The Ultimate Global Missile Guide: Secret Weapons and Strategic Arsenals Revealed

Missile technology forms the backbone of modern military power, from intercontinental nuclear-tipped rockets to precision-guided tactical weapons. This comprehensive country-by-country guide details the world’s missile systems – ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship and air-defense missiles, air-to-air weapons, and more – including those in service, in development, or recently retired. For each nation, we outline key missile systems with technical specifications (range, speed, payload, propulsion), their origin (indigenous or imported), and intended roles (strategic deterrence, air defense, ship-killing, etc.). Read on to discover the secret arsenals and cutting-edge missiles that shape global security.

United States: Arsenal of Advanced Missiles

The United States deploys one of the most sophisticated and diverse missile arsenals in the world, spanning strategic intercontinental weapons to tactical precision-guided munitions. U.S. missile systems are almost entirely indigenous designs, reflecting massive domestic defense R&D. Below we break down U.S. missiles by category, with key specifications and roles.

U.S. Ballistic Missile Systems (Strategic and Tactical)

The U.S. strategic deterrent relies on ICBMs and SLBMs in its nuclear triad, while shorter-range ballistic missiles provide tactical strike options. All U.S. ballistic missiles are solid-fueled and domestically developed.

Note: U.S. ballistic missiles feature solid-fuel propulsion for quick launch readiness and reliability. The Minuteman III ICBM, for example, travels at 15,000 mph (Mach 23) at burnout af.mil and can strike targets over 13,000 km away carrying a nuclear warhead. The Trident II D5 SLBM, deployed on Ohio-class submarines (and UK Vanguard subs), can exceed 12,000 km range with multiple nuclear warheads, reaching terminal speeds around Mach 24 navalnews.com. For tactical strikes, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is a short-range ballistic missile (300 km) used to hit high-value targets with conventional warheads armscontrol.org. Under development are cutting-edge systems like the LRHW hypersonic boost-glide missile and the Sentinel ICBM, which will ensure the U.S. retains a robust strategic strike capability into the future.

U.S. Cruise Missiles (Land-Attack and Anti-Ship)

The U.S. employs a variety of cruise missiles for land-attack, anti-ship, and standoff roles. These jet-powered missiles fly low and often subsonic (except where noted) to deliver conventional or nuclear payloads with high precision.

The U.S. pioneered long-range cruise missiles for precision strikes. The iconic Tomahawk (subsonic, turbofan powered) can hit targets 1,250–2,500 km away missilethreat.csis.org and has been a staple of U.S. Navy strikes. For nuclear deterrence, the Air Force fields the AGM-86B ALCM on B-52 bombers (up to ~2,500 km range) missilethreat.csis.org. Newer air-launched missiles like the AGM-158 JASSM and its stealthy anti-ship counterpart LRASM allow fighters and bombers to engage targets from hundreds of kilometers. The Harpoon remains a widely used anti-ship missile with variants for ships, subs, or aircraft (range ~120–240 km) missilethreat.csis.org. Notably, the U.S. is pushing the envelope with hypersonic cruise missiles (e.g. HAWC program) to achieve speeds above Mach 5 for time-sensitive, high-value targets – a response to advancements by Russia and China.

U.S. Surface-to-Air and Air Defense Missiles

From long-range strategic ABM systems to short-range MANPADS, the U.S. has a layered air and missile defense architecture. Key systems include the Patriot, THAAD, Aegis naval interceptors, and MANPADS like Stinger. Most U.S. SAMs are domestically developed, though some are fielded by allies through imports.

• Patriot PAC-3 – A mobile air-defense system firing hit-to-kill PAC-3 interceptors. Range ~35 km vs ballistic missiles (160 km vs aircraft with older PAC-2) and intercept speed up to ~Mach 5 en.wikipedia.org. Propulsion: solid-fuel. Role: point defense against tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft (used by 18 countries) missilethreat.csis.org. Origin: USA.
• THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) – A strategic theater missile defense that intercepts ballistic missiles in their terminal phase exo-atmospherically. Range ~200 km, speed ~Mach 8 (kinetic hit-to-kill) hfunderground.com. Propulsion: solid. Role: defense against medium-range ballistic missiles (deployed by USA, and recently in allies like S. Korea). Origin: USA.
• Aegis/SM-3 – The Navy’s Aegis combat system with Standard Missile-3 interceptors provides mid-course intercept of ballistic missiles. SM-3 Block IIA has ~2,500 km intercept range in space and speeds ~Mach 15+. Propulsion: 3-stage solid. Role: ship-based ballistic missile defense (also land-based “Aegis Ashore”). Origin: USA/Japan (co-dev).
• SM-6 – A versatile naval missile serving as long-range SAM and anti-ship weapon. Range ~240 km (anti-air), speed Mach 3.5+. Propulsion: solid dual-stage. Role: Fleet air defense and terminal ballistic missile defense; can strike surface targets. Origin: USA.
• NASAMS (AIM-120 AMRAAM) – A medium-range ground-based air defense using the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile. Range ~25–40 km (depending on variant). Propulsion: solid. Role: point/mid-range air defense (operated by USA (DC defense) and allies like Norway, Ukraine). Origin: USA/Norway.
• FIM-92 Stinger – Man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS). Range ~4.8 km, speed ~Mach 2.2. Infrared-homing. Propulsion: solid. Role: shoulder-fired missile for short-range defense against aircraft/UAVs. Widely exported. Origin: USA.

Notably, the Patriot system saw extensive use (and upgrades) from the Gulf War to current conflicts, evolving to tackle ballistic missiles with hit-to-kill PAC-3 interceptors. THAAD adds an upper-tier defense, capable of intercepting threats at the edge of space. At sea, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis ships armed with SM-3 and SM-6 missiles create a mobile shield against missiles and aircraft. This multi-layered approach – from high-altitude exoatmospheric interceptors to low-altitude point-defense – exemplifies U.S. commitment to air and missile defense.

U.S. Air-to-Air Missiles

American fighter aircraft are equipped with advanced air-to-air missiles (AAMs) for supremacy in the skies. These missiles are all indigenously developed or co-developed with allies:

• AIM-9 Sidewinder – Short-range IR-homing missile. Range ~35 km, speed ~Mach 2.5. Warhead: 9 kg HE fragmentation. Propulsion: solid rocket. Use: Within-visual-range dogfight missile (widely used since 1950s; latest AIM-9X variant has high off-boresight capability). Origin: USA.
• AIM-120 AMRAAM – Medium-range active radar homing AAM. Range ~75–105 km (D variant >160 km). Speed ~Mach 4. Warhead: 20 kg fragmentation. Propulsion: solid. Use: Beyond-visual-range engagements; primary BVR missile for U.S. and NATO fighters en.wikipedia.org. Origin: USA.
• AIM-260 JATM (in development) – Next-generation long-range AAM intended to replace AMRAAM. Estimated range >150 km. Likely Mach 5 class. Use: Counter advanced threats with longer reach (expected mid-2020s). Origin: USA.
• AIM-54 Phoenix (retired) – Long-range (180 km) radar-guided AAM once used on F-14 Tomcat, Mach 5 speed, 60 kg warhead. Retired 2004. Demonstrated U.S. long-range AAM capability; now succeeded by AIM-120D and upcoming AIM-260.

In summary, the United States maintains a comprehensive missile portfolio: from the Minuteman III ICBM standing alert in underground silos af.mil to the sea-skimming Harpoon and the combat-proven Patriot air defense system. Virtually every missile in U.S. service is indigenously developed, underscoring U.S. technological leadership. This arsenal serves a range of missions – nuclear deterrence, power projection, precision strike, and air and missile defense – forming a cornerstone of the U.S. military’s global reach and protective umbrella for allies.

Russia: From “Satan” ICBMs to Hypersonic Gliders

Russia fields one of the world’s most formidable missile inventories, inheriting Soviet legacies and adding modern designs. As a major missile power, Russia’s systems range from new-generation ICBMs and hypersonic weapons to layered air defenses. Many countries operate or import Russian missiles, but here we focus on those in Russian service (indigenous, except where noted).

