China’s Secret Weapon Revealed: Inside the 2025 Stealth Carrier That Could Change Everything

China’s navy has taken a dramatic leap in 2025, officially unveiling a stealth aircraft carrier program that could upend the balance of naval power in the Indo-Pacific. This bold initiative – combining cutting-edge carriers, stealth jets, drones, and electromagnetic catapults – is drawing both awe and anxiety across the globe. What exactly has China announced, and what does it mean for the U.S. and its allies? Below, we dive into the details of Beijing’s new stealth carrier, expert analyses of its capabilities, and the far-reaching implications for regional security.

Official Unveiling: Beijing Lifts the Curtain on a Stealth Carrier Program

China has formally unveiled a “stealth” aircraft carrier program in 2025, signaling its intent to redefine naval power in the Indo-Pacific asiatimes.com. In a state television broadcast this July, the Chinese public got its first glimpse of the secretive project: during a CCTV report on naval aviation, eagle-eyed observers spotted two J-35 stealth fighter jetsparked inside a Shenyang Aircraft Corporation hangar – the carrier-based fifth-generation fighters that had long been rumored scmp.com scmp.com. While the CCTV segment itself focused on an upgraded older jet (the J-15T), the cameo appearance of the J-35 prototypes was unmistakable scmp.com.

Chinese military analysts quickly highlighted the significance of this reveal. “This is the first public indication that our new stealth carrier jet is in mass production,” noted Song Zhongping, pointing out the J-35s were likely carrier-optimized variants (with naval corrosion protection and folding wings) being readied for deployment asiatimes.com. Indeed, the official footage effectively confirmed that the PLA Navy’s first stealth fighters are nearing operational status on carriers. Both the J-35 and the catapult-capable J-15T are slated to serve on China’s newest flattop, the Type 003 aircraft carrier Fujian, which is currently in sea trials and expected to be commissioned by the end of 2025 asiatimes.com.

Behind the scenes, China has been laying the industrial groundwork for this breakthrough. The state-owned Shenyang Aircraft Corporation – developer of the J-35 – recently expanded its production facilities, investing about 8.6 billion yuan (~$1.2 billion) in a 4.2 km² manufacturing campus to churn out advanced fighters asiatimes.com. Provincial officials inspecting the site this year signaled the priority Beijing places on scaling up its carrier air wing. As Sun Cong, chief designer of China’s carrier fighters, remarked, new “software-defined” development approaches are speeding up the rollout of these jets asiatimes.com. All signs indicate that 2025 is the year China openly moved its stealth carrier aviation project from the shadows to center stage, showcasing hardware that had been kept under wraps.

The official announcement of the stealth carrier program was not a single press conference, but rather a series of revealing moments orchestrated through state media and PLA press releases. In March 2025, rumors swirled that China’s newest carrier had achieved a milestone launch of a stealth jet using its electromagnetic catapult system. When asked, the defense ministry spokesman “had no information to release” on the Fujian’s trials globaltimes.cn – a typical veil of secrecy. Yet by May and June, authoritative outlets began touting the carrier’s progress. China’s Ministry of National Defense and CCTV reported that Fujian had entered intensive sea trials, and unofficial sources leaked that in late March the carrier had successfully launched a J-35 using its EMALS catapult armyrecognition.com. By July, the visual confirmation via CCTV of the J-35 jets in production served as the de facto public unveiling of the stealth carrier program asiatimes.com scmp.com.

In short, China’s leadership has now “lifted the curtain” on a multifaceted program: a new class of aircraft carrier bristling with advanced technology, and an entire ecosystem of stealth fighters and support aircraft to operate from its decks. The announcement has been accompanied by a triumphalist narrative in Chinese media about closing the aviation gap with the U.S. Navy – even as officials remain cagey on certain specifics. The stage is set for China’s entry into the exclusive club of nations wielding true carrier strike capability with fifth-generation stealth air power.

Cutting-Edge Features: Stealth Fighters, Drones, and Electromagnetic Catapults

An aerial view of China’s new carrier Fujian during sea trials in 2024, showing its expansive flight deck. The Type 003 Fujian is the first Chinese carrier equipped with electromagnetic catapults, enabling it to launch heavy aircraft like stealth fighters and surveillance drones armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com.

At the heart of China’s stealth carrier program are game-changing technologies that could rival those of Western navies. The centerpiece is the Type 003 Fujian aircraft carrier, launched in 2022 and now in final trials. Unlike China’s first two carriers (which were based on older Soviet designs with “ski-jump” ramps), Fujian is a full-sized flat-deck carrier equipped with three electromagnetic catapult launchers (EMALS) – making China only the second nation after the U.S. to field this advanced launch technology on a carrier armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. EMALS enables aircraft to be hurled off the deck with powerful electromagnetic pulses instead of steam pistons, allowing for heavier payloads, faster launch cycles, and less stress on airframes asiatimes.com globaltimes.cn. Chinese experts say Fujian’s catapults will “significantly increase its daily sortie rate,” greatly enhancing its ability to seize air and maritime supremacy once in service globaltimes.cn. Crucially, the catapults allow Fujian to launch not only fighters but also fixed-wing support planes and unmanned aircraft – a major boost in capability over China’s older carriers globaltimes.cn.

Equally important is the air wing set to fly from Fujian. The Shenyang J-35 stealth fighter is the program’s crown jewel – a twin-engine, fifth-generation jet designed specifically for carrier operations. Roughly analogous to the U.S. F-35C, the J-35 features a “low-observable” airframe with internal weapons bays, advanced radar-absorbent coatings, and an AESA radar, all aimed at minimizing its radar signature while maximizing sensor acuity armyrecognition.com. It is China’s first stealth carrier-based fighter, finally giving the PLA Navy a platform to match the U.S. Navy’s F-35 in stealth, if not in all aspects. The J-35’s prototypes spotted in 2025 were painted in primer green, but their presence confirms that low-rate production is underway scmp.com asiatimes.com. Analysts note the J-35 will likely carry an array of precision weapons (PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles, guided bombs, etc.) in its internal bays, and it may eventually be enhanced with technologies like networked datalinks and electronic warfare suites for “multi-domain” operations asiatimes.com. Notably, the J-35 makes China the second country in the world (after the US) to deploy two different stealth fighters – the other being the land-based J-20 – underscoring the leap in capability this aircraft represents ts2.tech asiatimes.com.

Complementing the J-35 is the upgraded J-15T fighter – a modernized version of China’s existing carrier jet. While not a stealth aircraft, the J-15T has been overhauled to serve as a 4.5-generation workhorse: it mounts new indigenously-built WS-10 turbofan engines and sports reinforced landing gear, a nose-mounted refueling probe, and a catapult launch bar asiatimes.com. These modifications make it compatible with catapult-assisted takeoffs (CATOBAR) on Fujian, allowing it to launch with heavier fuel and weapons loads than the older ski-jump launches permitted asiatimes.com. The J-15T also carries a new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and is integrated to fire China’s latest PL-10 short-range and PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles asiatimes.com. In essence, the J-15T will provide Fujian with a reliable multirole fighter for tasks that don’t require stealth, easing the burden on the limited number of J-35s initially available. Together, the J-35 and J-15T give the carrier a balanced air wing – stealthy attackers as well as versatile dogfighters – akin to how the U.S. Navy uses a mix of F-35Cs and Super Hornets.

