Hertz Stock Skyrockets on Surprise Profit – Inside HTZ’s 2025 Comeback Rally

• Stock Price (Nov 5, 2025): ~$6.73 per share, up 36% in one day after Q3 earnings, and +84% year-to-date ^{[1] [2]}. Market cap now around $2.8 billion, but still down from past highs.
• Q3 2025 Results: Revenue ~$2.5 billion (–4% YoY) and net income $184 million (first quarterly profit in 2 years) ^[3]. Adjusted EPS $0.12 crushed consensus (~$0.02–0.07) ^{[4] [5]}, signaling a sharp turnaround from a $1.3 billion loss in Q3 2024 ^[6].
• Rally Drivers: A “back-to-basics” fleet refresh and strong used-car sales helped Hertz swing to profit ^{[7] [8]}. Shares skyrocketed ~36% on Nov 4 after the earnings beat, marking their best session in over six months ^[9]. Retail traders piled in amid short-squeeze hopes, as nearly 45% of the public float was sold short pre-earnings ^[10].
• Analyst Sentiment: Wall Street remains cautious. Goldman Sachs reiterated a “Sell” with a $3.00 target (≈55% downside) even after the blowout quarter ^[11], citing pricing pressures and slim margins. Overall, 7 analysts rate HTZ a Moderate Sell with an average target around $4–4.18 ^[12], well below the current price.
• Financial Fundamentals: Trailing 12-month revenue ~$8.5 billion ^[13]; however, margins have been thin (gross margin ~11% ^[14]) due to high costs. Hertz carries $17.4 billion in total debt (vehicle-backed + corporate) ^[15], vs. ~$2.2 billion cash on hand ^[16]. No dividends are paid as the focus remains on reinvestment and debt reduction.
• Competitive Position: Hertz is the No.2 U.S. car rental firm (behind private Enterprise Holdings) and competes closely with Avis Budget (CAR). Avis’s Q3 revenue was $3.5 B with $360 M profit ^[17], and its stock is up ~61% YTD ^[18]. Hertz’s fleet utilization hit 84% (a record since 2018) ^[19], narrowing the efficiency gap with peers. Both Hertz and Avis are benefiting from strong travel demand, but pricing pressure is emerging as fleets expand.
• Notable Investors: Majority ownership by Knighthead Capital (~58%) gives Hertz a strong backer ^[20]. Billionaire Bill Ackman (Pershing Square) recently accumulated ~5% ^[21], betting that rising used-car values will “equate to a ~$1.2 billion gain” for Hertz’s fleet ^[22]. Insiders, however, have mostly been selling shares on rallies (no big insider buys in recent months) ^{[23] [24]}.
• Short Interest:~43% of float is sold short (as of mid-October) ^[25] – an unusually high level. This heavy short interest sets the stage for volatility: the latest earnings surprise triggered a partial short squeeze, as evidenced by 129 million shares traded on Nov 4 and a rapid price jump ^{[26] [27]}. Short sellers now face ~5–6 days of average volume to cover positions ^[28].

Recent Stock Performance & Surge After Earnings

Hertz stock has been on a rollercoaster in 2025. After starting the year in the low-to-mid single digits, HTZ shares languished under short-seller pressure until a sharp reversal this fall. Year-to-date, the stock has climbed ~84% ^[29], dramatically outperforming the broader market, and is up about 142% from a year ago ^[30]. The rally accelerated in early November when Hertz’s Q3 earnings blew past expectations and confirmed a return to profitability.

On November 4, 2025, Hertz announced a surprise profit, sending the stock up 36.2% in a single day to $6.73 ^[31]. This marked HTZ’s best day in over six months ^[32] and grabbed Wall Street’s attention. The trading volume exploded (129+ million shares, nearly 13× the average) as bullish investors and covering shorts piled in ^[33]. Hertz “surged 42%” intraday after the earnings news broke, Reuters reported ^[34], before settling up ~36% at the close.

Notably, this epic one-day jump was not a meme-fueled fluke like in 2020’s Reddit rally, but driven by solid fundamentals. As InvestorsObserver quipped, “this time it wasn’t because of a meme-stock rally” – Hertz posted real profits that vindicated turnaround believers ^[35]. The last time Hertz saw a comparable spike was during the wild post-bankruptcy meme surge in 2020 (when shares momentarily skyrocketed 825% amid retail frenzy) ^[36]. Now in 2025, the stock’s resurgence appears to be grounded in improving financials rather than speculative hype.

However, Wednesday Nov 5 saw some cooling off. After the huge rally, HTZ dipped ~3–5% in pre-market trading on profit-taking ^[37]. By mid-day Nov 5, shares hovered around the mid-$6 range as the market digested the news. This slight pullback is unsurprising given the magnitude of the jump; some short-term traders likely locked in gains. Even so, Hertz stock is still markedly higher than a week ago, reflecting growing optimism in its recovery story.

Latest News & Developments (Early November 2025)

The big headline is Hertz’s Q3 2025 earnings, reported November 4. Key takeaways from the release and call include:

• Return to Profitability: Hertz swung to a quarterly profit for the first time since 2023, delivering $184 million in net income (GAAP) or $0.42 per share ^[38]. A year ago, it had lost $1.33 billion in the same quarter ^[39]. On an adjusted basis, EPS was $0.12, handily beating analyst forecasts (~$0.02–0.07) ^{[40] [41]}. This earnings beat was “impressive” and far above Wall Street’s expectations ^[42] – one analyst noted it was a 700% surprise vs consensus ^[43].
• Revenue & Demand: Q3 revenue came in at $2.50 billion, slightly down 4% YoY amid softer pricing ^[44], but ahead of estimates (~$2.4 B) ^[45]. Importantly, rental volume and utilization improved. Hertz’s global revenue per day (RPD) was about $59, down ~4% YoY (with U.S. RPD down to $59.67 from $62.88) ^[46], reflecting pricing pressure as the industry fleet supply normalizes. Yet utilization hit 84%, its highest since 2018 ^{[47] [48]}, thanks to operational tweaks that kept more cars earning revenue. In North America, utilization jumped to 85% (from 82% last year) ^[49] even with a ~5% smaller fleet, illustrating Hertz’s improved efficiency and demand for its cars.
• Fleet “Back-to-Basics” Strategy: The quarter showcased Hertz’s “Back-to-Basics” plan paying off. The company completed a transformative fleet refresh – average vehicle age is now under 12 months ^[50]. A newer fleet means fewer breakdowns and lower depreciation costs, which was a major earnings driver. In fact, vehicle depreciation expense plummeted ~45% YoY in Q3 as Hertz has been able to sell older cars at favorable prices and replace them with newer models ^{[51] [52]}. Depreciation per unit is down to $273 per month, on track to stay below the $300 target ^[53]. CEO Gil West noted “We’ve transformed our fleet from a headwind to a competitive advantage,” with average car age <12 months now ^[54]. The newer cars not only rent more easily (higher customer satisfaction) but also retain value better, reducing the hit Hertz takes on resale ^[55]. This fleet strategy, summarized as “Buy Right, Hold Right, Sell Right,” boosted results: Hertz increased the portion of cars sold via higher-margin retail channels by 570 bps in 2025 vs 2024 ^[56] (including its direct Hertz Car Sales lots and new online channels).
• Used-Car Sales & Amazon Partnership: Hertz has leaned into selling vehicles directly to consumers to monetize its fleet. In August, it inked a deal with Amazon to sell thousands of used Hertz cars on the Amazon Autos platform ^[57]. This made Hertz the first rental firm to retail vehicles through Amazon, expanding its reach. The strategy appears to be working; Hertz said its car sales volume is up ~5.7 percentage points (as a share of fleet) this year ^[58]. Higher used-car proceeds helped offset softer rental rates. Management effectively followed Ackman’s playbook (more on that below), “strategically monetizing its fleet” while used-car prices are firm ^[59].
• Electric Vehicles Update: Hertz made waves in 2021 with large EV orders (e.g. 100k Teslas). However, faced with high EV maintenance costs and lukewarm rental economics, Hertz “offloaded a majority of its Teslas last year”, reverting to more gas cars ^{[60] [61]}. In Q3, Hertz reiterated that a slump in demand had prompted it to shed much of its EV fleet in recent years ^[62]. Instead, the focus has been on fleet age and utilization. (Hertz does still have EV initiatives – e.g. partnerships with GM and Polestar – but clearly is being selective to ensure profitability). The move away from expensive EVs reduced costs, as confirmed by the improved margins.
• Guidance & Q4 Outlook: While Hertz didn’t issue formal full-year guidance in the earnings release, executives did offer some insight. They cautioned that Q4 faces seasonal softness (post-summer leisure travel lull) and potential impact from the U.S. government spending freeze in early FY2026 (which hit government travel in Nov) ^[63]. Hertz’s Chief Commercial Officer noted government rental demand was “down substantially” in Q2, improved in Q3, but then “come down significantly” in early November due to the federal budget impasse ^[64]. On the bright side, corporate travel demand – which had been “in negative territory” year-over-year through Q3 – turned positive in October as business travel picked up ^[65]. This suggests Hertz may see a better mix of corporate rentals going forward, though holiday seasonality will temper Q4. Overall, Hertz expects to maintain its utilization gains and cost discipline into year-end, but acknowledged pricing remains a watchpoint if competitors flood the market with cars.

Beyond earnings, other recent developments include Hertz’s capital moves. In late September, Hertz raised $375 M via an issue of exchangeable senior notes (convertible debt) ^[66] – proceeds partly to refinance debt and potentially fund share buybacks. The company had authorized a $2.0 B share repurchase program (announced in June 2025) to return capital to shareholders ^[67], and has been actively buying back stock in tranches (including a €363 M (~$390 M) buyback in Europe through Nov 3 ^[68]). These repurchases reduced the share count and signal confidence, albeit they also drew some criticism for using post-bankruptcy cash for buybacks instead of debt (a SeekingAlpha analysis called prior $3.5B buybacks a “misstep” that left Hertz more leveraged ^[69]). Still, the buybacks have likely amplified the stock’s upside (and the squeeze effect) by removing float.

Analyst & Expert Opinions: Bulls vs. Bears

Despite Hertz’s improving results, analyst opinions remain divided – with a notable gap between turnaround bulls (including prominent investors) and Wall Street skeptics.

Bullish camp: One of the most vocal Hertz bulls is billionaire Bill Ackman, whose Pershing Square fund bought 12.7 million HTZ shares earlier in 2025 ^[70] (~4–5% stake). Ackman publicly bet on a Hertz turnaround, arguing that the market was underestimating the value of Hertz’s fleet. In an April post on X (Twitter), Ackman highlighted that “Hertz owns a fleet of over 500,000 vehicles valued at approximately $12 billion”, and calculated that “a 10% increase in used car prices would equate to a $1.2 billion gain on its auto assets, ~half the company’s market cap” at the time ^[71]. In other words, he saw a huge upside if Hertz could capitalize on rising used-car values by selling older cars at a profit. Ackman also noted Hertz had locked in 2025 new-car purchases at attractive prices, positioning it to flip cars advantageously ^[72]. Fast forward to Q3, and indeed Hertz did exactly that – selling more cars retail and benefitting from a stable used-car market. The strong quarter “proves that Bill Ackman was right to bet on the beleaguered company’s turnaround,” wrote InvestorsObserver ^[73]. Ackman’s thesis appears to be playing out, vindicating his contrarian investment. His stake, bought for ~$46.5 M ^[74], has roughly doubled in value with the stock surge.

Long-time Hertz backers (Knighthead Capital and Certares Management, which took Hertz out of bankruptcy in 2021) are also in the bull camp, though quietly. They collectively own a majority of shares (via Hertz’s principal shareholder entity) ^[75] and have steered the strategic “back-to-basics” course alongside CEO Gil West. Their presence has provided stability, and they’re likely pleased to see tangible results after a choppy 2022–2024.