Russian Ballistic Missiles (Strategic and Tactical)

Russia’s strategic rocket forces rely on a mix of silo-based and mobile ICBMs, submarine-launched missiles, and shorter-range ballistic systems. Russia has been modernizing with new heavy ICBMs and hypersonic capabilities.

Russia’s long-range missiles underpin its nuclear deterrent. The RS-24 Yars ICBM (solid-fueled, MIRV-capable) is deployed on mobile launchers and silos to ensure second-strike survivability. To replace aging Soviet-era heavy ICBMs, Russia is testing the RS-28 Sarmat, a 200+ ton liquid-fueled giant with a range up to 18,000 km missilethreat.csis.org. Sarmat can carry ~10 MIRVs or the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles, which detach and maneuver at Mach 20+ speeds en.wikipedia.org to evade defenses. Russia has reportedly put a limited number of Avangard boost-glide warheads on standby atop older UR-100N ICBMs, marking the first operational hypersonic glide weapon.

At sea, Russia’s Delta IV and new Borei-class nuclear submarines launch SLBMs like Sineva (liquid propellant) and Bulava (solid propellant) – each carrying multiple nuclear warheads and capable of striking targets >8,000 km away. For regional conflicts, Russia fields the Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile (500 km) carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads. Iskander travels on a flattened trajectory with quasi-ballistic maneuvers to complicate interception. An air-launched derivative, the Kinzhal, is launched from modified MiG-31K interceptors and can theoretically reach Mach 10, targeting high-value assets (like carriers or command bunkers) at ranges up to ~2,000 km. These tactical ballistic missiles were employed in conflicts such as the 2022 Ukraine war to strike operational-depth targets.

Russian Cruise and Anti-Ship Missiles

Russia and the former USSR have a rich history of cruise missile development – from heavy anti-ship missiles to modern long-range land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). Many are supersonic, reflecting a design emphasis on speed to penetrate defenses.

Russia’s cruise missiles serve both strategic and tactical roles. The Kalibr family, debuted in combat in 2015, gave the Russian Navy a precision land-attack capability akin to Tomahawk. Kalibr missiles launched from small frigates and submarines struck targets in Syria over 1,500 km away missilethreat.csis.org. Anti-ship variants of Kalibr and the P-800 Oniks are high-speed sea-skimmers designed to defeat naval air defenses with sheer velocity (Oniks reaches Mach 2.5).

The Air Force long-range aviation employs air-launched cruise missiles like the Kh-55/Kh-555 and stealthy Kh-101 for stand-off strikes. These were extensively used in recent conflicts to hit Ukrainian infrastructure from bombers flying far from danger. The Kh-55 series, originally nuclear, travels ~2,500 km missilethreat.csis.org; the conventional Kh-101 similarly exceeds 2,500 km with precision guidance. For maritime strike, the Soviet-era Kh-22 remains feared – a huge, Mach 4 anti-ship missile originally built to disable US carriers with a single nuclear or massive conventional warhead. Its modernized version, Kh-32, flies even higher and faster, making it challenging to intercept.

A headline development is the 3M22 Zircon, a scramjet-powered hypersonic cruise missile. In tests and statements, Zircon is said to reach Mach 8–9 with a range of 1,000 km rusi.org, striking both ships and ground targets. It’s launched from standard Russian ship VLS tubes, meaning even frigates can carry this ultra-fast weapon. While Western analysts caution that Zircon’s effective range against moving ships might be lower (due to needing to slow down for terminal targeting) rusi.org rusi.org, its addition to Russia’s arsenal marks a significant advancement in anti-ship warfare – dramatically compressing reaction times for defenders (a Mach 6 sea-skimming target gives a warship perhaps 15 seconds warning rusi.org). Zircon entered limited service in 2022–2023 on an Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, representing a new class of threat.

Russian Surface-to-Air and Air Defense Missiles

Russia has heavily invested in air and missile defense, deploying layered SAM networks that are among the world’s most extensive. Many countries import Russian SAM systems, a testament to their perceived capability.

Long-Range SAMs: The S-400 “Triumf” (SA-21) is Russia’s premier long-range SAM, with a 400 km reach using 40N6E missiles army-technology.com and ability to intercept high-speed targets (it can purportedly hit targets flying up to Mach 14) hfunderground.com. S-400 fires a mix of missiles: 48N6 series (~250 km range) for aircraft and shorter-range ballistic missiles, and 9M96 missiles (~120 km) for point defense army-technology.com army-technology.com. The system defends wide “bubbles” around strategic sites and forms an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) shield in places like Kaliningrad and Crimea missilethreat.csis.org missilethreat.csis.org. The newer S-500 “Prometheus” (just entering service) extends engagement altitude to exo-atmospheric ranges (intended against MRBMs/ICBMs and even low-orbit satellites) – with reported intercept range 500–600 km and target speeds > Mach 20 (under development, limited initial deployment).

Medium-Range SAMs: The S-300 family (SA-10/SA-20) and Buk series (SA-11/17) cover medium ranges. The S-300PMU-2 can engage aircraft ~200 km away and tactical ballistic missiles at shorter range, using 48N6 missiles (~Mach 6). The Buk-M2/M3 are mobile SAMs with 30–70 km range against aircraft, often used to protect field forces and complement long-range systems by filling the gaps at lower altitudes missilethreat.csis.org. Notoriously, a Buk system was implicated in the downing of flight MH17 in 2014, highlighting its deadly effectiveness against aircraft.

Short-Range/Point-Defense SAMs: Russia deploys numerous short-range systems to protect ground troops and strategic SAM sites from cruise missiles, drones, and PGMs. The Tor-M2 (SA-15) is an all-weather, short-range system (15–20 km) that can engage munitions and aircraft; the Pantsir-S1 combines 30mm guns with missiles (range ~20 km) to form a last line of defense against low-flying threats missilethreat.csis.org. Man-portable systems like Igla and Verba (SA-18/24) give infantry units an organic anti-air capability (5–6 km range).

Russia’s air defense doctrine creates three tiers: long-range S-400/S-300 batteries form the outer layer (covering hundreds of km) missilethreat.csis.org, medium-range Buk strengthens the mid-layer by targeting penetrators that leak through missilethreat.csis.org, and short-range Tor, Pantsir, Osa, etc., guard critical points and the SAM batteries themselves from air attack missilethreat.csis.org. This integrated network is further augmented by early-warning radars and command systems, making it a complex challenge for any adversary’s air campaign.

Russian Air-to-Air Missiles

Russian fighters and interceptors carry a variety of AAMs, many of which are widely exported:

• R-73 (AA-11 Archer): Short-range IR-guided dogfight missile with high agility (off-boresight capable via helmet cueing). Range ~30 km, speed ~Mach 2.5. Indigenous, in service globally.
• R-77 (AA-12 Adder): Active radar homing medium-range AAM (Russia’s rough equivalent to AIM-120). Range ~80–100 km (export R-77-1 up to 110 km), speed ~Mach 4. Warhead: 30 kg. Features a distinctive lattice-fin design in early variants.
• R-37M (AA-13 Axehead): Very long-range AAM for interceptors (MiG-31BM) and Su-35, etc. Range up to ~300–400 km (against non-maneuvering targets like AWACS) and speed ~Mach 6. It’s among the fastest AAMs, intended to kill high-value assets before they can withdraw.
• K-74M/izdeliye 760: Newer short-range AAM in development to replace R-73 with improved IR seeker and counter-countermeasures.
• K-77M (R-77 modernized): An upgraded R-77 variant with AESA radar seeker and extended range to ~190 km (supposedly for the Su-57 stealth fighter’s internal carriage).

Russian AAM designs often prioritize high speed and kinematic range – for instance, the R-37M fired from a high-flying MiG-31 can potentially hit Mach 6 to catch fleeing bombers or surveillance planes. Meanwhile, the R-73’s lethality in close combat was proven in conflicts (e.g., it achieved the first recorded over-the-shoulder shoot-down via helmet sight in the 1990s). These missiles, combined with potent Russian fighter aircraft, pose a serious threat to opposing air forces, especially when integrated with Russia’s ground-based air defenses.

