- Rising Supplier Debt: Mexico’s state-owned power utility, Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), saw its unpaid bills to suppliers reach about 77.4 billion pesos (≈$4.2 billion) as of Q3 2025 – a 4% increase year-on-year [1]. This is the second-highest third-quarter level in eight years [2], and CFE acknowledges it has yet to achieve the reduction in payables it projected for year-end [3]. (Between Q2 and Q3 2025, the balance dipped a mere 0.8%, still hovering above 77 billion pesos [4].)
- Company Promises No Crisis: CFE insists it is not facing a Pemex-like cash crunch. The utility maintains that no payments are overdue beyond agreed terms and that it adheres to strict contractual payment schedules [5] [6]. In August, CFE even forecasted it would cut supplier debt by 36% by the end of 2025 [7]. Officials stress that CFE’s finances are on stronger footing than Pemex, the state oil company, which saw its own supplier debts skyrocket by ~37% to over 500 billion pesos this quarter [8] [9].
- Record Interest Payments: CFE’s debt burden is straining its finances via interest costs. From January to September 2025, CFE paid 43.8 billion pesos (about $2.4 billion) just in interest, a 17.5% jump from the same period in 2024 [10] [11]. That averages nearly 4.8 billion pesos per month in interest outflow [12], the highest Jan–Sept interest bill in 8 years [13], reflecting both sizable debt and higher interest rates.
- Debt Profile and Reduction: CFE’s total debt (financial liabilities) stood at 487.3 billion pesos (~$26–27 billion) as of September 30, 2025 [14] [15]. Thanks to efforts to trim short-term and project-finance debt, this was actually 4.2% lower than a year prior (508.7 billion pesos in Sept 2024) [16]. Notably, short-term debt was cut by 14%, chiefly by reducing a short-term fiduciary financing instrument [17]. As of Q3 2025, about 65.7% of CFE’s debt is in bonds (“deuda documentada”), 17.4% via Pidiregas (infrastructure financing schemes), 13.2% in trust/fiduciary instruments, and 3.6% in bank loans [18]. However, CFE also carries massive labor liabilities (pensions and benefits) of 441.9 billion pesos – 21.5% of its total liabilities – which grew about 4% year-on-year [19], contributing to a decline in the company’s equity.
- Paper Profits vs. Real Strains: After a large net loss in 2024, CFE swung to a net profit of 56.9 billion pesos in Q3 2025 [20], aided by a strong peso that offset surging fuel costs [21]. CFE says these earnings are being reinvested to strengthen its finances and fund new power projects [22]. Experts, however, caution that CFE may be “following Pemex’s playbook” – propping up paper profits by pushing payments to suppliers [23]. Analysts note that while CFE’s recent profits and government backing put it on better footing than debt-ridden Pemex [24] [25], the growing backlog of unpaid bills and high debt-servicing costs pose a serious challenge that must be addressed for long-term sustainability [26] [27].
CFE’s Climbing Supplier Debt Puts Pressure on Operations
CFE’s debts to contractors and suppliers have climbed to multi-year highs, raising concerns about cash flow in Mexico’s electricity sector. According to CFE’s third-quarter 2025 financial report, accounts payable to suppliers reached ~77.3 billion pesos (circa $4+ billion) [28]. This represents a 3.8–4% increase over the same period last year [29] [30]. In fact, the July–Sept 2025 figure is the second-highest Q3 level since 2018 [31], indicating that payment backlogs – while not unprecedented – are near record levels. These obligations are all short-term (due within a year) [32], meaning CFE will need to find cash to settle them in the near future.
Such rising payables can have real economic ripple effects. Industry observers warn that CFE’s delayed payments are squeezing its vendors, many of whom rely on steady cash flow from CFE contracts. “The situation is starting to put suppliers and contractors in check,” La Crónica de Hoy reported, noting some vendors risk bankruptcy due to the cash crunch if bills remain unpaid [33]. The growing debt to suppliers – often small or medium-sized firms providing fuel, equipment, or services – mirrors a pattern seen at Pemex (the national oil company), which has also stretched out payments with dire consequences for its supply chain [34].
