War of the Drones: How Jammers, Lasers, and Nets Are Taking Down Rogue UAVs

Comparison of All Anti-Drone Systems and Technologies

Drones have revolutionized industries from photography to deliveries – but their misuse has created serious threats to safety, security, and privacy roboticsbiz.com. In recent years, incidents of rogue or malicious drones have skyrocketed. For example, the NFL’s Chief Security Officer reported that drone incursions at football games jumped from about a dozen in 2017 to 2,845 in 2023 – an almost 24,000% increase dronelife.com. Militaries are also alarmed: the war in Ukraine has seen “thousands of unmanned aircraft” used on the battlefield, a drone deployment scale never seen before reuters.com. Such events underscore how easily drones can spy, disrupt airports, carry illicit payloads, or even serve as deadly weapons.

In response, a rapidly growing counter-drone (C-UAS) industry has emerged. The global anti-drone market quadrupled from 2018 to reach about $2.4 billion in 2024 nqdefense.com, and is projected to exceed $10 billion by 2030 nqdefense.com. From military bases and prisons to airports and stadiums, there’s surging demand for technologies that can detect, track, and neutralize unauthorized drones. A wide array of solutions now exists – each with unique advantages and drawbacks. This report demystifies all the major anti-drone systems in use today, comparing how they work and when they’re used. We’ll cover everything from radar detection and radio jammers to futuristic laser cannons, drone-catching drones, high-power microwaves, net launchers, acoustic sensors, and integrated hybrid defenses. Along the way, we’ll look at real-world deployments (both military-grade and commercial), hear expert insights, and discuss the legal tightrope of using these tools. By the end, you’ll understand the pros, cons, and use cases of each counter-drone approach – and how, together, they form a layered shield against the growing drone threat.

Radar-Based Drone Detection Systems

Radar is one of the primary tools for spotting drones in the sky. Radar (Radio Detection and Ranging) works by sending out radio wave pulses and listening for echoes off objects. Traditional air-defense radars were designed for large aircraft, but modern counter-drone radars are specially tuned to detect very small, low-flying targets like hobbyist quadcopters ts2.tech. They provide 360° coverage and can track multiple drones simultaneously day or night, often at ranges of several kilometers for small drones ts2.tech ts2.tech. For instance, Israel’s Rafael “Drone Dome” system uses compact radars effective out to about 3.5 km for drone-sized targets ts2.tech, and the U.S. Army’s Ku-band KuRFS radar can precisely track dozens of UAS at once ts2.tech. Military-grade radars are so sensitive that some can even detect objects as small as a 9mm bullet in flight ts2.tech.

Pros: Radar offers early warning and long reach. It can detect drones far beyond the range of other sensors, providing valuable reaction time ts2.tech. It works in all weather and lighting conditions. Modern radar software with AI can even classify targets by flight behavior, helping distinguish a drone from, say, a bird or balloon ts2.tech. Radars are also hard to evade – a drone can’t easily hide from an active radar beam unless it’s extremely low or stealth-coated.

Cons: Small drones present a hard target for radar. Very low-flying or slow drones can blend into ground clutter (buildings, trees), making detection challenging ts2.tech. Birds often appear similar to drones on raw radar returns, leading to false alarms ts2.tech. New AI filters are improving this by recognizing typical bird vs. drone movement patterns, but identification is still tricky. Radars also only give a blip – they can tell something is there and moving, but not visually confirm what it is. Another consideration is that radar transmissions are regulated; you need a frequency license, and in military situations an emitting radar can tip off adversaries to your location ts2.tech. Radars tend to be larger and costlier than some other sensors (though portable counter-drone radars do exist).

Use Cases: Radar is the workhorse of many military C-UAS systems and is often the first line of detection for long-range drone defense. It’s used to monitor borders, military bases, critical infrastructure and large events. For example, after a drone caused major disruption at London’s Gatwick Airport in 2018, UK authorities installed military-grade radars (and other sensors) to watch airport airspace ts2.tech. Radars are almost always paired with other systems – typically, radar will cue a camera or secondary sensor to help identify the detected object. Notable manufacturers include companies like Blighter (UK), Robin Radar (Netherlands), Israel Aerospace Industries (Drone Guard radar), and major defense firms like Raytheon (which provides the KuRFS radar to the U.S. Army). As a baseline sensor, radar’s strength is providing all-weather, wide-area drone detection to anchor an integrated defense system.

RF Jammers – Radio Frequency Disruptors

One of the most popular countermeasures today are RF jammers – devices that can forcibly disrupt a drone’s remote control link. Most consumer and prosumer drones communicate with a ground controller via radio frequency (RF) signals (commonly in the 2.4 GHz or 5.8 GHz Wi-Fi bands). An RF jammer works by blasting a strong, noisy signal on those same frequencies, overwhelming the drone’s receiver so it can no longer “hear” commands from its pilot ts2.tech. From the drone’s perspective, it’s like suddenly being in a radio shadow: it loses contact with its controller and typically goes into a fail-safe mode ts2.tech. Depending on the drone’s programming, it might hover and land on the spot, or automatically return to its takeoff point, or just crash if it has no safety routine ts2.tech. In essence, jamming can induce an immediate non-kinetic kill, stopping the drone without firing a bullet.

Pros: Jammers offer a way to neutralize drones without destroying them – no shotgun blasts or laser beams, just radio waves. This reduces the risk of dangerous debris if the drone simply lands. A sufficiently powerful jammer can also handle multiple drones simultaneously by blanketing an area of the sky with interference ts2.tech. Jamming units come in many forms: from stationary rack-mounted emitters to rifle-like “jammer guns” that an operator can point at a drone ts2.tech. For example, DroneShield (an Australian firm) makes a DroneGun Tactical that looks like a big sci-fi rifle; security teams can simply aim and trigger it to drop a drone out of the sky or force it to go home ts2.tech. These devices tend to be quite portable and quick to deploy, making them popular with police and military units for high-profile events, convoy protection, or guarding a checkpoint. As one defense expert noted, jamming is a non-lethal approach and doesn’t risk an explosion – “no projectiles or lasers, just radio waves” ts2.tech, which is appealing in populated environments.

Cons: RF jamming has significant limitations. Range is relatively short – usually effective only within a few hundred meters to maybe 1–2 km at best for high-power versions ts2.tech. A drone can simply fly outside the jammer’s radius and remain unaffected. Jamming is also indiscriminate: it doesn’t just affect the rogue drone. It can interfere with other electronics and communications in the area – knocking out Wi-Fi networks, radio links, or even upsetting local cell towers ts2.tech. This collateral interference is a serious concern, especially near airports or in urban areas (more on legal restrictions later). Another drawback is that the outcome of jamming can be unpredictable. While many drones land as intended, some might veer off on a random trajectory or keep flying on their last commanded path ts2.tech. Clever attackers have exploited this by pre-programming drones with a GPS route so that even if jammed, the drone carries on its mission autonomously. In fact, on the modern battlefield, combatants have started using drones that don’t rely on RF control at all – for instance, some ISIS and Russian frontline drones use pre-set autopilot or optical guidance, or even physical tethered links, making them impervious to jamming dronelife.com breakingdefense.com. As Dr. Paul Schwennesen, co-director of the Global Strategy Decisions Group, warned Congress, “Jamming doesn’t work the way we think it does… [In Ukraine] they’re operating drones using AI visual targeting with no RF frequency to jam” dronelife.com. In other words, jammers are not a silver bullet – sophisticated adversaries are finding ways around them, such as drones that navigate by camera and require no radio once launched.

Use Cases: Despite its limits, RF jamming remains one of the most widely deployed counter-drone techniques for now. Military units and U.S. federal agencies regularly use jammers to protect forward operating bases or convoys from hostile drones (where permitted by law). Allied forces in Iraq and Syria, for example, have employed backpack jammers to down drones used by insurgent groups. Law enforcement and security contractors use jammer guns to guard events like the Olympics, the World Cup, or VIP summits – scenarios where you might see personnel quietly scanning the skies with a jammer at the ready. Notable products include the DroneGun and DroneShield’s newer DroneGun Tactical and DroneGun MKIII (a pistol-sized jammer), the American-made Battelle DroneDefender, and kits by companies like Black Sage, IXI (Dronekiller), and others. Russia and China have fielded their own jammer rifles (e.g., Russia’s “Stupor” jammer was shown in 2022). Importantly, civilian use of jammers is heavily regulated or banned in most countries (they can only be operated by authorized authorities) – more on that in the legal section. In summary, RF jammers are a common “soft kill” measure: they’re relatively low-cost, reusable, and don’t physically harm the drone, but they must be used carefully and are increasingly being countered by next-gen drone tactics.

GPS Spoofers – Hacking a Drone’s Navigation

Closely related to jamming are GPS spoofers, another “soft kill” electronic attack. Instead of outright blocking a drone’s signals, a spoofer tricks the drone by feeding it bogus navigation data. Most drones rely on GPS (or other GNSS satellites) for positioning. A GPS spoofer transmits counterfeit GPS signals that slowly override the real satellite signals, making the drone think it’s in a different location ts2.tech. By manipulating what the drone believes are its coordinates, defenders can confuse the drone’s guidance system – for example, spoofing it into a digital “geo-fence” that causes the drone to automatically land or veer away. In one scenario, a spoofer might create a fake GPS bubble telling the drone it has entered a restricted zone, triggering the drone’s built-in return-to-home or landing behavior. In military applications, GPS spoofing has even been used to hijack hostile drones mid-flight – essentially convincing the drone to navigate to a new “home” location chosen by the defender, all without the operator’s knowledge ts2.tech.