In summary, Russia’s missile forces reflect its strategic emphasis on deterrence, area denial, and power projection despite economic constraints. Indigenous designs like the S-400 and Iskander have also become export successes (e.g., S-400 sold to China, Turkey, India army-technology.com). With new systems like hypersonic Zircon and Avangard, Russia seeks to outpace NATO missile defenses and preserve its ability to strike and defend. From the Cold War “Satan” ICBMs to cutting-edge hypersonics, Russia remains a top-tier missile power shaping global strategic stability.

China: Growing Missile Superpower and A2/AD Arsenal

China’s missile program has expanded dramatically, making it a leading missile power in both quantity and technological breadth. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force fields missiles for strategic deterrence, regional power projection, and area-denial – including advanced ballistic missiles and an array of conventional rockets. Most Chinese missiles are indigenously developed, though early programs benefitted from foreign technology (e.g. Russian, and historically, some U.S. designs via allies). Today China’s arsenal covers everything from ICBMs that can reach the U.S. mainland to swarms of short-range rockets and anti-ship missiles designed to complicate any approach to its coasts.

Chinese Ballistic Missiles (Short- to Intercontinental)

China has the world’s largest and most diverse inventory of ballistic missiles. This includes strategic nuclear missiles as well as conventional short-range missiles for regional conflicts.

China’s ICBM force has rapidly modernized and expanded. The solid-fueled DF-41 – China’s longest-range missile – can carry multiple warheads to targets across the globe missilethreat.csis.org. It is deployed on road-mobile TELs and possibly rail cars, giving Beijing a survivable second-strike. Older DF-5 silo missiles are being retrofitted with MIRVs to remain credible. U.S. intelligence reports indicate China is constructing hundreds of new silos in western China, potentially for DF-41s or new DF-31 variants, signaling a major ICBM force increase.

Regionally, China’s medium and intermediate-range missiles provide a potent anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) umbrella. The DF-26 IRBM, with 4,000 km range, can strike U.S. bases on Guam (hence its nickname) and also has an ASBM variant to target ships at long range. It’s dual-capable (nuclear or 1,200-kg conventional warhead). For shorter ranges, the DF-21D was the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) – its maneuverable warhead reportedly can adjust trajectory to hit moving vessels like aircraft carriers missilethreat.csis.org, out to ~1,500 km. This “carrier killer” has been a driver of U.S. Navy tactics and missile defense development in the Western Pacific. Other DF-21 variants cover nuclear (DF-21A) and conventional land attack (DF-21C) roles missilethreat.csis.org missilethreat.csis.org.

At the tactical level, China possesses thousands of short-range ballistic missiles. The DF-15 and DF-11 families (600 km and 300 km respectively) were infamously fired near Taiwan during the 1995–96 crisis. Newer solid-fueled SRBMs, like the DF-12 (export name M20), offer quick-reaction, high-accuracy strike options in a regional conflict (for example, saturating Taiwan’s defenses or U.S. bases in Asia). These have modular warheads, including unitary high-explosive, submunitions, bunker-busters, or possibly EMP payloads.

China also introduced hypersonic boost-glide missiles into its arsenal. The DF-17, first revealed in 2019, mounts a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) onto a medium-range booster missilethreat.csis.org missilethreat.csis.org. The DF-17’s HGV flies at Mach 5+ and can maneuver unpredictably in the atmosphere, making it extremely hard to intercept. It’s primarily a conventional system aimed at regional targets (e.g., U.S. carriers or bases in Asia), though potentially nuclear-capable. This technology demonstrates China’s commitment to leapfrogging traditional defenses with novel systems.

Chinese Cruise, Anti-Ship, and Air-Launched Missiles

China’s cruise missile development has paralleled its ballistic program, yielding a variety of land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles (many of which are indigenously developed but some trace lineage to Soviet/Russian designs or foreign tech via Pakistan, etc.). Key systems include:

• CJ-10 / DF-10 LACM: A ground-launched or air-launched land-attack cruise missile (sometimes called Changjian-10). Range ~1,500+ km. Subsonic, with a 500 kg HE warhead. Deployed on road-mobile launchers and H-6K bombers. This is a pillar of China’s conventional long-range strike (analogous to U.S. Tomahawk). Variants include the CJ-20 air-launched version.
• KD-20 / YJ-100: Air-launched cruise missiles carried by H-6 bombers; thought to be similar to CJ-10 with 1,500+ km range, used for land attack.
• YJ-83: Standard subsonic anti-ship cruise missile (~180 km range) for ships and aircraft. Comparable to Harpoon/Exocet in size and profile. Used by most PLA Navy surface combatants and naval aircraft.
• YJ-62: Earlier long-range anti-ship missile (~400 km) deployed on destroyers (such as Type 052C). Subsonic, larger warhead (300+ kg).
• YJ-18: A newer multistage anti-ship cruise missile (likely based on Russian Kalibr). Range ~540 km missilethreat.csis.org. It cruises subsonically then accelerates to supersonic (Mach 3+) in the terminal phase – combining long reach with high endgame speed. Deployed on Chinese destroyers and submarines.
• YJ-12: A supersonic (up to Mach 3) air-launched anti-ship missile with ~250–300 km range. Carried by strike aircraft (e.g., JH-7, H-6). Its high speed and sea-skimming profile present a severe challenge to ship defenses.
• CM-302: Export designation for YJ-12, offered as a high-speed anti-ship missile abroad.
• DH-10 / HN-2/3: The “Donghai-10” or Hong Niao series were early subsonic LACMs (range 1,500–2,000 km) developed from the 1990s onward, now evolved into the CJ-10.
• AKD-20 / CM-400AKG: An air-launched supersonic missile (by AVIC) marketed for export, possibly used by Pakistan on JF-17. Range ~250 km, Mach 4, for high-value ground or ship targets (sometimes dubbed “carrier killer” in export literature).

China has also invested in anti-ship ballistic missiles (as noted, DF-21D and DF-26) to complement these cruise missiles – creating a layered threat to naval forces at multiple ranges and trajectories.

Notably, Chinese ASCMs are widely exported (C-802, C-803, etc., which are export versions of YJ missiles) and also deployed on a vast array of platforms, from Type 022 stealth missile boats to coastal truck launchers. The mix of subsonic and supersonic profiles forces adversaries to prepare for both low-and-slow and high-and-fast threats.

Chinese Surface-to-Air Defense Missiles

China’s air defense network is a mix of domestic systems and a few imported Russian ones, increasingly dominated by indigenous HQ-series SAMs:

• HQ-9: China’s long-range SAM (often compared to S-300). Range ~200 km (for HQ-9B variant) against aircraft, with limited ABM capability against shorter-range missiles. Uses a radar and guidance concept similar to early S-300P. The naval version is HHQ-9 (on Chinese destroyers).
• HQ-19: Under development for BMD (similar to THAAD, potentially exoatmospheric intercept of intermediate-range missiles).
• HQ-16: Medium-range SAM (range ~40–70 km) co-developed with Russia (based on Buk). It’s deployed on newer PLA Navy frigates and in Army units for regional air defense.
• HQ-17: A reverse-engineered variant of the Tor (SA-15) short-range system for point defense.
• HQ-12 (KS-1): Medium-range SAM, older system (50 km).
• HQ-7: Short-range SAM (15 km) based on the French Crotale, used for point defense of bases and ships (as HHQ-7 on older frigates).
• HQ-22: A newer medium/long-range SAM (approx 170 km range) introduced as a cheaper complement to HQ-9, also exported as FK-3 (notably Serbia acquired FK-3 in 2020s).
• Foreign SAMs: China imported several Russian S-300PMU batteries in the 1990s (and perhaps S-300V for army). More recently, China bought the S-400 from Russia, with deliveries completed by 2019 army-technology.com. These high-end Russian systems likely protect strategic areas alongside HQ-9s, and China likely uses them to study and improve its own designs.