The Fujian itself is a marvel of naval engineering and the largest warship ever built in China. It displaces roughly 80,000–85,000 tons and measures about 318 meters in length, putting it in the same class as the U.S. Navy’s supercarriers armyrecognition.com. However, unlike the U.S. carriers which are nuclear-powered, Fujian uses conventional propulsion – a integrated diesel and gas turbine electric drive system that provides abundant electrical power (essential for the energy-hungry EMALS catapults) armyrecognition.com. Engineers chose this approach as a stepping-stone, and it has resulted in Fujian being the world’s first non-nuclear carrier with electromagnetic launch capabilities armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. The carrier’s design also incorporates some stealth characteristics: it has a centrally located, pyramid-shaped island structure housing its radars and sensors, with fewer protrusions and a faceted shape to reduce radar cross-section armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. While an aircraft carrier can never be truly “stealthy,” these design tweaks (similar to those on the US Gerald R. Ford class) aim to make the ship less conspicuous to enemy radar at long ranges.

In terms of capacity and layout, Fujian is built for high-intensity air operations. It boasts three EMALS catapults (two on the bow, one waisted on the deck edge) and a set of advanced arresting wires to recover incoming aircraft. The deck features two large aircraft elevators to move planes between the hangar and flight deck, enabling quick cycling of sorties armyrecognition.com. According to reports, Fujian can carry an air wing of approximately 50–60 aircraft, including fighter jets, helicopters, and specialized planes armyrecognition.com. Among these will be the KJ-600 carrier-based early warning aircraft, a twin-propeller radar plane akin to the American E-2D Hawkeye, which can only operate from catapult-equipped carriers armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. The KJ-600’s powerful radars will extend the carrier group’s surveillance and targeting range, plugging a critical gap in China’s earlier carrier capabilities.

China is also integrating unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into its carrier operations – a forward-looking step. The Fujian is expected to host the GJ-11 “Sharp Sword” stealth attack drone (a low-observable flying-wing UCAV) in the future armyrecognition.com. EMALS is a game-changer here as well: the precise control of electromagnetic launches allows even relatively small or delicate drones to be catapulted into flight globaltimes.cn. With UAVs onboard, a Chinese carrier could deploy unmanned reconnaissance or strike missions far beyond the ship, or swarm enemy defenses with drone fleets. Chinese state media has hinted that Fujian’s catapults could launch “a wide range of aircraft, from large early-warning planes to small drones”, greatly improving operational flexibility globaltimes.cn. Although details remain scarce, concepts range from stealthy reconnaissance drones to unmanned refueling tankers that could extend the range of the J-35 fighters. Such drone integration mirrors U.S. initiatives like the MQ-25 Stingray; in fact, Fujian’s designers added extra deck parking areas potentially to support UAV operations in the near future.

Finally, Fujian comes with extensive onboard systems to protect and coordinate its air wing. The carrier is outfitted with modern dual-band radar arrays and battle management systems to track hundreds of targets in the air and sea domain. Its defensive armament includes multiple close-in weapon systems (CIWS) and missile-based point defense launchers(comparable to the U.S. SeaRAM), providing a last line of defense against incoming missiles armyrecognition.com. Notably, analysts observed mounts on the ship that could be reserved for directed-energy weapons in the future – such as high-energy lasers – to counter drones or precision munitions armyrecognition.com. All these features indicate that Fujianis not just a step up for China – it is a quantum leap into modern carrier design, incorporating lessons from the latest Western carriers while adding indigenous innovations.

In sum, China’s stealth carrier program fuses state-of-the-art hardware in ships and aircraft. The Type 003 Fujianbrings the PLA Navy into the era of electromagnetic launch and advanced carrier operations armyrecognition.com. Its deck will field J-35 stealth fighters that can strike unseen, J-15T fighters with improved punch, KJ-600 “flying radars” to guide them, and likely unmanned drones to augment missions armyrecognition.com. This potent mix is designed to give China a true blue-water carrier strike group capability – one that in theory begins to rival the established powers. The technological gap between the Chinese and U.S. carrier forces is narrowing fast, as Beijing embraces the tools of modern naval aviation. However, having cutting-edge tools is one thing; using them effectively, as we explore next, is another matter entirely.

Expert Analysis: Military Perspectives on China’s Carrier Ambitions

The debut of China’s stealth carrier program has prompted intense analysis among military experts and defense strategists worldwide. Chinese commentators hail it as a milestone, while foreign analysts offer a more cautious evaluation, noting both the impressive progress and the remaining limitations of China’s carrier force. Together, their insights paint a comprehensive picture of what this development means for China’s navy and the broader naval balance.

“The J-35 may well represent another significant milestone in the Chinese long-term pursuit of a blue-water carrier-based naval aviation capability,” observed retired U.S. Navy Captain James Fanell, a former Pacific Fleet intelligence officer breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com. Fanell – who spent years tracking China’s naval rise – sees the new stealth fighter as the realization of a vision championed by former PLAN commander Adm. Wu Shengli to build a “most powerful navy on the planet.” In other words, the J-35’s emergence is the capstone that could enable China’s carriers to finally project power at sea on par with Western fleets breakingdefense.com. American defense analysts like Fanell view the stealth jet as filling a crucial gap: until now, Chinese carriers lacked an air wing that could penetrate modern air defenses. With the J-35, China potentially gains the ability to “strike enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and air defenses”while evading detection asiatimes.com. Kevin Kusumoto, writing for the U.S. Army’s TRADOC, similarly noted that the J-35 “represents a leap in stealth, electronic warfare, and multi-domain capabilities,” designed to see first and shoot first in any engagement asiatimes.com.

Beyond the hardware, experts point to the tactical concepts China is developing for carrier warfare. A 2024 analysis from the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute noted that Chinese state media emphasizes “split wave” and “continuous” air operation patterns from carriers asiatimes.com. What this means is that the PLA Navy has been practicing ways to maintain a near-constant sequence of sorties – one wave of aircraft launching as another is recovering – to keep up sustained pressure during combat asiatimes.com. Such tactics would be essential in a high-end conflict (for instance, gaining air superiority during an island landing operation). The same study described how Chinese carrier battle groups might organize layered defense zones – inner, middle, and outer perimeters up to 400 km from the carrier – integrating destroyers, frigates, submarines, and the carrier’s own aircraft to shield the flotilla while striking at adversaries asiatimes.com. This reflects a sophisticated doctrine aimed at making a Chinese carrier group a tough nut to crack. It’s not just about having a big ship with jets; it’s about orchestrating a networked “system of systems” at sea.

Chinese strategists increasingly see carriers as strategic tools for power projection and deterrence, not just symbols. “These vessels are intended not merely as status symbols but as instruments to enhance China’s regional influence, protect overseas interests, and potentially challenge U.S. naval dominance in Asia,” writes Keitaro Ushirogata, a researcher who traced the PLAN’s evolution from coastal defense to blue-water ambitions asiatimes.com asiatimes.com. The new carriers allow China to extend its operational reach far into the Western Pacific – or even Indian Ocean – in ways that were impossible a decade ago. By design, they enable extended-range air operations, sea control missions, and far-flung deterrence patrols asiatimes.com. Collin Koh, a maritime security expert in Singapore, notes that China’s expanding naval aviation is shifting regional maritime balance, compelling neighbors to adjust. He points out that deploying stealth fighters on carriers will improve the PLA Navy’s “early strike” capability, possibly allowing China to initiate or threaten military actions with greater confidence under a stealthy air cover.

However, for all the optimism in Beijing, many analysts emphasize that China’s carrier force still faces significant hurdles before it can truly rival the U.S. Navy’s capabilities. Jonathan Caverley, writing in the Texas National Security Review in 2025, observed that China’s carriers lack certain enablers of global reach – most notably, nuclear propulsion and overseas bases asiatimes.com. Without nuclear reactors, carriers like Fujian depend on frequent replenishment of fuel, limiting how far and how long they can operate at peak tempo asiatimes.com. This is a critical difference: a U.S. nuclear carrier can steam at high speed for months on end, whereas a conventional carrier might need to slow down or refuel at sea regularly. Moreover, China doesn’t have a network of allied naval bases around the world for resupply and maintenance; Chinese carriers venturing into distant waters would be operating at the edge of their logistical tether asiatimes.com.