Pros: Like jamming, GPS spoofing is non-destructive – the goal is to safely redirect or capture the drone intact. When it works, it’s highly precise: the drone can be landed exactly where you want it, or sent off-course in a controlled way, without any damage. Spoofing signals can be focused so that only the targeted drone is affected, in theory making it more selective than broad jamming. Another advantage is subtlety; a well-executed spoof might not alert the drone’s operator that anything is wrong – the drone may simply appear to wander off or malfunction. This technique gained fame in the Iran–U.S. incident of 2011, when Iranian forces claimed to have spoofed the GPS of a U.S. spy drone and landed it intact (though details are murky). In concept, hijacking a drone via GPS or protocol signals is a very elegant neutralization: the drone basically surrenders itself to you.

Cons: GPS spoofing is technically complex and even more tightly regulated than jamming. To fool a drone’s GPS, the spoofer’s fake signals must overpower satellites that are 24000 km away – not easy! It requires careful synchronization and power control; too obvious a spoof and the drone might detect the anomaly and go into fail-safe. Even when successful, spoofing carries the same risk of collateral effects as jamming, if not more ts2.tech. Those fake GPS signals don’t just hit the rogue drone – they could be picked up by nearby phones, cars, or aircraft. Imagine multiple vehicles or planes suddenly thinking they’re somewhere else; it’s a serious danger. For that reason, GPS spoofing is rarely, if ever, authorized in civilian airspace ts2.tech. It’s mostly a military tool used in combat zones or tests. Moreover, many drones have gotten wiser to GPS tricks: if they lose reliable GPS, they might switch to other navigation modes (like inertial guidance or machine vision) and thus ignore spoofing attempts ts2.tech. Some advanced drones use encrypted GPS or multi-frequency receivers that are harder to spoof. And again, fully autonomous drones that navigate by map or visual cues won’t be affected by GPS manipulation at all. In summary, GPS spoofing is a niche but intriguing method – highly effective when it works, but difficult to pull off and generally off-limits outside of battlefields due to the broad disruption it can cause ts2.tech.

Use Cases: Confirmed uses of GPS spoofers are mostly military or intelligence operations. The U.S. military and others have developed spoofing capabilities for specialized teams (like electronic warfare units) to commandeer small enemy drones rather than shoot them down. Russia has reportedly used GPS spoofing around sensitive sites (e.g., the Kremlin) to confuse civilian drones and even navigation apps – essentially creating “GPS dark zones” for security. In the civilian sphere, there are no off-the-shelf spoofers available to the public (doing so would be illegal). However, research groups have demonstrated spoofing in controlled environments – one famous college experiment landed a drone on a fake “GPS carrier signal” with only a brief discrepancy of a few meters. A notable commercial system in this category is the Israeli Regulus Cyber system, which advertises GNSS spoofing defense (and presumably offense) for authorities. Still, given the regulatory hurdles, spoofing is largely a military-grade tool, used sparingly when an intact capture is especially valuable (for intelligence gathering on the drone or its payload).

(Aside: Another high-tech neutralization related to spoofing is “cyber takeover,” where instead of spoofing GPS, the defender hijacks the drone’s control link by hacking its protocol. Systems like D-Fend’s EnforceAir or Palo Alto’s SkySafe can intercept the drone’s Wi-Fi or radio signals and send a “come to me” command, seizing control. These drone hacking methods are highly precise – the drone lands intact at your feet – but depend on the drone’s make/model and known vulnerabilities ts2.tech ts2.tech. If successful, they leave the drone completely intact for forensics ts2.tech. However, such systems need constant updates to hack new drone models and won’t work on drones with encrypted or unknown protocols ts2.tech. Cyber takedown is an emerging capability and typically restricted to government use as well, since it may involve intercepting communications. It’s an elegant approach when permissible: as one manufacturer described, it’s effectively hacking the rogue drone so it “hands itself over to you” ts2.tech.)

Drone-Catching Interceptor Drones

Sometimes, the best way to defeat a drone is with another drone. So-called “anti-drone drones” or interceptor UAVs are fast becoming a staple in the counter-UAS arsenal. These are drones (often quadcopters or small unmanned planes) launched to chase and neutralize a rogue drone in mid-air. They can neutralize targets in two main ways: physically ramming the rogue drone out of the sky, or capturing it with a net or tether. This concept essentially lets you conduct an aerial dogfight on a small scale – a defensive drone hunts down the intruder.

One example is Anduril Industries’ “Anvil” interceptor, a compact fixed-wing drone that uses AI guidance to smash into enemy drones at high speed ts2.tech. It’s basically a small kamikaze that sacrifices itself to take out the target (much like a guided missile, but cheaper) ts2.tech. The Anvil and similar interceptors can autonomously patrol an area and, when a threat is detected, sprint towards it and knock it out by sheer impact. Anduril’s interceptors proved so promising that the U.S. Navy has started deploying them (the “Raiders” or “Roadrunner” interceptors) on ships to bolster defense against drone attacks ts2.tech ts2.tech. These interceptors loiter until assigned a target, then dive onto it – drastically cutting response time versus launching a traditional missile ts2.tech. On the other end of the spectrum are net-carrying drones like the Fortem DroneHunter F700. DroneHunter is a quadcopter that tows a net; when it approaches a rogue drone, it can either fire the net or entangle the target by swooping over it, then carry the ensnared drone away or drop it by parachute ts2.tech ts2.tech. Fortem’s system is autonomous too – it uses onboard radar/AI to lock onto the target. According to Fortem, the DroneHunter has achieved about an 85% success rate in tests, even against fast-moving drones ts2.tech. Law enforcement in several countries have trialed similar net drones for urban settings.

Pros: Interceptor drones provide a highly targeted, flexible response. They can chase a threat across the sky and adjust in real-time, something fixed defenses struggle with. This makes them effective against maneuvering or high-speed targets that might dodge a stationary net or avoid a ground-based jammer ts2.tech. They’re also scalable and cost-effective. Firing a $3 million missile to kill a $1,000 drone is a terrible cost ratio; but sending up a reusable quadcopter or a $5,000 expendable drone is much more sensible ts2.tech. As one Business Insider report noted, intercept drones help solve the “cost asymmetry” problem of drone threats ts2.tech. In terms of safety, using drones to kill drones can be safer for bystanders – there are no bullets or high-velocity shrapnel that could hit the ground ts2.tech. If a net is used, the rogue drone can be brought down intact with no explosion, eliminating debris risk entirely. “It is much preferable to remove that threat from the sky with a net that mitigates collateral damage,” explains Jon Gruen, CEO of Fortem Technologies, “because there’s no debris falling from the sky, no explosion in the air, none of those kinetic effects” breakingdefense.com. Capturing a drone intact also allows forensic analysis of its payload, data, or origin – a big plus for law enforcement and military intelligence ts2.tech. Finally, interceptors can operate within restricted areas (like over a stadium or city) where shooting guns or firing lasers would be too dangerous. They’re essentially guard drones that can patrol and respond as needed, even indoors or in complex terrain.

Cons: The duel of drones is not without downsides. Interceptor drones are generally single-use per target – if they ram the threat, they often crash too, and if they deploy a net, they might have only one or two shots. Thus, a swarm of hostile drones could overwhelm them by sheer numbers or force them to reload after one catch ts2.tech. They also take time to engage: an interceptor needs to be launched or be in position, then navigate to the target. If a rogue drone pops up very suddenly and close by (like a small quadcopter dashing toward a podium), a ready-to-fire jammer or laser might stop it faster than scrambling an interceptor drone. Another issue is mid-air collision risk: while two small drones colliding usually just drop, there’s still some chance of debris or even burning batteries falling – albeit far less than if one blew it up with a missile ts2.tech. Interceptor drones also depend on robust communication and guidance (often using GPS and radio links themselves, unless fully autonomous). This means they too could be affected by heavy jamming environments or require strong encryption to avoid being spoofed. In battlefield conditions, a savvy enemy might deploy decoy drones or swarms to exhaust interceptors – sending cheap drones to draw out the defensive drones and use up their nets or fuel. The interceptors also need to be recharged and maintained, adding logistics burden. Weather can be a factor: high winds or rain might ground defensive drones when other countermeasures (like radar or lasers) could still operate. Finally, cost is lower than missiles but not trivial – losing an interceptor per kill can add up (though companies are working on drones that survive the collision or release the net and remain airborne).

Use Cases: Despite cons, many armed forces and security agencies are embracing drone-on-drone defense. In the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, both Ukrainian and Russian forces have reportedly used small quadcopters to ram each other out of the sky or drop entangling nets, essentially DIY drone dogfights at the front lines ts2.tech. This proves the concept’s effectiveness even in ad-hoc form. On a more systematic level, the U.S. Department of Defense has invested in several interceptor drone programs. The U.S. Army tested the SMASH UAV and others for base protection. The U.S. Navy in 2023–2024 began fielding Anduril’s interceptors on its warships as mentioned, teaming them with Raytheon’s Coyote missiles for layered ship defense ts2.tech. Japan’s police have used interceptor drones to guard VIP visits, and Tokyo police famously deployed net drones to secure public spaces. Several European countries are evaluating interceptor drones for airport protection, after incidents like Gatwick’s disruption. Notable manufacturers include Fortem Technologies (USA), Anduril (USA), Israel Aerospace Industries (Harpy NG interceptor drone), Robotican (Israel, makes a “Rooster” interceptor), and startups like OpenWorks (UK) which has drone-mounted net systems. As drone threats evolve, we can expect “drone vs drone” battles to become common – it’s almost a return to old-fashioned dogfighting, but with unmanned systems. And with AI getting better, future interceptor drones might not even need human guidance; they could autonomously swarm against incoming drones. For now, interceptor drones are best used as part of a layered defense, handling scenarios where precision and minimal collateral damage are paramount (e.g. a drone over a crowded event or near critical infrastructure where jamming failed or wasn’t allowed).