CFE had hoped to reverse this trend by year-end. Back in August, the utility told El Universal it projected a 36% drop in supplier debt by the end of 2025 [35]. Indeed, there was a modest improvement quarter-to-quarter: between Q2 and Q3 of 2025, the amount CFE owed suppliers edged down 0.8% [36]. But that reduction is minimal, leaving payables still above 77 billion pesos. In other words, the substantial payoff CFE envisioned has not materialized yet. The company attributed the late-year payoff plan to timing issues – noting that a large share of its annual budget and project execution (about 33.5% of spending) is heavily “back-loaded” into the final quarter of the year [37] [38]. In a statement, CFE explained that many infrastructure works and investment commitments are settled in Q4, which skews the timing of payments [39]. This suggests CFE expects to catch up on payments in the last months of 2025, leveraging end-of-year budget allocations.
Meanwhile, CFE officially maintains that its current supplier debt is under control and within “normal parameters” [40]. The company insists that no critical invoices have been left past due despite the rising balance [41]. “CFE maintains and fulfills payment commitments under the agreed contractual terms,” the firm stated, emphasizing that “no overdue payables exist that would compromise operations or contractor relationships.” [42] In other words, CFE acknowledges the higher outstanding balance, but portrays it as a managed figure – arguing that payment terms have simply been longer, not violated. Furthermore, a CFE spokesperson noted that the utility has not altered its payment procedures or extended deadlines to suppliers, asserting “a responsible management of liabilities and a track record of timely payment” [43].
“We’re Not Another Pemex”: CFE vs. Pemex Debt Situations
CFE’s leadership is keen to distinguish the power utility’s financial situation from that of Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) – the state oil giant infamous for its debt woes. The comparison arose because Pemex too has been piling up unpaid bills to suppliers, but at a far more alarming scale. In its Q3 report, Pemex disclosed that its payables to suppliers and contractors exploded to 517.1 billion pesos (about $28 billion), a 28.4% jump from ~402.9 billion a year earlier [44] [45]. In dollar terms, Pemex’s commercial debt rose 37% year-on-year (helped by currency fluctuations) [46] – an astonishing increase that pushed its supplier debt above the half-trillion-peso mark [47]. By Q3 2025, Pemex owes roughly six to seven times more to its vendors than CFE does.
Crucially, Pemex has admitted it cannot sustain that trajectory and has scrambled for solutions. Immediately after revealing the spike in payables, Pemex “again promised” to pay suppliers down in the coming months [48]. The oil firm announced plans to settle 220 billion pesos of debts “in the next few months” [49] – nearly 40% of its outstanding invoices – using a special financing program backed by the government’s development bank (Banobras) [50]. In fact, Pemex highlighted that it had already paid 299 billion pesos to suppliers in the first nine months of 2025 and was rolling out additional credit facilities to accelerate payments in September and October [51]. Despite these assurances, Pemex’s woes have drawn concern from markets and contractors alike, and the company continues to post large net losses (over 61 billion pesos loss in recent results, even after government “rescues”) [52].
CFE, by contrast, is at pains to argue its situation is much healthier. CFE officials stress that their payables, while elevated, are a fraction of Pemex’s and not growing at the same breakneck pace [53]. “The company does not face the same problems as Pemex,” CFE’s statement declared, pointing out that Pemex’s supplier liabilities jumped 37% in one quarter and surpassed 500 billion pesos, whereas CFE’s rose ~4% to 77 billion [54]. Moreover, unlike Pemex, CFE managed to post a solid profit this year. In Q3 2025, CFE reported a net profit of 56,916 million pesos (~$3 billion) for the quarter [55], a sharp turnaround from a 10.9 billion peso net loss in the same quarter of 2024 [56]. These earnings underscore that CFE’s core operations are not hemorrhaging cash in the way Pemex’s are. In fact, CFE’s management noted that its profits are being reinvested: the retained earnings are “being capitalized to strengthen CFE’s financial position and fund new investments in generation, transmission and distribution,” [57] aligning with the government’s electric infrastructure expansion plans.