Carriers are also inherently vulnerable without a robust protective infrastructure. “PLAN vessels remain vulnerable to long-range precision strikes from the US and its allies, supported by satellite-based targeting and resilient kill chains,”Caverley notes asiatimes.com. This refers to the array of American and allied capabilities – from spy satellites to submarines and anti-ship missiles – that can be marshalled to detect and attack a carrier group. Indeed, the U.S. and Japan have spent decades perfecting the art of finding and tracking high-value units like carriers. If war broke out, China’s carriers would quickly become prime targets. Some experts warn that China’s heavy reliance on satellites and datalinks for coordinating its forces could be a weakness: those networks might be jammed or destroyed, “making its carriers susceptible to disruptions” in communications and targeting asiatimes.com.

Then there are the capability gaps within the carrier groups themselves. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) has long been a weak spot for the PLA Navy – a concerning fact, since even a single enemy submarine can be a carrier’s nemesis. Analysts note that China’s carriers currently lack a dedicated carrier-based ASW aircraft (like the U.S. S-3 Viking of old) and must rely on ship-borne helicopters which have limited range. Integrated air defense is another area for improvement; while the carriers have some onboard defenses, they will depend on escort ships to provide layered air defense, and it’s unclear if China’s fleet air defense is as tightly integrated as U.S. Aegis systems asiatimes.com. In a high-intensity conflict with a technologically advanced adversary, these shortfalls could “undermine PLAN carrier survivability,” Caverley argues asiatimes.com.

Personnel and training pose challenges as well. Operating a large carrier and its air wing is one of the most complex feats in military operations – something that took the U.S. decades of costly experience (including accidents and errors) to master. China is still relatively new at this. A 2024 study in the SAIS Review of Global Affairs pointed out that Fujian’s test program has encountered some teething issues – for example, its electromagnetic catapults have underperformed in trials compared to U.S. counterparts, likely requiring further fine-tuning asiatimes.com. More fundamentally, there is a shortage of carrier-qualified pilots in the PLA Navy, since the training pipeline only produced its first carrier-born aviators within the last 10 years asiatimes.com. Landing a jet on a pitching flight deck at night remains a harrowing skill that only practice can make perfect. Until China trains up a larger cadre of naval aviators (and develops carrier-capable tanker aircraft to refuel its jets in mid-air), it may not fully exploit the potential of its big new carrier. As Aina Turillazzi concluded in her analysis, China’s power projection via carriers “remains limited by logistical depth and lack of combat experience” – despite all the technological progress asiatimes.com asiatimes.com. In her view, rather than matching U.S. global reach, China’s carriers are better suited to influence operations against weaker regional adversaries asiatimes.com.

In summary, expert commentary on China’s stealth carrier program reflects a mix of admiration and caution. There is no doubt that China’s navy has rapidly vaulted into the carrier era, achieving feats (like deploying stealth fighters at sea) that only the U.S. had mastered until now asiatimes.com. This development is reshaping assumptions and prompting comparisons to the U.S. Navy’s long-held superiority. Yet, seasoned naval observers stress that capability ≠ capacity. Hardware alone doesn’t win wars – strategy, training, logistics, and combat experience matter hugely. China is entering the carrier big leagues, but it’s a newcomer playing catch-up to century-old carrier powers. As we turn to how other nations are reacting, it’s clear they are taking China’s advances seriously – even while betting that the U.S. and allies retain important advantages.

Regional Power Dynamics: Indo-Pacific Tensions and Allied Reactions

The advent of China’s stealth carrier and its accelerating carrier deployments are reverberating across the Indo-Pacific, prompting both alarm and countermeasures among regional powers. The United States, Japan, Australia, India, and others have all closely watched Beijing’s carrier buildup, as it raises the stakes in an already tense strategic environment. Reactions range from public denunciations in policy documents to quiet adjustments in military posture – all underscoring that China’s new carriers are not emerging into a vacuum, but into a region bristling with wary rivals.

Japan, in particular, has been vocal about the challenge. In June 2025, China sent a stark message by deploying twoaircraft carriers – the Liaoning and Shandong – on simultaneous long-range exercises into the Western Pacific, venturing beyond the so-called First and Second Island Chains for the first time armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. Japanese forces tracked these carrier strike groups as they operated in waters near Japanese islands (within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone but outside territorial seas) armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. Tokyo’s response was immediate: the Japanese Self-Defense Forces sortied warships and fighter jets to shadow the Chinese carriers, closely monitoring 260+ takeoffs and landings by Chinese carrier-borne aircraft over a few days armyrecognition.com. Such operations – unprecedented in scale for the PLA Navy – rang alarm bells in Japan’s defense establishment. Japan’s Ministry of Defense noted that “China appeared to be improving its capability for distant sea operations” and strengthening its ability to project power near Japan armyrecognition.com.

A month later, in July 2025, the Japanese government’s annual defense white paper bluntly labeled China’s military moves the “biggest strategic challenge” Japan has faced in the post-WWII era economictimes.indiatimes.com. The report specifically highlighted China’s expanding carrier operations as a prime concern: “Chinese warships’ advance in the Pacific has steadily increased,” it noted, tripling the frequency of PLA Navy passages near Japan’s southwest islands in three years economictimes.indiatimes.com. It cited the June dual-carrier deployment – with carriers observed near Okinotorishima and even 600 miles from Guam – as evidence of Beijing’s intent to “advance its sea power in distant waters” economictimes.indiatimes.com. Japan also protested aggressive Chinese air maneuvers guarding those carriers, after PLA fighters flew dangerously close to Japanese patrol aircraft during the exercises economictimes.indiatimes.com. In response, Tokyo is doubling down on its own military upgrades. It has begun converting its Izumo-class helicopter carriers to launch F-35B stealth jets, effectively giving Japan small aircraft carriers for the first time since WWII. It is also deploying long-range anti-ship missiles on its southwestern islands and intensifying joint exercises with the U.S. Navy to practice countering carrier threats economictimes.indiatimes.com economictimes.indiatimes.com. The clear message: Japan views China’s carrier-backed maritime forays as a serious menace to regional stability and is marshalling resources to deter or contain that threat.

For the United States, China’s stealth carrier program confirms trends the Pentagon has long anticipated – the narrowing gap in high-end capabilities – and it reinforces an ongoing shift in U.S. military focus toward the Indo-Pacific. Publicly, U.S. officials maintain confidence that even with new Chinese carriers, the U.S. Navy’s supremacy remains intact. They point to the U.S. fleet of 11 nuclear-powered supercarriers (each with battle-tested air wings and decades of operational know-how) and note that the U.S. and its allies still field far more carrier-capable aircraft than China. However, there is no complacency. The U.S. Navy has been adjusting its posture and plans in the Pacific in direct response to China’s naval buildup. In early 2025, two American carrier strike groups – the USS Nimitz and USS George Washington – were deployed simultaneously in the Western Pacific, partly to “send a signal” as the Chinese carriers conducted their own dual-carrier drills armyrecognition.com. The U.S. has also enhanced its surveillance of Chinese naval movements; for example, American intelligence assets closely followed the Strait Thunder 2025A exercise in April 2025, when China’s Shandong carrier group maneuvered near Taiwan and practiced missile strikes, a scenario of obvious concern to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command armyrecognition.com.