High-Energy Laser Weapons (“Laser Cannons”)

Directed-energy weapons, especially high-energy lasers (HEL), have captured the public imagination – think of science fiction-style laser cannons shooting drones out of the sky. This is one area where reality is quickly catching up to the hype. Modern anti-drone laser systems use electrically powered lasers, typically in the tens of kilowatts, to focus a beam of intense heat onto a drone and disable or destroy it. The laser beam, when kept on a small drone for a few seconds, can melt critical components or ignite the drone’s battery or electronics, causing the drone to fail in flight ts2.tech ts2.tech. A laser might burn through the drone’s propellers or airframe, literally making it fall apart, or blind its sensors and fry its circuit boards. It’s a high-tech take on shooting a drone with light instead of bullets.

Pros: Lasers bring some incredible advantages. They operate at the speed of light – as soon as you pull the trigger (or rather, hold the beam on target), the effect is immediate on the target, with no travel time or ballistic drop to worry about. A laser also offers pinpoint precision: you can aim at a specific part of a drone (for instance, targeting the payload or battery) and there’s no risk of hitting something behind the drone since the beam will dissipate beyond the focal point. Importantly, lasers have a virtually unlimited “magazine.” As long as you have electrical power, you can keep firing; there are no bullets or missiles to run out. This makes the cost per shot extremely low – on the order of a few dollars worth of electricity – once the system is deployed ts2.tech ts2.tech. Contrast that with a $100,000 interceptor missile or even a $2,000 drone; lasers, after the upfront cost, are cheap to use. They also leave no explosive debris; a drone hit by a laser might catch fire or just drop intact once its electronics fail. And if properly managed, a laser can incinerate a drone in a fairly controlled way – some tests have shown drones just popping and falling straight down as their motors melt. Lasers are silent and invisible (if using infrared beams), so they can operate stealthily. Current systems have demonstrated kills out to a few kilometers; for example, a 10 kW laser on Rafael’s Drone Dome shot down multiple drones in testing at undisclosed ranges ts2.tech. The U.S. Army and Navy have fielded 10–50 kW class lasers that successfully destroyed drones in mid-air – in fact, Raytheon reported its lasers have over 40,000 hours of testing and have downed more than 400 drone targets (mostly small drones) to date reuters.com. As power scales up (prototypes of 100–300 kW lasers are in development), lasers could engage larger UAVs and even volleys of drones quickly ts2.tech ts2.tech. Another pro: lasers don’t disrupt other signals – they won’t interfere with Wi-Fi or aircraft comms like jammers do, nor produce EMP effects like microwaves. This makes them attractive for use around sensitive installations if safety can be managed.

Cons: The biggest nemesis of lasers is the environment. Unlike bullets, laser beams can be defeated by weather. Rain, fog, smoke, dust or heat haze in the air can scatter or absorb the beam energy, dramatically reducing range and effectiveness ts2.tech. A phenomenon called thermal blooming occurs when a laser superheats the air it’s passing through, causing the beam to spread and weaken ts2.tech. So, lasers are not all-weather – a foggy morning or sandstorm can render them nearly useless. They also require an unobstructed line-of-sight; a drone that’s behind a building or hill can’t be targeted until it’s visible. Another limitation is time-on-target: a high-power laser might need anywhere from 2 to 10 seconds of steady aim to burn down a drone, depending on the drone’s size, distance, and the laser’s power. During that time, the drone could move or something could interrupt the beam. If a swarm of drones comes, lasers can theoretically engage many in succession but usually one at a time, so a large swarm might overwhelm the recharge or retarget cycle. Current laser systems are also big and power-hungry. Even a 10 kW laser typically is mounted on a truck or a trailer with a dedicated power source or generator ts2.tech. The U.S. Army’s prototype laser “Stryker” vehicle uses a large battery bank to fire a 50 kW beam, for example. Portability is improving (Raytheon showed a laser on a small flatbed F-150 truck breakingdefense.com), but you’re not going to see a handheld anti-drone laser rifle anytime soon. Safety is another critical issue: High-energy lasers can cause serious eye damage to anyone who accidentally crosses the beam, even miles away. There are international prohibitions on using blinding lasers against personnel, so operators must be very careful to target only drones and ensure the beam doesn’t strike anywhere near humans in a way that could reflect into eyes ts2.tech ts2.tech. Additionally, if a mis-aim or malfunction occurs, a powerful laser could ignite property or cause unintended harm. For these reasons, most laser C-UAS systems are still in testing or limited deployment under strict rules. The cost of the system is also high – developing high-power lasers with beam directors and cooling systems runs in the tens of millions of dollars per unit, though that cost is gradually coming down.

Use Cases: Lasers are being actively pursued for military base defense and battlefield use. The U.S. is integrating lasers into its short-range air defense (SHORAD) units; for example, the Army’s DE-MSHORAD program put a 50 kW laser on a Stryker vehicle and tested it successfully against drones. The British Army, in July 2024, tested a Raytheon high-energy laser mounted on a Wolfhound armored vehicle, marking the first such firing on UK soil reuters.com. Israel has developed the “Iron Beam” – a laser component to complement its Iron Dome, intended to shoot down drones (and potentially rockets) more economically; Iron Beam reportedly uses a ~100 kW class laser and is nearing operational status. China and Russia have also unveiled vehicle-mounted anti-drone lasers (e.g., China’s low-altitude guard lasers used at airshows, and Russia’s rumored “Peresvet” system, though details are scant). Critical infrastructure protection is another area: trials have put laser units around airports and oil facilities to see if they can create a dome of drone denial. For example, after drone attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil fields in 2019, defense firms pitched high-energy lasers to Gulf states as a way to zap drones before they hit targets. In the U.S., energy labs (like Lawrence Livermore) have developed tactical lasers that could be used at nuclear sites or big events to shoot down intruding drones if kinetic weapons are too risky. Looking ahead, militaries love the idea of using a $5 of electricity beam to destroy swarms that would otherwise require expensive missiles. The U.S. Navy is particularly keen, since warships could face drone swarms; they’re working on lasers above 300 kW as part of the HELCAP program ts2.tech. Once those are mature, a warship could have a “laser CIWS” (close-in weapon system) to vaporize drones and even speedboat threats continuously. On the civilian side, lasers are trickier – you’re unlikely to see police blasting a drone with a laser in downtown anywhere due to safety concerns. But some airports have expressed interest in directed-energy defenses at perimeter areas (where the laser would be fired in a safe direction away from flight paths). Notable Players: Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing are all heavily invested in anti-drone lasers for the U.S. and allies. In Europe, companies like MBDA, Rheinmetall, and Thales are developing their own versions. These systems often integrate with radar and optics to automatically track a drone and hold the beam on it. The general consensus is that lasers will be a game-changer for drone defense – essentially giving a “light-speed sniper” in the sky – but they must be deployed under the right conditions and with careful control.

Net Guns and Launcher Systems

Not all drone defense involves cutting-edge electronics – some solutions are decidedly low-tech but effective, like literally shooting a net to capture the drone. Nets are one of the earliest counter-drone methods tried, and they remain popular for scenarios where you want the drone physically intact or need to avoid any collateral damage from things falling fast. There are a couple of ways nets are used:

Handheld or Ground-Launched Net Guns: These are devices (often shoulder-fired or mounted on a tripod) that fire a canister or projectile which deploys a net in the air. Think of a net as a weighted web – when it hits a drone, it entangles the propellers or airframe, causing the drone to lose lift and tumble. Many net projectiles are designed with a small parachute attached ts2.tech; once the drone is caught, the parachute deploys and both the net and entangled drone float down gently ts2.tech. This prevents a hard crash that could injure people or damage the drone’s surroundings. Typical range for handheld net guns is short – about 20 to 100 meters effectively ts2.tech. Larger net launchers (fired from a cannon or multi-launcher system) might reach out to 300+ meters ts2.tech. One well-known product is the SkyWall 100 by OpenWorks Engineering (UK), which is a bazooka-like launcher firing a net cartridge; it has been used in trials by police and military units in Europe and the U.S. Another is the Talon net drone munition by Department 13 (US). There are even 40mm grenade-style nets that can be launched from a standard grenade launcher attachment on a rifle. Net launches are usually a one-shot deal – you have to reload after firing – so they rely on careful aim and close range. The advantage is they are simple and immediate: point, shoot, capture. In 2015–2016, Tokyo’s Metropolitan Police made headlines by introducing a net gun drone unit to catch suspicious drones – video showed a police drone deploying a large net to snare a target hovering near a building.

Interceptor Drones with Nets: As covered earlier, some defender drones carry nets rather than doing a kamikaze strike. The Fortem DroneHunter is a prime example, using a launched net to snag a rogue drone in flight ts2.tech. These interceptor drones can extend the effective range of net tactics since they fly out to meet the target. Once the target is netted, the interceptor can either tow it away from a sensitive area or release it with a parachute so it drops softly ts2.tech. The DroneHunter F700 mentioned earlier even carries multiple net rounds, allowing it to engage more than one hostile drone per mission (usually 2–3 nets per drone). A notable real-world use: During the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea, security teams deployed drone interceptors with nets to patrol for any unauthorized drones, given concerns about North Korean UAVs – fortunately, none were needed in action.