Bearish camp: On the other side, many sell-side analysts and short sellers remain unconvinced that Hertz’s comeback is sustainable. Goldman Sachs exemplifies the cautious view – just this morning (Nov 5) Goldman reiterated a “Sell” rating on HTZ, maintaining a $3.00 price target ^[76] (less than half the current price). Goldman acknowledged the Q3 beat, but warns it may be short-lived. They point out that trailing 12-month EBITDA is only $31 M ^[77] (paltry for a company with $8B+ revenue) and that rental pricing trends are weak. In Q3, Hertz’s Americas revenue per day fell more than expected, which Goldman sees as a sign of “ongoing industry pricing pressure… as Hertz and competitors expand their fleets next year.” ^[78] Essentially, they fear that as car supply normalizes (post-pandemic) and rivals like Avis and Enterprise bulk up fleets, rental rates will stay under stress. Goldman highlighted Hertz’s gross profit margin is only ~11% ^[79] – very low – and they are skeptical Hertz can hit its targeted 3–6% EBITDA margin by 2026, modeling only ~2.4% themselves ^[80]. The firm wants to see “more concrete evidence” of sustained earnings power and pricing power before turning positive ^[81]. They also note that HTZ already ran +83% YTD despite these concerns ^[82], implying the stock price may have run ahead of fundamentals (i.e., appears “overvalued at current levels” according to their models) ^[83].

Other analysts echo similar caution. The consensus rating is equivalent to a Sell/Hold, with 4 Sells and 3 Holds recently ^[84]. The average price target of ~$4.18 suggests ~40% downside from $6.70 ^[85]. Analysts had been downgrading Hertz through 2024 as losses piled up – e.g. J.P. Morgan cut to Underweight with an $11→$3 target back in April ^[86]. Even after Q3’s surprise, some may worry that a one-off used-car boon doesn’t fix structural issues like high debt and cyclical demand. Additionally, a looming economic slowdown or further rise in interest rates could hurt travel demand and increase Hertz’s financing costs, which bears are quick to flag.

Neutral/Other views: Retail investors on forums like Stocktwits have been exuberant after earnings, noting the huge short interest. One bullish user argued “the stock’s floor has been $5 for most of the year… downside is limited with tremendous upside as shorts are forced to cover. $7 then no resistance,” essentially calling for a continued squeeze higher ^[87]. Meanwhile, some finance bloggers and independent analysts have updated valuations: for example, a DCF analysis on SimplyWall.St suggests HTZ might still be undervalued if it can execute (their model, pre-earnings, saw 90% upside) ^[88]. However, such forecasts hinge on optimistic assumptions about sustained profitability.

In summary, the bull case hinges on Hertz’s turnaround momentum – improving operations, asset tailwinds, and strategic investors in its corner – leading to far higher earnings in coming years (and thus a cheap stock today). The bear case stresses that Hertz is not out of the woods: it’s a leveraged cyclical business facing intense competition, and its current valuation already factors in a lot of good news. This tug-of-war is evident in the stock’s high volatility and massive short interest.

Financials at a Glance

Hertz’s latest financials reflect a company in transition from crisis to recovery. Here’s a snapshot of key metrics:

Table: Hertz’s key financial metrics, highlighting the dramatic swing to profitability in Q3 2025. The company’s aggressive cost-cutting and fleet optimization yielded positive earnings per share for the first time since 2023 ^[104]. Revenue dipped slightly year-over-year, but better fleet utilization and lower depreciation underpinned improved margins.

A few observations from these numbers:

• Profitability: The Q3 net income of $184M is a stark turnaround from heavy losses in 2022–2024. Hertz’s adjusted corporate EBITDA in the last 12 months is still roughly breakeven (around $–49M trailing, per filings), but the quarterly run-rate is now positive. If Hertz can string together similar quarters, annual EPS could turn positive going forward. However, on a trailing basis, EPS is still negative, so conventional valuation metrics like P/E are not meaningful yet ^[105].
• Leverage: Hertz remains highly leveraged, with over $17 billion of debt on the balance sheet ^[106]. The majority (~$11.8B) is vehicle-backed debt (asset-backed securities and loans tied to the car fleet), and about $5.6B is corporate debt (term loans, notes, etc.) ^[107]. This structure is typical for rental companies – they finance cars with secured debt and use corporate debt for other needs. Hertz’s net non-vehicle debt is around $4.55B after cash ^[108]. Interest expense is substantial (over $100M per quarter just on non-vehicle debt ^[109]). The high debt amplifies risk: even with improved EBITDA, net corporate leverage is not meaningful (negative EBITDA historically) ^[110], and Hertz’s credit ratings are still in junk territory. Reducing debt or growing EBITDA (preferably both) will be key to sustaining the turnaround. The good news: Hertz has “robust ABS market access” ^[111], meaning it can continue to refinance vehicle debt as needed, and it extended a $1.7B credit facility in May 2025 ^[112] to push out maturities.
• Cash & Liquidity: With ~$2.2B of liquidity ^[113] (cash plus credit lines), Hertz has a buffer to withstand bumps and to invest in its fleet. Q3 saw +$250M in free cash flow ^[114] thanks to profitable operations and used-car sales. This cash is being applied to both share buybacks and fleet purchases. Notably, Hertz has secured its vehicle procurement for model year 2026 at favorable terms ^[115] – insulating it somewhat from new-car inflation – and expects to maintain low depreciation costs next year.
• Margins: The profit margin is still low (~7% net in Q3). Hertz’s gross margin was ~10.9% over the past year ^[116], reflecting high operating costs and depreciation that had weighed on results. In Q3 specifically, adjusted corporate EBITDA margin was around 7.6% (190M on 2.5B rev). That’s an improvement, but still below healthy levels. For comparison, Avis Budget’s adjusted EBITDA margin was ~15.9% in Q3 (559M on 3.51B rev) ^[117], and Avis’s net margin ~10%. This shows Hertz has more ground to cover on profitability, perhaps achievable as the fleet overhaul yields further cost savings. Hertz is targeting a long-term EBITDA margin of 3–6% (corporate level) by 2026 ^[118], which underscores how slim margins are in this business even in good times.
• Valuation: At ~$6.70/share, Hertz’s market capitalization is ~$2.8B. Enterprise Value (market cap + debt – cash) is much higher, roughly $15–16B, which is ~2.3× sales ^[119] and ~8.3× EV/EBITDA (forward) ^[120]. Its price-to-sales ratio is ~0.25 ^[121] – superficially “cheap,” but low P/S is common in highly leveraged, low-margin sectors. By contrast, Avis (CAR) trades at ~0.4× sales ^[122] and ~9.5× forward earnings ^[123], reflecting its stronger profitability. If Hertz can sustain, say, $0.50 annual EPS (roughly extrapolating Q3) and grow that, the stock’s forward P/E could look reasonable. But currently, consensus expects a loss for full-year 2025 (pre-Q3 consensus was around –$0.55 EPS) ^[124], explaining why some analysts view the stock as overextended.