Independent analysts agree that CFE’s fundamentals are stronger than Pemex’s, though they caution this is a low bar. “Experts recognize that the situations of Pemex and CFE are different, since the power utility rests on much better bases than the oil firm,” El Universal noted, referencing CFE’s recent net income as a sign of relative strength [58]. CFE benefits from lower debt levels, better cash flow from customers, and significant government subsidies, whereas Pemex is mired in debt and has struggled to turn a profit. Víctor Ramírez, an energy consultant at P21Energía, highlighted that CFE’s situation is “not even close to Pemex’s” dire straits [59]. CFE hasn’t had to ask the government to directly step in to pay suppliers (as Pemex did); it continues to cover operating costs and debt service from its own revenue and budgeted support.
However, experts also warn CFE not to grow complacent. Ramírez urged CFE to “prioritize operational security by paying its debts [to suppliers]” rather than letting obligations mount [60]. He noted that while CFE is not in a crisis, postponing critical maintenance or project expenses due to unpaid bills could eventually hurt power reliability – a risk Mexico cannot ignore. He and others pointed out that CFE is carrying a “very heavy burden” from years of under-investment, and now must shake off the “legacy of lack of projects in the sector – transmission, generation, and poor planning of combined-cycle plants” in certain regions [61]. This was a pointed reference to what Ramírez called a “lethargy” under Manuel Bartlett, CFE’s former director (2018–2024), whose policy decisions allegedly stalled some expansions [62]. In essence, CFE has ground to make up in infrastructure investment, even as it juggles financial discipline. That balancing act – investing for the future while paying past bills – is where observers say CFE must not falter, lest it drift toward Pemex’s path.
Debt and Interest: High Costs Despite Slight Debt Reduction
Beyond its supplier payables, CFE’s overall debt load remains enormous, and servicing this debt is growing more expensive. According to data from the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (IMCO) and official filings, CFE’s total debt stood at 487.3 billion pesos as of September 2025 [63] [64]. This figure includes all bank loans, bonds, and other financing obligations on CFE’s books. The good news is that CFE’s management managed to trim this figure by roughly 21 billion pesos over the past year [65] – a 4.2% reduction from around 508.7 billion in Sept 2024 [66]. Much of the improvement came from paying down short-term debt: CFE’s short-term liabilities were cut to 118.7 billion (from 138.7 billion a year prior) thanks to reducing a short-term fiduciary financing program [67]. CFE also paid down some longer-term “documented” debt (such as bonds), which fell modestly by 2.5% year-on-year to 320.1 billion pesos [68]. Additionally, Pidiregas project debt – a form of off-budget financing for energy infrastructure – dropped about 14% over the year to 84.1 billion pesos [69], as some of these obligations were retired.
This slight deleveraging, however, has not relieved the immediate financial strain of carrying debt. With interest rates higher and debt still near half a trillion pesos, CFE’s interest payments have surged to record levels. In the first nine months of 2025, CFE shelled out 43.8 billion pesos in interest expenses on its debt [70]. That is 17.5% more than the Jan–Sept period a year prior (which was 37.4 billion) [71]. According to IMCO’s analysis, this 43.8 billion pesos is the highest interest bill CFE has faced in any January-to-September span since at least 2018 [72]. It equates to roughly 4.8 billion pesos per month spent just to service debt [73] – money not going into maintenance, new projects, or other needs. The jump in interest costs partly reflects rising global and domestic interest rates over the past year, and partly the sheer scale of debt CFE still carries. It underscores that even as CFE pares back some debt, its financing costs are eating up a growing share of its income.
