Newell Brands Stock Crashes on Tariff Woes – Inside NWL’s Plunge and Turnaround Struggles

Stock Price Collapse: Newell Brands (NASDAQ: NWL) shares plunged over 30% on October 31, 2025, closing around $3.25 – a new all-time low ^[1]. The one-day drop of ~32% wiped out nearly a third of its value, as investors reacted to weak earnings. Just days prior, NWL was trading near $5 (the stock opened at $5.00 on Oct 29) ^[2]. The year-to-date loss now exceeds 65%, vastly underperforming the S&P 500’s ~16% gain in 2025 ^[3]. Over the past five years, NWL stock has cratered ~77% in value ^[4].
Disappointing Q3 Earnings:Q3 2025 results missed expectations. Net sales were $1.81 billion, down 7.2% year-over-year (vs. ~$1.89 B expected), and adjusted EPS was $0.17 (vs. $0.18 consensus) ^[5]. Core sales fell 7.4%. The company did swing to a small GAAP profit of $21 million (EPS $0.05) after a loss last year ^[6] ^[7], but this was overshadowed by the top-line miss and margin pressures. Gross margin slipped to 34.1% (from 34.9% a year ago) due to tariff costs, volume declines, and inflation ^[8] ^[9]. Operating cash flow also plunged, down over two-thirds to $103 million year-to-date, as tariffs and working capital needs hit cash generation ^[10].
Major Outlook Cut: The Q3 report came with a sharp guidance downgrade. Newell slashed its full-year 2025 forecast, now expecting net sales to decline 4.5%–5.0% (worse than the prior 2%–3% decline guidance) ^[11] ^[12]. Normalized EPS for 2025 was cut to $0.56–$0.60 (down from $0.66–$0.70 prior, and below analyst consensus ~$0.67) ^[13] ^[14]. The company also trimmed its Q4 outlook – forecasting Q4 sales down 1%–4% and EPS of $0.16–$0.20, well under Wall Street’s ~$0.27 estimate ^[15]. Additionally, operating cash flow guidance was slashed almost in half (to $250–$300 million from $400–$450 million) due to higher inventory costs from tariffs ^[16]. These cuts underscore mounting headwinds and drove the stock selloff.
Tariffs and Weak Demand Weigh: A key factor in Newell’s struggles is the impact of U.S.–China tariffs on its cost structure. Management revealed an expected $180 million in incremental tariff costs in 2025, with ~$115 million ( ~$0.23 per share) directly hitting gross profit ^[17] ^[18]. In Q3, tariffs shaved at least ~55 basis points off gross margin ^[19] ^[20]. CEO Chris Peterson noted that tariff-driven price hikes dampened demand, and retailers cut inventory levels to adjust to higher costs ^[21] ^[22]. International markets were soft (especially Brazil), further pressuring sales ^[23]. In Peterson’s words, “Our team responded swiftly with strategic measures… to mitigate the impact. Sales were affected by reduced retail inventory levels, softness in international markets… and moderated demand following tariff-driven pricing actions” ^[24]. The company views the retailer inventory correction as a one-time event now largely absorbed ^[25], and expects some rebound ahead – but tariffs remain a significant drag.
Turnaround and Cost-Cutting Efforts: Newell has been in turnaround mode, launching major restructuring initiatives to right-size the business. In early 2023 it rolled out “Project Phoenix”, aiming to eliminate redundancies and save ~$250 million, including a ~13% reduction in headcount ^[26] ^[27]. This was followed by a 2024 Realignment Plan to further streamline operations ^[28]. Benefits are starting to show: normalized operating margin in Q3 was 8.9% – slightly lower than last year’s 9.5% ^[29] – but would have improved if not for one-time tariff costs ^[30]. CFO Mark Erceg highlighted that overhead expenses have finally started declining (down ~120 bps as a percentage of sales, “the first time in three years”) ^[31] ^[32]. The company is aggressively cutting costs and deploying AI-driven productivity tools to boost efficiency ^[33]. Erceg also noted Newell invested in innovation and advertising at the highest rate (as % of sales) in nearly a decade, even as it slashed other costs ^[34] ^[35]. These moves are part of an effort to rekindle growth and improve margins despite the tough environment.