In sum, Hertz’s financials are much improved from a year ago, but the company is still early in its recovery. It has a heavy debt load and modest margins, so execution needs to remain sharp to justify the stock’s recent strength.

Competitive Landscape: Hertz vs. Peers

Hertz operates in a concentrated industry dominated by a few major players. Its main competitors are:

• Avis Budget Group (NASDAQ: CAR): Avis is a publicly traded rival and a good benchmark for Hertz. Avis reported Q3 2025 revenues of $3.5B (+1% YoY) and net income $360M ^[125] – notably larger than Hertz on both counts. Avis’s global fleet and revenue base exceed Hertz’s (Avis includes the Budget and Zipcar brands as well). Avis has benefitted from many of the same trends as Hertz (strong travel rebound, high used-car values), but entered this year in a more profitable position. In Q3, Avis’s EBITDA rose 11% with Americas RPD down ~3% ^[126], indicating it too faced pricing pressure but managed costs well (fleet costs fell). Avis stock hasn’t been stagnant either – it’s up ~61% YTD and ~23% year-over-year ^[127] – but Hertz’s rally has outpaced it thanks to the turnaround story. At ~$130/share, Avis trades at ~9.5× forward earnings ^[128] with a ~$4.6B market cap ^[129], roughly double Hertz’s market cap. Avis carries significant debt as well (~$17B, similar order as Hertz), but has been consistently profitable since 2021 and even instituted a small dividend in late 2022 ^[130] (though Finviz shows no current dividend, it paid one last year). In terms of strategy, Avis has also been rotating its fleet aggressively and leveraging technology (apps, connected cars) to improve margins. Investors currently appear to favor Avis for its steadier performance – its analyst consensus is more mixed (some Buys, average target ~$117) ^[131], which is below the current price, hinting at tempered expectations after a big run.
• Enterprise Holdings (Private): Enterprise (which owns Enterprise Rent-A-Car, National, and Alamo brands) is the largest car rental company in the U.S. by fleet size and revenue, and is privately held (family-owned). While detailed financials aren’t public, Enterprise historically has had a huge local rental market presence (neighborhood locations) complementing airport rentals, giving it a diverse customer base. Enterprise likely generates more revenue than Hertz and Avis, and it reportedly weathered the pandemic relatively well due to its focus on insurance replacement rentals and local markets (which bounced back faster than airport travel). Enterprise has been investing in technology and even car-sharing (it runs CarShare in Europe), and like Hertz/Avis, it’s been refreshing its fleet and dabbling in EVs. For competitive context, Enterprise’s market clout means pricing power – if Enterprise decides to cut rates or expand fleet aggressively, it can pressure margins industry-wide. Conversely, when the big three (Enterprise, Hertz, Avis) are disciplined, the industry enjoys a rational pricing environment. Recently, the trend of fleet expansion (after the pandemic car shortage) is something all majors are doing carefully to avoid oversupply. Enterprise’s exact growth isn’t known, but analysts note that all competitors increased vehicle purchases in 2023–2024 as auto production recovered. So far, demand has kept pace, but if Enterprise or others overshoot, pricing could soften further. Hertz has signaled it will maintain discipline in fleet size (its fleet is actually smaller YoY by 7% ^[132]). In summary, while Hertz is improving, it must continue to compete on service and network with these giants. The good news: the travel recovery provides a rising tide for all, and Hertz’s high airport exposure is paying off now that air travel volumes are robust again.
• Others: There are smaller players like Sixt (a German firm expanding in the US), Fox/Europcar (owned by Europcar/Stellantis), and Turo (peer-to-peer rentals) nibbling at the edges. Sixt has been growing its U.S. presence and offers a premium fleet; Hertz actually partnered with Sixt years ago in Europe. Thus far, none of these have materially disrupted the big three’s dominance, but Hertz keeps an eye on them. Also, rideshare services (Uber/Lyft) are sometimes seen as indirect competition for certain rental use-cases, but many travelers still need the flexibility of a car rental especially outside big cities.

In terms of competitive comparisons: Hertz’s strength has been its strong brand (iconic “Hertz” name, global reach in 160 countries) and its airport footprint (Hertz is often #1 or #2 at major airports). Its Hertz Gold Plus Rewards loyalty program and partnerships (with airlines, credit cards, etc.) help lock in customers. Avis is comparable in global reach (operating in ~180 countries) and also strong at airports (via Avis and Budget). Enterprise historically dominated the home-city market (insurance replacement, weekend rentals). All are now overlapping more: Hertz and Avis opened more local branches, and Enterprise aggressively went after airport market share in the 2010s. So the battleground is largely service and price. One point: customer satisfaction – Hertz has focused on improving this, claiming a 50% YoY jump in Net Promoter Score in North America in Q3 ^[133] as it improved vehicle quality and rental speed. Satisfied customers and a younger fleet could help Hertz win business from Avis/Enterprise over time if maintained.

Overall, the car rental industry in late 2025 is in a healthier place than a few years ago, but also facing normalization. Rental rates that spiked in 2021–22 have cooled as more cars become available. The companies that manage fleet supply best and keep customer experience high will retain pricing power. Hertz’s Q3 suggests it is on the right track operationally; now it must keep pace (or leapfrog) competitors that won’t be standing still.