Pros: Nets are one of the safest countermeasures in terms of avoiding collateral harm. They capture the drone intact, which is great if you need to examine it for evidence (e.g. to find out who sent it or what it was carrying) ts2.tech. Because the drone typically can’t detonate or crash hard once entangled, nets are ideal for crowded events, stadiums, and urban environments where you absolutely don’t want bullets or high-energy beams. A net-caught drone often just shuts off and hangs, especially if a parachute is used – meaning no fire, no explosion, and minimal risk to bystanders ts2.tech. Ground-launched net guns are relatively inexpensive and reusable; you can carry a device and a bandolier of net cartridges, giving a security team multiple chances to catch a drone with minimal training. They also don’t interfere with any spectrum (no jamming), and they don’t require line-of-sight back to an operator like hacking techniques – a net will snare the drone no matter who is controlling it or how. Accuracy at short range is quite high for net guns (some have sights or even smart scopes) and if the drone is hovering or moving slowly, a net can reliably take it down ts2.tech. Net interceptor drones extend this method to protect a larger radius and can chase intruders beyond the boundary of a venue, which is a big plus if you need more coverage ts2.tech. Overall, nets provide a low-tech, proven solution – even if all your high-tech gear fails, a well-aimed net is a brute-force answer to stop a drone.

Cons: The biggest limitation is range and scale. Most net solutions are close-range, requiring the drone to be relatively near. A motivated pilot might hover just outside net gun range and taunt security. Reloading nets is slow – after one shot, an operator might need half a minute or more to insert a new cartridge, during which time a second drone could get through ts2.tech. Nets are also less effective against very fast or maneuverable drones; a racing drone at 80 km/h might blow past the net or be hard to hit ts2.tech. Strong winds could deflect a net or reduce aim accuracy. If a net does not include a parachute, then you still have the issue of a drone (now a lump of tangled electronics) falling from the sky and potentially causing injury or damage ts2.tech. Even with a parachute, if the drone was carrying something hazardous (like an explosive or bio-agent), capturing it might not neutralize that hazard – although arguably it’s better than detonating it. There’s also a chance a particularly large drone might not be fully stopped by a net (the net could tear or only catch part of it). Interceptor drones carrying nets share issues with all interceptors: they need time to engage and can only carry a limited number of nets ts2.tech. If the hostile drone performs agile evasive maneuvers, it could evade a net or cause a miss ts2.tech. Training and rules of engagement matter too; an overzealous use of nets near active civilian aviation could ensnare something unintended (though that scenario is unlikely with proper procedure). Finally, one can note that netting a drone doesn’t neutralize the operator – the person controlling the rogue drone is still at large, so nets are a tactical fix but not a strategic one (the same can be said for most methods though).

Use Cases: Nets have been used in VIP protection (e.g., Swiss police protected the World Economic Forum with net guns on standby), major public events (like Olympic ceremonies, as mentioned), and around critical infrastructure like nuclear power plants. Many police departments around the world have evaluated net capture devices because they are legally less problematic – you’re not destroying an “aircraft”, just catching it. The Dutch police famously trained eagles at one point to grab drones, which is a kind of “biological net” approach – the eagles could snatch a drone from the air. This worked, but was eventually discontinued due to the birds’ unpredictability and welfare concerns (still, it showed how far people would go for a debris-free capture!). In prisons, nets have been used to stop drones dropping contraband; some systems even deploy automated net bazookas on prison perimeters that fire at detected drones. On the military side, nets aren’t typically used in open battle (you wouldn’t try a net gun against a swarm of hostile drones incoming at high speed), but they have been considered for base security in low-risk takedowns – for example, if a small quadcopter is hovering to spy on a base, a net drone could quietly pluck it without alerting the adversary that anything violent happened. Manufacturers & Users: Aside from OpenWorks (SkyWall) and Fortem (DroneHunter), companies like Droneshield and Dedrone have offered net solutions or partnered with net tech (Dedrone had a robotic interceptor called DroneDefender that included net options). A Japanese company, Kawasaki, even developed a net launcher mounted on a drone that could deploy a large net between two UAVs to “fence in” a target. These creative approaches underscore that when it comes to stopping drones, sometimes a simple net is the most elegant solution. As one U.S. Army C-UAS tester quipped, “If you absolutely don’t want it to go boom or zoom, a net is your best bet.”

High-Power Microwaves (HPMs) and EMP Weapons

Another high-tech category in anti-drone defense is high-power microwave weapons – essentially devices that unleash powerful pulses of electromagnetic energy to fry drone electronics. You can think of HPM systems as creating a localized electromagnetic pulse (EMP), similar to the concept from sci-fi where a blast of energy disables all electronics in an area. In practice, HPM devices emit microwaves (often in focused cone beams) that induce large voltages or currents in the drone’s circuits, burning them out or causing processors to crash instantly ts2.tech ts2.tech. The drone’s motors, control chips, and battery management can all be zapped in a microsecond, leading the drone to fall out of the sky on the spot ts2.tech. Crucially, HPMs don’t need to maintain a beam on target – one pulse can knock down multiple drones at once if they’re within its broad cone, making this approach ideal for swarm scenarios ts2.tech.

Pros: High-power microwaves offer something lasers and bullets don’t: area coverage. An HPM blast is often described as a “cone” or “bubble” of protection – any drone that enters that volume gets disabled, which is fantastic for defeating drone swarms or fast maneuvers ts2.tech. It’s effectively a shotgun vs. the laser’s rifle. As a directed-energy weapon, HPM is also speed-of-light and ignores the drone’s motion (you don’t have to lead a target; if it’s in range when you fire, it’s hit). It works on drones of all types: even an autonomous or radio-silent drone can’t hide from an EMP – if it has electronics (and all drones do), it’s vulnerable ts2.tech. HPMs are non-kinetic like lasers and jammers, meaning no shrapnel or bullet hazard. They also tend to be faster to act than interceptor drones or guns once a target is in range – just push a button and the drone’s lights go out immediately. Another advantage is that microwaves, unlike lasers, aren’t as affected by weather; rain or fog attenuate them less (though they can be impacted by moisture to some degree). Modern HPM systems use directional antennas to focus their energy and limit collateral spread ts2.tech. This is important to avoid frying friendly gear. The promise of HPM is shown in testing: the U.S. Air Force’s prototype HPM called “THOR” successfully shot down dozens of drones at once in a 2021 field test – achieving up to a 90% kill rate on a drone swarm target ts2.tech. Another example is Epirus Inc.’s “Leonidas” HPM – a compact system that has impressed the U.S. Army enough to invest in multiple units. Leonidas in tests was able to stop not only drones but also disable boat motors and ground robots with its pulses foxnews.com. Epirus claims it can be tuned to take out entire swarms in a fraction of a second. “It’s kind of like a Star Trek shield… It’s able to turn them off from very far away,” explains Joe Lonsdale, co-founder of Epirus, highlighting that HPM can act like an invisible force-field against drones foxnews.com. Lonsdale even went on to say, “This is going to touch every aspect of warfare over the next decade,” referring to the impact HPM anti-drone tech will have foxnews.com foxnews.com. Such confidence underscores that militaries see HPM as a game-changer for cheaply countering the drone threat (and indeed Epirus just raised $250M in funding in 2025 to accelerate deployment foxnews.com foxnews.com).

Cons: The flip side of an “electronic shotgun” is that it can hit unintended targets. HPM is not selective – any electronics in the blast zone, whether friend or foe, could be damaged ts2.tech. That means if you fire an HPM on a city block, you might knock out nearby security cameras, Wi-Fi routers, car electronics, maybe even parts of the power grid or hospital equipment if very close. This makes current HPM weapons unsuitable for most civilian settings ts2.tech. They are best reserved for controlled environments (like battlefields or wide-open protection of an isolated facility). There’s also a concern that powerful EMPs could violate FCC regulations or harm the spectrum environment – it’s like setting off a super-broad jammer that could even affect aircraft avionics if they’re too close. Another challenge is size and power: HPM systems tend to need significant power sources, such as generators or capacitors that charge up for each pulse. Early prototypes are truck-mounted or container-sized. Epirus has made strides with Leonidas being relatively compact (fits on a trailer or even on a Stryker vehicle in the “Leonidas Mobile” variant twz.com), but still, you’re not carrying one in a backpack. The weight and energy consumption mean mobility is limited (although ongoing work aims to ruggedize and miniaturize them). Cooldown and recharge is another factor: you might need a few seconds or more between shots for the capacitors to recharge or components to cool, which in a heavy swarm attack could limit fire rate. Also, unlike lasers which can do a “light tickle” to warn or disable a sensor, HPM is all-or-nothing – you can’t really dial it down to just disable a drone’s camera; it will likely fry everything, meaning the drone will crash immediately. That leads to the issue of immediate hard-kill: when a drone is hit by HPM, it usually just dies in mid-air and drops straight down ts2.tech. There’s no option to have it land gently or return home; so if it’s directly overhead sensitive assets or people, it’s going to fall with whatever kinetic energy it has (though often small drones don’t have much mass to cause damage, it’s still a concern). Legally, HPM weapons are considered a form of electronic warfare, and their use by anyone other than the military or specially authorized agencies is strictly forbidden (they’d be treated akin to using an EMP bomb). Lastly, one must consider countermeasures: it’s possible to harden drones against EMP to some degree (shielding critical electronics, using optical or fiber optic control links). In fact, as mentioned, Russian forces started using fiber-optic tethered drones specifically to avoid jamming and potentially HPM effects (the wire can shield signals) breakingdefense.com. If drones are hardened or use mostly non-electronic components (e.g., pneumatically controlled), HPM might be less effective – though those are exotic cases.