The makeup of CFE’s 487 billion-peso debt reveals some strengths and risks. Over 65% of the debt is “documented” – essentially bonds and securities, much of it denominated in pesos and some in foreign currencies [74]. These are typically long-term and fixed-rate, which provides stability (and indeed CFE was able to reduce this portion slightly this year [75]). Around 17% of the debt is Pidiregas obligations [76], which are often tied to specific generation or pipeline projects; this portion declined significantly as CFE and the government have worked to bring more of these liabilities onto the books and pay them down [77]. Another 13% of debt is held via fiduciary instruments (trusts) [78] – likely short-term notes or structured financing; and the remaining ~4% are bank loans [79]. The diversification means CFE isn’t overly exposed to any single creditor, but it also means complex management to juggle various repayment schedules.
Importantly, these figures do not include CFE’s massive pension and retirement benefit obligations, which are considered labor liabilities. That burden is almost as large as the financial debt itself – CFE’s pension liability is 441.9 billion pesos as of Q3 2025 [80]. This grew by 17 billion pesos (4%) in the last year [81], despite reforms in past years aimed at containing it. If one combines all of CFE’s obligations – financial debt, pensions, accounts payable, etc. – total liabilities reach roughly 2.1 trillion pesos [82]. By comparison, CFE’s annual revenue for the first nine months was 524 billion pesos [83] (likely around 700 billion for a full year), highlighting that debt and liabilities are roughly three times yearly revenues. This leverage magnifies why timely payments and interest costs are critical issues. Indeed, due to changes in these balances, CFE’s equity (net worth) slid by 3.2% in the past year, down to 699.3 billion pesos as of Q3 2025 [84].
One silver lining in CFE’s 2025 results is that, unlike 2024, the company is profitable on paper – primarily thanks to external factors that won’t reliably repeat. CFE’s operating costs jumped 12.5% in the last year, largely because natural gas prices – a key fuel for power plants – spiked nearly 50% [85]. This would normally hammer the bottom line. But the Mexican peso’s significant appreciation in 2025 produced a large foreign-exchange gain for CFE, since part of its debt is in U.S. dollars [86]. That currency gain offset the fuel cost surge, resulting in a strong net profit of 125.1 billion pesos for the first nine months of 2025 [87] [88]. (A year prior, CFE had a net loss of 85.8 billion pesos in Jan–Sept 2024 [89].) This swing to profit has provided some breathing room. CFE notes that it is reinvesting those profits to shore up its finances and expand capacity, in line with the government’s “National Electric System Strengthening and Expansion Plan 2025–2030” [90] [91]. Analysts caution, however, that relying on currency gains or one-off factors is risky. If fuel prices remain high or the peso’s value reverses, CFE’s margins could tighten again – and high debt costs would bite harder. The emphasis, they say, should be on improving true operational efficiency and managing debt, rather than deferring costs to suppliers to paper over thin margins [92] [93].
Warnings from Experts: Don’t “Play Pemex’s Game” with Payables
Financial experts and industry observers are watching CFE’s maneuvers with a mix of optimism and concern. On one hand, they acknowledge CFE’s recent progress – the utility has stabilized its debt, returned to profitability, and continues to enjoy government confidence. On the other hand, they see red flags in the growing supplier debt and interest costs, which resemble patterns that plunged Pemex into deeper trouble.
“CFE seems to be following the same script as Pemex: showing paper profits while accumulating payables to suppliers,” warned Carlos Flores, an energy sector specialist, in comments to El Universal [94]. He noted that CFE’s commercial debt (to vendors) keeps rising, even as the company touts operational stability and positive earnings. This discrepancy “casts doubt on the real solidity of its finances,” Flores said bluntly [95]. In his view and that of other analysts, a state-owned firm can make its books look better in the short term by slowing or postponing payments – but that trick eventually reaches a limit. “Postponing payments is not synonymous with efficiency, but rather a way to transfer financial costs onto the supply chain,” Flores added, emphasizing that true financial health would require paying vendors on time instead of inflating results at suppliers’ expense [96]. In other words, CFE’s profitability should come from operational improvements and sufficient revenue – not from effectively borrowing from suppliers by delaying what it owes.