Insider Activity & Ownership Sentiment

Hertz’s ownership and insider activity present an interesting picture:

• Major Holders: As mentioned, Hertz emerged from bankruptcy (in 2021) under new ownership. Private equity firm Knighthead Capital (along with partners Certares and Apollo) took a controlling stake. According to recent filings, Knighthead affiliates still own roughly 58% of Hertz ^[134] – essentially the majority of the company’s equity is in strong hands. This concentrated ownership means the public float is relatively small (~127 million shares out of ~310M total) ^[135]. It also means Knighthead’s incentives are aligned with long-term value; they have been patient, focusing on restructuring and now reaping the rewards of improving fundamentals. Other notable institutions include BlackRock (~5.8%), Vanguard (~4.5%), and Pershing Square (~4.9%) ^[136] – the latter being Bill Ackman’s stake which we discussed. In total, institutions and hedge funds hold ~98% of the stock ^[137], an unusually high figure (the top 25 shareholders alone exceed 100%, indicating some overlapping or legacy positions) ^[138]. This means retail ownership is very low; HTZ is mostly in the hands of funds, though that includes some who are short.
• Insider Trading: The executive team and board (insiders) own only ~1.6% of shares ^[139]. In the past 12 months, insiders have not been buying stock on the open market in any significant quantity. In fact, insiders have primarily been selling when transactions occur ^[140]. Over the last quarter, there were no insider purchases, but the Chief HR Officer sold ~21,458 shares at ~$5.67 in late August ^[141], and earlier in the year he sold additional tranches (42k in May, 22k in March) ^[142]. Last year, even interim CEO (and board member) Mark Fields sold some shares (100k in Nov 2024) ^[143]. These sales were relatively modest (often tied to stock grants or personal diversification). Still, the lack of insider buying may indicate that management felt the stock’s recovery was uncertain or that they were adequately granted stock via compensation already. It’s not necessarily bearish, but it suggests insiders were not pounding the table at lower prices – perhaps because Knighthead holds such a large stake that management’s personal purchases wouldn’t move the needle much.
• Institutional Sentiment: Institutional investors have been split: some, like Ackman, clearly bullish; others, like Goldman Sachs’s asset management or some hedge funds, have been shorting the stock heavily. The short interest being ~55 million shares (43% of float) ^[144] implies a lot of those shares are borrowed from institutional holders lending out shares. Why such high short interest? Likely, a contingent of the market believed Hertz was overvalued or would struggle as travel normalized. Some hedge funds may have used Hertz as a hedge/trade against Avis or the auto sector, or doubted Knighthead’s strategy. The short interest had been building throughout 2023/early 2025 (e.g. ~38% of float short in March 2025, rising to 45% by April) ^[145]. Pershing Square’s involvement possibly attracted more shorts who viewed it skeptically. Now, with Q3 results out, a number of shorts are feeling the pain – the days-to-cover at ~5.5 suggests it could take over a week of heavy buying for them to close out ^[146]. This dynamic could keep upward pressure on HTZ if good news continues (a classic short squeeze scenario).
• Insider/Management Outlook: On the earnings call, management’s tone was confident but measured. CEO Gil West is not a flashy promoter; he’s known as an operations-focused leader (formerly a Delta Air Lines COO). His commentary stressed “focused execution and operational discipline” delivering results ^[147]. He also said “our progress is meaningful, [we have] our heads down, but our eyes are on the horizon” ^[148] – implying management is staying humble and concentrated on long-term success, not just this quarter’s pop. This is reassuring to many investors. The fact that Hertz didn’t immediately guide to the moon or celebrate with insider stock buys suggests they know there is more work ahead.

Overall, the ownership structure gives Hertz a unique profile: it’s not widely held by the public, but rather by a few key players with deep conviction (Knighthead, Ackman) and by skeptics via short positions. Such a setup often leads to volatility (as we saw), but also potentially outsized moves if the thesis continues to play out (shorts covering, etc.). For a retail investor, it’s worth noting that Knighthead and other insiders could eventually reduce their stakes (e.g. via secondary offerings) to realize gains or improve liquidity; such events can pressure the stock if not handled carefully. There’s no indication of that yet, but it’s something to watch for in 2026.

Market & Macro Factors

Hertz’s performance is tied to multiple external factors in the market and economy:

1. Travel and Tourism Trends: The car rental business is highly correlated with travel activity. In 2025, travel demand has remained robust – both leisure and (gradually) business travel have been recovering toward pre-pandemic levels. Hertz has benefitted from strong leisure travel all year (beach and national park destinations were booming, international inbound tourism up, etc.). The company did note airport demand was slightly negative YoY in early 2025 (Feb–June) but then turned positive from July onward ^[149] as travel strengthened in summer. Leisure travel tends to drop in the fall, which Hertz is seeing (typical seasonal trough in Q4) ^[150], but holiday travel in late Q4 could provide a small bump. Corporate travel is a key swing factor – it’s still not fully back to 2019 levels, but Q3 saw sequential improvement and even positive growth by October ^[151]. If corporate travel continues to normalize in 2026 (as more companies resume conferences, client visits, etc.), Hertz could see a nice tailwind especially in its premium Hertz and National brands (Hertz also operates Dollar and Thrifty for value-focused travelers, which do well with leisure). Conversely, if there’s an economic downturn, business travel could soften again, hurting a segment Hertz is eager to grow. Ride-hailing vs rentals: It’s worth noting that for some types of trips (short stays in cities), ride-hailing can be an alternative to renting a car. But high Uber/Lyft prices and traveler preference for personal vehicles during COVID have kept rental demand high. The structural threat from rideshare hasn’t derailed rental companies yet, and many travelers still find renting more convenient for multi-day, multi-stop trips.