Use Cases: High-power microwave defenses are currently finding a niche in military force protection. The U.S. Air Force deployed a prototype called PHASER to an overseas base in 2019 for field evaluation (though details are limited, it was an HPM system reportedly). The U.S. Army is moving fast on this front: in July 2025 they awarded contracts for new HPM systems, including Epirus’s Leonidas Gen 2, to be part of their Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC) for base defense twz.com. The Army’s program even gave a formal name “IFPC-HPM” to these systems, indicating they foresee it as a program of record going forward twz.com. Leonidas units are expected to guard forward operating bases by zapping incoming drone swarms (and possibly rockets) in the very near future twz.com. The U.S. Marines are also prototyping a portable HPM called “Marine ADS” or “Expeditionary swarm crusher” ts2.tech to protect moving units. Another concept is Lockheed Martin’s MORFIUS, which is a reusable drone armed with an HPM payload – it would launch and detonate a microwave burst among a swarm, taking them out, then return for recharging ts2.tech. This is like a hybrid of kinetic and directed energy: a missile that doesn’t destroy via fragmentation but via EMP. Countries like China and Russia are presumed to be developing similar tech, as they have shown interest in EMP weapons for drone defense in concept (China has exhibited a truck-mounted HPM jammer for drones called “Poly Defender”). Israel’s Rafael also added an HPM option to its “Drone Dome” system, complementing its jammers and 10kW laser. In civilian contexts, HPM use is basically non-existent because it’s too disruptive; however, one could imagine emergency use if, say, a swarm of drones was attacking a chemical plant – an authority might use an HPM if lives were at stake and collateral electronics damage was an acceptable risk. Manufacturers & Fielding: Epirus (US) is a leader with Leonidas; Raytheon had a system called CHAMP (originally as a missile-based EMP weapon) and now works on deployable versions; the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) developed THOR and Mjolnir prototypes. On the international side, companies like Diehl and MBDA in Europe are researching it under EU projects. The expert consensus is that HPMs, like lasers, will play a major role in future drone defense – potentially giving defenders a way to instantly sweep the sky of many drones at once. As one industry executive summarized: “A core differentiator of Epirus’ high-power microwave is our ability to defeat both individual drones and large swarms” forbes.com. The coming decade will show if these systems can be scaled down and made selective enough to be widely deployed beyond the battlefield.

Acoustic Sensors for Drone Detection

Not every anti-drone technology is about blasting or capturing the drone – a crucial part of C-UAS is detection, and one of the more novel detection methods uses sound. Acoustic sensors are basically arrays of sensitive microphones that listen for the unique noise of drone propellers in flight ts2.tech. Drones, especially the common quadcopters, produce a telltale buzzing or high-pitched whine from their motors and prop blades. This acoustic signature can travel relatively far, and importantly, can go around obstacles (you can hear a drone even if it’s behind a building or in the dark). Each drone model tends to have a distinctive frequency profile – like a fingerprint in sound – due to its motor speed, propeller shape, and size ts2.tech. By comparing incoming sound to a database of known drone signatures, acoustic systems can not only detect a drone but sometimes even identify the model or type from the sound ts2.tech.

Pros: The big advantage of acoustic detection is coverage of blind spots. If a drone is flying low behind a tree line or sneaking through an urban canyon where radar can’t see and cameras can’t spot, its buzz might still give it away ts2.tech. Sound can diffract around buildings and over walls, so acoustics act as a great gap-filler for areas where line-of-sight sensors have trouble ts2.tech. It’s also completely passive – acoustic sensors don’t emit anything, so they don’t require spectrum licenses and they don’t alert the drone that it’s being detected (unlike an active radar ping) ts2.tech. Acoustic sensors can detect radio-silent drones that might evade RF detectors (for instance, an autonomous drone won’t emit radio signals, but it still makes noise) ts2.tech. They are generally small and portable; you can deploy a network of acoustic sensors on rooftops or utility poles to cover an area without much infrastructure ts2.tech. By using multiple microphones in different locations (an array), an acoustic system can triangulate the drone’s location via the difference in sound arrival times – effectively giving you bearing and sometimes elevation of the drone ts2.tech. Another pro is that acoustics can contribute to classification – by knowing the sound signature, the system might tell you “this is a DJI Phantom” vs “this sounds like a small racing drone,” which helps responders assess the threat. AI and machine learning have greatly improved acoustic detection: advanced algorithms convert audio into visual spectra and pick out the subtle drone hum even in noisy environments ts2.tech. There have been demonstrations where AI could detect a drone sound buried under city noise that a human might not notice at all. Also, acoustic sensors hear in all directions (omnidirectional mics), so one sensor can cover a good area around it, albeit with limited range.

Cons: The primary drawback is limited range. Small drone noises don’t travel very far – typically, acoustic detection range for a hobby drone might be a few hundred meters at best ts2.tech. For very noisy drones (larger ones or ones with gas engines), maybe up to a kilometer under ideal conditions, but for a little battery quadcopter, 100–500 m is the realistic window. That means acoustic alone often gives very short warning time (a drone could be quite close by the time you hear it). The next issue is background noise and false alarms. In an urban environment, there’s a constant din of cars, lawnmowers, HVAC units, birds chirping, people talking – all of which can mask or mimic drone sounds to some degree ts2.tech. A sudden loud noise (like a motorcycle revving or a helicopter overhead) can overwhelm the microphones or create false positives. Even in warzones, the noise of gunfire, explosions, or generators can drown out drone buzz. While AI filtering helps (e.g., algorithms can ignore steady noises or known non-drone sounds), noisy environments will always reduce acoustic effectiveness ts2.tech. Weather also plays a role: heavy wind can not only create noise but physically push sound waves away, altering how far the drone noise carries. Additionally, some drones are getting quieter – manufacturers have been improving propeller designs to reduce noise (for benign reasons like making drones less annoying to people), which ironically makes them harder to hear. An acoustic system also struggles to give precise tracking; it might alert “drone detected roughly 200m north” but to lock onto it and visually confirm, you’d ideally queue a camera in that direction. So acoustic is usually used as a supplementary sensor that cues others. Lastly, acoustic sensors require careful calibration and updating of their signature libraries. New drone models may have different sounds, so the library needs to expand. And if a drone changes its RPM (say it hovers vs speeds around), its sound changes pitch – the system must account for these variations.

Use Cases: Acoustic detection has proven particularly useful in layers of defense. For example, some prisons use acoustic sensors along with RF sensors to detect contraband delivery drones – if someone tries a radio-silent drone to avoid RF detection, the acoustic picks up the buzzing approach. The U.S. Army has included acoustic sensors in some of its C-UAS systems to cover stealthy drones; notably, the Titan C-UAS system tested by the Army uses a multi-sensor approach including acoustic. On the battlefield, there are anecdotes that soldiers have used simple acoustic detectors or even smartphone apps to alert them to small drones (ISIS drones often made a distinctive buzz soldiers learned to listen for). In urban scenarios, police might deploy an acoustic array on rooftops if they need temporary drone monitoring for, say, a large parade or marathon, especially if other sensors are restricted. Airports have trialed acoustic sensors to complement radar – radar can struggle near the ground due to clutter, so an acoustic could help catch a drone that comes low near a runway. One Israeli company, D-Fend, has an acoustic unit that it adds to its system primarily to classify drone types. A European system under development, APIDS (Advanced Protected Infrastructure Drone System), tested acoustic networks to secure airspace over events like the Paris Air Show. Manufacturers: Some known players in acoustic drone detection include Squarehead Technology (Norway), which offers a product called Discovair that is an acoustic array for drones, and DroneShield (Australia/US) which integrates acoustic sensors in its multi-sensor kits. In academia, research teams have even explored using smartphone microphone arrays crowdsourced to detect drones via sound. In summary, acoustic sensors are best as part of a hybrid solution – they add resiliency by catching drones that might slip past radar or optical, but they are rarely used alone due to range and noise issues ts2.tech. As one counter-drone specialist put it, “Acoustics give you ears where your eyes can’t see”, useful for early hints or confirmation of a drone’s presence especially when it’s hiding behind obstacles.

Hybrid and Layered Anti-Drone Systems

Given that no single sensor or countermeasure is foolproof, the prevailing trend in C-UAS is to deploy layered, hybrid systems that combine multiple technologies. The idea is to capitalize on the strengths of each method while covering each other’s weaknesses ts2.tech defenseadvancement.com. A comprehensive anti-drone system typically has a “detect, track, identify, and defeat” chain – and to accomplish all those steps reliably, integration is key.