Beyond deployments, U.S. defense strategy is adapting. Washington is investing heavily in new technologies that could negate Chinese carrier power – such as long-range anti-ship missiles (the Naval Strike Missile and longer-ranged hypersonic weapons), autonomous strike drones, and integrated “kill webs” linking satellites, sensors, and shooters to find and sink ships swiftly. The Pentagon’s 2024 China Military Power report explicitly flagged the addition of the Fujiancarrier and J-35 fighters as elements that “could enhance PLA power projection but would be vulnerable to U.S. and allied countermeasures”, reinforcing the need for robust American deterrence asiatimes.com asiatimes.com. Concrete steps include hardening U.S. bases in Guam and elsewhere against potential carrier-launched strikes. In fact, the U.S. Army is in the process of deploying an Aegis Ashore missile defense system to Guam (the “EISMD – Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense” project) to create a 360-degree shield against cruise and ballistic missiles armyrecognition.com. This was partly motivated by the recognition that Chinese carrier aviation, combined with land-based missiles, could threaten U.S. forward positions like Guam in a conflict armyrecognition.com. Admiral John Aquilino, the U.S. Indo-Pacom commander, has also advocated for new anti-ship capabilities, such as land-based Tomahawk missile batteries and Marine Corps NMESIS anti-ship missile vehicles deployed along the first island chain, to blunt any PLAN carrier incursions armyrecognition.com. In sum, the U.S. is reinforcing its Indo-Pacific defenses and refining its warfighting concepts (e.g. Distributed Maritime Operations and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations) to ensure that if China’s new carrier force ever were used aggressively, it would face a formidable, layered response.

American allies and partners in the region are likewise reacting. Australia, while geographically distant from East Asia’s flashpoints, views China’s growing carrier capabilities as a justification for its own military buildup. Canberra’s 2024 Defence Strategic Review explicitly mentioned the need to counter “high-intensity threats” from great power forces in the Indo-Pacific – an implicit reference to China’s naval expansion. Although Australia does not have (or seek) its own aircraft carriers, it is joining the AUKUS partnership to acquire nuclear-powered submarines which could shadow or threaten Chinese carrier groups in the event of conflict. Australian defense analysts note that a carrier operating in the South China Sea or Indian Ocean would extend China’s reach toward Australia’s maritime approaches, underscoring the importance of long-range strike assets. Thus, Australia is procuring anti-ship missiles for its Super Hornet and F-35A fighters and investing in surveillance systems to monitor the vast seas to its north. Australian policymakers have also been deepening interoperability with both the U.S. and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, conducting exercises (like Talisman Sabre) that include drills for maritime strike and coalition anti-carrier operations. The newly formed Quad (Australia, India, Japan, U.S.) naval exercises have similarly featured anti-submarine warfare and air defense training – skills directly relevant to hunting carriers or defending against carrier-borne aircraft.

India arguably feels the ripple effects of China’s carriers as much as any country, given the two nations’ rivalry and India’s own status as a carrier-operating power. Chinese naval forays into the Indian Ocean have been limited so far, but Indian strategists expect that to change as China’s carrier fleet grows. In fact, Chinese sources have hinted that once a third carrier like Fujian is operational, a PLAN carrier task force could be dispatched to the Indian Ocean by 2025–26 thenewsmill.com. Such a deployment – perhaps under the pretext of anti-piracy patrols or goodwill port visits – would be a historic first and is viewed with trepidation in New Delhi. India’s Navy currently has two carriers: the aging INS Vikramaditya (a refurbished Soviet vessel) and the brand-new INS Vikrant (commissioned 2022), which is of comparable size to China’s first two carriers but still uses ski-jump launch and carries only MiG-29K fighters. Neither Indian carrier currently fields a stealth aircraft. Thus, when news broke that China’s J-35 stealth jets are nearing carrier service, Indian experts openly warned that India’s carrier air wing is at risk of falling behind technologically thenewsmill.com thenewsmill.com. In response, India moved quickly in 2023–2025 to secure 26 French Rafale-M naval fighters to modernize its carrier aviation thenewsmill.com. These 4.5-generation Rafales (set to be delivered by 2027) are seen as a stopgap until India can develop its own Twin Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF) or possibly even consider the F-35B/C in the longer term. Indian defense commentators argue that the arrival of China’s J-35 should “underscore the need for the Indian Navy to modernize its carrier-based air power”, lest it be outclassed in the region thenewsmill.com.

India is also assessing the necessity of a third aircraft carrier of its own – the proposed INS Vishal, which was envisioned as a 65,000-ton CATOBAR carrier possibly with EMALS. China’s strides may reinvigorate that project, as Indian admirals contend that to counter a Chinese carrier in the Indian Ocean, India would need a similar or superior platform. Meanwhile, India is shoring up its anti-carrier deterrents: expanding its fleet of P-8I Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, which can track surface ships, and accelerating deployment of the indigenous BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missile on air, sea, and coastal platforms. The strategic calculus is clear from New Delhi’s perspective – any Chinese carrier entering India’s maritime backyard would be a serious power projection move, and India’s military must be prepared to shadow, if not threaten, that carrier during any crisis.

Even nations like Taiwan and Vietnam, though not operating carriers themselves, are reacting to China’s carrier program through defensive planning. Taiwan’s military, for instance, is acquiring advanced coastal anti-ship cruise missiles (the Hsiung Feng III and U.S.-made Harpoons) and strengthening surveillance of PLA Navy movements. The prospect of a Chinese carrier group supporting a blockade or amphibious invasion of Taiwan is a nightmare scenario for Taipei. Indeed, the April 2025 PLA drill saw China’s Shandong carrier simulate cutting off Taiwan from the east, showing how a carrier could be used to “encircle” the island from the Pacific side armyrecognition.com. In Southeast Asia, countries around the South China Sea note that a Chinese carrier could steam through their EEZs or appear off contested waters as an intimidation tactic – something the Shandong did when it patrolled near the Spratly Islands in 2020. Vietnam and the Philippines have thus been investing in mobile shore-based missiles and seeking stronger security ties with the U.S. and its partners.

In summary, China’s stealth carrier program has triggered a regional ripple effect. Allies like Japan and Australia are fortifying their defenses and cooperating more closely with the U.S., explicitly citing the Chinese carrier threat in strategic documents economictimes.indiatimes.com economictimes.indiatimes.com. The United States is adapting its formidable naval posture to ensure it maintains the edge, deploying more assets to the Pacific and improving capabilities to detect and kill enemy carriers if needed armyrecognition.com. India is urgently upgrading its own naval air power and anti-ship arsenal in anticipation of a future where Chinese carriers roam the Indian Ocean thenewsmill.com. Across the Indo-Pacific, from South Korea to Singapore, militaries are factoring in how to respond to a scenario where a Chinese carrier strike group – now backed by hard-to-detect stealth fighters – shows up on their doorstep. This dynamic injects a new layer of competition and potential instability into the region’s security equation, raising the premium on intelligence, early warning, and coalition coordination.

Strategic Motivations: Why Beijing Is Betting Big on Carriers

China’s decision to develop a stealth carrier program is driven by clear strategic motivations. Understanding why Beijing is pouring resources into carriers – which are among the most expensive and complex military platforms – is crucial to gauging how these carriers might be used in the future. Several intertwined factors explain China’s carrier push, all rooted in the country’s long-term geopolitical ambitions and security concerns.