2. Used Car Market: The used vehicle market is crucial for rental car profitability. Car rental companies buy new cars and sell them after ~1-2 years; the difference between purchase price and resale value (net of depreciation booked) can make or break margins. In 2021, rental firms made windfall profits selling cars because used prices spiked to record highs (due to chip shortages). In 2022–2023, those prices moderated somewhat but remained historically elevated. Ackman’s point about tariffs – the U.S. imposed some import tariffs that could restrict new car supply – was a view that used car prices might rise again. So far in 2025, used car prices have been choppy: after some declines early in the year, they ticked up over the summer thanks to higher new car prices and limited inventory of certain models. Hertz’s Q3 results clearly indicate depreciation per car is well-controlled ($273/month) ^[152], implying that resale values are strong (since that figure is under the normal ~$300+ they target). If used car prices increase further into 2026, Hertz stands to gain big – they might sell cars at a profit relative to book value, boosting earnings (like Ackman’s $1.2B upside scenario ^[153]). If used prices fall sharply (e.g. due to a flood of new cars or recession reducing demand), Hertz could face higher depreciation costs or even write-downs. Currently, industry watchers see used prices staying relatively firm in the near-term, aided by still-constrained new car production of rental-fleet-friendly models and sustained consumer demand for affordable cars. Hertz also hedges this risk somewhat by selling more cars via retail channels (which fetch higher prices than auction). Bottom line: The residual value environment is a swing factor to monitor. So far it’s a positive or neutral factor for Hertz in 2025.

3. Interest Rates & Financing: A less obvious but important macro factor is interest rates. Rental companies finance their fleets largely with debt. As rates have risen over the past year (U.S. Fed rate hikes), the cost of those car loans and asset-backed notes has gone up. Hertz’s interest expense on non-vehicle debt jumped ~39% YoY for the first 9 months of 2025 (to $371M) ^[154], and vehicle financing rates also climbed. Higher rates also impact consumers’ decision: expensive car loans make renting occasionally more attractive than owning for some, but they also can dampen travel if consumer budgets tighten. Hertz has managed to refinance some debt and extend maturities to mitigate near-term rate impact (e.g. the new exchangeable notes likely carry a lower coupon). But generally, if interest rates remain high or rise further, Hertz’s interest costs will remain a drag on profitability and cash flow. Conversely, any easing of rates in 2026–27 would relieve some pressure (both on Hertz’s costs and on economic activity/travel demand).

4. Economic Health: Macro-economic conditions (GDP growth, employment, consumer spending) feed into travel demand. The U.S. economy in 2025 has been growing modestly but with persistent inflation and high rates. If there’s a recession or slowdown in 2026, businesses might cut travel and consumers might vacation closer to home or less often, which could hurt rental car volume and pricing. On the other hand, if the economy achieves a “soft landing” or continues to expand, Hertz could see continued revenue growth. Notably, a unique factor right now is the U.S. government budget situation – intermittent shutdown threats can pause government employee travel (as Hertz cited for early November) ^[155]. Geopolitical events (pandemics, wars affecting oil prices, etc.) also indirectly impact Hertz (e.g. fuel prices affect driving demand and one-way rentals). Currently oil/gas prices are moderate, so fuel isn’t a major headwind to renting.

5. Technology and Mobility Shifts: Longer-term, things like autonomous vehicles or shifts to “mobility as a service” are often discussed as disruptive forces. Hertz has even positioned itself as a “mobility company” that can “thrive across the full spectrum of mobility” (as CEO West put it) ^[156]. In practical terms, near-term these are not big factors – fully self-driving rental fleets are years away, and car-sharing hasn’t overtaken traditional rentals outside specific urban markets. But Hertz is keeping an eye on such trends; it had a partnership with Uber to rent Teslas to Uber drivers, for instance. Any significant move to alternative models of car use could pose challenges or opportunities. For now, traditional rentals remain in demand.

In summary, the macro context for Hertz is cautiously favorable: travel is strong (if slightly cooling seasonally), used car tailwinds exist, but there are potential headwinds in rates and economic uncertainty. Hertz’s resurgence coincides with a generally supportive environment – which it needed, coming from bankruptcy – and the company is trying to capitalize on that while preparing for any bumps ahead. Investors should keep an eye on travel metrics, used car indexes, and Hertz’s fleet financing rates as barometers of its operating environment.

Short Interest Dynamics

One cannot analyze HTZ stock in 2025 without addressing the elephant in the room: the extremely high short interest. As noted, roughly 43% of Hertz’s public float is sold short ^[157]. This is one of the highest short percentages of any mid-cap stock. For context, this level indicates a large bet by some market participants that Hertz’s stock would fall. The reasons behind such heavy shorting likely included: skepticism about Hertz’s earnings potential, the stock’s strong run from 2021 lows, dilution concerns (post-bankruptcy shareholders did get diluted when new equity was issued), and perhaps a perceived valuation disconnect (bears might have argued the enterprise value didn’t justify the meager profits until now).

The high short interest has two major implications:

• Volatility & Squeeze Potential: When a stock is this heavily shorted, any positive catalyst (like an earnings beat) can trigger a rush for the exits by short sellers. As they buy shares to cover their positions, it creates additional demand, amplifying price gains in a feedback loop. This short squeeze dynamic is arguably what we saw on Nov 4 – a portion of that 36% jump was shorts scrambling to cut losses. Stocktwits sentiment was buzzing about this: “45% of the shares are sold short… tremendous upside as shorts are forced to cover,” one retail trader noted optimistically ^[158]. The days-to-cover metric of ~5.5 days ^[159] means if shorts all decided to cover at average volume, it’d take almost a week of nonstop buying – a recipe for potentially more spikes if triggered by news. On the flip side, if the stock had disappointed, shorts could have pushed it down hard, so it cuts both ways. Looking ahead, as long as short interest remains elevated, HTZ will likely trade with outsized reactions to news. If Hertz delivers another profitable quarter or some positive development, a continued squeeze is possible. Conversely, if the rally fades, shorts may reassert pressure.
• Cost of Borrow & Sustainability: Interestingly, carrying such a large short position can be costly. The borrow fee rate for HTZ shares has likely risen (Fintel showed it was elevated given the demand to short) ^[160]. If the stock stays around $6–7, shorts face a tough decision: hold on (and pay borrow fees) hoping the stock eventually declines, or cut and move on. The resolution of this could take time; some shorts may be long-term pessimists willing to wait. But if fundamentals keep improving, the short interest could gradually unwind, which itself would support the stock price.