Overall, China’s SAMs create a dense defensive bubble over its territory and naval groups, forming an Eastern variant of the layered approach (long-range HQ-9/S-400, medium HQ-16/22, point-defense HQ-17/7). Integration with extensive radar networks and new technologies (like anti-stealth radars) aims to counter the threat of advanced fighters and cruise missile strikes.

Chinese Air-to-Air Missiles

China’s air-to-air missile technology lagged the West and Russia in the past, but has caught up significantly. Current and upcoming AAMs include:

• PL-15: A long-range radar-guided AAM introduced on PLA fighters like J-20 and J-16. Estimated range 200 km+, with a dual-pulse motor. The PL-15’s development (with an AESA seeker) reportedly spurred the U.S. to develop AIM-260 to regain parity. It’s designed to target high-value assets (tankers, AWACS) from standoff distance as well as fighters.
• PL-12 (SD-10): Active radar homing medium-range AAM (~70 km), analogous to AIM-120B/C. In service on many Chinese fighters and exported (e.g., as SD-10 to Pakistan for the JF-17).
• PL-10: Advanced short-range IR missile with high off-boresight capability for modern fighters (equivalent to AIM-9X or IRIS-T). Arming J-20, J-10C, etc.
• PL-21/PL-X: Rumored very-long-range AAM (possibly in testing) that could use ramjet propulsion (similar concept to MBDA Meteor) for ranges of 300+ km.
• PL-8: An older short-range IR AAM (licensed Python-3 from Israel in 1980s).
• PL-9: Short-range IR (improved PL-8).
• PL-AAF: (A hypothetical name for an anti-radiation AAM? Some sources mention China working on missiles to target AWACS specifically by homing on their radar emissions).

In essence, China’s advanced AAMs like the PL-15 signal its intent to challenge adversary aircraft before they can get within their own weapon release range. Combined with the long range of Chinese fighters’ sensors and growing stealth capabilities, the PLA Air Force is working towards a beyond-visual-range dominance strategy in the Western Pacific.

In summary, China’s missile arsenal has rapidly evolved into an all-encompassing force: nuclear-tipped ICBMs that secure its status as a major power missilethreat.csis.org missilethreat.csis.org, medium-range missiles that hold bases and carrier groups at risk missilethreat.csis.org, and short-range systems that reinforce territorial claims (e.g., against Taiwan, South China Sea). The combination of ballistic and cruise missiles in its A2/AD strategy aims to deter third-party intervention by threatening high losses. As China continues to innovate (e.g., hypersonic glide vehicles, maneuverable ASBMs), it is shifting the strategic balance and forcing rivals to rethink defense postures in Asia missilethreat.csis.org missilethreat.csis.org. The Chinese missile force, once modest, is now a centerpiece of Beijing’s military might.

Israel: Cutting-Edge Indigenous Missiles in a Small Nation

Despite its size, Israel has developed a world-class range of missile systems, driven by unique security needs and a high-technology sector. Israel’s missiles cover strategic deterrence, air and missile defense, and tactical precision strikes. Many are indigenously developed, though Israel also imports or co-develops some systems with allies (e.g., the U.S. or India).

Israeli Ballistic and Strategic Missiles

Israel maintains ambiguity around its strategic forces, but it is widely reported to have a triad of delivery systems for nuclear deterrence – including ballistic missiles known as Jericho.

• Jericho III: Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with an estimated range of 4,800–6,500 km. Propulsion: 3-stage solid. Believed to carry a single nuclear warhead (several hundred kilotons) or possibly MIRVs in future. Status: Operational (indigenous). Jericho III gives Israel the ability to strike targets far beyond the Middle East (potentially reaching all of Iran, Europe, or even Asia) and is the cornerstone of its second-strike capability.
• Jericho II: Medium-range ballistic missile (~1,500 km). Propulsion: 2-stage solid. Deployed in the 1980s. Thought to carry a nuclear warhead (approx 1 MT) or conventional payload. Possibly retired or in reserve as Jericho III took over.
• Jericho I: Short-range ballistic missile (~500 km) – Israel’s first ballistic missile (1970s), now obsolete and likely decommissioned.
• LORA (Long Range Attack): A quasi-ballistic theater missile (tactical ballistic missile). Range ~400 km, 570 kg warhead armscontrol.org. Propulsion: solid. Status: Operational (indigenous, by IAI). LORA provides precision strikes for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); for example, it was exported to Azerbaijan and used in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It can be ship-launched or ground-launched.
• Shavit: Space launch vehicle based on Jericho II/III technology. While used to launch satellites, it demonstrates capability to loft heavy payloads (potential ICBM technology). Israel has orbital launch capability, making it one of the few countries with that technology.

Israel does not openly discuss nuclear warheads, but it’s widely believed to have ~80–100 nuclear weapons. The Jericho missiles are presumed nuclear delivery vehicles, alongside Air Force fighter-bombers and Dolphin-class submarines (which can launch cruise missiles).

Israeli Cruise Missiles and Air-Launched Weapons

Israel has developed advanced cruise missiles, especially air-launched, leveraging its aerospace industry:

• Popeye (AGM-142 Have Nap): Air-launched standoff missile. Range ~80 km (standard Popeye) up to ~150 km (Popeye II “Popeye Turbo”). Warhead ~360 kg HE or penetrator. Used by Israeli F-15I and F-16 aircraft; exported to several countries. Notably, a reportedly extended-range submarine-launched version (“Popeye Turbo”) with range ~1,500 km is believed to provide Israel’s sea-based nuclear capability armscontrol.org armscontrol.org (launchable from modified torpedo tubes of Dolphin subs, nuclear warhead possible).
• Delilah: Air-launched loitering cruise missile. Range ~250 km. Warhead ~30–50 kg. What makes Delilah special is its ability to loiter and circle the target area, allowing real-time target selection or abort. It’s basically a UAV-like cruise missile, highly useful against relocatable targets or for avoiding collateral damage.
• Rampage: A newer air-launched supersonic missile (developed by Israel Aerospace Industries and Israel Military Industry). Range ~150 km. It’s essentially a rocket-propelled standoff weapon, GPS guided, intended to destroy high-value, well-defended targets (like bunkers, air defense sites) with a 570 kg warhead. Operational on F-16s and F-15s.
• Gabriel: Anti-ship cruise missile series (indigenous since the 1960s). The latest Gabriel V (Advanced Naval Attack) has ~200 km range, subsonic sea-skimming flight, and an advanced seeker for anti-ship and land-attack roles. Israel’s Sa’ar corvettes and some foreign navies use Gabriel missiles.
• Harop (loitering munition, a.k.a. “suicide drone”): Though not a traditional cruise missile, the Harop is an Israeli-developed loitering weapon with a 1,000+ km range and an electro-optical seeker to dive onto radar emitters or targets. Widely exported (e.g., used by Azerbaijan).
• Spike NLOS: An electro-optical guided missile with 25+ km range (a member of the Spike ATGM family) launched from helicopters or vehicles. It blurs the line between an anti-tank missile and a tactical surface-to-surface missile due to its long range and camera guidance (useful for precision strikes in complex terrain).