On the detection side, a hybrid system might use radar, RF scanners, optical cameras, and acoustic sensors all together defenseadvancement.com. For example, Dedrone’s platform and DroneShield’s system both fuse data from 3D radars, passive RF receivers, PTZ (pan-tilt-zoom) day/night cameras, and acoustic units. An emerging standard is: Radar spots an incoming object and gives a location track; an RF sensor listens to classify if it’s a known drone make/model (and might find the pilot’s location via signal triangulation); an acoustic sensor adds confirmation if in range by hearing the buzz; then an electro-optical camera (possibly with thermal infrared) is cued to zoom in on the target for visual identification ts2.tech ts2.tech. In the command center, software (often aided by AI) fuses these inputs to create a single “air picture” – reducing false alarms and increasing confidence ts2.tech. If radar alone detects something, you might wonder if it’s a bird, but if simultaneously the acoustic hears a drone-like hum and the RF sensor picks up a DJI controller signal, you can be pretty sure it’s a drone. This sensor fusion, guided by AI, can also predict the drone’s path and intent (e.g., heading toward a crowd vs just passing by) ts2.tech. Companies like Fortem and DroneShield have showcased AI that forecasts a rogue drone’s trajectory in real time, giving responders a few extra seconds to react ts2.tech. Integration also means user-friendly operation: a single interface shows all detections on a map, tracks targets, and may even automatically cue countermeasures.

On the defeat side, layered defense usually employs a graduated response. Commonly, soft kill methods (jamming, protocol takeover, spoofing) are attempted first, since they pose less risk of collateral damage ts2.tech. If those fail or aren’t sufficient – for instance, if the drone is hardened or there are too many of them – the system escalates to hard kill options (like lasers, microwaves, nets, or interceptors). This approach is sometimes called the “shooter and shooter” or “multi-effector” strategy: have multiple different weapons available and let the system or operator choose the best for the situation. For example, the U.S. Army’s LIDS (Low Altitude Drone Defender) system integrates a radar (KuRFS) and EO/IR sensors for detection, an RF jammer for soft kill, and if needed, Coyote interceptors (small anti-drone missiles) for hard kill at longer ranges ts2.tech. In a LIDS setup, if a drone is far, they might launch a Coyote to physically destroy it; if it’s closer, they might jam it first; if a swarm comes, they could fire multiple Coyotes or in the future use HPM for area kill ts2.tech. Similarly, Israel’s Drone Dome system is marketed as a multi-layer: detect via radar/RF, identify via camera, then either jam it or, if it’s a high-threat or jam-resistant, shoot it with a 10 kW laser ts2.tech. European consortia (like the INDRA-led JEY-CUAS project) have explicitly concluded that “the most effective solutions will be those capable of integrating the largest number of detection and neutralization technologies” defenseadvancement.com – in other words, a layered defense that can adapt to any drone scenario.

Hybrid systems also focus on command and control (C2) – making sure all these pieces work in unison. A well-designed C2 interface will allow an operator to see a drone alert, verify it on camera, then with one click choose an engagement option (jam, take over, or kinetic). Increasingly, automation is being added: some systems can automatically trigger a jammer when a drone crosses a preset boundary, or launch an interceptor drone from a ready silo without waiting for human command (with a person able to abort if needed). For instance, Anduril’s Lattice system ties its sensors and Anvil interceptors together so that once a threat is confirmed as hostile, an interceptor can be autonomously dispatched and guide itself into the target ts2.tech ts2.tech. The role of the human becomes more supervisory – because in a swarm attack scenario, no human can handle dozens of drones at once, so AI must prioritize and engage threats at machine speed ts2.tech. This is a delicate area: many militaries insist a human remain “in the loop” before lethal action, but for non-lethal actions like jamming, full automation is often allowed.

In real deployments, hybrid approaches are already the norm. For example, during U.S. presidential inaugurations or papal visits (events of high drone risk), authorities deploy a mix: detection by radar + RF + cameras all feeding into a joint operations center, and multiple countermeasures on hand (jammers, net guns, even conventional snipers as last resort). At airports, companies like Dedrone have installed systems that detect via RF and radar and then alert a dedicated response team that can use a jammer gun if needed – this minimizes disruption by ensuring they only jam once a threat is positively ID’ed and entering a restricted zone ts2.tech. Notable integrated systems: Black Sage’s CUAS system (used by US Air Force in some bases) integrates radar, EO/IR, RF, and can cue various effectors from jammers to high-power optics. SAIC’s MEDUSA combines sensors and a high-power microwave. Thales “EagleShield” is a French system combining radar, RF and EO sensors with jamming and interception drones, all designed to comply with laws by tailoring frequencies used ts2.tech. Indra’s system in Europe (as per the JEY-CUAS project) is building a framework where any sensor/effector can plug into a standard C2 for drones, ensuring interoperability across NATO forces defenseadvancement.com.

The pros of hybrid systems are clear: higher detection probability, fewer false alarms (since multiple sensors cross-verify), and layered defense increases the chance of successful mitigation with minimal unintended effects. One method can cover for another’s blind spot – e.g., if an RF-detector misses a radio-silent drone, maybe the acoustic picks it up; if jamming fails, a net or laser is backup. Cons and challenges of hybrid setups mostly revolve around complexity and cost. Integrating many sensors and effectors from different manufacturers is not trivial – data formats, latencies, and calibrations have to be synchronized. The systems can become expensive; not every venue can afford a full suite with radar + EO + RF + HPM + lasers, etc. There’s also the issue of training: operators need to understand multiple technologies and their appropriate use. For example, they must know not to fire a high-power microwave in a downtown area unless absolutely necessary, or when to escalate from jamming to kinetic. The UI design is crucial to prevent overwhelm – the concept of “sensor fusion” is to simplify info, but if done poorly, an operator might be looking at four separate screens and get confused. Another subtle challenge is rules of engagement and legalities: a system might have capabilities that the local law doesn’t allow to use (for instance, a private security team might have detection gear but not be legally allowed to jam or take over a drone ts2.tech ts2.tech). So a hybrid system could detect perfectly but then just alert authorities rather than act, if the user isn’t authorized to use the defeat tech. We see this currently in the U.S. – many stadium and airport deployments are detection-only, feeding info to federal authorities who can respond.

Nonetheless, the clear trend is toward highly integrated solutions. The arms race between drones and defenders is prompting development of “system-of-systems” approaches. Future C-UAS networks may link not just local sensors, but also tap into cloud-based drone tracking networks (like detecting a drone as soon as it takes off by its remote ID broadcast). There is talk of interlinking radar and sensor data across cities or regions to have a bigger air picture and avoid duplication, similar to how air traffic control radars feed a central system. Regulators are also getting involved by mandating tech like Remote ID – essentially a drone’s “digital license plate” broadcast. As that becomes standard, counter-drone systems will integrate receivers for those signals, allowing them to instantly tell friendly compliant drones from potential rogues ts2.tech. That will greatly help reduce false alarms and focus countermeasures only on truly suspicious drones. We might even see authorized drones working with C-UAS systems: for instance, police drones automatically intercepting or escorting unidentified drones out of sensitive areas, under coordination of a central AI.

In summary, hybrid systems represent the state-of-the-art in counter-drone defense. As a European defense report succinctly put it, combining multiple detection and neutralization means “the most effective solutions will be those capable of integrating the largest number” of technologies defenseadvancement.com. No single gadget can solve the drone threat, but a coherent network of sensors and layered countermeasures can come close to a foolproof shield. It’s the classic “layered defense” philosophy: deter, detect, deny, and if all else fails, destroy – using every tool in the toolbox in a coordinated way to protect the skies from malicious drones.

Regulatory and Legal Challenges

Deploying anti-drone technology isn’t just a technical matter – it’s a legal tightrope. In many countries, drones are legally considered a type of aircraft, and that means taking them down can run afoul of strict laws. There are international conventions and national laws that prohibit shooting down or interfering with aircraft except in very specific, authorized cases ts2.tech. Furthermore, many counter-drone methods involve emitting signals (jammers, spoofers) or intercepting communications, which can conflict with communications laws and privacy laws. Here are some key points on the regulatory landscape:

Use of Force and “Aircraft” Laws: Most nations have statutes derived from aviation law which make it illegal for anyone except the state to damage or destroy an aircraft in flight. Even a small drone can be classed as an aircraft. For example, in the United States it’s part of federal law that you cannot disable or intercept a civil aircraft without proper authority – doing so could be interpreted as a federal felony. This means a private citizen or even local police generally cannot shoot down a drone, even if it’s hovering illegally over private property (that’s frustrating to many, but it’s the current law). Likewise, using a jammer on a drone’s radio might be seen as interfering with an aircraft’s operations, also illegal except for specific agencies. Only a handful of federal agencies in the U.S. are explicitly allowed to engage drones with countermeasures: namely the Department of Defense (military), Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice (FBI, etc.), and Department of Energy (for nuclear site protection) ts2.tech. This authority was granted in a law called the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, which carved out exceptions so these agencies can detect and mitigate drones in certain scenarios ts2.tech. Even then, they have to follow strict procedures and reporting. State and local law enforcement (your city police, sheriff, etc.) currently do not have general authority to jam or shoot down drones in the U.S. ts2.tech. So if a drone is spotted over a concert and it’s a potential hazard, local police legally have to call a federal agency (like DHS or FBI) to actually use a jammer or take action – the locals can’t do it themselves in most cases ts2.tech ts2.tech. There’s ongoing debate about this, as many feel this is too restrictive when time is of the essence. In fact, U.S. lawmakers have introduced bills to extend limited counter-UAS authority to state and local police under controlled conditions ts2.tech. As of early 2025, those hadn’t passed, leaving a gap. The practical effect is that, in the U.S., most non-federal entities stick to detection only (which is generally legal), and if mitigation is needed, they involve federal partners. An example was the infamous Gatwick Airport drone incident in the UK (2018): multiple drone sightings shut down the airport for days. The airport authorities themselves had no legal power to jam or shoot the drones, so the British Army had to be called in with their counter-drone equipment to resolve it ts2.tech. This spurred changes – now UK police and certain military units have pre-deployed systems at major airports, but it highlighted the red tape.