Other experts have echoed these cautions while still recognizing CFE is far from a crisis. Víctor Ramírez of consultory P21Energía agreed that unpaid bills could eventually pinch CFE’s operations if left unchecked [97]. Power plant maintenance, fuel procurement, and new projects might slow down if contractors aren’t paid promptly, affecting reliability. However, Ramírez also highlighted that “the situation of CFE is not even close to that of Pemex” [98], reinforcing that the electric utility has a stronger starting point. The key, he argued, is for CFE to “shake off the heavy burden” of past policy missteps and under-investment, and ensure the company’s recent profits are sustainable [99]. For instance, CFE needs to invest in upgrading transmission lines and completing generation projects (like combined-cycle gas plants) that were delayed, particularly those needed in regions like the Yucatán peninsula where power supply has been tight [100]. These investments are capital-intensive, and if CFE continues to carry high short-term debts, it might struggle to finance the infrastructure it desperately needs.
There’s also a broader governance and policy perspective to consider. Under the previous administration (2018–2024, with Manuel Bartlett at the helm of CFE), the company took a more nationalist, insular approach – focusing on state-led projects and rolling back private generation involvement. Some analysts believe this led to missed opportunities and “bad decisions” that caused lethargy in expanding capacity [101]. The new administration under President Claudia Sheinbaum (sworn in late 2024) has signaled a commitment to expanding and modernizing the grid, including 51 major electrical infrastructure projects by 2030 to boost generation and reach universal electrification [102] [103]. This plan requires heavy investment – roughly $22–23 billion USD over 2025–2030 [104] [105] – and CFE’s ability to execute it will depend on financial health. If CFE’s balance sheet is weighed down by short-term liabilities and if it keeps pushing expenses down the line, it could jeopardize the rollout of new power plants and transmission lines. As Flores and others imply, the true test of CFE’s touted profitability will be if it can meet obligations and invest, without one undermining the other [106].
Notably, it’s not just CFE’s debts to others that matter, but also what others owe to CFE. A recent investigation revealed that various Mexican government entities – from state governments to municipalities and federal agencies – have racked up significant unpaid electricity bills with CFE, totaling about 46.4 billion pesos as of late 2025 [107] [108]. This includes public lighting bills and government facility usage that haven’t been paid, due to local budget shortfalls or disputes. For example, several states (like Chihuahua, Sonora, Chiapas) each owe CFE billions of pesos for power supply to their jurisdictions [109] [110]. Municipal governments are collectively the largest chunk of this government-sector debt to CFE, accounting for about 34.7% of the 46 billion (since many municipalities haven’t paid for street lighting and other services) [111]. These arrears represent money CFE is owed but hasn’t received, further straining its cash flow. President Sheinbaum’s government has acknowledged the problem and is seeking ways to resolve these debts – potentially by offsetting them or using federal funds – so that CFE’s revenue stream improves [112] [113]. Clearing these dues could, in theory, inject CFE with funds that might then pay off suppliers or invest in new projects [114] [115]. It’s a reminder that CFE’s financial web is intertwined with public sector finances at large.
Outlook: Financial Forecast and Market Implications
Looking ahead, CFE’s financial health will heavily depend on government support and prudent management, and the consensus is that both will continue to be forthcoming. Credit rating agencies consider CFE a quasi-sovereign entity – its fortunes closely tied to the Mexican government. In early 2025, Fitch Ratings reaffirmed CFE’s debt at investment grade (on par with Mexico’s sovereign rating) and maintained a “Stable” outlook [116]. The rationale was CFE’s strategic importance as Mexico’s electricity provider and 100% state ownership, which makes government backing virtually assured. Fitch even upgraded its assessment of government support for CFE to “Almost Certain,” effectively aligning CFE’s credit profile with the sovereign [117]. In practical terms, this means investors and markets widely expect that Mexico’s federal government would intervene to prevent a default at CFE, whether by capital injections or assuming obligations, if it ever came to that. This support is not theoretical – it’s built into the state’s budget: federal subsidies and transfers to CFE are substantial, covering costs that the utility cannot with its own revenues.