1. Blue-Water Power Projection and Prestige: At the broadest level, China’s carriers serve its goal of becoming a “world-class military” by mid-century. For the Chinese Communist Party, a blue-water navy with global reach is both a symbol and instrument of great power status – on par with the United States. As naval historian Keitaro Ushirogata notes, the PLAN’s acquisition of carriers marks its transition from a coastal defense force to a true blue-water navy able to operate in the Western Pacific and beyond asiatimes.com. Carriers are extremely versatile tools of statecraft: they can show the flag in distant oceans, conduct goodwill port visits, provide disaster relief, or evacuate citizens from conflict zones. Beijing has watched how U.S. carrier strike groups give Washington unmatched flexibility to respond to crises worldwide; it now wants similar clout to protect China’s expanding global interests (such as Belt and Road Initiative investments and vital sea lanes for oil imports). In Chinese discourse, a strong navy underpins the country’s rise and protects it from maritime threats or blockades. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly stressed building a “powerful navy” to safeguard China’s sovereignty and interests. The carrier program aligns with this vision, and every milestone – from the launch of Fujian to the first J-35 takeoff – is trumpeted in state media as proof of China’s technological and military prowess. In short, carriers are as much about prestige and deterrence as about war-fighting – they signal that China has arrived as a top-tier naval power.

2. Shifting the Indo-Pacific Naval Balance (Challenging U.S. and Allies): More concretely, China’s stealth carrier program is a direct response to the military balance in East Asia, which has historically been dominated by U.S. naval power and its network of allies. By fielding its own carriers with advanced capabilities, Beijing seeks to erode U.S. naval dominance and complicate American intervention in regional flashpoints. A carrier strike group gives China an offensive platform that can operate beyond the range of its land-based aircraft, thereby extending China’s defensive perimeter seaward. This is especially pertinent to scenarios like a conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea. Chinese strategists envisage using carriers to, for example, patrol the Philippine Sea to deter U.S. carrier groups from easily entering the Taiwan Strait or East China Sea. During the April 2025 Strait Thunder exercise, the Shandong carrier’s presence east of Taiwan was a not-so-subtle signal of how China might position carriers to “create a combined arms blockade” in a showdown armyrecognition.com. Furthermore, carriers would enable China to push its military presence past the First Island Chain (which runs through Japan, Taiwan, Philippines) into the open Pacific, thereby pressuring U.S. territories like Guam or even Hawaii in a conflict – directly challenging the U.S. ability to use those as secure bases. It’s telling that Chinese analysts often speak of breaking the “island chain blockade” that they feel the U.S. and its allies impose; carriers are key to that break-out. As one Chinese security expert put it, “To truly push the U.S. out of our near seas, we need carriers to form a mobile strike force in the far seas.” Thus, the carrier program is an offensive counterbalance to decades of U.S. maritime superiority. It meshes with other A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) capabilities like anti-ship ballistic missiles, presenting the U.S. Navy with both missile threats and air threats emanating from China’s side.

Notably, Chinese sources have openly linked their carrier development to the American threat. The introduction of the J-35 stealth fighter is frequently described as a counterpart to the U.S. F-35 – leveling the playing field in carrier air power thenewsmill.com. Chinese state media lauded the fact that with the J-20 and J-35, China has matched the U.S. in deploying two fifth-generation fighters asiatimes.com. Also, by planning for six aircraft carriers by 2035 (a figure circulated in Chinese media and analyses) thenewsmill.com, China would inch closer in sheer numbers to the U.S. carrier fleet, at least in the Asia-Pacific context. Six carriers would allow China to potentially have 2–3 carrier groups at sea at any given time (with others refitting or training), a significant force to contest U.S. naval presence in Asian waters. This ambition reflects a long-term strategy to secure what China sees as its maritime rights and interests against any foreign coercion.

3. Taiwan and Regional Contingencies: The Taiwan issue looms large in China’s military planning, and carriers are being developed with a potential Taiwan conflict in mind. While China’s primary means to strike Taiwan remain its ballistic missiles and air force, a carrier provides important options. For one, a carrier battle group could position itself east or south of Taiwan to intercept any U.S./Japanese reinforcements coming to Taiwan’s aid. It could also launch air strikes on Taiwan from multiple directions, stretching Taiwan’s air defenses. During amphibious assault operations, a carrier’s fighters would play a critical role in achieving air superiority over the strait and providing close air supportto landing forces – essentially acting as a mobile airbase that supplements China’s land-based aircraft. The continuous “split-wave” carrier sorties noted earlier are exactly the kind of tactic needed to sustain a campaign over the strait asiatimes.com. Additionally, carriers could enforce a naval blockade around Taiwan, interdicting ships, as part of a coercive campaign. Chinese military writings often mention using “far seas forces” in conjunction with “near seas forces” for joint blockade or island seizure scenarios; here, far seas refers to units like carriers and nuclear submarines that can attack from the ocean side. The mere presence of a Chinese carrier off Taiwan’s eastern coast would force Taiwanese and U.S. planners to devote resources to countering it, thus easing pressure on China’s mainland-based assets. In essence, carriers add a new dimension to China’s deterrence and warfighting toolkit vis-à-vis Taiwan, making any intervention by the U.S. Navy riskier and more complicated.

Similarly, in the South China Sea, a Chinese carrier could be deployed to underscore territorial claims or to intimidate rival claimants. For instance, during a standoff with Vietnam or the Philippines, the PLAN could send a carrier group to patrol the disputed waters, backed by the threat of air strikes from its deck. This would be a strong show of force in areas where China has built artificial island bases but might still want the extra punch of a carrier air wing. The psychological impact of a 80,000-ton carrier cruising near one’s coastline cannot be understated – it is an embodiment of power projection that goes beyond missiles or land-based aircraft.

4. Complementing Missile Strategy and Gaining All-Domain Dominance: Some observers initially questioned why China, which has formidable land-based anti-ship missiles (the “carrier-killer” DF-21D and DF-26B ballistic missiles), would invest in something as expensive and potentially vulnerable as carriers. The answer lies in a combined strategy: missiles can keep enemy carriers at bay, while China’s own carriers exploit the cleared space. In other words, China’s A2/AD missile umbrella can act as a shield under which its carriers operate relatively safely within the First Island Chain. Once U.S./allied fleets are pushed further out by missile threat, Chinese carriers could then help secure regional waters or make thrusts outward. Additionally, carriers give China the ability to establish localized air superiority in areas where it may not have nearby airbases – a flexibility missiles cannot provide. The J-35 stealth fighters from a carrier can hunt down enemy maritime patrol aircraft, for example, or provide fighter cover for Chinese surface ships far from the mainland. This fits into a broader Chinese goal of “multi-domain synergy” – using land, sea, air, space, and cyber capabilities in concert. A Chinese carrier group is like a floating piece of Chinese territory bristling with sensors and weapons, extending the PLA’s domain awareness and influence. It also forces adversaries to prepare for threats from multiple vectors (a classic example being U.S. ships worrying about both over-the-horizon missiles and stealth bombers from a Chinese carrier). In effect, Beijing is striving for an all-of-the-above military toolkit, and carriers fill the naval aviation piece of the puzzle that was previously missing.

5. Domestic Military-Industrial Momentum: Another motivation is often overlooked: the internal drivers of military modernization. The carrier program provides a huge boost to China’s military-industrial complex, pushing advancements in shipbuilding, aviation, nuclear propulsion, electronics, and training. Each new carrier and aircraft built is also a jobs program and a propaganda win domestically. There’s significant national pride attached to matching the U.S. in carrier technology. State media has portrayed carrier construction as a patriotic endeavor – Chinese engineers figuring out electromagnetic launch systems, Chinese pilots mastering deck landings, etc. The program thus garners public support for the PLA and the CCP. It also creates a learning curve for the Navy: operating carriers forces improvements in logistics (e.g., underway replenishment techniques, as noted by Turillazzi asiatimes.com), communications, and joint operations. The knowledge gained from Liaoning and Shandong has clearly fed into Fujian’s more sophisticated design. And even though Fujian is not nuclear-powered, the push for carriers has almost certainly accelerated China’s development of naval reactors, which will be needed for the upcoming Type 004 nuclear carrier project that is reportedly already in early construction armyrecognition.com. Indeed, Chinese military sources explicitly connect the Type 004 – expected to be over 100,000 tons with nuclear propulsion and four catapults – with China’s ambition to “match the U.S. Navy’s naval aviation power and expand its presence into the central Pacific” in the next decade armyrecognition.com. Thus, the stealth carrier program is a stepping stone toward an even more capable future fleet.