As of now, Hertz has somewhat of a powder keg quality – a fundamental story of turnaround plus a technical story of short squeeze. It’s reminiscent of meme stocks, except Hertz now has real earnings to justify some optimism. It’s a scenario where good news can feed on itself via short covering. Traders should be prepared for swings: for example, any hint of weaker results or guidance could embolden shorts again and send shares tumbling quickly. Monitoring short interest updates (which come bi-monthly via NASDAQ reports) is worthwhile.

Importantly, high short interest also reflects that many do not believe in Hertz’s valuation. It’s a contrarian indicator – in this case, contrarians like Ackman bet against the shorts and are winning currently. But if the shorts ultimately prove correct (say, if Hertz’s profits fizzle out next year or travel slumps), the stock could retreat significantly. Therefore, while the short squeeze narrative is exciting for now, longer-term stock performance will still hinge on fundamentals delivering and converting some skeptics into believers.

Dividend & Capital Return Policy

For income-focused investors, note that Hertz does not pay a dividend. Since emerging from bankruptcy, all cash has been directed to rebuilding the business, reducing debt, and repurchasing shares. There’s no indication a dividend will be initiated soon – Hertz’s priority is to strengthen its balance sheet and invest in growth. Its rival Avis doesn’t consistently pay dividends either (Avis paid a small one in 2022 but then none in 2023). Car rental is inherently cyclical and capital-intensive, so companies often choose share buybacks (which can be flexibly started/stopped) over fixed dividends.

Speaking of share buybacks, as mentioned, Hertz has a large authorization in place. In the first half of 2025, the company repurchased a significant amount of its stock (some reports say ~$350M worth through Q2). Additionally, in Europe (where Hertz’s shares trade on the Frankfurt exchange as HTZ1), the company had a separate program (~€141M) that was ongoing ^[161]. These buybacks underscore management’s confidence that the stock was undervalued. And in hindsight, buying under $5 (where it traded for much of 2023–early 2025) appears to have been accretive now that shares are ~$6–7.

However, the Seeking Alpha critique ^[162] argued that Hertz perhaps overdid buybacks early, using $3.5B in 2021–2022 post-bankruptcy cash to repurchase shares (possibly near $15–20/share levels in late 2021) – only for the stock to later collapse and that cash essentially wasted from a value standpoint. It’s a valid caution that capital return timing matters. Going forward, Hertz will likely be more measured. They will probably opportunistically use some of the $2B program, especially on dips, but they’re also issuing some shares via convertible notes (the exchangeable notes due 2029/2030 can convert to equity if the stock doubles, with a cap at ~$13.94 ^[163]). So dilution could occur in the future if the stock really skyrockets (which ironically is when dilution is least painful).

In summary, no dividend for now, but buybacks are in play as a way Hertz is managing its capital structure. Investors should treat HTZ primarily as a growth/turnaround investment, not an income asset.

Forward-Looking Analysis & Forecast

The pivotal question: what’s next for Hertz? Is this quarter a one-hit wonder, or the start of sustained growth? Let’s examine the road ahead:

Near-term (Q4 2025 – Early 2026): Hertz has signaled some softness in Q4 due to seasonality and specific headwinds (government travel pause) ^[164]. Analysts will be looking at whether Hertz can remain profitable in the slower quarters. Even a small profit or breakeven in Q4 would be a positive surprise (since Q4 is usually much weaker than Q3 for rentals). If Hertz can post full-year 2025 around break-even or slight profit, it sets a baseline to grow from in 2026. The company’s own “North Star” metrics provide hints at priorities: one is RPU > $1,500 (Revenue per Unit per month) ^[165]. With utilization improvements, Hertz is approaching that (84% of 30 days ≈ 25 days rented; 25 * ~$59/day ≈ $1,475 per unit – just shy of $1,500). So reaching that $1,500/unit target likely means either a bit higher pricing or utilization, or more ancillary revenue per rental (insurance, GPS, etc.). The other key metric is DPU < $300 (Depreciation per Unit) – they already hit $273 ^[166]. Holding that under $300 through 2026 as planned ^[167] would stabilize a major expense line even if used car prices normalize.

Hertz also mentioned a North America Net Promoter Score jump of 50%, which bodes well for repeat business ^[168]. Happy customers could translate to market share gains from rivals in key locations. In early 2026, if travel remains robust, Hertz could see solid Q1/Q2 results compared to weak early 2025 comps (remember, the first half of 2025 was likely loss-making). So there’s a good chance Hertz will show strong year-over-year earnings growth in the first half of 2026 simply because the bar is low and their cost structure is now leaner.

Wall Street Estimates: It’s likely analysts will revise their forecasts upward after this Q3 beat. Prior to earnings, the consensus was for 2025 full-year EPS around -$0.10 to -$0.20 (some had even -$0.50) and 2026 EPS maybe +$0.20–0.30. Now, we might see projections like 2025 EPS ~$0.20 positive and 2026 EPS $0.50–$0.60 if they assume Hertz can keep margins improving. Revenue in 2026 could grow modestly (low-single digits?) given fleet expansion plans. If those numbers materialize, the current stock price ( ~$6–7 ) would be about 11–14× a 2026 EPS of $0.50, which isn’t outrageous. It suggests that if Hertz executes well, the stock could have more room to run, or at least hold its gains.