Jamming and Hacking Laws: Technologies like RF jammers and GPS spoofers are basically doing things normally reserved for government communications agencies or the military. In the U.S., the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) bans the use of transmitters that interfere with licensed radio communications. So a private company or local police cannot just turn on a jammer – it’s illegal (with hefty fines and criminal penalties). Only federal entities given exception by law can jam, and even they must coordinate with the FCC in many cases. Similarly, GPS is considered a critical utility; interfering with GPS (a federal system) is a big no-no unless you’re authorized. Cyber takeover techniques (hijacking the drone’s link) could potentially violate hacking laws or wiretap laws if done by non-authorized actors, because you are intercepting a communication and sending commands on someone else’s network. There’s a fine line: one could argue it’s a form of lawful electronic warfare if done by govt agents to a threat, but if a private citizen tried to take over their neighbor’s drone, that’s unlawful hacking. European Union countries have analogous restrictions: e.g., under EU telecom law, jamming is generally illegal except for military/police in very specific operations. Countries like France and Germany allow only national police or military to deploy jammers, and typically require case-by-case approval. In the UK, only the Home Office or Defense can authorize countermeasures like jamming or directed energy in civilian airspace. These laws exist partly to protect the broader communications infrastructure – imagine rampant jamming, it would chaos for wifi, GPS, etc.

Detection vs Privacy: Even detecting drones has some legal nuances. Using RF scanners means you are intercepting radio signals. In the U.S., the law (specifically, the Wiretap Act) forbids intercepting the content of communications of others. Most drone RF detectors are designed to capture only the metadata (signal type, direction, drone ID) and not eavesdrop on any video feed the drone is sending. If they recorded the actual video feed or communications without consent, that could be deemed illegal surveillance. In some jurisdictions, there had to be careful legal review to ensure RF drone detection doesn’t violate wiretap rules – typically they justify it by saying the system ignores content and only flags the presence of control signals (which is allowed since it’s like radio direction-finding, not listening to a conversation) ts2.tech. Optical surveillance of drones can inadvertently capture footage of people on the ground, raising privacy concerns as well ts2.tech. Many countries require that if you have continuous monitoring cameras (CCTV), you need to post notices or have policies, and similar questions arise for continuously watching the sky for drones.

Civilian Airspace Safety: Aviation regulators (like the FAA in the U.S., EASA in Europe) are extremely wary of anything that might harm legitimate aircraft. Firing guns or lasers near airports is an obvious hazard (you might accidentally hit a plane or blind a pilot). Even high-powered jamming could disrupt aircraft navigation or communications if mis-aimed. So counter-drone use near airports is tightly constrained. The Gatwick case prompted UK authorities to station counter-drone units ready to go, but even they must coordinate closely with air traffic control when employing jammers or lasers, to avoid endangering passenger planes ts2.tech. The general rule is: kinetic force or high-power jamming in controlled airspace requires top-level clearance. In the U.S., any time a federal agency uses counter-UAS measures in civilian airspace, they have to notify the FAA and often issue a Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) to ensure other aircraft avoid the area. This obviously can slow down the response.

Liability and Ownership: Another issue – if you shoot down or jam a drone that turns out to be a misidentified friendly or hobbyist drone, who is liable for damages? What if a police jammer causes a drone to crash onto a highway and cause an accident? These legal liability questions make many agencies cautious. Military in a combat zone doesn’t worry about that, but domestically, public safety agencies sure do. Thus, rules of engagement are usually strict: identify positively it’s not a friendly or authorized drone before engaging. One way to help identification is the new Remote ID regulation: drones are starting to broadcast a digital ID (much like an electronic license plate). Counter-drone systems can read this to see the drone’s registration info. If it’s an authorized flight (like a media drone with permission or a delivery drone), defenders can hold fire. Regulators are pushing this so that in the future, any drone that isn’t broadcasting ID can be assumed rogue and mitigated accordingly ts2.tech. We’re not fully there yet, but it’s coming.

Legal Trend: The legal landscape is slowly evolving to catch up with the threat. In the U.S., after years of complaints, Congress has considered giving state and local authorities some narrow counter-drone powers, especially to protect critical infrastructure or large public events ts2.tech ts2.tech. One bipartisan bill (as of 2024) aimed to allow state police to use jammers during emergencies when a rogue drone poses risk to a crowd, with federal oversight. But civil liberties groups have raised concerns – they worry about privacy (agencies abusing anti-drone tech to surveil or to interfere with legitimate drone use), and about the slippery slope of allowing more jamming (fearing it could be misused or overdone). The tech industry also is cautious: telecom companies don’t want random entities emitting RF interference. So progress is measured. Outside the U.S., countries like Japan and Australia have updated laws to empower police to intercept drones in certain zones (e.g., around airports or critical sites), often after high-profile incidents. France implemented laws ahead of events like the Bastille Day parade to let security forces take down unauthorized drones. India and Pakistan have given their border security forces authority to shoot down drones, due to cross-border smuggling threats. China, as one might expect, centrally controls this – police and military units there have been using jammer rifles and drone catchers for a while, and civilian ownership of such countermeasures is not permitted.

Manufacturers and compliance: Companies building counter-UAS tech are very aware of these constraints. Many advertise features to ensure legal compliance. For example, Thales’ EagleShield system touts that it can be configured to only jam certain frequencies or stay within power limits to comply with regulations ts2.tech. DroneShield builds region-specific firmware so that their jammers will only operate on bands authorized in that country. Some systems have a “detect-only mode” for use by non-federal users, which can later be upgraded to mitigation mode if laws change. This way, a stadium can invest in a system and use detection now, but be ready to add jamming if it ever becomes legal for them.

Privacy is also a concern: anti-drone cameras might incidentally film people in their backyards, or acoustic sensors might record conversations as they listen for drones. Agencies deploying these have to follow privacy guidelines, like deleting non-threat data and not using the system to eavesdrop beyond its drone-finding purpose. Public notice is often required (e.g., a sign that area is under drone surveillance, similar to CCTV notices).

Military context: On the battlefield or in combat zones, the legal concerns are fewer, but some still apply via the laws of armed conflict. It’s generally lawful to shoot down enemy drones as they are considered legitimate military targets (no issue of civilian aircraft there). One interesting point: Protocols ban weapons intended to cause permanent blindness to humans – there was concern if anti-drone lasers could violate that if misused. Military lawyers have determined that using lasers to destroy drones is fine, as the intent is to damage equipment, not to blind soldiers (and they take precautions not to expose people’s eyes) ts2.tech. Another discussion has been: if a drone is just doing reconnaissance, is it proportional to destroy it with a missile that might cause collateral damage? Generally yes, if it’s an enemy asset, you can target it, but militaries weigh the means used. HPMs and lasers that cause minimal collateral damage are actually quite attractive legally because they reduce risk to civilians compared to shooting machine guns into the air that could fall down somewhere.

In summary, legal issues often lag technology. Currently, the use of anti-drone detection tech is becoming widely accepted (most places allow detecting and tracking as long as you respect privacy). But the use of countermeasures (jamming, spoofing, kinetic) remains heavily restricted outside of military and top-security contexts ts2.tech ts2.tech. This is a bit of a paradox: the tech exists to take down a rogue drone at a stadium, but the police on site might have their hands tied until a federal agent arrives or until the drone actually causes harm. Lawmakers are cautiously trying to expand authority in face of the rising drone threat, but they are balancing concerns about misuse. Meanwhile, drone operators are being corralled into compliance measures like Remote ID to make it easier to sort friend from foe. One expert, Jeffrey Baumgartner (a critical infrastructure security VP), summed it up in testimony by urging that “modernizing our defenses [and] updating our legal frameworks” must go hand-in-hand so we can “safeguard critical infrastructure [and] protect public safety” from drone threats dronelife.com. Until those frameworks catch up, the deployment of anti-drone systems in civilian life will continue to require careful navigation of laws and often involvement of those with special authority. It’s a classic case of technology racing ahead and policy struggling to keep pace – but given the stakes, regulators are now actively engaging to avoid a situation where either drones run rampant or, conversely, countermeasures create new hazards.