Indeed, government subsidies account for roughly 40% of CFE’s EBITDA (operating earnings), according to Fitch [118]. These subsidies primarily compensate CFE for selling electricity to residential and agricultural users at below-cost tariffs, as part of social policy. Fitch projects that government transfers to CFE will be about 85 billion pesos in 2025 and ~87 billion in 2026 [119]. Such amounts, injected via the federal budget, help keep CFE afloat and allow it to invest while keeping lights on for consumers at reasonable rates. The recently announced 2025 budget did set CFE’s programmable spending at 382 billion pesos (a slight 1% real increase) [120], and as CFE noted, a lot of that spend is concentrated in the final quarter. Should push come to shove, analysts expect that political authorities would rather increase support for CFE than see it accumulate unpaid obligations that could hurt the economy or cause power outages.
From a financial forecast perspective, experts foresee a mixed picture for CFE: moderate leverage, but tight cash flows. Thanks to improved earnings in 2025, Fitch estimates that CFE’s adjusted total debt-to-EBITDA ratio will stay below 3× by end-2025 [121]. In other words, the company’s operating profits are enough to cover its debt load three times over, which is a manageable level for a utility. Factors contributing to this ratio include stronger EBITDA (helped by subsidies), lower fuel costs going forward (if gas price spikes subside), favorable exchange rates, and the government’s ongoing financial support [122]. However, free cash flow is expected to remain negative in the next couple of years [123]. The reason is ambitious capital expenditure (capex): CFE is embarking on an expansion plan to add generation capacity (including ~2.7 GW of new combined-cycle gas plants by 2028 and over 4.4 GW of renewables by 2027) [124] [125], plus improvements to the grid. These projects require heavy investment, much of which will likely be financed through new debt if internal cash isn’t sufficient [126]. Fitch cautions that CFE will probably run cash flow deficits as it spends on these projects, meaning it must either borrow more or receive more government funds.
The market implication is that while CFE’s bonds are considered reliable (backed by the state), the company’s financial flexibility is limited. Any unexpected shocks – such as a sharp rise in natural gas prices, a drop in electricity demand, or a cutback in government subsidy due to fiscal constraints – could pressure its finances. Additionally, if Mexico’s sovereign credit rating were to be downgraded, CFE’s rating would likely drop in tandem [127], possibly raising its borrowing costs. Conversely, there’s little upside for CFE’s credit rating beyond Mexico’s own standing [128]. For the Mexican public and businesses, the stakes are high: a financially strained CFE might lead to deferred maintenance or slower expansion, which could affect service quality or capacity in the long run.
For now, the forecast for CFE’s “stock” – figuratively speaking, since it’s not publicly traded – is cautiously stable, thanks to government support. Investors in CFE’s debt instruments and observers see a utility that is too important to fail, but one that must navigate challenges carefully. Meeting the year-end goal of substantially reducing supplier debt will be a key litmus test. If by the end of 2025 CFE manages to pay down a large portion of that 77 billion peso supplier tab (as promised) [129], it would signal that the recent spike was indeed a timing issue being resolved. It would also provide relief to contractors and validate the government’s strategy of back-loading payments into Q4. On the other hand, if the payables remain high or grow, it may heighten concerns that CFE is quietly building up a Pemex-like problem.
Ultimately, experts advocate for continued transparency and discipline. CFE will need to demonstrate that its improved financial results aren’t merely due to accounting maneuvers or one-off windfalls, but reflect a sustainably run operation. That means keeping debts – both to bondholders and to suppliers – under control, maintaining access to financing for new projects, and leveraging government support to bolster (rather than cover up) its financial position. As Mexico’s sole power utility, CFE’s ability to manage its debt and expenses responsibly will directly impact the country’s energy future. So far, the company insists it is on the right path, but the coming months and years – as it juggles paying down interest, catching up with suppliers, and investing in infrastructure – will be the true test of CFE’s fiscal health and resilience [130] [131].
Sources: Recent reporting from El Universal [132] [133], La Crónica de Hoy [134] [135], El Diario (Agencia Reforma) [136] [137], Reporte Índigo [138] [139], and expert analysis by IMCO and Fitch Ratings [140] [141].
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