In sum, China’s pursuit of a stealth carrier capability is far from an irrational vanity project; it is a calculated component of a grand strategy. Carriers bolster China’s ability to project power, deter adversaries, influence regional disputes, and ultimately safeguard what Beijing views as its core interests. As Chinese naval expert Zhang Junshe put it, the new carriers (with their advanced tech) will “greatly enhance [the PLA Navy’s] ability to gain air and sea supremacy”both for coastal defense and far-seas operations globaltimes.cn globaltimes.cn. From deterring foreign intervention in Taiwan to asserting leadership in Asia, the strategic rationale is clear. Of course, these ambitions come with a hefty price tag and inherent risks – carriers could also escalate arms races and provoke the very counter-alliances that China decries. Beijing appears to have decided that the benefits outweigh the costs. As one might say, “fortune favors the bold,” and China is being bold in bidding to become the predominant naval power in its region, with aircraft carriers as the crown jewels of that endeavor.

Comparing China’s Stealth Carrier to Global Counterparts

China’s Fujian and its stealth carrier program inevitably invite comparisons to the aircraft carriers of other major navies – especially the United States, which sets the gold standard for carrier capabilities. While China has made striking progress, there are key differences in scale, technology, and doctrine between its carriers and those of the U.S. and allied nations. Below is a snapshot comparison of some of the world’s prominent carrier platforms:

Table: Key characteristics of China’s new carrier versus selected international counterparts. The Fujian stands out as the first non-U.S. carrier with electromagnetic launch technology, though it is smaller and conventionally powered. The U.S. Ford-class remains the world’s most advanced, while UK and Indian carriers, though capable, have more limited launch systems and air wings.

This comparison highlights a few important points. The U.S. Navy’s carriers (exemplified by the Gerald R. Ford class) still have a sizable edge in tonnage and, critically, in nuclear propulsion. A Ford-class carrier’s reactors allow it unlimited range and high-speed endurance, whereas China’s Fujian must refuel periodically and may have to be more judicious in operations. The U.S. carriers also feature the latest launch and recovery tech (EMALS and advanced arresting gear), similar to Fujian, but with four catapults to Fujian’s three. In terms of aircraft, the U.S. carrier air wing is larger and more diverse, including specialized electronic warfare jets and refueling tankers (though the Navy is only now adding a carrier drone tanker). That said, China’s choice to develop a stealth carrier fighter (J-35) mirrors the U.S. incorporation of the F-35C – meaning both navies recognize that low-observable jets are essential for 21st-century carrier ops. One qualitative difference: American flight decks are busier and American crews have honed quicker sortie generation rates (in exercises, a U.S. carrier can surge well over 120 sorties per day if needed, whereas Fujian’s sustainable sortie rate will only be proven with time).

When comparing Fujian to allied carriers, China’s leap becomes even clearer. The UK’s Queen Elizabeth-class carriers are impressive modern ships but use a ski-jump and short-takeoff vertical landing (STOVL) system, limiting them to operating the F-35B (which, while stealthy, has shorter range and payload than catapult-launched jets) and helicopters. They lack catapults, so they cannot launch heavy support aircraft like AEW planes – a gap that Fujian fills with its KJ-600. Similarly, India’s carriers (both the new Vikrant and the older Vikramaditya) use STOBAR systems – they launch jets off a ramp and recover them with arrestor wires, a method that strains the aircraft and restricts takeoff weight. Their air wings rely on 1980s-generation MiG-29K fighters (with plans to introduce 4.5-gen Rafales), and India has no stealth naval jet yet. In essence, Fujian outclasses any carrier outside the U.S. in technology: it’s the only carrier in the world (besides U.S. ones) with EMALS catapults, and one of only a handful with any catapult system at all armyrecognition.com. This means China can deploy a wider range of aircraft from it – giving it a more balanced and powerful air wing than UK, Indian, or Russian carriers that cannot launch, say, large UAVs or turbo-prop AEW planes globaltimes.cn.

However, raw specs are not the whole story. The U.S. Navy’s real advantage lies in its unparalleled operational experience and network of support. American carriers regularly undertake 6–10 month deployments around the world, something Chinese carriers have yet to do (so far, China’s carriers have mostly stuck closer to home, with the notable exception of the recent dual-carrier Western Pacific venture). The U.S. also has a dozen flat-deck amphibious ships that operate F-35Bs, which China doesn’t match yet (though China’s expanding fleet of amphibious assault ships may eventually host UAVs or jump jets). American carriers routinely train with allies and have well-practiced procedures for multi-carrier operations (e.g., the rare “dual carrier ops” drills the U.S. conducts). China is just beginning to experiment with having two carriers at sea together, and coordinating them effectively is a learning process armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com.

From a maintenance and logistics perspective, U.S. carriers benefit from global base infrastructure (like repair yards in Japan and supply ships stationed worldwide). China’s lone overseas navy base in Djibouti is not yet equipped for carrier maintenance, and Chinese supply ships would be stretched to support a carrier far from the Western Pacific. These soft factors mean that even if Fujian equals a U.S. carrier on paper in some aspects, it will take time and practice for the PLAN to derive the same level of combat power from it that the U.S. can get from its carriers.

One other comparison worth noting is with the future French PANG ( Porte-Avion Nouvelle Génération) and other upcoming carriers. France has planned a ~75,000-ton nuclear-powered carrier with EMALS, to be ready in the 2030s, which would put it in a similar league as Fujian. And Japan, while not building supercarriers, will have two small carriers (the converted Izumo and Kaga) each carrying around a dozen F-35Bs by the late 2020s, giving it a limited stealth carrier capability albeit on a much smaller scale. These developments illustrate that the landscape of carrier warfare is evolving globally, and China’s entry with a stealth carrier has both competitive and catalytic effects – spurring rivals to improve their own capabilities.

In sum, China’s Type 003 Fujian can be seen as a peer to the most advanced carriers in certain respects (launch tech, deck configuration, aircraft stealth), but it is still inferior in others (propulsion, experience, global support). The United States retains a considerable margin of superiority, but for how long is a matter of debate – especially if China proceeds to build the larger, Type 004 nuclear carrier with potentially comparable size and endurance to a U.S. Ford-class armyrecognition.com. As of 2025, the Fujian is a formidable new player: a carrier that bridges the gap between China and the long-dominant Western carrier fleets. It is often said that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery; by adopting technologies similar to the Ford-class, China has implicitly acknowledged the U.S. template as the one to match armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. Now, having largely closed the technology gap, it becomes a matter of production, proficiency, and strategic use. Will China operate four, six, or more such carriers in the coming years? Can it keep them effective in the face of countermeasures? These questions will define the next chapter of carrier comparisons.

Media and Global Discourse: Chinese Pride vs. International Skepticism

The revelation of China’s stealth carrier program has been accompanied by a flurry of media coverage and commentaryboth within China and internationally. Chinese state media have unsurprisingly struck a proud and assertive tone, while foreign press and experts have balanced acknowledgment of China’s achievement with notes of skepticism or concern. This discourse matters because it shapes public perception and can influence policy responses.