Israeli Air Defense Missiles (Multi-Tier Missile Defense)

Israel faces frequent rocket and missile threats, leading it to develop a multilayered missile defense shield – one of the most comprehensive in the world:

• Arrow 2 and Arrow 3: These are exo-atmospheric anti-ballistic missile interceptors, jointly developed with the United States. Arrow 2 (operational since ~2000) targets short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the upper atmosphere. Arrow 3, operational since 2017, intercepts outside the atmosphere (exo-atmospheric) and is designed to destroy long-range missiles and potential Iranian ICBMs in space missilethreat.csis.org. Arrow 3 can even act as an anti-satellite weapon at need. These are hit-to-kill interceptors (no warhead, they physically collide with the target).
• David’s Sling (a.k.a. Magic Wand): A medium-range air defense system designed to intercept large-caliber rockets, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles in the 40–300 km range. Uses the Stunner two-stage interceptor missile, which has an imaging infrared and radar seeker. David’s Sling fills the gap between Arrow and Iron Dome – it was successfully first used in 2023 to intercept a Russian missile over Ukraine (operated by Ukrainian forces) – showcasing its capability against cruise missiles or SRBMs. It’s an Israeli-U.S. co-development (Rafael and Raytheon).
• Iron Dome: Famous short-range anti-rocket system. Range of Tamir interceptor: 2–70 km. It uses a small radar-guided missile to shoot down incoming rockets, artillery shells, and mortars (as well as UAVs) missilethreat.csis.org. Since first deployment in 2011, Iron Dome has intercepted thousands of rockets with a high success rate, protecting Israeli cities from Gaza-launched projectiles. Each battery can cover a medium-sized city. The Tamir missile is highly agile and uses proximity-fused warhead to destroy targets – it’s also being adapted for mobile short-range air defense (e.g., mounted on ships as “C-Dome”).
• Barak-8: A naval (and land) medium-range SAM co-developed with India. Range ~70 km, with an active radar seeker. It defends ships or ground installations against aircraft, missiles, and drones. The Barak-8 equips Israeli Sa’ar-6 corvettes and Indian Navy ships (known as MR-SAM on land). It’s a modern networked system with 360° coverage.
• Spyder: A quick-reaction short/medium-range air defense system using Python-5 (IR) and Derby (radar) air-to-air missiles in a ground-launched mode. Range ~20 km (Spyder-SR) to 50+ km (Spyder-MR with booster). It provides point defense for forces or infrastructure and has the benefit of dual-mode missiles for different target types.
• Arrow 4 (planned): A future upgrade in early development to handle emerging threats, possibly including maneuvering hypersonic reentry vehicles.

This multitier system (Iron Dome for short range, David’s Sling for medium, Arrow for long/high) is tailored to counter everything from unguided Qassam rockets up to Iran’s Shahab-3 MRBMs, creating a protective “missile shield” over Israel. It’s done in close partnership with the U.S., and some components (e.g., Iron Dome batteries) have even been procured by the U.S. for evaluation.

Israeli Air-to-Air and Anti-Armor Missiles

• Python-5: A top-tier short-range IR-guided AAM with full sphere capability (can even engage targets behind the launching aircraft with appropriate cueing). Range ~20 km. Extremely agile (thrust-vectoring). Used on F-15, F-16, and has been integrated on Indian Su-30MKIs as well. Earlier Pythons (3 and 4) were also successful Israeli designs.
• Derby: A beyond-visual-range AAM (active radar homing) with ~50 km range. Used by Israeli fighters and offered for export (e.g., on India’s HAL Tejas, or as part of Spyder system). An upgraded I-Derby ER extends range to ~100 km with a dual-pulse motor.
• Spike Family: While anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) rather than air-to-air, the Spike deserves mention. Israel’s Spike series (SR, MR, LR, ER, NLOS) are among the most advanced ATGMs globally, featuring fire-and-forget IIR guidance, lofted trajectories, and even fiber-optic data links in some versions. Spike NLOS, with ~25 km range, can be launched from helicopters or ground vehicles to hit beyond-line-of-sight targets precisely – effectively a guided mini-missile for surgical strikes (used notably against Hezbollah and other threats). Origin: Indigenous (Rafael). Exported widely (Europe, Asia, etc.).

In summary, Israel’s missiles demonstrate how a smaller nation leverages technology to address outsized threats: ballistic missiles (Jericho) ensure a credible deterrent in a volatile region; a world-leading missile defense network protects its populace from continual rocket fire and potential Iranian missiles; and a suite of sophisticated tactical missiles (loitering munitions, anti-ship, anti-tank, etc.) give the IDF precision punch in conflicts. Many Israeli systems have become global benchmarks (Iron Dome for C-RAM, Spike for ATGM, Barak-8 for SAM), underlining the country’s role as a missile innovator. All major Israeli missiles are indigenous or co-developed, reflecting a strategy of self-reliance for critical capabilities.

Ukraine: Evolving Arsenal Under Fire

Ukraine historically inherited a large Soviet arsenal but surrendered nuclear weapons in the 1990s and saw its strategic missiles withdrawn or scrapped. In the ongoing conflict with Russia (since 2014, escalated 2022), Ukraine’s missile capabilities have been a focus, and it has received significant Western missile systems while also developing some indigenous weapons.

Ukrainian Missile Systems

• OTR-21 Tochka-U: A Soviet-era short-range ballistic missile (SS-21 Scarab) with ~120 km range and a 482 kg warhead armscontrol.org. Propulsion: solid. Ukraine possessed Tochka-U in its inventory and has used them in the 2022 war for tactical strikes, though stocks are limited. Status: Aging/limited (origin: USSR). Likely to be phased out as newer systems arrive.
• Hrim-2 (Grim-2) / Sapsan (development): An indigenous Ukrainian SRBM project. Range expected ~280–500 km (export version likely 280 km per MTCR). Payload ~480 kg HE. Mobile TEL-based. Developed by Yuzhnoye Design Bureau. It has been tested but full deployment was delayed by funding and then the war. If operationalized, Hrim-2 would replace Tochka-U with a modern solid-fueled precision missile in Ukraine’s arsenal armscontrol.org.
• Neptune (R-360): An indigenous anti-ship cruise missile, based loosely on the Soviet Kh-35 design but with modern electronics and extended range. Range ~280 km. Subsonic sea-skimmer. Warhead ~150 kg. Propulsion: turbojet (with booster). Entered service in 2021 with Ukraine’s coastal defense; notably, Ukrainian forces used Neptune missiles to sink the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva in April 2022. Status: Operational (indigenous). It can target ships and possibly be used against land targets.
• Vilkha MLRS: An upgraded guided version of the BM-30 Smerch 300mm rockets, developed by Ukraine. Range ~70–120 km (depending on version). These are technically guided rockets, not missiles, but they provide precision-strike capability akin to missiles (GLONASS/GPS guided). Status: Operational (indigenous).
• Western-provided Systems: Since 2022, Ukraine has received or is set to receive numerous Western missile systems:
  • M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS firing M30/M31 GMLRS rockets (GPS-guided, ~80 km range) – these are rockets, but provide precise missile-like effects and have been decisive in striking Russian ammo depots and C2 nodes.
  • ATACMS (if provided by the U.S.): MGM-140 ATACMS is a 300 km ballistic missile for HIMARS/M270. As of mid-2025, reports suggest potential future delivery, but none confirmed yet publicly.
  • Storm Shadow / SCALP-EG: Franco-British air-launched cruise missiles given by the UK (and France). Range ~250–560 km (export versions to Ukraine likely limited to ~250 km) defencepk.com instagram.com. 450 kg penetrator warhead. Stealthy and very accurate. Ukraine has integrated them on Su-24M strike aircraft and used them effectively against high-value targets (e.g., command centers, supply hubs) deep behind Russian lines.
  • HARPOON: Coastal defense batteries provided by Denmark/US/UK. Ukraine’s Navy, largely lost at sea, repurposed Harpoon anti-ship missiles to bolster coastal defense alongside Neptune. These were used to hit Russian naval vessels (in conjunction with Neptunes).
  • NASAMS (Air Defense): Norway and the US provided NASAMS batteries which use AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles to protect Kyiv and other areas from cruise missiles and drones. Range ~25 km.
  • Patriot PAC-3: Critically, Ukraine received Patriot systems from the US/Germany/Netherlands in 2023 to defend against ballistic missiles and aircraft. Ukrainian Patriot batteries have intercepted targets like Russian Kinzhal missiles in flight, demonstrating their effectiveness.
  • IRIS-T SLM: A German-supplied medium-range SAM (range ~40 km) using IRIS-T missiles (with enhanced motor) from fixed launchers. Highly effective against cruise missiles and drones – Ukraine has used IRIS-T to intercept many threats with near-perfect track record.
  • Other SAMs: Older Soviet SAMs (S-300PT/PS long-range, Buk-M1 medium-range, Osa-AKM short-range, etc.) are still in use, though losses have occurred. Western MANPADS like Stinger and Starstreak also bolstered Ukraine’s point defenses.
  • Anti-tank missiles: Thousands of Western ATGMs (Javelin, NLAW, etc.) were delivered. Indigenous Stugna-P and Corsar laser-guided ATGMs have also proven effective against armor.