Dividend Slashed, Yield High: In a bid to conserve cash for the turnaround, Newell drastically cut its dividend in 2023. The quarterly payout was reduced to $0.07 per share (from $0.23 previously – a ~70% cut) ^[36]. This lower dividend (paid September 15, 2025) amounts to $0.28 annually, which at the current stock price yields 8–9% ^[37]. While the yield is attractive on paper, it reflects the depressed share price and dividend reduction. Notably, Newell’s dividend payout ratio is negative on a GAAP basis (due to recent net losses) ^[38], raising questions about sustainability. The company deemed the cut necessary to fund growth initiatives and debt reduction ^[39], but it has made the stock less appealing to income-focused investors. Newell’s last twelve-month high was $11.78 per share ^[40] – so long-term holders have not only seen the stock price tumble, but also their dividend income drop sharply.
Analyst Sentiment and Targets: Wall Street is cautious on NWL. The consensus rating is “Hold”, with a few buys and one sell in the mix ^[41]. According to Benzinga, 11 analysts cover Newell with an average 12-month price target of about $7.38 ^[42]. Price targets range from a bullish $9 (Canaccord Genuity) to a low of $5.50 (Citigroup) ^[43] – all well above the current ~$3–4 share price, reflecting hopes of recovery but also the stock’s collapse. Notably, some targets were cut before the latest earnings (e.g. JPMorgan trimmed its target from $7 to $6 in late October while reiterating an Overweight rating ^[44]). We may see further revisions now. Valuation-wise, Newell looks extremely cheap by traditional metrics (trading at under 0.3× sales and ~5× forward EBITDA), but that is balanced by its high debt and uncertain earnings trajectory. Some analysts have warned that Newell’s risks currently outweigh its potential upside. For instance, investment site Financhill noted that despite Newell’s famous brands, “falling sales, negative earnings and debt load” make the stock riskier than its potential upside – especially with the dividend advantage gone ^[45]. Until there are clear signs of a turnaround gaining traction, analysts appear hesitant to recommend aggressive buying.
Recent News and Brand Updates: In the days before the earnings debacle, Newell issued several product-related press releases. Its Yankee Candle division launched a Polar Express-themed holiday collection on October 27, 2025 ^[46], and introduced a new premium “YC Collection” line on October 24 ^[47], aimed at reinvigorating home fragrance sales. Meanwhile, the Sharpie brand announced it was relaunching an Extra Fine marker (after nearly a decade) on October 20 ^[48], responding to consumer demand. These brand initiatives show Newell leveraging its well-known franchises to drive consumer interest. However, such news had little effect on the stock given the overshadowing impact of financial results. The focus for investors remains on Newell’s revenue and profit trends, not just product launches.
Competitive Landscape: Newell’s challenges are occurring amid a generally tough consumer goods environment, though NWL’s decline is notably severe. The company operates in the consumer products/staples arena, which is currently one of the weaker-performing sectors – the industry ranks in the bottom 17% of sectors for stock performance, according to Zacks ^[49]. High inflation and shifting retail patterns have hurt many peers. For instance, Spectrum Brands (SPB) – a similar diversified consumer products firm – saw sales drop 10% in its recent quarter and its stock is down roughly 40% from 52-week highs ^[50]. Clorox, a larger household products peer, had its own earnings hit by supply chain issues earlier in 2025, and Hasbro and Mattel (in the toys segment) have struggled with tepid consumer demand. Perhaps most dramatically, Newell’s rival in kitchen storage, Tupperware Brands, filed for bankruptcy in 2024 after a collapse in demand for its containers ^[51]. Newell has thus far avoided such a fate and continues to generate ~$7+ billion in annual sales, but the pressure on legacy consumer brands is evident. On the positive side, Newell’s portfolio – which includes Rubbermaid, Coleman, Mr. Coffee, Graco, Paper Mate, Elmer’s and more – does represent a stable of well-known, oft-dominant products in their categories. This brand equity could give Newell an advantage if it can navigate the current headwinds. The CEO pointed out that in key categories like Writing (pens and markers), Newell’s domestic manufacturing base and competitive pricing are helping it regain share ^[52] ^[53]. Going forward, Newell must leverage these strengths against competition from both established peers and cheaper private-label alternatives that are pressuring shelf space.