Recent Developments and Future Innovations (2023–2025)

The counter-drone arena is evolving as rapidly as the drone threat itself. Recent events and innovations in the past two years have significantly shaped the landscape:

• Lessons from the Ukraine War: The conflict in Ukraine (2022–2023) has been a wake-up call about drones in modern warfare. Both small quadcopters and larger UAVs have been used in huge numbers for surveillance and attack, pushing countermeasures to the limit reuters.com. Ukraine became a testing ground: electronic warfare units on both sides dueled with jammers and spoofers daily, while frontline soldiers improvised with rifle fire and drone-on-drone ramming. A Ukrainian defense official noted that within months, new drone tactics emerged that traditional Western C-UAS systems hadn’t even considered – for example, the Russian use of FPV drones with fiber-optic tethers that cannot be jammed breakingdefense.com. This has forced a rapid adaptation: now cutting a drone’s control fiber or having fallback directed-energy options are on the agenda breakingdefense.com. Western militaries, observing this, have fast-tracked projects like Joint Project Vanaheim (a US-UK initiative launched in 2025) to share knowledge and speed up C-UAS development breakingdefense.com. In short, Ukraine proved that counter-drone tech must be agile – it’s an arms race where each side counteracts the other’s counters in quick succession dronelife.com.
• Bigger, Better Directed-Energy: The last two years saw major milestones in lasers and microwaves. In July 2024, the British Army test-fired a Raytheon anti-drone laser from a Wolfhound armored vehicle – the first laser shootdown of a drone on UK soil reuters.com. By 2025, that same system (HELWS) was being considered for naval use, with Raytheon developing a palletized version to put on ships for swarm defense breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com. The power of available lasers is steadily rising: 50 kW prototypes are operational, and 300 kW-class lasers (capable of engaging faster targets like cruise missiles) are on the horizon for late 2020s deployment ts2.tech ts2.tech. On HPMs, the U.S. Army in mid-2025 committed serious funding (~$43 million) to buy new Leonidas HPM systems from Epirus twz.com – a sign that these are graduating from prototype to field gear. There’s also a push to miniaturize directed energy: the U.S. Marines’ project named “Portable OTM” aims to create a man-portable or vehicle-portable microwave system for short-range swarm defense ts2.tech. If successful, troops could carry an HPM backpack to zap drones in the field.
• Autonomy and AI: Counter-drone systems themselves are getting smarter. New software updates allow systems like Dedrone and DroneShield to autonomously manage threats – e.g., automatically cue cameras, jam a drone that enters a restricted zone, or launch an interceptor drone without manual control. AI-based target recognition has improved identification; recent demos showed systems differentiating a drone’s silhouette vs a bird’s in real-time with high accuracy ts2.tech ts2.tech. This reduces false alarms significantly. Also, swarm vs swarm concepts are emerging: DARPA in the U.S. is experimenting with using friendly drone swarms to counter hostile swarms, coordinating via AI – essentially overwhelming the threat with sheer numbers or electronic confusion. China has also shown AI-directed formations of intercept drones at arms expos.
• Commercialization and C-UAS as a Service: With drone incidents rising, private companies and governments have formed partnerships to protect events. A noticeable trend is “Counter-UAS as a service” – rather than every stadium buying millions in equipment, companies offer to provide a mobile team and gear for an event. In 2023 and 2024, firms like DroneShield and CACI International were hired to secure major league sports events, political conferences, and even the World Cup in Qatar (2022) where multiple systems (radars, jammer guns, DroneHunter interceptors) were deployed and actually brought down a number of unauthorized drones trying to enter the airspace (those incidents mostly went unpublicized to avoid copycats). This service model lowers the barrier to using advanced C-UAS tech in the civilian sphere under proper authorization.
• Notable Deployments: Many countries have started rolling out national anti-drone networks. For instance, Japan after some drone intrusion incidents, set up rapid response police C-UAS units in major cities by 2024, armed with jammer guns and net drones. India deployed Israeli Smashing systems (like Smart Shooter rifle sights) and its own DRDO-made drone jammers to border bases to counter militant drones. Middle Eastern countries invested heavily after seeing drones used in conflicts – the UAE and Saudi Arabia have reportedly bought both Israeli systems (Drone Dome) and Western tech to guard oil facilities and expos. Even smaller nations like Singapore tested integrated C-UAS at their airports. The U.S. meanwhile is putting C-UAS kits at all major military installations and has quick-reaction teams on standby in DC for any drone incursions (recently, they intercepted a small drone that entered restricted airspace near the Capitol using a combination of RF takeover tech – the operator was caught and the drone safely landed).
• Drone ID and Air Traffic Integration: In September 2023, the U.S. FAA’s Remote ID rule went into effect – all new drones must broadcast an ID signal. By 2024, many drones started complying (though enforcement is still lax). This is a game-changer for counter-drone: systems can now have a receiver that reads these IDs and cross-checks them against allowed flight plans. Many C-UAS vendors have added Remote ID modules in 2024–25. For example, Dedrone announced a software update in 2024 that integrates Remote ID data to flag drones that are not broadcasting or that are on a “no-fly” list (e.g., based on their ID, you know it’s owned by someone who shouldn’t be there). The next step is integration with UTM (Unmanned Traffic Management) systems. If cities set up drone traffic control networks (like virtual corridors for delivery drones), the counter-drone system can tap into that to automatically know which drones are friendly/approved. Anything outside the plan is then clearly a target. NASA and FAA did tests in 2022–2023 showing such integration is feasible.
• Emerging Threats: While defenders have upped their game, drone tech is also advancing. Recent developments include drones with optical stealth coatings (reducing glare and visibility), quieter propulsion (some drones now have noise-dampening propellers or even bladeless fans), and AI-driven autonomy where drones can dynamically avoid countermeasures. The rise of “kamikaze drones” (loitering munitions like the Shahed-136 used in Ukraine) blurs the line between drones and missiles, challenging C-UAS systems to intercept what are essentially small cruise missiles – something lasers and high-power microwaves are increasingly tasked to handle. Drone swarms coordinating autonomously were demonstrated by researchers in 2024, meaning future threats might be dozens of drones acting in concert to overwhelm defenses. This has pushed militaries to consider extreme counters like high-powered EMP bombs or directed energy walls.
• International Collaboration: Knowing the global nature of the threat, countries have started collaborating on C-UAS development. NATO set up a technical group specifically for counter-drone in 2023, exchanging data from incidents. The EU’s aforementioned JEY-CUAS project brought together companies like Indra, Leonardo, Thales to create a blueprint for next-gen European C-UAS defenseadvancement.com defenseadvancement.com. Their conclusions (published in late 2024) emphasized modular systems that can integrate everything from radars to lasers, and recommended standard protocols so that, for example, a French sensor could feed a German effector seamlessly defenseadvancement.com. This means in a crisis, allied countries’ systems could work together. It’s akin to how air defense networks share radar tracks – in the future, perhaps counter-drone networks will share drone tracks in real time across borders if needed (for instance, to stop a drone that’s moving from one country’s airspace to another).
• Improved Counter-Drone Drones: Companies are iterating new interceptor UAVs. In 2025, Anduril unveiled an improved Interceptor “Nightshade” (hypothetical name) that can carry multiple expendable darts to take out several drones per sortie, addressing the one-and-done issue. Likewise, Fortem introduced an upgraded DroneHunter with AI that can chase faster targets and better target nets at small racing drones. New drone interceptors are also being designed to handle larger unmanned aircraft – for example, Boeing is experimenting with using loyal wingman drones (originally for air combat) to intercept hostile UAVs like a cruise missile.
• Legislative Moves: On the legal front, by mid-2025, there’s movement in the U.S. Congress to reauthorize and expand drone defense authorities. A House bill known as the “Safeguarding the Homeland from Unmanned Threats Act” was tabled, aiming to let critical infrastructure operators (like power plants) use certain countermeasures in emergencies, and to extend DOJ/DHS authorities (which were due to expire) dronelife.com ts2.tech. While not passed yet, it signals recognition that local and private entities might soon get limited permissions to act against rogue drones, under oversight. Similarly, the UK in 2024 updated its Air Navigation Order to explicitly allow designated officers to disable drones within a “Flight Restriction Zone” of airports, after the Heathrow drone scare in 2019 and others. As these laws shape up, industry is preparing — training programs for police in handling C-UAS are being developed (one called “Counter-UAS Basic Course” launched in 2024 by a consortium in the US to teach local officers how to respond in coordination with fed teams).
• Public Awareness and Counter-Drone etiquette: Public campaigns have started to educate drone hobbyists about staying clear of sensitive areas and informing them that authorities do have countermeasures. For example, during the 2024 European Football Championship, police ran social media ads warning “Don’t fly drones at venues – we have tech to take them down and you will be arrested.” This kind of messaging is meant to deter casual intrusions (which are the majority of incidents). It’s an interesting development: the existence of counter-drone measures themselves can be a deterrent if publicized, somewhat akin to saying “beware of the dog” even if the dog is rarely unleashed.

Looking ahead, we can anticipate more convergence of counter-drone and traditional air defense. As drones range from tiny quadcopters to large unmanned planes, militaries will integrate C-UAS with systems that also handle rockets, artillery, and missiles – a holistic approach often called C-sUAS/SHORAD integration. The future might see laser-equipped drones hunting other drones (some experiments have put small lasers on quadcopters to zap enemy drone rotors). And as anti-drone tech gets more prevalent, drone makers will no doubt try to make drones that detect and avoid countermeasures (some high-end drones can already detect jamming and try to automatically fly out of a jammed zone).

In conclusion, the period of 2023–2025 has been one of rapid advances and real-world trials for anti-drone systems. We’ve seen them move from theoretical or sporadically used, to actively deployed in conflicts and major security events worldwide. The technology is maturing – high-power lasers and HPMs are proving effective, interceptors are getting smarter, and layered systems are the standard. At the same time, laws are (slowly) being adjusted to allow these tools to be used when necessary, under controlled conditions. The cat-and-mouse game with drone threats will continue, but the past two years have shown that with sufficient investment and coordination, it’s possible to significantly mitigate the risk drones pose. The next few years will likely bring even more impressive countermeasures – and no doubt the need for them, as drone technology itself proliferates. It truly is an arms race in the skies, but one where defenders are now mobilized and catching up fast, deploying everything from eagle-eyed radars to AI-driven interceptors to keep us safe from rogue eyes in the sky.

Sources: (See linked references for detailed information and expert commentary on each system and development) roboticsbiz.com ts2.tech ts2.tech breakingdefense.com reuters.com foxnews.com dronelife.com defenseadvancement.com.