In summary, Ukraine’s indigenous missile industry was nascent but growing before the war (Neptune, Hrim-2, etc.). The exigencies of war have made Ukraine heavily reliant on Western missile aid for both offense and defense. That said, Ukraine has used creativity in modifying or repurposing systems – for instance, alleged adaptations of S-200 SAMs for surface-to-surface strikes have been reported (using the old SAM as a 300 km-range ground attack missile). As the conflict continues, Ukraine’s role as an experimental ground for modern missile warfare (from Patriots intercepting Kinzhals to HIMARS shaping the battlefield) cannot be overstated. The war is effectively testing the latest missile technology from both Russia and NATO in real time, and Ukraine’s arsenal will likely continue to evolve with new contributions and innovations.

Other Notable Missile-Armed Nations

In addition to the major powers above, many other nations operate or develop significant missile systems, either indigenously or via imports. Below we summarize key missile capabilities of various countries across different regions, highlighting indigenous developments and notable imports.

North Korea: Rogue Missile Power

North Korea has prioritized missiles as its primary military asset. It possesses a wide spectrum of ballistic missiles, mostly indigenous (often based on Soviet/Chinese designs but considerably advanced through testing):

• Short-range: Hwasong-5/6 (Scud-B/C variants, 300 km & 500 km). KN-23, KN-24, KN-25 – a new generation of solid-fueled SRBMs tested since 2019, highly maneuverable (range 400–600 km), designed to defeat theater missile defenses.
• Medium-range: Hwasong-7 (No Dong) – ~1,300 km, capable of hitting Japan with a 1,000 kg warhead (potential nuclear carrier). Pukguksong-2 – ~1,200 km solid MRBM (land-based version of SLBM).
• Intermediate-range: Hwasong-12 – ~4,500 km (demonstrated overflights of Japan). Used to threaten Guam.
• Intercontinental: Hwasong-14 (~10,000 km) and Hwasong-15 (~13,000 km) ICBMs tested in 2017 can potentially reach the U.S. mainland with nuclear warheads rusi.org. In 2022, Hwasong-17 (a massive new ICBM, possibly capable of multiple warheads) was tested to full ICBM ranges.
• Submarine-launched: Pukguksong-1 (KN-11) – ~700 km SLBM (tested from submerged barge). Pukguksong-3 – ~1,900 km SLBM (tested from underwater platform in 2019). North Korea revealed newer SLBM designs (Pukguksong-4/5) but not yet flight tested.
• Cruise Missiles: North Korea unveiled a long-range land-attack cruise missile in 2021 (often compared to Tomahawk). Claimed range ~1,500 km, subsonic. Also, Kumsong-3 is an anti-ship cruise missile (likely based on Russian Kh-35) with ~250 km range, tested in 2017.
• Notably, North Korea is developing solid-fuel ICBM technology. In April 2023, it flight-tested a large solid-fueled ICBM (tentatively called Hwasong-18) – a significant step to a more road-mobile and prompt-launch nuclear missile force.

Virtually all of North Korea’s missiles are indigenous (though early help came from Soviet Scuds and possibly Pakistani designs for No Dong/Ghauri). They have rapidly iterated via testing, often in violation of UN resolutions, to field a credible nuclear deterrent. North Korean missiles typically serve as both propaganda (demonstrating regime strength) and practical deterrents. Its willingness to export missile technology (to countries like Iran, Syria, Pakistan in the past) has been a proliferation concern.

India: Indigenous Strategic and Tactical Missiles

India has developed an extensive missile program under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO):

• Ballistic (Strategic): Agni series – Agni-I (700 km SRBM), Agni-II (2,000 km MRBM), Agni-III (~3,000+ km IRBM), Agni-IV (~4,000 km), and Agni-V (~5,000+ km) which is India’s first ICBM-class missile, bringing targets across China, Europe, and beyond into range armscontrol.org. Agni-V is 3-stage solid, can carry a ~1.5 ton payload (likely MIRV in the future) and is canisterized for rapid launch. India is working on Agni-VI (speculated longer range, MIRV capable). All Agnis are solid-fueled and Indian-developed.
• Submarine-launched: K-15 (Sagarika) – ~750 km SLBM (on INS Arihant SSBN). K-4 – ~3,500 km SLBM in development/testing to arm newer SSBNs. These give India a nuclear triad capability (though range is shorter than top-tier SLBMs).
• Tactical Ballistic: Prithvi series – 150–350 km short-range missiles (liquid-fueled). Now being supplemented by Prahaar (~150 km solid SRBM) and Pranash (planned 200 km solid SRBM). Shaurya – a quasi-ballistic hypersonic missile (~700 km, solid fuel, can maneuver, nuclear-capable).
• Cruise Missiles:BrahMos – a famed supersonic cruise missile co-developed with Russia armscontrol.org armscontrol.org. Range ~300 km (original), now ~500 km in newer tests after MTCR entry armscontrol.org. Speed ~Mach 2.8–3 armscontrol.org. BrahMos can be launched from land, ship, aircraft (BrahMos-A on Su-30MKI), and even sub (future plan). It’s an anti-ship and land-attack weapon with a 200–300 kg warhead. BrahMos is perhaps the world’s fastest operational cruise missile armscontrol.org and a source of national pride (named after Brahmaputra and Moskva rivers). An export version was sold to the Philippines (2022) and others are in negotiations.
  • BrahMos-II (in development) is intended to be a hypersonic cruise (Mach 7+) with Russian collaboration (using scramjet tech).
• Nirbhay – a subsonic 1,000 km land-attack cruise missile (similar to Tomahawk), still in developmental trials (mixed success so far). Will offer a cheaper, longer-range option than BrahMos.
• Anti-Aircraft and Anti-Missile:
  • Akash – medium-range SAM (25 km) with a command-guidance and large warhead, in service with Indian Army/Air Force.
  • Barak-8 – as mentioned, co-developed with Israel (India calls the land version MR-SAM). Provides ~70 km range air defense for naval and air force use missilethreat.csis.org.
  • PAD/AAD – India’s indigenous anti-ballistic missile system (Prithvi Air Defense and Advanced Air Defense). PAD (exo-atmospheric interceptor) tested successfully against missiles ~2,000 km class; AAD is endo-atmospheric for lower altitude intercepts. India aims for a two-tier missile shield for cities like Delhi.
• Air-to-Air:
  • Astra – indigenous BVR AAM (~100 km) active radar homing, recently integrated on Su-30MKI and being improved (Astra Mk2 with ~160 km range in dev).
  • For shorter range, India uses mostly Russian R-73 or Israeli Python; an indigenous SRAAM is planned but not fielded yet.

India’s missile program is largely indigenous, spurred by security competition with China and Pakistan. It has achieved major milestones like ICBM reach and supersonic cruise tech, joining the elite group of nations in those domains armscontrol.org armscontrol.org. Indian missiles provide nuclear deterrence (especially vis-à-vis China) and conventional options for precision strikes (BrahMos is a key conventional deterrent against high-value targets, like enemy warships or headquarters).

