Fiber-Optic Drones in Ukraine: Evolution, Applications, and Impact

Introduction and Background

Fiber-optic guided drones – UAVs that communicate via a physical fiber-optic cable rather than radio – have emerged as a game-changing technology in the Ukraine–Russia war. Though the concept of wire-guided munitions is not new (wire-guided anti-tank missiles like the U.S. TOW and Israel’s Spike have been in service for decades), applying fiber-optic tethers to drones is a recent innovation accelerated by battlefield necessity. Before the war, such “wire-controlled drones” seemed impractical or unnecessary, but Russia’s heavy use of electronic jamming quickly changed that perception. Early prototypes of fiber-linked drones appeared in 2023 on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides, and by 2024 the technology was deployed operationally. This report details the development of fiber-optic drones, their military and civilian applications in Ukraine, technical specifications, tactical uses, communication advantages, resistance to electronic warfare, key manufacturers, and comparisons with other drone types.

Military Applications of Fiber-Optic Drones in Ukraine

Russian Deployment: Russia was the first to field fiber-optic first-person-view (FPV) drones at scale in this war. The first known model was the “Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky” drone, developed by a Russian volunteer tech group (Ushkuinik) led by Aleksey Chadaev kyivindependent.com. It was deployed around August 2024 in Russia’s Kursk region to counter a Ukrainian incursion, and it proved extremely effective in targeting Ukrainian troops and supply convoys. Russian forces used these tethered FPV “kamikaze” drones to monitor and strike Ukrainian logistics routes, making troop resupply in the Kursk salient nearly impossible. A Ukrainian medic described how their “logistics just collapsed; fiber optic drones were monitoring all routes, leaving no way to deliver ammunition or provisions”. By late 2024 and early 2025, Russia had elite drone units (e.g. units codenamed “Rubicon” and “Sudny Den”) experienced with fiber-optic FPVs, which were redeployed to eastern Ukraine (Donetsk oblast) to bolster offensive operations around hotspots like Pokrovsk and Toretsk. Russian fiber drones reportedly played a crucial role in forcing Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk border salient by rendering movement too dangerous.

Russian fiber-optic drones are typically FPV quadcopters carrying an explosive (often repurposed RPG warheads or small bombs) and trailing a long spool of fiber-optic cable. One recovered Russian unit had a spool length of ~10.8 km (≈7 miles) of fiber. Russian models have demonstrated ranges up to 20–30 km and high reliability: Ukrainian intelligence indicated Russian fiber drones had about an 80% success rate at 20 km range (failures mostly due to pilot error). This outclasses early Ukrainian fiber drones, which initially had only a 10–30% success rate at 15 km. One reason is technical: Russian developers opted for higher-end communication tech – using 1490–1550 nm wavelength fiber links (lower signal attenuation) and digital IP cameras with custom OpenIPC-based software, plus higher-power transmitters uasvision.com uasvision.com. This gave Russian fiber drones a clearer control signal at long distances. In contrast, early Ukrainian builds often repurposed a single Chinese analog-to-digital converter system using 1310 nm for control (which suffers three times higher signal loss per km) and analog FPV cameras uasvision.com uasvision.com. The Russian approach, while more expensive, yielded superior range and video quality.

Ukrainian Adoption: Once Russia’s advantage became apparent, Ukraine raced to catch up in fiber-optic drone development. Ukrainian innovators, who had led in other drone tech, found themselves behind in this instance. By mid-2024, Ukraine’s military and government tech incubators sent an urgent signal to domestic drone makers that fiber-optic FPV drones were “very much needed” and that the state was ready to procure them in quantity. A pivotal moment was a Ukrainian special forces incursion into Kursk in summer 2024, which encountered Russia’s fiber drones; Russian sources noted Ukrainian electronic warfare units could jam all Russian drones except the fiber-optic ones. This reality check prompted Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense to fast-track fiber-drone programs.

In December 2024, Ukraine’s Defense Innovations Department held a public demonstration of FPV drones controlled via fiber-optic cable for high-ranking officers. Over a dozen domestic models were presented, some able to carry up to 3 kg of payload, and live test flights were conducted for military observers. By early 2025, dozens of Ukrainian engineering teams were developing fiber-optic drones or components, supported by the government’s Brave1 tech cluster. Factories in Ukraine ramped up capacity, with claims that thousands of fiber drones per month could be produced given sufficient components. Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, stated in mid-2025 that 15 companies were now manufacturing fiber-optic drones in Ukraine.

Front-line Ukrainian units began using fiber drones in late 2024, initially in small numbers. A commander from the National Guard’s 12th Special Purpose Brigade (Azov) recounted that only <5% of their drones currently use fiber links due to limited supply. Those few, however, had outsized impact. An International Legion drone pilot (“George”) described a mission in fall 2024 where his fiber-optic drone, carrying a 1.6 kg warhead, penetrated intense Russian jamming and flew into a cellar hiding Russian soldiers, killing them – a feat impossible for a radio drone in that area. Watching the successful strike via the perfect video feed, his team realized the “huge implications” – “That first time I used the fiber optic, I never wanted to go back to the regular [radio]”, he said. Fiber drones have been especially useful in electronic warfare-heavy fronts like Bakhmut and the Donbas. By early 2025, Ukrainian drone units (e.g. the Achilles Strike Company of the 92nd Brigade, and Azov’s drone battalion) were regularly fielding fiber FPVs for high-priority strikes, even as they work to increase supply.