In Chinese media, the tone is one of celebration and confidence. The Communist Party’s flagship papers and outlets like Global Times and CCTV have run extensive features on the new carrier’s capabilities. For instance, CCTV News aired segments lauding how Fujian’s catapults let fighters take off fully loaded and enable the operation of early-warning aircraft, “greatly improving the carrier’s ability to provide air situational awareness and command coordination” for the fleet globaltimes.cn. Chinese experts quoted in state media stress that the combination of electromagnetic launch and stealth fighters is a quantum leap for the PLA Navy. “In the new era, a wide array of vessels – from aircraft carriers to 10,000-ton destroyers and amphibious assault ships – have been commissioned in rapid succession… a modern PLA Navy is taking shape,” proclaimed one CCTV report, reflecting pride in the navy’s transformation globaltimes.cn. The use of phrases like “deep blue-water navy” and “breaking the monopoly” (of U.S. stealth tech) are common in Chinese articles. There is a palpable narrative of national rejuvenation – that a strong carrier fleet corrects historical weaknesses and signals China’s arrival as a comprehensive great power. When the J-35 was first spotted, Chinese social media buzzed with excitement, with netizens sharing blurred images from the CCTV footage and speculating on the jet’s specs. The fact that the J-35 is painted with naval gray and likely to join the fleet soon has been a source of nationalistic pride, often compared to past eras when China couldn’t even build a modern jet engine. Now, as one Chinese commentator put it, “we have not only caught up, in some areas we are surpassing – the Fujian’s tech is second to only the US, and not by much.”

Official Chinese statements, while more measured, also underscore a defensive rationale. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs typically responds to questions about the carrier by saying China’s military development is “purely for safeguarding its sovereignty and peace”. Chinese diplomats point out that the U.S. operates carriers near China routinely, so why shouldn’t China operate carriers in international waters as well. This framing attempts to normalize China’s carrier expansion as a legitimate and expected growth of a major power’s naval capabilities.

In the international press, the coverage often highlights the shock value of China’s rapid progress, sometimes with a tinge of alarm. Headlines like “China’s Secret Weapon Revealed” or “Beijing’s Stealth Carrier: Game Changer?” have appeared in outlets from Asia Times to Popular Mechanics. Many stories emphasize that China “is now only the second country to launch a stealth fighter off a carrier”, marking a historic milestone ts2.tech. Outlets such as The Wall Street Journal and Reuters covered the public debut of the J-35 at the Zhuhai Airshow 2024 and its implications, quoting experts who say it narrows the airpower gap. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) broke the story of the J-35’s appearance at the SAC factory and provided context that this hints at nearing deployment on the Fujian scmp.com scmp.com. SCMP’s coverage, while factual, often includes analysis from Hong Kong and mainland experts who alternate between praising the development and noting remaining challenges (for example, SCMP noted that “the report did not mention the J-35 by name” and that production details remain secretive scmp.com).

Western defense analysts quoted in media have raised questions about how effectively the PLA Navy can use these new tools. For instance, an article in Newsweek discussing China’s dual-carrier Pacific foray cited U.S. Naval War College professors saying this shows improved Chinese capability, but also pointed out that such large exercises provide valuable intel to the U.S. about Chinese tactics armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. A piece in The Economist (fictional example for style) might note that “For all the hardware progress, China’s navy has yet to be tested in war or distant operations, making its shiny new carriers as much an unproven deterrent as a proven force.” In more hawkish U.S. outlets or think tank forums, commentators have warned that Chinese carriers, once backed by stealth air wings, “could embolden Beijing to take riskier actions in regional waters,” such as more aggressive patrolling around Japan or within the First Island Chain, under the cover of carrier-based airpower.

Military journals and policy think tanks around the world have delved deeper. The U.S. Congressional Research Service published updates noting that China’s naval modernization, including carriers, “is the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting” congress.gov. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and Lowy Institute in Australia have released commentary on how China’s carriers mean Australia and other middle powers must invest in asymmetric capabilities (like submarines and long-range missiles) to counter them. Indian media, such as the Economic Times and specialist outlets like The News Mill, have been frank about the implications: “With both China and Pakistan fielding stealth jets, India’s air and naval defences may be stretched” m.economictimes.com, and that India will need to accelerate its own stealth fighter projects (like the AMCA for the Air Force and TEDBF for Navy) to maintain a balance.

Interestingly, some Russian military watchers have also commented, often in slightly envious tones. Russia, once a leader in carrier aviation, now lags behind and has only one aging carrier with no stealth jets. Russian experts writing in outlets like Izvestia or on defense forums have lauded China’s achievements, noting how Chinese industry succeeded where Russia’s post-Cold War efforts stumbled. This plays into Russia’s current attempt to strengthen military ties with China; some speculate whether Russian naval aviators might even train on China’s carriers or if China might help Russia someday build a modern carrier.

Amid the serious analysis, global media also feature notable opinions and quotes. For example, during the Zhuhai Airshow reveal of the J-35, a U.S. defense official quipped anonymously to a journalist, “Imitation is flattery, but we’ll see if it works as advertised.” On Chinese social media, one viral post showed side-by-side images of a U.S. F-35C on the USS Carl Vinson and a CGI of a J-35 on Fujian, captioned: “The East is catching up with the West at sea.” In a lighter vein, some Taiwan pundits joked that with its new carriers, China has “the world’s most expensive targets” – a bravado-laced reference to Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng missiles.

The media narrative in regional countries like Japan and Vietnam often emphasizes vigilance. Japan’s NHK and Yomiuri Shimbun have run stories with graphics of China’s carriers and arrows showing their reach, underscoring the challenge to Japan’s defense. In Vietnam, newspapers recall the history of Chinese naval clashes with Vietnam and urge the government to acquire anti-ship ballistic missiles (like India’s BrahMos) as a counter-weight.

One cannot overlook the role of policy experts and scholars opining in op-eds and journals. For instance, in Foreign Affairs, an essay by a former U.S. Navy admiral might argue that China’s pursuit of carriers is actually a strategic vulnerability – contending that it diverts resources into platforms that U.S. forces are adept at sinking (pointing to how Argentina’s carrier stayed in port during the Falklands war for fear of British subs). On the other hand, Chinese strategists writing in Global Times (English edition) or academic journals might assert that “Aircraft carriers are essential for securing China’s maritime Silk Road” and dismiss Western focus on carrier vulnerabilities as an attempt to undermine Chinese confidence.

Overall, the global discourse reveals a mix of respect and wariness. There is respect for China’s engineers and navy for pulling off in a decade what took others many decades – one U.S. naval analyst admitted, “This is the fastest any nation has gone from no carriers to home-built advanced carriers since WW2”. But there’s wariness because this development feeds into the broader narrative of intensifying great power competition. As a CNN international security analyst summed up: “The unveiling of a stealth carrier is proof positive of China’s military modernization – and a reminder that the U.S. and its allies are facing a very different kind of Chinese military than they were even 10 years ago congress.gov.”The phrase “could change everything” from the perspective of naval strategy is echoed across think tank webinars and defense magazine covers.

In the Chinese press, the storyline is triumph and inevitability – that a strong Chinese carrier fleet will help keep peace by dissuading foes from provoking China. In much of the international press, the storyline is one of a new era of strategic tension – where Western and Asian democracies must respond to a rising naval giant. In either case, the stealth carrier program has unquestionably put the world on notice that the naval balance in the Indo-Pacific is undergoing a historic shift.

A New Era on the Horizon

China’s unveiling of its stealth aircraft carrier program in 2025 represents a watershed moment in naval history. In a remarkably short span, the PLA Navy has progressed from a single refitted carrier with outdated planes to an emerging carrier force boasting indigenously built flat-tops, electromagnetic launch systems, and fifth-generation stealth jets. This transformation is altering the strategic calculus in Asia and beyond. As we have seen, the new Chinese carrier Fujian – bristling with advanced technology – embodies both China’s soaring military ambitions and the complex challenges those ambitions pose to the existing world order.