Key drivers for 2026:

• Fleet and Capacity: Hertz has secured vehicles for 2026 and wants to keep depreciation low ^[169]. The trick will be not to overshoot demand. If they expand the fleet again (after cutting it in 2023–25), they must do so in tandem with demand growth. The CFO will likely provide an outlook on fleet size: a modest uptick might be planned to capture more revenue, but they’ll avoid flooding the market. Competitors’ actions here will be telling – a united disciplined approach means decent pricing for all; a race for market share could spoil pricing.
• Pricing Strategy: With signs of pricing pressure in the U.S., Hertz may lean on yield management and segmentation. They could, for instance, push more premium rentals or ancillary services to boost revenue per rental even if daily base rates are soft. Launching new products (e.g. subscription rentals, electric vehicle specials, etc.) could differentiate them. Given Hertz’s fleet is younger and less maintenance-prone, they might have room to offer slightly lower prices or deals and still profit, undercutting competitors with older fleets. But that’s a double-edged sword. Ideally, industry pricing stabilizes or even rises if travel demand stays high and car supply doesn’t overshoot.
• Cost Structure: Hertz will continue focusing on costs – they already cut overhead significantly in bankruptcy. The big variable cost is fleet holding cost (depreciation and interest). They seem to have that optimized for now. Another cost is operations (staff, facilities). As volume rises, operating costs per transaction can fall (scale economies). In Q3, direct operating expense per day actually fell despite fewer cars, thanks to efficiency gains ^[170]. There may be more to squeeze out via tech (self-service kiosks, better logistics for car rotation, etc.). If inflation impacts wages or other expenses, Hertz will aim to offset that with productivity.
• Electric and New Mobility Initiatives: While Hertz scaled back on Tesla, it hasn’t abandoned EVs. It still has thousands of Tesla, Polestar, GM EVs on order or delivered (Hertz announced buying 175k GM EVs over 5 years in 2022). The strategy likely shifted to adding EVs slowly and in markets/customers that value them (like corporate accounts aiming to lower carbon footprint, or in Europe where gas is pricey). EVs could become a selling point if managed right, or a headache if utilization is low. Hertz’s “Hertz Electrifies” marketing and partnerships (with city charging infrastructure, etc.) will quietly continue. By 2026, we might see EVs being, say, 10% of Hertz’s fleet (just speculative) – something to watch. They might also revamp the narrative: earlier in 2023, EV hype cooled, but if oil prices spike or EV economics improve, Hertz could tout itself as ahead of the curve in electrification again.
• Debt Refinancing: Hertz has some debt maturities coming up (certain notes, etc.). In 2025 they extended a revolver; in 2026–27 they might look to refinance more to lower interest costs if rates improve. Any successful refinancing at lower rates could save tens of millions in interest, effectively boosting net income. Alternatively, they might pay down some debt if cash flow surprises to the upside. A ratings upgrade (currently likely in B/B+ range) could also help slightly with borrowing costs. This is more behind-the-scenes, but important for long-term value.

Risks and Challenges: On the horizon, a few things could impede Hertz’s momentum: a U.S. recession (less travel), a glut of new cars (hurting used values and pricing), spike in fuel prices (making renting + driving more expensive for consumers), or resurgence of COVID or similar (affecting travel). Regionally, Europe and International (which is ~20% of Hertz’s revenue) have been steady; any global turmoil there could hit that segment. Also, Hertz still carries the baggage of bankruptcy – some customers and corporate clients might have drifted to competitors during that period; winning them back takes time. Ensuring top-notch customer service and reliability will be key to solidify its turnaround reputation.

Forecast Scenarios:

• In a bull case, Hertz continues to execute its plan: 2026 sees modest revenue growth (say 5–8%), better pricing as corporate travel fills the gap of any leisure softness, and careful fleet growth keeps utilization ~80%+. Used car residuals stay favorable, keeping depreciation low. The result could be, hypothetically, $800M+ adjusted EBITDA and $300M+ net income in 2026 (roughly $0.70 EPS). The stock could then justify a higher price, maybe approaching double-digits if investors believe the trajectory. Some bulls might even see this as a multi-year turnaround that eventually gets HTZ back to pre-2019 earnings levels (Hertz once earned >$500M/yr in net income in its heyday).
• In a bear case, this Q3 turns out to be a peak: perhaps used car prices soften, cutting into gains, and competitors’ fleet expansion causes rental rates to slip further. If HTZ’s earnings drop back to near-zero or negative in 2026, then the stock might sink back toward $3–4 (where the bears’ targets lie). And heavy debt would again become the focus, raising questions about long-term solvency (though bankruptcy 2.0 seems very unlikely short of a catastrophic downturn).

Current indications (travel trends, company actions) seem to favor a middle ground: Hertz likely will remain profitable but at a fairly low margin for a bit, gradually improving. The analyst community, once they update models, might project mid-single-digit EPS growth beyond 2026, but not explosive growth – remember, this is a mature industry. Thus, as a stock, HTZ might transition from a “deep value turnaround” to a more normal valuation story. If the share price stabilizes around current levels, it would reflect that normalization.

Leadership’s Vision: CEO Gil West’s comment, “building a company that can thrive across the full spectrum of mobility” ^[171] hints at longer-term aspirations – possibly diversifying services (like more car sales, ride-share rentals, EV charging solutions, etc.). Under his leadership and the board (which includes people like Tom Wagner of Knighthead and former auto execs), Hertz will likely seek ways to not just recover but reinvent parts of its business for the future of mobility. For example, leveraging telematics in cars to optimize rentals, partnering with city transportation agencies, expanding subscription offerings (Hertz has experimented with “Hertz My Car” monthly subscription). These won’t move the needle overnight but show that Hertz doesn’t intend to be a static legacy company.

In summary, the outlook for Hertz appears cautiously optimistic. The company has navigated the hardest part of the turnaround (stemming losses, upgrading the fleet) and now needs to prove it can produce steady profits. If it does, there’s room for the stock to further appreciate or at least consolidate gains as the earnings “catch up” with the share price. Investors will be watching the next earnings (Q4 and Q1) closely for validation. For now, Hertz Global Holdings has staged one of 2025’s more remarkable comeback stories – turning a pandemic bankruptcy into a potential growth story – and the coming year will determine just how far that comeback can go.

Sources: Financial data and statements were compiled from Hertz’s official Q3 2025 earnings release ^{[172] [173]} and conference call commentary ^{[174] [175]}, as well as analysis by Reuters ^[176], Yahoo Finance/TipRanks ^{[177] [178]}, InvestorsObserver ^[179], and Goldman Sachs via Investing.com ^{[180] [181]}. Competitive figures from Avis’s reports ^[182] and market data from Finviz ^{[183] [184]}. Short interest and ownership details were obtained from NASDAQ/Benzinga short report ^[185] and SimplyWall St ownership breakdown ^{[186] [187]}. All information is up-to-date as of Nov 5, 2025.

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