Tactical Impact: On the battlefield, fiber-optic FPV drones are being used primarily as one-way attack munitions (loitering kamikaze drones) and for short-range reconnaissance-strike missions. They are typically flown low and can be guided with pinpoint accuracy into targets such as armored vehicles, dugouts, or even through windows and doorways of buildings. Ukrainian operators note these drones allow attacks in scenarios that were previously off-limits to FPVs: “They’re really great when you need to fly into a building like a hangar to look inside and strike straight away… [or] flying in forested areas”, according to an FPV team leader in Ukraine’s Achilles unit. Because fiber drones remain controllable even in dense urban or wooded terrain (where radio drones would lose signal), areas that used to be safe from drones – forests, indoor hideouts – are no longer safe. In one anecdote, Ukrainian soldiers noted they used to move relatively safely along tree-lined roads (since foliage blocked radio signals of enemy drones), but now Russian fiber-optic FPVs can snake through the woods with impunity.

Perhaps the biggest impact has been in counter-EW (electronic warfare) operations. During 2024, both sides invested heavily in expensive jamming systems to protect tanks and positions from the swarm of radio-controlled FPV drones. Fiber-optic drones essentially rendered those jammers useless. Ukrainian and Russian EW units also sometimes interfered with their own side’s drones (multiple teams in the same sector inadvertently jamming each other), a problem eliminated by using fiber control. By 2025, fiber drones were considered “the weapon shaping entire operations” on some fronts. Imagery from spring 2025 shows Ukrainian roads covered by tunnels of netting and fields littered with glistening strands of discarded fiber – new fixtures of the battlefield’s landscape. Both sides acknowledge these unjammable drones have become a critical capability, likened to the importance of artillery in their ability to strike targets at will.

Civilian and Non-Combat Uses of Fiber-Optic Drones

Beyond direct combat roles, fiber-optic drones have found niche non-combat applications in Ukraine, primarily in logistics and potentially in civilian sectors requiring reliable connectivity. A striking example is the use of fiber-optic controlled unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to deliver supplies to front-line troops. In 2025, Ukrainian units introduced small tracked robots (described as “miniature unarmed tanks”) that carry 100–150 kg of ammunition, food, and fuel to forward positions, controlled via fiber-optic cable. These ground drones, guided remotely through a tether, have taken over many dangerous supply runs that would expose human drivers to enemy FPV drone attacks. “We use drones to avoid the drones,” quipped one soldier – meaning they use their fiber-optic ground drones to evade Russian flying FPVs hunting for supply trucks. The fiber link makes the UGVs impervious to jamming or interception, ensuring they can be driven even in the electronic warfare-saturated front lines. If a ground drone is destroyed by enemy fire (or even attacked by stray dogs, as has happened), no lives are lost. This innovation is seen as a lifesaver for sustaining troops under heavy drone threat.

Fiber-optic tethering is also inherently useful in civilian scenarios where radio communication is unworkable. Even before the war, tethered robots and drones were used for inspecting tunnels, mines, and pipes – environments where remote control via cable is more reliable than radio. The war has accelerated development of such systems. For example, Ukrainian companies are now adapting heavy hexacopter “bomber” drones to fiber-optic control for specialized missions (these can carry larger payloads). One prototype by Dronarium Air uses fiber-optic control and can automatically switch to GPS guidance or return-to-base if the cable breaks. This kind of fail-safe could be valuable for civilian drone uses (e.g. in disaster areas or industrial inspections) to ensure a mission isn’t lost due to a cable snag.

The proliferation of fiber cables on the battlefield has even created unintended “civilian” use by wildlife. In a surreal anecdote, birds in Donbas have been seen weaving fiber-optic strands from spent drone tethers into their nests. A bird’s nest made almost entirely of fiber-optic cable was found near Toretsk by the Azov Brigade, highlighting how ubiquitous the material has become in the environment.

Looking ahead, the expertise Ukraine is gaining in fiber-optic drone tech could translate to civilian industries post-conflict. Secure, jam-proof fiber-controlled drones might be useful for infrastructure maintenance in high-interference zones, or for law enforcement and border security where communications can be deliberately jammed. However, as of now, the primary civilian benefit has been indirect – improving battlefield logistics (which has humanitarian implications by getting food and water to soldiers more safely) and preserving human life.

Technical Specifications and Capabilities of Fiber-Optic Drones

Fiber-optic FPV drones in Ukraine are typically modified commercial-style quadcopters or hexacopters with a spool of optical fiber added. The drone frames are often made of carbon fiber or polymer, with standard racing drone electronics and a first-person camera. Key specifications include:

• Communication Link: A thin fiber-optic cable (often single-mode fiber) unwinds from a spool as the drone flies. The spool is usually carried on the drone between the frame and the payload. Typical fiber lengths are 5 km, 10 km, 15 km, up to 20 km. Ukrainians have used drones effectively out to ~15 km, and know of successful uses at 20 km, while Russians reportedly field spools up to 30 km. The fiber is extremely lightweight (a 10 km coil might weigh around 0.9–1.2 kg) and very thin (0.2–0.3 mm diameter), but stronger than it looks – standard mil-grade fiber can have tensile strength over 100,000 psi. Still, it can break if strained or bent too sharply.
• Speed and Maneuverability: Fiber FPVs are somewhat larger and heavier than normal FPVs due to the spool and a larger battery. A typical design can fly around 60 km/h and perform normal maneuvers. However, the added mass makes them slower and less agile than equivalent radio drones. Pilots note the drones must be built on larger frames with more powerful motors to lift the spool, which reduces acceleration and makes them easier targets for small-arms fire. High-end racing FPVs (radio-controlled) can reach >150 km/h – fiber drones do not usually attain such speeds.
• Range: The operational range is essentially the length of the fiber tether. Common Ukrainian-made spools are 10 km; longer (15–20 km) coils exist but have higher failure rates if the tech isn’t high quality. In practice, 10 km fiber drones are achieving ~50% success to target, whereas early 15 km attempts had <30% success until better components were used. Russian long-range fiber drones (20 km) have been very effective (≈80% success). Notably, unlike radio drones, fiber drones do not require line-of-sight – they can snake behind hills or into structures as long as the cable is intact. The trade-off is that a radio-controlled drone with mesh network relays or satellite link could potentially go much farther (hundreds of km), whereas a fiber drone is hard-limited by its tether length.
• Payload: Early fiber FPVs carry similar warheads to regular kamikaze drones – often small anti-armor grenades or RPG warheads (~0.5–1.5 kg explosive). The drone itself (frame + battery + spool) might weigh 5–7 kg, so total takeoff weight is higher than a standard FPV. Some larger fiber-optic drones can carry more; Ukrainian company BattleBorn reports their fiber drones can carry anywhere from ~1.5 kg up to 8 kg of explosives depending on the model. For example, a big hexacopter bomber on a fiber leash could drop a heavier bomb or multiple grenades. However, heavier payloads shorten flight time and make the drone even less maneuverable, so most combat uses focus on small, precise strikes. Ground fiber-drones, by contrast, can haul 100+ kg since they drive on tracks – but they are slow moving UGVs.
• Flight Time: Fiber-optic link itself does not greatly change flight time; it depends on the drone’s battery and weight. A typical FPV kamikaze drone might have ~10–15 minutes of flight endurance. The heavier fiber drones likely have slightly shorter flight times if using the same batteries, due to weight and drag. Their missions are usually short (fly out 5–10 km, dive on target). Tethered observation drones (where the drone is powered via cable from the ground) can loiter much longer, but those are mostly stationary “aero-tether” systems not widely used in this war due to mobility issues.
• Video/Data Feed: The fiber link provides a high-bandwidth, high-resolution video feed with minimal latency. Operators report getting a “perfect video feed right up to the target”, unlike analog FPV radio links which often become snowy or cut out during the final approach. Fiber can carry HD digital video with virtually no lag, giving the pilot a clear view to precisely guide the drone. This is a major benefit – one reason Russians shifted to fiber was that autonomous AI-guidance (machine vision) wasn’t yet reliable, so a human pilot with a clear video feed is preferred kyivindependent.com.
• Control Systems: Both sides have improvised control systems for fiber drones. Many use COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) flight controllers with custom firmware to accept commands via a wired interface. The control signal is often Ethernet or serial data over fiber. As noted, Russians integrated IP networking on the drone (media converters and OpenIPC software with IP cameras) uasvision.com, essentially turning the drone into a node on a fiber network for control/video. Ukrainians initially used simpler analog FPV feeds piped through fiber (hence the Chinese analog-to-digital converters) uasvision.com. Moving forward, one can expect standardized fiber-optic drone control units to emerge, perhaps using ruggedized fiber connectors and plug-and-play spools.
• Cost: Early in the war, fiber-optic drone components were very expensive. In 2023 a single spool plus optical transmitter kit from China could cost up to $2,500, making a fiber drone an expensive one-way weapon. By late 2024, as Chinese factories ramped up production (fueled by large Russian orders), prices fell dramatically. As of 2025, a 10 km fiber spool + comms module is about $500 (and falling). A complete fiber-optic FPV drone now might cost roughly $1,000–$1,500, only a few hundred dollars more than a high-end regular FPV setup. A Ukrainian commander cited about $1,200 per drone for a 10 km range unit. Domestic production could lower this further; Ukrainian manufacturers project that with local spool winding and assembly, fiber drones will cost only $70–$140 more than radio ones (roughly $500–$800 total). Ground fiber-UGVs are costlier – e.g. a batch of five Ratel UGVs with fiber control (35 kg total payload) costs ₴1.2 million ($32k).

Summary of Typical Fiber-Optic Drone Specs: A representative example of a mid-size fiber FPV drone would be: a quadcopter with ~12–13″ propellers, all-up weight ~10 kg including a 1 kg warhead and 1 kg of fiber tether, max speed ~60 km/h, effective range 5–10 km (with 10 km cable) depending on terrain, and cost around $1,000. It provides a 1080p video feed to the operator and is practically immune to radio-frequency interference. More advanced models push range to 15–20 km or payloads up to ~5–8 kg, at the cost of larger size and higher price.

Tactical Advantages of Fiber-Optic Communication

Fiber-optic control confers enormous tactical advantages in the electronic warfare environment of Ukraine:

• Impervious to Radio Jamming: The foremost benefit is immunity to RF jamming. Unlike regular drones that rely on radio uplinks which can be disrupted by noise or targeted jammers, a fiber-optic drone maintains a hardwired link to the operator. No known electronic warfare system can jam a signal traveling inside a fiber-optic cable. Ukrainian and Russian forces have deployed a wide array of EW units (vehicle-mounted jammers, anti-drone guns, etc.) that proved effective against standard drones. Fiber drones bypass all of them – “electronic warfare means…are just inefficient” against fiber, as a Ukrainian drone commander put it. In trials, Ukrainian EW specialists found they could bring down all enemy drones except the fiber-linked ones. This allows fiber drones to penetrate the dense “electronic shields” that both sides put up around key positions. For example, during the battle for Hlyboke, a fiber drone slipped past intense jamming to hit its target, whereas any radio drone would have failed.
• Undetectable by RF Sensors: Because they do not emit radio frequency energy, fiber-optic drones are stealthier in terms of electronic signature. Neither the drone nor its operator is radiating, so devices like RF scanners, direction-finders, or anti-drone RF monitoring systems cannot pick them up. This is critical: many drone detection systems used in Ukraine (including by NATO units assisting Ukraine) rely on spotting the drone’s control signal or video transmission. Fiber drones are effectively radio-silent “dark drones.” As The War Zone notes, “another major advantage to a wired FPV drone is that it would not radiate any energy…that could be detected. These electronic emissions…can prove deadly for the operator if [the enemy] triangulate their position. There is no such vulnerability with a wire-guided FPV drone.”. In practical terms, an FPV pilot using a fiber drone can operate without fear of being geolocated by the enemy’s electronic surveillance – a lifesaver, since Russians have used Radio Reconnaissance to target drone operators with artillery. Fiber drones remove that risk.
• High Bandwidth, Reliable Connection: The fiber link offers a high-data-rate, low-latency connection, supporting clear video and responsive control to the very end of the mission. Operators get a real-time POV feed that doesn’t cut out even during the final seconds of a terminal dive (when analog FPV feeds often go to static). One expert noted the cable transmits a high-quality image back to the ground “right up to the moment of detonation.” This reliable feed dramatically increases hit probability, since the pilot can manually steer into small or moving targets with confidence. It also enables reconnaissance use – the pilot can thoroughly inspect an area (even inside structures) and abort or alter the mission if needed, something riskier to do with autonomous drones. In essence, fiber provides the “perfect video feed” and control link as long as the cable remains intact.
• Not Limited by Radio Line-of-Sight: Fiber drones can fly into places radio-controlled drones cannot. Normally, FPV drones struggle if the operator is behind a hill or if the drone flies into a building or deep into woods, because the radio signal is blocked. Terrain, structures, and even the earth’s curvature limit radio line-of-sight. Fiber optics eliminate the line-of-sight requirement – the drone can literally go around corners, into basements, under dense canopy, etc., as long as the fiber can follow (or at least not break). Ukrainian soldiers noted that previously, they were safe from FPVs deep in forests (“the forest blocks radio signals”), but fiber drones changed that: “it [was] very difficult for [a radio] drone to descend into the middle of the forest…because the radio signal disappears,” but a fiber drone has no such issue. This capability has “opened up” targets that used to be naturally protected from drones. Both sides have exploited this: Russian fiber drones in Kursk surveilled roads through forests that were once secure supply routes, and Ukrainian special operators have used fiber drones to peek into enemy bunkers or building interiors before attacking.
• Counteracting Terrain Effects: In addition to deliberate jamming, fiber solves the problem of signal loss at long distances and near the ground. FPV drones flying low (to avoid detection) often lose radio contact because the antennas are near ground level, especially as they approach a target. As The War Zone describes, “maintaining line-of-sight radio connection…as [a drone] gets very low to the ground” is difficult; terrain undulations or buildings can break the link. Fiber-optic control means drones can hug the ground or maneuver freely without worrying about maintaining radio line-of-sight. This is particularly useful for anti-armor FPVs that skim just above fields to avoid detection – a tactic now viable without losing control.
• Production and Supply Advantages: Interestingly, using fiber might ease some supply issues. A fiber-optic drone needs no radio transmitter or receiver on board, which were components sometimes in short supply (due to export restrictions on dual-use electronics). By removing the radio module, builders simplify the parts list. Ukrainian developers noted that when certain radio-frequency chips became scarce, going fiber-optic allowed continued production using just optical components. Additionally, fiber drones’ effectiveness in a jammed environment means fewer drones may be needed to achieve a given effect (since each one has a higher chance of hitting the target), potentially offsetting their higher cost with greater efficiency.

In summary, fiber-optic drones provide a countermeasure-resistant attack capability that can penetrate EW defenses and reach any hideout. As one Ukrainian media post touted: “We will find a countermeasure-resistant FPV drone to break through any Russian electronic warfare system. This is precisely the type of weapon [we have].”. So far, that boast has held true – neither side has yet fielded an effective way to electronically counter fiber-guided drones.

Limitations and Challenges of Fiber-Optic Drones

Despite their advantages, fiber-optic drones have notable drawbacks and limitations. They occupy a specialized niche and are not a wholesale replacement for radio drones. Key challenges include:

• Physical Vulnerability of the Tether: The fiber-optic cable itself is a potential Achilles’ heel. It can snag or sever on obstacles in the environment. Urban battlefields with ruins, trees, and power lines present a maze that a trailing cable can catch on. If the fiber is yanked or cut, the drone immediately loses communication. There have been cases of accidental breakage and even enemy action to cut cables. In one incident, a Russian quadcopter actually deliberately flew through a Ukrainian drone’s fiber tether, slicing it with its rotors and causing the drone to crash. Operators must fly with this vulnerability in mind – avoiding sharp turns around corners and maintaining some altitude to prevent draping the line over obstacles. To mitigate this, fiber drone tactics include flying higher and then diving almost vertically onto targets (to keep the line mostly clear above ground). Still, the tether is a constant consideration and risk.
• Limited Maneuverability and Speed: The “tethered” nature imposes performance constraints. The trailing cable creates drag and can inhibit extreme maneuvers. More importantly, the drone’s design has to accommodate the weight and volume of the spool, making it bulkier. As noted, fiber drones use larger frames and batteries, which makes them slower and less nimble targets. One commander said a fiber drone is easier to shoot down with small arms than a standard tiny FPV, simply because it’s bigger and can’t juke as quickly. The high maneuverability of FPV drones (which can zigzag and dive at high-g forces) is partially sacrificed. Additionally, the spooled cable can introduce a slight lag in control if there’s slack, though fiber’s latency is minimal – it’s more the drone’s inertia that is an issue. Pilots need to adapt their flying style, and inexperienced pilots have lost fiber drones by not accounting for the tether’s handling peculiarities.
• Range Constraints: Fiber drones are restricted to relatively short-range operations compared to some radio-controlled or satellite-guided drones. The maximum range is the cable length (usually 5–15 km). While this covers most tactical scenarios on a front line, it means fiber drones cannot perform deep strikes far behind enemy lines unless launched from very close to the frontline. By contrast, a radio drone with a mesh network or a satellite link could reach targets dozens or hundreds of kilometers away. For example, Ukraine has used long-range UAVs (likely satellite-guided or GPS-guided) to strike airbases deep in Russia – something a fiber drone physically could not do. Thus, fiber FPVs “will occupy only a specific niche and will not be produced in the millions”, as Ukrainian experts conclude. They are extremely useful for local area dominance (within ~10 km) but not for long-endurance or strategic-range missions. Units must still rely on conventional drones for far-range recon or strikes beyond the front.
• Logistical Footprint: The need for spools adds complexity to logistics and deployment. Soldiers must carry the relatively delicate fiber spools and handle them carefully. In the field, discarded cables litter the ground, to the point that they glint in the sun and can reveal launch sites if not relocated. Ukrainian operators noted that the reflective fiber strands accumulating around a launch position can tip off the enemy to where drones are being launched. As a result, teams have to “switch positions more often” to avoid being targeted once their spent cables give them away. Handling the leftover coils is also a minor nuisance – cleaning up or concealing kilometers of fine fiber after each mission isn’t easy.
• Manufacturing Challenges: Initially, many Ukrainian manufacturers simply imported Chinese fiber tether kits and lacked know-how to optimize them. This led to reliability problems – e.g. improper integration caused drones to still emit some radio signals or have the fiber tear due to poor spool mechanics. Over time, the better producers incorporated feedback and improved their systems, raising success rates to ~50% per strike and climbing. Still, making the fiber-optic communication modules and winding high-quality spools is non-trivial. The fiber must be wound to deploy smoothly without tangling or breaking. According to industry insiders, “the technology for winding fibre optics and assembling communication boards is not the simplest” – it requires precision machines and experienced engineers, though it’s achievable with effort. Companies like Smart Electronics Group in Ukraine proposed fiber drones early on but were rebuffed due to high cost and complexity at that time. Now, with state support, manufacturers are rapidly improving, but production still lags demand. The Ukrainian commander “Yas” noted in May 2025 that good fiber drone makers have long waiting lists, and his unit often must wait 2–3 months for deliveries or else refuse low-quality alternatives. This constraint keeps fiber drones a limited commodity on the Ukrainian side for now.
• Higher Cost (vs. simple FPVs): While prices are dropping, fiber drones still cost more per unit than improvised radio drones. In mid-2023, no one wanted to pay $2500 for a single-use drone. As of 2025, a fiber drone might cost on the order of $1000, versus a few hundred dollars for a basic FPV. This means volunteer-funded drone units must consider where fiber drones are worth the expense. Often they reserve fiber drones for high-value targets or in areas where radio drones simply cannot operate due to jamming. The cost factor is diminishing over time (with projections of parity in cost after local mass production), but it’s an inherent limitation in scaling up usage.
• Payload Trade-offs: The payload capacity is reduced because some lift is used for the cable. A fiber drone carrying a 1 kg warhead might be the same size as a radio drone carrying a 2 kg warhead. This could mean slightly less explosive punch on target on average. Also, fiber FPVs haven’t been as extensively used in swarm tactics yet (where dozens of small FPVs saturate a target) – partly because each drone is costlier and more complex. They are more often used in singular precision strikes. If a mission calls for delivering a truly large explosive, other means (like ground robots or artillery) might be better due to the weight penalty of fiber.
• Learning Curve: Troops have to learn new tactics for fiber drones. Piloting with a tether, managing the spool, and executing attacks without entangling the cable require training. Ukrainian operators are “just beginning to master this technology,” and as they do, many current issues might be mitigated. For instance, careful route planning can minimize snag risk (e.g. flying above treetop height until near the target). As experience grows, the failure rate due to human error should drop, and the effective use of fiber drones will improve.

In summary, fiber-optic drones are highly effective but specialized tools. A Ukrainian National Guard platoon commander summed it up: ideally, a unit should have a mix – “plenty of standard FPV drones [radio] on different frequencies, drones with machine vision, and fiber-optic drones. Each is effective in its own way and serves specific tasks.” Fiber drones excel at certain defensive operations (e.g. picking off armored vehicles under heavy jamming or in fog where optical guidance is needed) and offer capabilities under conditions where others fail. But their limitations – range, weight, visibility, cost, and tether management – mean they complement rather than completely supplant other drone types. As one media article noted, fiber FPVs will fill an important niche in drone warfare, not dominate it entirely.

Key Manufacturers and Developers

Multiple actors in Ukraine and abroad have driven the development of fiber-optic drones:

Ukrainian Manufacturers/Teams: Ukraine’s drone industry is a mix of formal defense firms, volunteer engineers, and military tech units. Some notable names include:

• Vyriy Drone: A private Ukrainian company co-founded by Oleksii Babenko. Vyriy has been at the forefront of FPV drone production and is credited with assembling the first FPV quadcopter made entirely from Ukrainian-produced components in 2023 (though not fiber at first). Babenko, Vyriy’s CEO, has been a vocal figure sharing performance stats and advocating improvements in fiber drones uasvision.com. He highlighted the gap with Russia’s tech and pushed for adopting better fiber transmitters and thicker fiber to improve success rates uasvision.com. Vyriy is also involved in efforts to localize fiber spool manufacturing to bring costs down.
• BattleBorn: A Kyiv-based drone producer (mentioned in Business Insider) that develops a range of drones, including fiber-optic FPVs. Its CEO (callsign “Max”) stated “there is almost no defense against these [fiber-optic] drones” and noted they frequently and efficiently destroy high-value equipment. BattleBorn’s COO (“Alex”) detailed their drone specs (up to ~10 km range now, aiming for 15 km, with payloads 3–8 kg). BattleBorn is an example of a company rapidly iterating designs and ramping production to meet military demand.
• Dronarium (and WARMAKS): Dronarium Air is a Ukrainian drone development group that by March 18, 2024, had already showcased a fiber-optic drone prototype – a swift response to Russia’s first use. They also worked on a heavy hexacopter with fiber control (in partnership with Warmaks), which can revert to autonomous modes if tethered control fails. Dronarium’s early prototype was likely one inspiration that spurred broader adoption on the Ukrainian side.
• Smart Electronics Group: Co-founded by Vladyslav Oleksiienko, this team claims to have proposed fiber-optic drones to the army in early 2023, though there was no interest at that time. Now, Oleksiienko is involved in development and has provided insight on market segmentation (standard vs specialized drones). Such companies often collaborate under the Brave1 initiative to get their products tested and certified (codified) for procurement.
• 3DTech and Others: A company named 3DTech was noted for handing over a fiber-optic FPV drone to Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR). They also had photos circulating of their models. Many other small firms – e.g. “Boiovi Ptakhy Ukrainy” (Warbirds of Ukraine), Kamik-A, Raptor Engineering, OWL (OWAD), Ptashka Drones, etc. – are listed in the Brave1 catalogue, each offering slightly different fiber drone solutions (varying spool lengths, prices, local/Chinese fiber). By mid-2025, over 25 Ukrainian engineering teams were working on fiber-drone tech, with about 10 moving toward mass production contracts. This vibrant ecosystem, backed by government support, is rapidly closing the gap with Russia.
• Aerorozvidka & Military Units: Ukraine’s military has also leveraged its in-house innovation arms. Units like the 12th Azov Brigade’s Unmanned Systems Battalion have tech-savvy soldiers who adapt and improve drones on the front. The Azov battalion’s commander credited one of his team members with making fiber-optic FPVs a reality for their unit – essentially a bottom-up innovation. Such field modifications and feedback to manufacturers have been key in refining the drones.

Russian Manufacturers/Developers: Russia’s effort has been characterized by grassroots volunteer engineering and partnerships with Chinese suppliers:

• Aleksey Chadaev and Ushkuinik: Chadaev, a political scientist turned volunteer, founded the “Ushkuinik” military tech accelerator. His project produced the Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky fiber-optic FPV and possibly other models kyivindependent.com. This indicates a semi-organized innovation drive within Russia to leap ahead in drone tech, spurred by calls from prominent military bloggers in 2023 to achieve a breakthrough in drone warfare. The success of Chadaev’s project challenged stereotypes of Russia’s military as inflexible.
• Volunteer Units (Rubicon, Sudny Den): These are not manufacturers per se, but Russian drone battalions that refined the use of fiber drones in combat. Their experience effectively served as R&D; through trial and error in Kursk and Donetsk, they improved tactics and perhaps provided feedback for better designs. It’s likely they also assemble drones in the field from kits.
• Chinese Suppliers: Chinese companies play a major role as component and fiber providers. Russian entities have been ordering large quantities of fiber-optic spools and associated electronics from Chinese manufacturers, who report growing orders each month. One Ukrainian manufacturer noted discovering that a Chinese factory had already been producing fiber spools for Russia for seven months straight – now Ukraine sources from them too. Essentially, Chinese fiber-optic technology (initially meant for telecom or industrial use) has been repurposed for drones by both sides. The Chinese appear willing to sell to anyone, making them “the biggest beneficiaries” of this new trend, according to Ukrainian insiders. This includes fiber cable, optical transceivers, and possibly even ready-made drone kits. While not publicly named (likely to avoid sanctions), these suppliers have enabled Russia to scale up faster and now aid Ukraine in catching up.
• Western Volunteers and Support: On the international support front, one surprising contributor has been a former U.S. Marine named Troy Smothers. Smothers runs a company called Drone Reaper and became aware of Russia’s fiber drones through media. He developed a simple fiber-drone design (using about $360 in off-the-shelf parts) and brought it to Ukraine to demonstrate. Starting in late 2023, he toured Ukraine showing units how to build and use fiber FPVs, effectively kickstarting Ukraine’s program. According to Forbes/NDTV, Smothers’ design and training were a catalyst that helped Ukraine rapidly stand up local production. His phone “lit up” with calls from Ukrainian soldiers after videos of a successful fiber strike went online businessinsider.com businessinsider.com. This is a notable example of international volunteer support accelerating innovation on Ukraine’s side. Additionally, NATO countries have provided general support in drone technology and counter-drone training, though specifics on fiber drones are scant. We do know Ukraine has targeted the supply chain of Russian fiber drones – for instance, Ukrainian forces have bombed Russian fiber-optic cable factories to disrupt their production. This indicates that Western intelligence and weaponry (which Ukraine uses for long-range strikes) are indirectly part of the counter-fiber-drone effort by hitting the source.

In sum, Ukraine now has a burgeoning domestic fiber-drone industry, thanks to a synergy of local tech talent, government initiative (Brave1, MoD demos), and foreign help (volunteers like Smothers and likely funding via donor organizations). By mid-2025, this industry is poised to supply the military in a structured way – multiple models have been codified for procurement and contracts are being drawn up. On the Russian side, a combination of creative volunteer engineers and ready access to Chinese tech gave them an early lead, which they exploited on the battlefield while Ukrainian production was still ramping up. Both sides rely on globalized supply chains (Chinese fiber), illustrating the international dimension of this ostensibly local innovation.

