes active, it could administer a Universal Service Fund (common in many countries) where a small portion of telecom revenues is pooled to fund rural connectivity projects and internet access for low-income users. Such a fund was contemplated in Lebanon’s regulatory framework but never effectively used.

Despite these efforts, significant gaps remain. Many of the initiatives so far have been piecemeal or concentrated in the capital. The economic crisis also shifted priorities – programs that might have funded digital inclusion were diverted to more urgent humanitarian needs. However, the silver lining is that the crisis also underscored the importance of internet access (for example, when everything shut down in 2020, people realized how vital the internet was for remote work, education, and receiving news). This awareness can drive more support for inclusion projects. It’s encouraging that top leadership now talks about engaging the diaspora and building digital capacity nationwide arabnews.com arabnews.com, as it implies future donor-funded recovery plans might include investments in closing the connectivity gap.

In conclusion, digital inclusion in Lebanon is a work in progress. There are seeds of progress – tech hubs, community initiatives, planned strategies – but scaling them will require political will, funding, and stability. As Lebanon works to recover from its crises, ensuring that all its people can get online affordably and reliably should be a priority, since that will enable other sectors (education, economy, governance) to recover faster as well.

Historical Evolution of Connectivity (Pre-2019 to 2025)

To put the current state in perspective, it’s helpful to look at how Lebanon’s connectivity has evolved from before 2019 through today (2025). The country’s internet journey has been one of early promise, periods of stagnation, leaps forward, and recent setbacks:

• 1990s to Mid-2000s – Early Adoption and Slow Speeds: Lebanon connected to the global internet in the mid-1990s, being an early adopter in the Arab world. Dial-up internet was introduced commercially around 1995, though at extremely high prices back then (e.g. $60/hour in the very beginning) en.wikipedia.org. By 1998, Lebanon impressively had ~40,000 internet subscribers, almost half of all users in the Arab region at the time en.wikipedia.org. This early start was facilitated by the academic network led by AUB in the 90s en.wikipedia.org. However, the monopoly telecom structure meant dial-up remained expensive and not universal. In the 2000s, private ISPs emerged under strict licensing. Notably, Lebanon was late to broadband – while other countries introduced DSL in the early 2000s, Lebanon only rolled out DSL in 2006 en.wikipedia.org. The first DSL connections finally gave Lebanese an “always-on” internet experience, but speeds were low (256 kbps to 1 Mbps plans initially) and coverage was limited beyond city centers. During the late 2000s, some stopgap measures appeared: a few companies offered “Ethernet” LAN internet in cities and WiMAX wireless broadband started around 2007 to serve areas with no DSL en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. The mobile sector saw growth with two GSM networks since the 90s, but data on phones was limited (GPRS/EDGE) until 3G arrived in 2011. In summary, pre-2010s connectivity was marked by very slow speeds by today’s standards, high costs, and an urban focus.
• 2011–2015 – An Upgrade Phase: This period saw significant improvements. The introduction of 3G mobile broadband in 2011 suddenly allowed people to access the internet on the go at a few Mbps en.wikipedia.org. Shortly after, 4G/LTE launched in 2013 (one of the first in the region to do so) en.wikipedia.org, although initial coverage was limited. On the fixed side, the government invested in expanding the international bandwidth by joining new submarine cables (IMEWE cable in 2011 was a boost). There was also a project to lay 4,700 km of fiber optic backbone connecting all telephone exchanges, which by 2013 was reportedly almost complete en.wikipedia.org. However, that backbone was initially used to feed the exchanges, with the “last mile” still copper – hence speeds at end-users only crept up to 2 Mbps, then 4 Mbps and so on as ADSL2+ and some VDSL2 were deployed in a few exchanges. The “2020 Telecom Vision” plan launched in 2015 was a landmark, setting targets for nationwide 4G and fiber-to-the-home by 2020 en.wikipedia.org. Under this plan, Ogero in 2016–2018 began installing fiber in phases, and also upgraded many exchanges to support higher DSL speeds. As a result, by around 2016–2018, internet speeds in Lebanon improved from the abysmal levels earlier: many DSL users in Beirut could get 4 to 8 Mbps packages, and some pilot fiber users in areas like parts of Beirut or Hazmieh enjoyed 50+ Mbps. Mobile 4G spread to cover most of Beirut and the coastal corridor, giving smartphone users speeds in the tens of Mbps where available. Lebanon’s global ranking in internet speed, while still low, was climbing as these upgrades took effect.
• 2016–2018 – Peak Expansion and Optimism: By the late 2010s, there was cautious optimism that Lebanon would finally catch up to global broadband standards. The data shows a notable jump: fixed broadband subscription numbers and speeds were rising. For example, World Bank data indicates fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people jumped from around 10 in 2015 to 22.8 in 2018 opendataforafrica.org opendataforafrica.org, meaning more households were signing up as DSL reached new areas and prices were slightly reduced in 2017 (the government cut some internet tariffs that year, doubling speeds for the same price, which was celebrated at the time). The average fixed download speed by early 2018, while still low globally, was in the range of 4–6 Mbps (up from maybe 1–2 Mbps in 2012). Mobile data was booming too – 4G usage skyrocketed, and Lebanon often boasted about having among the highest mobile penetration rates in the region (over 80% of the population had a mobile phone). The fiber-to-cabinet (FTTC) deployments meant some users near upgraded cabinets could get VDSL connections of 20–50 Mbps by 2018. Indeed, an Al-Akhbar report cited by The961 noted that 35% of the fiber project was done by end of 2019, with an expectation of completion by 2022 if things stayed on track the961.com the961.com. On the mobile front, Alfa and Touch even demoed 5G technology in 2018 on a limited scale as a publicity showcase – though no commercial 5G rollout was attempted. During these years, Lebanon’s telecom sector was actually generating large revenues (in USD) for the government, thanks to pricy plans and a monopoly – ironically, that was a disincentive to make internet too cheap or fast, but at least there was reinvestment happening in infrastructure. By mid-2019, a Lebanese internet user in Beirut might have a 10 Mbps DSL or fiber line at home and a 4G phone with decent coverage – not on par with say Dubai or Doha, but much improved from a decade prior.