Pakistan: Deterrence through Missiles

Pakistan developed its missile arsenal primarily as a nuclear delivery mechanism in parity with India. Many Pakistani missiles are named after historical figures (Hatf series, now mostly Shaheen/Ghauri):

• Ballistic Missiles:
  • Shaheen-II – MRBM ~1,500 km, solid-fueled two-stage, carrying nuclear warhead (in service).
  • Shaheen-III – IRBM ~2,750 km, tested in 2015, intended to reach India’s farthest islands (Andaman/Nicobar) – not yet operational with nuclear payload but likely soon.
  • Ghauri (Hatf-5) – MRBM ~1,250 km, liquid-fueled (based on North Korean No Dong) armscontrol.org. Nuclear-capable (first flight 1998).
  • Ababeel – in development, purported MIRV-capable MRBM (~2,200 km) to penetrate Indian BMD; tested in 2017.
  • Nasr (Hatf-9) – 60–70 km tactical ballistic missile (solid, fired from a 4-pack launcher). This is a nuclear-capable battlefield rocket to counter India’s Cold Start doctrine by threatening use of low-yield nukes on advancing forces.
  • Abdali (Hatf-2) – SRBM ~200 km; Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) – SRBM ~290 km; Shaheen-I (Hatf-4) – SRBM ~750 km. These cover short-range needs, mostly nuclear or dual-capable.
• Cruise Missiles:
  • Babur (Hatf-7) – Ground-launched cruise missile, ~700 km range, subsonic, terrain-hugging. Can carry nuclear or conventional warhead. Test-launched from land and reportedly from underwater platform (Babur-3 SLCM).
  • Babur-3 – Submarine-launched version (from diesel submarines) tested ~450 km, giving Pakistan a potential second-strike capability if deployed on Agosta-90B or forthcoming Chinese subs.
  • Ra’ad (Hatf-8) – Air-launched cruise missile (~350 km) for Pakistani aircraft (like Mirage III or JF-17). Nuclear-capable, subsonic.
• Air Defense: Pakistan primarily imports SAMs (e.g., Chinese HQ-16, LY-80 medium-range system in service, and seeking HQ-9 or equivalent for long range). Pakistan doesn’t have indigenous long-range SAMs yet.
• Anti-Ship: Pakistan’s Navy uses Chinese-origin missiles: Harbah (a variant of Babur for anti-ship/land attack, tested ~450 km), C-802 (Noor) on ships (~120 km), Exocet on submarines (French SM39 on Agosta subs), and Harpoon/(possible) on P-3 Orions historically (though older). The Navy is acquiring the Harbah and adapting Babur for ship launch to enhance anti-ship and land-attack reach.
• Air-to-Air: Relies on mix of U.S. (AIM-120 AMRAAM on F-16) and Chinese (PL-15 on JF-17 Block III, PL-5/PL-10 etc.) – no indigenous AAM.

Pakistan’s missile program heavily benefitted from foreign cooperation: e.g., Ghauri via North Korea, Babur cruise possibly with Chinese help or Tomahawk tech from crashed U.S. missile, etc. Nonetheless, it has established a robust production and has tested and deployed these systems to maintain deterrence against India’s conventional superiority.

Iran: The Middle East’s Missile Proliferator

Iran has built the largest missile force in the Middle East as a means of power projection and deterrence, given it lacks a modern air force. Largely indigenous (with some North Korean and Chinese assistance historically), Iran’s arsenal includes:

• Ballistic Missiles:
  • Shahab series: Shahab-1/2 (Scud-B/C copies, 300 km/500 km). Shahab-3 (No Dong derivative from NK) ~800–1,000 km, liquid-fueled, nuclear-capable (basis for many variants).
  • Ghadr-1 – improved Shahab-3, range ~1,600 km, lighter airframe.
  • Emad – Shahab-3 variant with maneuvering reentry vehicle for better accuracy (~1,700 km).
  • Sejjil-2 – solid-fueled MRBM, ~2,000 km range, under development (tested multiple times successfully) – key for a more survivable rapid-launch force.
  • Khorramshahr – MRBM ~2,000+ km with 1.5 ton payload (possibly derived from North Korean Musudan). Tested to 2,000 km with 1,800 kg warhead, implying longer range with lighter payload.
  • Iran has many SRBMs: Fateh-110 (300 km solid), and its evolutions like Zolfaghar (700 km), Dezful (~1,000 km). These solid SRBMs are accurate (CEP in tens of meters) and were used in strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq (Jan 2020) armscontrol.org and against ISIS and Kurdish targets. The Fateh family gives Iran a powerful regional strike toolkit.
• Cruise Missiles:
  • Soumar / Hoveyzeh – ground-launched cruise missiles reportedly based on the Soviet Kh-55 (which Iran illegally acquired in 2001). Range claimed 1,300+ km (Hoveyzeh up to 2,000+ km). Subsonic, ground-hugging, nuclear-capable (if Iran had warheads).
  • Noor – anti-ship cruise (reverse-engineered C-802) ~120 km.
  • Ghader/Qader – improved Noor, ~200 km.
  • Kh-55 – Iran tested components of acquired Kh-55s, forming basis for Soumar.
  • Abu Mahdi – a new anti-ship cruise missile Iran revealed (claimed range 1,000 km), likely a derivative of the Hoveyzeh.
• Anti-Ship Ballistic: Persian Gulf (Khalij Fars) – a Fateh-110 with an optical seeker to hit moving ships (~300 km). Also Zolfaghar Basir (optically guided Zolfaghar) ~700 km anti-ship.
• SAMs: Iran’s best SAM is Bavar-373, an indigenous long-range system similar to S-300 (Iran bought S-300PMU2 from Russia, finally delivered 2016). Bavar-373 claims ~200 km range. Iran also has Taer-2/Mersad (Hawk copies), 3rd Khordad (a Raad system that shot down a U.S. Global Hawk drone in 2019, range ~50–75 km). It even markets a copy of the Russian Tor (called Herz) and has various old Soviet SAMs (SA-2, SA-6) modified.
• Drones & Loitering Munitions: Not missiles per se, but Iran’s use of kamikaze drones (e.g., Shahed-136 with ~2,000 km range) blurs with cruise missiles. These have been exported (to Yemen’s Houthis, and used by Russia in Ukraine) and serve similar roles to long-range missiles in striking targets at range, albeit slowly.

Iran’s missile doctrine emphasizes saturation and asymmetric warfare: in a conflict, Iran could launch salvos of dozens of missiles (ballistic and cruise) at regional bases, cities, oil infrastructure, and naval forces. Its missiles also serve diplomatically – as bargaining chips or tools of influence (Iran has armed proxies like Hezbollah, and Houthis with variants of its missiles). Under sanctions, Iran’s advances are notable: indigenous solid-fuel motors, guidance improvements, and even satellite launch rockets (Simorgh, etc.) which double as ICBM tech testbeds.

Other Asia-Pacific Nations

• Japan: Self-imposed limits long restricted Japanese missiles to anti-ship and SAMs. However, recently Japan announced plans to acquire standoff strike capability in response to threats. It’s buying Tomahawk cruise missiles from the US and extending the range of its Type 12 anti-ship missiles (from ~200 km to 900+ km, including a possible IRBM in development). Japan’s current indigenous missiles: Type 12 (truck-launched anti-ship, ~200 km), Type 93/Chu-SAM (medium SAM), Type 03 Chu-SAM Kai (extended range ~100 km SAM), and maritime SAMs like ESSM and SM-3 (co-developed with US for BMD on Aegis destroyers). It does not have ballistic missiles (by policy), but this is shifting with talk of developing “counterstrike” missiles.
• South Korea: Developed a strong missile program especially after easing of range limits (formerly capped by agreement with US). Its ballistic missiles include Hyunmoo-2A/B/C (300/500/800 km respectively), and new Hyunmoo-4 (~800+ km with 2-ton payload) giving quasi-IRBM capability. These are solid-fuel and very accurate (aimed at N. Korean bunkers, etc.). South Korea also developed the Hyunmoo-3 family of cruise missiles (500–1,500 km range land-attack). It deploys Cheongung-II SAM (KM-SAM, ~40 km range, co-developed with help from Almaz-Antey of Russia, similar to S-350) and imported systems like Patriot. Also notable is the Haeseong anti-ship series (e.g., SSM-700K C-Star, ~200 km, and Hyunmoo-3 based anti-ship). In 2022, South Korea unveiled a prototype SLBM (successfully test-launched from a submarine, based on Hyunmoo-2, ~500 km) – making it one of the few to have sub-launched conventionally armed ballistic missiles.
• Taiwan: Facing China, Taiwan invests in missiles as a deterrent. Indigenous systems: Hsiung Feng II (subsonic anti-ship, ~150 km) and Hsiung Feng III (supersonic anti-ship, ~400 km). Land-attack cruise: Hsiung Feng IIE (~600 km). Taiwan’s Sky Bow II/III SAMs (think Patriot-like, ~200 km for Sky Bow III) defend against ballistic missiles alongside imported Patriot PAC-3. Taiwan is also developing a variant of the Sky Bow as a potential MRBM (for counterstrike to mainland).
• Turkey: An emerging producer, Turkey has made Bora (a 280 km SRBM, exported as Khan) with tech from China’s B611. It also produces various guided rockets. Turkey’s SOM is a stealthy air-launched cruise missile (~250 km) developed in-country, now integrated on F-16s and planned for the indigenous fighter. In air defense, Turkey co-developed Hisar-A/O short/medium range SAMs and is working on Siper long-range SAM (while controversially buying S-400 from Russia). It also fields J-600T Yıldırım (150 km ballistic missile) derived from Chinese WS-1.
• Europe (beyond France/UK):
  • Germany doesn’t deploy ballistic missiles (treaty-limited post WWII), but co-developed the Meteor AAM (Ramjet BVR missile, 100+ km) en.wikipedia.org and the Taurus KEPD 350 ALCM (500 km, stealthy, with Sweden) en.wikipedia.org – which Germany and Spain use.
  • Italy co-developed the Storm Shadow/SCALP with UK/France (now deployed on Italian jets). Italy also worked on Aspide SAM/AAM (derived from AIM-7 Sparrow) and the Aster SAM with France.
  • Others: Many European nations participate in the MBDA consortium, contributing to missiles like Aster, Meteor, Exocet etc., rather than purely national projects.
• Israel (covered above) often partners with countries like India (Barak-8, BrahMos) and the U.S., further spreading its missile tech influence.