Geopolitical Implications and Defense Strategies

The advent of fiber-optic drones in Ukraine has several broader implications for warfare and international security:

• Shift in Drone Warfare Paradigm: The heavy use of jamming in Ukraine – one of the first conflicts with large-scale drone-vs-EW battles – has led to this novel solution. Now militaries worldwide are taking note. Fiber-optic guided drones (sometimes dubbed FOG-D) were largely absent from Western arsenals, as Western forces haven’t faced comparable jamming while using drones against insurgents. But seeing their effectiveness, NATO militaries may explore similar systems for contingencies against peer adversaries (who will use EW). Ukraine has effectively become a testing ground for drone innovation, and fiber-optic control is among the prominent outcomes. We can expect to see this concept integrated into future doctrine for unmanned systems, where appropriate – for example, specialized assault drones for urban combat that use fiber to remain jam-proof.
• Countermeasures and Responses: As of now, neither Ukraine nor Russia has an effective counter to fiber drones besides physically destroying them. This has spurred a mini arms race in counter-countermeasures. Ukrainian developers, through Brave1, are already testing ways to counter enemy fiber drones – “physically neutralising such FPV drones using turrets, net launchers and shotguns, as well as…lasers to disable them”. Essentially, since you can’t jam them, you must shoot them down or otherwise sever the link (perhaps a laser could burn the fiber or blind the drone’s camera). This will drive investment in C-UAS (counter-UAS) systems that rely on kinetic or directed-energy effects rather than electronic warfare. Western companies (like Spotter Global, which wrote about detecting FOG-D drones) are also adapting ground radars and optical sensors to pick up small fiber drones that don’t emit RF. The conflict underscores that passive defense (camouflage nets over trenches, physical covers over vehicles, etc.) is returning in importance – Ukrainian troops have draped netting over kilometers of front-line roads to guard against low-flying fiber FPVs. Geopolitically, countries are watching and learning how a combination of low-tech (nets) and high-tech (lasers) might counter these new threats.
• International Supply and Sanctions: The role of Chinese manufacturers supplying both sides raises questions for international export controls. Fiber-optic cables and components are dual-use items, not typically restricted. However, their use in drones that are causing significant battlefield damage might attract scrutiny. If Western nations wish to slow Russia’s fiber drone program, they might pressure Chinese firms or provide alternatives to Ukraine so that Ukraine isn’t also funding those same suppliers. It’s a reminder of how global commerce can inadvertently arm both sides of a conflict – a geopolitical tightrope, especially as China officially stays neutral but its companies profit from the war. Meanwhile, Western support to Ukraine could expand into providing rugged fiber-optic systems or advanced optical tech to keep Ukraine ahead in this drone race (should Western governments choose to).
• Broader Defense Strategy – Combined Arms: Fiber-optic drones have proven so effective that some Ukrainian soldiers call them “the last hope for changing the course of the war” in Ukraine’s favor. This may be hyperbole, but it reflects how crucial drones have become – rising to an importance comparable to traditional arms like artillery. Commanders now must integrate drone strategy at the operational level. For instance, Russia concentrating fiber drone units in certain sectors (Kursk, then Donetsk) suggests they use them en masse to shape a battle (e.g. cutting off an enemy’s logistics in a given area). Ukraine similarly might deploy fiber drones in swarms for a major offensive or to counter an armored thrust where jamming is heavy. The technology fits into a broader combined arms approach: drones (radio and fiber) working alongside EW, artillery, infantry, etc. We see evidence of this in how Ukraine is using ground fiber drones in concert with other efforts – by removing drivers from supply convoys, they mitigate one Russian tactic (FPV ambushes). In essence, each side is adjusting tactics and strategy to account for the presence of unjammable drones: fortifying supply lines, dispersing forces more, or conversely, using fiber drones to pave the way for assaults by knocking out jammers and armor.
• Psychological and Humanitarian Aspects: The psychological impact of knowing the enemy has essentially unstoppable drones is non-trivial. Ukrainian fighters in Kursk described travel under fiber drone threat as “worse than playing Russian roulette” because the odds of being hit were so high. Such fear can shape soldier behavior and civilian morale. Conversely, Ukrainian troops get a boost knowing they have a tool to strike back through the jamming. On a humanitarian note, fiber drones taking over some high-risk roles (like supply delivery, as mentioned) means fewer human casualties – a positive from the perspective of war’s toll. However, the lethality of the battlefield also increases; previously safe zones (hospitals behind forests, etc.) might now be vulnerable, which could put civilians at more risk if they are in what was once “dead ground” now made alive by fiber optics.
• Global Proliferation: If fiber-optic drone designs proliferate beyond Ukraine/Russia, we could see non-state actors or other countries adopt them. For example, a well-resourced militant group could use fiber drones to negate a government military’s jammers in a local conflict. The know-how is spreading via online forums and social media as well – even bird nests with fiber cable went viral, highlighting the phenomenon. The international community might need to consider arms control or at least be prepared for the next iteration of drone warfare where jamming is not a catch-all defense. Ukraine’s allies are likely already considering how to help Ukraine maintain the edge – possibly by supplying advanced fiber optic communication kits or helping with domestic production (there are reports of Western-sourced fiber winding machines being considered).

In conclusion, the rise of fiber-optic drones in Ukraine underscores the dynamic nature of modern warfare, where each move (heavy jamming) prompts a countermove (wired drones), which in turn prompts new counters (laser-based C-UAS, etc.). This cycle drives innovation at a breakneck pace. Internationally, the conflict has essentially showcased a new capability that militaries around the world must account for – both in terms of exploiting it and defending against it. And for Ukraine, support in this area (through training, technology transfer, or components) becomes part of the broader military aid discussion, much as air defenses or artillery are.