• 2019–2020 – The Crash and Initial Decline: The end of 2019 was a turning point. With the eruption of nationwide protests and the economic/financial crisis, the telecom sector was thrust into uncertainty. In October 2019, one of the triggers of protests was a proposed tax on WhatsApp calls – highlighting how integral and sensitive internet connectivity had become. That tax was scrapped, but by early 2020 the currency started plummeting. The government, desperate for revenue, did not immediately adjust telecom prices, which meant the telecom companies started running at a loss in LBP terms. Maintenance on the network slowed because suppliers weren’t being paid on time. Then came the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and the Beirut port explosion in August 2020. The pandemic increased reliance on internet (with many working or studying from home), pushing the networks to their capacity limits. Ogero reported something like a 30% surge in internet usage during lockdowns. The network held up initially, but strain showed – some throttling occurred, and average speeds dropped slightly under heavy load. The port explosion damaged some fiber cables and central office buildings in Beirut, causing outages until repaired. Meanwhile, the brain drain began – skilled telecom engineers started emigrating as their salaries became nearly worthless in hard currency. By 2021, the cracks were widening: prolonged power cuts and fuel shortages led to periodic telecom outages, as discussed earlier. The trend of improving connectivity reversed. Metrics like the Inclusive Internet Index saw Lebanon slip in rankings for readiness and availability freedomhouse.org. The momentum of fiber rollout halted as the 2020 budget cut Ogero’s capital spending to near zero the961.com. In effect, late 2019 was the high-water mark for Lebanon’s connectivity growth, and 2020 marked the beginning of a regression.
• 2021–2022 – Freefall and Emergency Measures: These two years were arguably the worst for internet access since the civil war. The currency collapse led to absurd scenarios like a monthly DSL subscription costing less than $2 at black market rate, which was great for users initially but meant Ogero couldn’t even afford basic operations. As a result, telecom services teetered on collapse. In summer 2021, certain areas experienced multi-day internet blackouts; NetBlocks reported nation-scale outages correlating with fuel crises freedomhouse.org. People increasingly bought backup solutions like 4G routers on different mobile networks, or even dusted off old dial-up modems (Ogero’s dial-up pool was reportedly used by some as a last resort!). The quality of service plummeted: jittery connections, high latency, and fluctuating speeds became common. Recognizing this emergency, in July 2022 the government raised tariffs (the Sayrafa pricing decision) freedomhouse.org. This move, plus interim fixes like obtaining fuel through special funds, provided a bit of relief by late 2022 in terms of keeping the lights on. Speeds were still low, but at least a more stable cashflow meant Ogero could do maintenance again and mobile operators could buy fuel. The data shows that by the end of 2022, internet penetration had dropped slightly (from ~89% to ~86%) due to the affordability crisis freedomhouse.org, but by January 2023 the bleeding had slowed. The number of mobile connections and internet users started stabilizing thanks to the pricing adjustment (though at a societal cost). We can consider 2022 the rock-bottom year where things were restructured to prevent total collapse.
• 2023–2024 – Partial Stabilization and New Opportunities: In 2023, Lebanon’s internet showed signs of partial recovery in some metrics. As noted earlier, median fixed broadband speeds which had sunk to ~8 Mbps began rising again, reaching 12+ Mbps by early 2024 freedomhouse.org datareportal.com. This likely reflects Ogero being able to fix and activate some fiber cabinets and optimize networks once the tariff hike brought some funds. Mobile speeds remained in the 30-35 Mbps range median, though the user experience was still marred by outages and the occasional worker strike (like the Ogero strike in March 2023 that caused scheduled cuts freedomhouse.org). The public by now had adapted in some ways – many had both an Ogero line and a 4G data plan and would switch between them as needed. The conversation also shifted towards innovative solutions: the Starlink idea came up in late 2023 as mentioned, and by 2024 it gained traction. Also, 2023 saw more serious talk of reforms: the Telecom Ministry under a caretaker government tried to push through structural changes (though with limited authority). In 2024, the broader geopolitical situation (the Israel-Gaza war’s spillover) again tested the network, but also underscored the need for backup connectivity, giving impetus to Starlink. By 2025, with a new president and hints of an IMF deal, there’s a cautious hope that the telecom sector will get investment. The DataReportal statistics for 2025 show Lebanon had 5.34 million internet users (91.6% penetration) at the start of 2025 datareportal.com datareportal.com, a slight increase from the previous year as some confidence returned. Mobile connections at 4.68 million even exceeded population (80% of population, but many people have two SIMs) datareportal.com, indicating the mobile sector remains strong in reach. However, fixed broadband subscriptions remain relatively low (roughly 7 per 100 people as of 2022, likely a bit more by 2025) – meaning most households still are not plugged into high-speed fixed lines, relying instead on mobile data or nothing. Lebanon’s ranking in global indices is still poor (for example, its Inclusive Internet Index rank of 74/110 in 2022 freedomhouse.org and likely similar in 2023 places it behind many MENA peers). But the trajectory in late 2024 into 2025 is at least upward in terms of network performance after hitting bottom.