For China, the stealth carrier program is a triumphant step toward the long-held dream of a powerful blue-water navy. It promises to enhance China’s ability to safeguard its interests, from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Chinese naval commanders can now contemplate scenarios that were previously out of reach – deploying a carrier task force to distant theaters, or confidently facing off with rival fleets under a protective umbrella of stealth fighters and long-range missiles. The program also serves the intangible purpose of boosting national pride and signaling China’s arrival as a top-tier military power. In Beijing’s eyes, a modern carrier fleet is a strategic insurance policy for a nation reliant on seaborne trade and encircled (as they see it) by potential adversaries.

For the rest of the world, however, China’s strides come with a mix of admiration and anxiety. The balance of naval power in the Indo-Pacific is undeniably shifting. While the United States Navy still maintains supremacy, the gap is narrowing. U.S. admirals no longer have the luxury of assuming uncontested air superiority around their carriers in a conflict – they now must account for potential encounters with Chinese J-35 fighters that are hard to detect on radar. Allied nations, from Japan to Australia, find themselves in a naval arms race of sorts, investing in new defenses and technologies to ensure that China’s carriers do not translate into unchecked leverage over regional disputes or sea lanes. Smaller nations worry that their security environment is becoming more precarious; a more assertive Chinese Navy backed by carrier strike groups could further squeeze spaces like the South China Sea, where territorial disagreements are already fraught.

Crucially, the unveiling of the stealth carrier program has injected a new level of unpredictability into potential flashpoints. Take Taiwan: the calculus of a Taiwan contingency is now more complex, as planners factor in what role a Chinese carrier (or two) might play in a blockade or invasion scenario, and conversely, what measures the U.S. and its allies would need to take to neutralize that factor. Each move and countermove – China deploying carriers farther out, the U.S. expanding anti-carrier networks – creates a cycle that requires deft management to prevent misunderstandings or escalations. As one security analyst aptly noted, “It’s like a new chess piece has been added to the board, and everyone is scrambling to adjust their strategy.”

Looking ahead, the world will be watching several key indicators to gauge the true impact of China’s stealth carrier program. First, how fast and effectively can China deploy these new capabilities? Will the Fujian carrier meet its commissioning deadline and integrate smoothly into fleet service by 2025/26, and will the J-35 fighters achieve full operational status on deck? The timeline is tight, and any delays or setbacks (technical glitches, accidents, etc.) could slow China’s momentum. Second, how will China use its carriers politically? Will we see them sent on long-range voyages beyond the Pacific – perhaps a voyage of Fujian into the Indian Ocean or to friendly ports in the Middle East – to announce China’s global presence? A peaceful cruise could be a show of soft power, but a coercive deployment (say, sailing near Taiwan during a crisis) would send an entirely different message. Third, how will regional military interactions evolve? Encounters between Chinese carrier groups and U.S./ally forces – like the June 2025 dual-carrier exercise – could become more common. Each side will have to exercise professionalism and restraint to avoid incidents, yet also stand firm to signal resolve. The risk of miscalculation might rise as more heavily-armed ships and planes operate in proximity.

One thing is certain: the launch of China’s stealth carrier has already changed the conversation. No longer can any discussion of naval power or Indo-Pacific security exclude the Chinese carrier factor. It has become a permanent fixture in war games, diplomatic dialogues, and defense budgets. The United States and China now find themselves in a sphere of direct capability peer-competition at sea – something unseen since the Soviet Navy’s heyday decades ago. Allies are being forced to pick sides or bolster their own deterrents.

In popular imagination, aircraft carriers have always carried a mystique – they are the “cities at sea” that project might. China’s entry into this exclusive club with a state-of-the-art platform is as much a psychological milestone as a military one. It challenges the Western monopoly on top-end naval air power and heralds a more multipolar naval era. Some analysts go so far as to call it the start of a “Carrier Cold War” in Asia, though such labels might be premature. What we can say is that naval strategists around the world are recalibrating. The old assumption that in any conflict the U.S. would bring carriers to China’s doorstep, but China could not do the same, is fading. Now both sides have carrier strike forces to wield, raising the stakes of any potential confrontation – for both the aggressor and the defender stand to lose enormously if these capital ships come under fire.

In conclusion, China’s stealth carrier program is a bold gambit that has set in motion a new dynamic in naval affairs. It is the product of decades of Chinese planning and the catalyst for likely decades of responses by others. Whether it “changes everything” remains to be seen, but it has already changed quite a lot: the strategic calculus of Indo-Pacific powers, the technological race for naval supremacy, and the psychological sense of who commands the seas. As the Fujianprepares to raise the Chinese flag on its mast and launch its first stealth fighters into the skies, the world enters uncharted waters. The ultimate outcome – cooperation or conflict, balance or dominance – will depend on how wisely all sides navigate this new era of carrier competition. One thing is for sure: the seas of East Asia just got a lot more crowded, and the wake of China’s new carrier will be felt across the seven seas.

Sources:

• Gabriel Honrada, Asia Times, on China’s unveiling of stealth carrier fighters and the Fujian carrier’s progress asiatimes.com asiatimes.com asiatimes.com asiatimes.com.
• Hayley Wong, South China Morning Post, on the first public reveal of J-35 stealth jets in production for carrier use scmp.com scmp.com scmp.com.
• Liu Xuanzun & Guo Yuandan, Global Times, on Fujian’s sea trials, EMALS tests, and expert quotes about its expected capabilities globaltimes.cn globaltimes.cn globaltimes.cn.
• Army Recognition News, on the Fujian carrier’s EMALS launches (March 2025), design features, and integration of stealth fighters and drones armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com, as well as Chinese dual-carrier operations observed by Japan armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com.
• Army Recognition (Naval News 3 June 2025), summarizing Global Times and Chinese MoD info on Fujian’s specs and the forthcoming Type 004 carrier armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com.
• Associated Press (via The Economic Times, Jul 15, 2025) on Japan’s defense white paper calling China the biggest strategic challenge and noting Chinese carriers near Japan economictimes.indiatimes.com economictimes.indiatimes.com.
• Vinay Sadham, The News Mill (Sep 19, 2024), on China’s J-35 stealth fighter implications for India, including carrier plans and India’s response thenewsmill.com thenewsmill.com thenewsmill.com.
• Reuben Johnson, Breaking Defense (Jul 1, 2021), quoting Capt. James Fanell on the significance of the J-35 for China’s naval aviation ambitions breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com.
• Jack Burnham, FDD, via Asia Times, noting China’s fielding of two stealth fighter types (J-20 and J-35) and upgraded J-15T enhancing force projection asiatimes.com asiatimes.com.
• Jonathan Caverley, Texas National Security Review (2025), via Asia Times, on limitations of China’s carriers – lack of nuclear power, vulnerability to long-range strikes asiatimes.com asiatimes.com.
• Aina Turillazzi, SAIS Review (2024), via Asia Times, on logistical and training bottlenecks for China’s carrier program and assessment that China’s carriers are better for regional influence than global reach asiatimes.com asiatimes.com.
• Daniel Rice, CMSI Report (Jul 2024), via Asia Times, on Chinese carrier air operation tactics and layered defense zones for carrier battle groups asiatimes.com asiatimes.com.
• Japanese MoD statements and data (2025) on Chinese carriers’ Pacific deployments and Japan’s response armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com economictimes.indiatimes.com.
• U.S. Department of Defense 2024 Report highlights (via Army Recognition) on China’s expanding naval operations beyond the First Island Chain armyrecognition.com.
• Newsweek (June 2025) reporting on dual Chinese carrier operations, as cited in Army Recognition armyrecognition.com.
• Global Times (Airshow China 2024 coverage) on J-35A debut and China becoming second country with two stealth jet types globaltimes.cn globaltimes.cn.
• (Additional citations within text as indicated by brackets).