Comparison: Fiber-Optic Drones vs. Radio-Controlled vs. Satellite-Linked Drones

Ukraine’s military now employs a variety of drones with different control methods. Each has its advantages and limitations. Below is a comparison of fiber-optic guided drones with traditional radio-controlled drones and satellite-linked drones (such as large UAVs) in the Ukraine war context:

As the table shows, fiber-optic drones have a unique profile: they are superior in contested electronic environments but come with range and flexibility limits. Radio-controlled drones remain indispensable for their ease of use and ability to saturate the battlefield (albeit with countermeasures reducing their effectiveness). Satellite-linked drones serve a completely different scale of operation – strategic depth rather than tactical front-line support – and have been less visible in Ukraine after early successes and subsequent losses (for example, by mid-2022, Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2s were used more for ISR than strikes due to increased Russian air defenses and jamming).

Importantly, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Ukraine has been experimenting with hybrid approaches – for instance, using radio drones with machine vision AI to autonomously hit targets in the final phase (bypassing jamming), and heavy drones that can switch between fiber-optic control and radio (as backup). Each method (fiber, radio, satcom) has its niche, and the trend is towards a layered UAS strategy: use radio drones for most tasks, deploy fiber drones for the toughest EW-heavy missions, and use satellite drones for long-range or when beyond-line-of-sight is needed.

Conclusion

Fiber-optic drones in Ukraine represent a remarkable adaptation to the fierce electronic warfare contest of the war. In a conflict defined by constant innovation, this deceptively simple “back to basics” solution – a spool of glass fiber – has had outsized impact, enabling drones to strike with precision where previously they would be blinded or cut off. Militarily, fiber-optic FPVs have proven their worth by neutralizing expensive jamming systems and expanding the drone battlefield into once-protected spaces. They have reinforced the lesson that air superiority in modern war extends down to the low-altitude, small-UAV level – and that control of the electromagnetic spectrum is just as crucial there. Both Russia and Ukraine have integrated these systems into their operations, and as production increases, we may see larger coordinated deployments (so far, usage has been somewhat piecemeal due to limited supply). Commanders now recognize drones as essential as artillery or armor – indeed Ukrainian and Russian officials liken the proliferation of FPV drones to the significance of artillery in firepower.

Strategically, the race for fiber-optic drone supremacy has galvanized domestic industries and international cooperation. Ukraine turning to dozens of tech startups, volunteer experts, and foreign partners to field a new capability in months exemplifies the agility of its defense sector under pressure. Russia’s ability to innovate (contrary to expectations) in this area also sends a signal that no side has a perpetual monopoly on drone tech – it’s a fast-moving playing field. Nations around the world are watching these developments. NATO militaries will likely incorporate the lessons on both offense and defense: expecting that future conflicts (especially against near-peers) will involve contested spectrum, and that having a mix of solutions (from hardened radio links to fiber tethers to autonomy) is prudent.

For Ukraine’s international supporters, continuing to support drone innovation has become as important as supplying traditional hardware. We see this in how quickly knowledge transfers happened – e.g., an American volunteer sharing designs, or Western-supplied funds being used by Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation to boost drone programs. Even as tanks and jets grab headlines, it may be these small buzzing quadcopters with their invisible fiber tails that tip the scales in critical battles.

In the coming months, we can expect refinements and countermeasures to further evolve. Ukraine is already working on the next wave of improvements: better machine vision for semi-autonomous strikes (so drones can home in without a constant link) and scaled-up local production of fiber-optic components to avoid dependency. Russian engineers will not sit idle either; they might attempt even longer-range fiber drones or creative tactics like using one drone to cut another’s tether (as already occurred once). The cat-and-mouse game continues. But regardless of specific outcomes, one thing is certain: the Ukraine war’s legacy will include having ushered in the era of fiber-optic drones, adding a new chapter to drone warfare. As one Ukrainian soldier wryly observed about the fiber trend, “Due to the high cost, it seemed [they] would never become widespread, but prices are now falling” – implying it’s only a matter of time before every unit has a few of these unjammable eyes in the sky.

Ultimately, a well-rounded drone force will use each type of drone to its strengths, achieving a balance. Fiber-optic drones, radio drones, and satellite drones each complement the others. Ukraine’s experience shows that rather than one technology replacing all others, the real advantage comes from integration – deploying the right tool for the job. Fiber-optic drones filled a crucial gap in Ukraine’s capabilities at a pivotal time. Going forward, they will likely remain a specialized but decisive asset in Ukraine’s arsenal, and a vivid example to the world of innovation under fire.

Sources:

• Altman, Howard. “Inside Ukraine’s Fiber-Optic Drone War.” The War Zone, May 28, 2025 .
• Trevithick, Joseph, and Rogoway, Tyler. “Russia Now Looks To Be Using Wire-Guided Kamikaze Drones In Ukraine.” The War Zone, Mar 8, 2024 .
• Farrell, Francis. “As Russia’s fiber optic drones flood the battlefield, Ukraine is racing to catch up.” Kyiv Independent, May 20, 2025 .
• RFE/RL (Ukrainian Service). “Fiber-Optic Drones: The New Must-Have In Ukraine War.” March 12, 2025 .
• RFE/RL (Ukrainian Service). “Fibre-Optic Drones Replace Drivers To Deliver Critical Supplies To Ukraine’s Frontlines.” May 15, 2025 .
• UAS Vision. “Accuracy Comparison of Ukrainian and Russian Fiber Optic Drones.” Apr 29, 2025 uasvision.com.
• NDTV. “Birds Build Nests Using Fibre Optics Found In FPV Drones In Ukraine.” Jun 8, 2025 .
• Business Insider. “Inside Ukraine’s race to crank out unjammable, fiber-optic drones…” Feb 7, 2025 businessinsider.com.
• Ukrainska Pravda (Ekonomichna Pravda). “A weapon entirely immune to jamming: How Ukraine is rolling out production of fibre-optic drones.” Jan 13, 2025 .
• Spotter Global (Jamie Mortensen). “New Stealth Fiber-Optic Guided Drones & How to Detect Them.” Apr 25, 2024 .