Other Middle East:

• Saudi Arabia: Unusually for a U.S. ally, Saudi bought Chinese DF-3A IRBMs in the 1980s (2,650 km, nuclear capable but Saudis have no nukes) and more recently DF-21 MRBMs from China missilethreat.csis.org missilethreat.csis.org (Saudi’s DF-21s are likely conventional). These give Saudi a long-range strike (ostensibly aimed at Iran). Saudi also has many Western systems: Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD (ordered) for defense, Harpoon and Exocet for anti-ship, and air-launched missiles on Western jets (e.g., Storm Shadow on Tornado perhaps, if integrated).
• Gulf States: The UAE funds advanced projects – it helped develop the Black Shaheen (French SCALP variant) used on its Mirage 2000s ias4sure.com. The UAE also bought ATACMS (300 km) from the US, and equipped its F-16s with JSOW and JASSM. They also invested in air defense (Patriot, THAAD).
• Egypt: Historically had a joint missile program with Argentina and Iraq (Condor II/Badr-2000 MRBM in the 1980s) which was cancelled. Today Egypt fields mainly imports: Scud-B, possibly Scud-C, and recently reportedly interested in Indian BrahMos or others. Its main AAM/SAM are Russian or American (e.g., S-300VM, Buk, Patriot).
• Syria: Before the civil war, Syria had Scuds (Scud B and Scud-D ~700 km), SS-21 Tochka, and some M-600 (Iranian Fateh-110 copies) via Iran, used in the war. Its chemical warheads were destroyed per 2013 deal. Air defenses included S-200, Buk, Pantsir, etc., many of which remain active in limited capacity.
• Others: Iran’s proxies like Hezbollah have received Iranian Fateh-110 (named “Khaybar”), Zelzal rockets (200+ km unguided), and countless shorter rockets – effectively giving non-state actors missile-like capabilities. The Houthi in Yemen used Iranian Qiam (Scud variant) and cruise missiles to strike Saudi Arabia and UAE (e.g., the 2019 Aramco attack with cruise missiles and drones was attributed to Iran’s Ya Ali cruise or similar). This proliferation underlines how missile technology is spreading beyond nation-states.

NATO and Other Allies:

• United Kingdom & France (covered among majors) – both have nuclear SLBMs (Trident II D5 in UK navalnews.com, M51 in France), and jointly produced the Storm Shadow cruise missile en.wikipedia.org. France also has ASMP-A supersonic nuclear cruise missile for its bombers.
• NATO Europe largely relies on U.S. missiles or collaborative European programs (e.g., Taurus, Meteor, Aster). No other NATO member has ballistic missiles, except Turkey (short-range) and historically, obsolete Scuds in some Eastern European states (dismantled upon joining NATO).
• Russia’s neighbors like Belarus and Kazakhstan host Russian missiles (Iskander in Kaliningrad and possibly Belarus recently; Kazakhstan had Topol ICBMs in Soviet era, returned them). North Korea’s missile tests have spurred South Korea and Japan to boost their arsenals (already discussed).
• South Asia aside from India/Pakistan: Bangladesh and Myanmar have some Chinese anti-ship missiles and SY-400 SRBM systems in Myanmar. Sri Lanka operates an Indian RLACM (supersonic) for ship defense.
• Africa: Largely importers: e.g., Egypt and Algeria have Scuds; Algeria also got Iskander-E (280 km export variant) from Russia armscontrol.org. South Africa historically developed RSA series missiles and space launchers under apartheid (RSA-3, RSA-4 could have been IRBMs) but dismantled them in the 1990s along with nuclear weapons. Today no African nation openly deploys ballistic missiles (except Egypt/Algeria), though many have SAMs.

Conclusion

In conclusion, missile technology – ranging from intercontinental nuclear missiles to shoulder-fired rockets – has proliferated globally, with dozens of countries fielding advanced systems. Major powers like the U.S. and Russia maintain the most diverse arsenals missilethreat.csis.org missilethreat.csis.org, including high-yield ICBMs and cutting-edge hypersonic weapons, underpinning their strategic deterrence and power projection rusi.org armscontrol.org. Emerging powers such as China and India rapidly expanded their missile capabilities, achieving long-range reach and modern precision strike systems missilethreat.csis.org armscontrol.org. Meanwhile, smaller states like Israel and North Korea have developed niche but potent missile forces to ensure their security or influence disproportionate to size armscontrol.org rusi.org.

Missiles have become central to national defense strategies – whether it’s NATO investing in missile defense shields against rogue attacks, or countries like Iran and Pakistan relying on missiles to offset conventional weaknesses. Indigenous development is often a source of prestige and strategic autonomy (e.g., BrahMos for India armscontrol.org, the Iron Dome for Israel missilethreat.csis.org). Where domestic programs lag, states readily import or collaborate to acquire needed missiles, as seen with S-400 systems in Asia army-technology.com or Patriot batteries in Europe and the Middle East.

In the 21st century, the trend is toward faster, more precise, and more survivable missiles:

• Hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and missiles promise to defeat current air defenses rusi.org rusi.org.
• Solid-fuel mobile missiles increase readiness and concealment (e.g., North Korea’s move to solid ICBMs, India’s Agni-V canisterization).
• Networked precision (missiles with seekers, data links, AI) improves accuracy – exemplified by Russia’s Iskander or the US’s JASSM-ER.
• Missile defenses are also advancing (hit-to-kill interceptors, laser defenses in R&D) to counter these threats, leading to an offense-defense technological race.

This global missile guide reveals a world where nearly every military relies on some class of missiles – be it for deterrence, defense, or power projection. As geopolitical tensions persist and technology spreads, missiles (and counter-missile systems) will continue to shape the strategic landscape. Nations large and small will seek the leverage that “secret weapons” in their arsenals – from ICBMs in hidden silos to mobile launchers in the desert – can provide. In essence, the balance of power in many regions hinges on these missile capabilities, making understanding them crucial to grasping global security dynamics armscontrol.org missilethreat.csis.org.

Sources: Connected references have been provided throughout this report, citing official military factsheets, defense analysis (CSIS Missile Threat, Arms Control Association), and reputable defense industry reporting for the data on ranges, speeds, payloads, and deployment status of the missile systems discussed af.mil navalnews.com armscontrol.org rusi.org. These sources ensure the information is accurate and up-to-date, reflecting the latest open-source intelligence on the world’s missiles as of 2025.