In summary, the timeline of 2010s into mid-2020s for Lebanon’s internet is a story of initial improvement, a severe crash, and a slow rebound. Pre-2019, Lebanon was finally speeding up – new infrastructure, better speeds, more users. Post-2019, crisis erased some of those gains and highlighted the fragility of the system. As of 2025, the country is trying to climb back, using both conventional means (reforms, fiber completion) and unconventional ones (satellites). This historical context shows how critical stable governance and economy are for something as technically straightforward as keeping the internet on. It also demonstrates the resilience of Lebanese users and engineers who managed to keep some level of connectivity through an unprecedented collapse.

Conclusion: Towards a Connected Future

Lebanon’s journey with the internet has been tumultuous, reflecting the country’s broader fortunes. Today, the state of internet access in Lebanon is a mix of contrasts: ultra-modern fiber rings and 4G towers exist alongside decades-old copper lines and patchwork wireless routers; an impressively high internet penetration rate over 90% datareportal.com belies the fact that many users are barely hanging on via expensive mobile data or communal connections. The “fiber optics to Starlink skies” narrative captures Lebanon at a crossroads – on one hand, there is a fully laid fiber backbone waiting to be leveraged and a tech-savvy population eager for connectivity; on the other hand, there are skies now dotted with satellites offering a chance to leapfrog chronic infrastructure problems.

For Lebanon to truly move forward and ensure fast, affordable, and reliable internet for all its people, several things need to happen. Economic stabilization is foundational – with a recovered economy, the telecom sector can invest in upgrades, pay its staff, and possibly attract foreign partnerships. Policy and governance reforms must continue: establishing a functional regulator, encouraging competition (even if via technologies like satellite or community ISPs), and cracking down on corruption and waste in the sector will improve efficiency and user trust. The fiber-optic rollout should be a priority once funding is available, as it is the long-term solution for high-capacity, low-cost bandwidth to every neighborhood – the project’s completion would allow Lebanon to finally harness the ample international bandwidth at its disposal en.wikipedia.org and perhaps offer gigabit speeds to consumers someday. Electricity sector reform goes hand in hand, because without 24/7 power, no telecom network can be truly reliable; the government’s plan to fix electricity by 2026 (with tariff hikes and new plants) freedomhouse.org freedomhouse.org, if realized, will greatly benefit the internet uptime.

On the inclusion front, stakeholders should build on the initiatives we discussed: empower municipalities and NGOs to create public Wi-Fi hubs, introduce subsidized packages (perhaps funded by a USF or the IMF social support programs) for low-income families, and ensure that as new technologies like Starlink come in, they are not just luxuries for the few but catalysts for broader access (for instance, negotiating with SpaceX on a community pricing model could be revolutionary). The Lebanese diaspora and tech community can also play a key role – they have been a lifeline during the crisis and can continue to support with knowledge transfer, funding for digital projects, and advocacy.

Encouragingly, Lebanon’s leadership in 2025 appears to recognize the importance of the digital economy – calling it a “sovereign decision” to digitize as a means to rebuild arabnews.com arabnews.com. This top-down emphasis, combined with bottom-up resilience seen in Lebanese society, could finally align to produce tangible improvements. The dream would be that in a few years, Lebanon is no longer trailing in internet rankings but is a regional tech hub as once envisioned – with fiber-connected villages in the mountains, widespread 5G in cities, and even Starlink dishes connecting remote farms or nature reserves.

Ultimately, internet access is more than just a convenience in Lebanon; it’s a critical utility for education, business, and staying connected in a time of uncertainty. The past has shown how much the country can achieve when the sector is prioritized (as in the mid-2010s growth) and how quickly gains can erode when it’s neglected. The current state is one of cautious optimism: the infrastructure has stabilized enough to function, new solutions are on the horizon, and awareness of the internet’s importance is at its highest. If Lebanon can navigate its economic recovery and implement smart telecom reforms, the coming years could see a significant positive turnaround – truly moving from the dark days of network blackouts to a future where Lebanese citizens enjoy fast, reliable connectivity whether through fiber under the sea or satellites in the skies.

Sources: The information in this report was gathered from a range of up-to-date sources, including Freedom House’s 2023 and 2024 Freedom on the Net reports on Lebanon freedomhouse.org freedomhouse.org, data insights from DataReportal 2025 datareportal.com datareportal.com, news articles (e.g. Al-Monitor, AGBI) detailing Starlink’s entry into Lebanon al-monitor.com agbi.com, local digital rights organization SMEX analyses on telecom pricing and policy smex.org smex.org, and historical context from Wikipedia and The961 on Lebanon’s telecom development en.wikipedia.org the961.com. These sources provide a comprehensive, factual basis for assessing Lebanon’s internet infrastructure, market, and usage from pre-2019 through 2025.