In-Depth Report

Stock Price Plunge and Recent Performance

Newell Brands’ stock cratered in late October 2025, culminating in a one-day collapse on October 31 after its earnings release. The shares fell from about $4.72 to around $3.25 in a single session, a drop of roughly 32% ^[54]. This rout left the stock at its lowest price on record ^[55], an astonishing fall for a company that five years ago traded above $20 per share. The selloff on Oct. 31 was precipitated by disappointing quarterly results and a hefty cut to the company’s outlook (more on that below). It capped off a brutal year for NWL shareholders – even before the latest plunge, the stock was down over 50% in 2025, and the year-to-date loss now sits around -66% ^[56]. By comparison, the S&P 500 index is up about 16% in the same period ^[57]. In other words, Newell has massively underperformed the market.

It’s worth noting that NWL’s decline has been a multi-year story. The stock has lost about three-quarters of its value in the past five years ^[58], as the company has struggled with integration issues, high debt, and shifting consumer trends. The latest drop pushed shares well below their prior 12-month low of $4.22 ^[59]. In fact, NWL was trading in the mid-$4 range just ahead of earnings – it opened at $5.00 on Wednesday, Oct. 29 ^[60] – but once results came out, the floor fell out from under the stock. The plunge on Oct. 31 was accompanied by extremely heavy volume, indicating a rush for the exits by investors.

The immediate trigger was Newell’s Q3 earnings announcement, which not only showed weaker-than-expected results but also delivered bad news about the future. The magnitude of the guidance cut (discussed in detail in a later section) clearly spooked the market. Additionally, Newell’s share price decline has been exacerbated by the fact that it is a heavily indebted company in a rising interest rate environment – factors that make investors more risk-averse. The stock now has a market capitalization of roughly ~$2 billion at $3–4 per share (down from $10+ billion at its peak in the late 2010s).

For context, consumer staples and household products stocks overall have been under pressure, but Newell’s drop is extreme. The Zacks Consumer Products – Staples industry (which includes Newell) is in the lowest quintile of sector rankings ^[61], reflecting the difficult environment of rising costs and cautious consumer spending. Yet Newell’s decline in 2025 far exceeds most peers. This outsized drop indicates company-specific issues on top of the macro challenges.

Q3 2025 Earnings: Misses and Margins

Newell’s third-quarter 2025 earnings (released Oct. 31) fell short of analyst expectations on both the top and bottom lines. Net sales for Q3 were $1.81 billion, down 7.2% year-over-year ^[62] and about $80 million below the $1.89 billion consensus estimate ^[63]. This marks another quarter of revenue decline for Newell, which has been struggling to reignite sales growth. Core sales (which exclude currency and M&A impacts) were down 7.4%, indicating broad-based weakness in underlying demand ^[64].

Profitability was mixed: adjusted (normalized) diluted earnings per share came in at $0.17, a penny shy of the $0.18 expected ^[65]. That adjusted EPS was up a penny from last year’s $0.16 ^[66] ^[67] (thanks to cost cuts), but the small beat versus prior year wasn’t enough to impress – especially given the revenue miss. On a GAAP basis, Newell actually earned $0.05 per share (or $21 million net income) ^[68], a notable improvement from the -$0.48 loss per share (–$198 million net loss) in Q3 2024 ^[69] ^[70]. However, the prior year’s loss was driven by a large non-cash goodwill impairment charge, so the swing to a GAAP profit is less about robust operating success and more about lapping a one-time write-down. Indeed, normalized net income was essentially flat – $70 million vs $69 million in the year-ago quarter ^[71] ^[72].

Margin trends illuminated the headwinds Newell faced in Q3. Gross margin was 34.1%, down from 34.9% a year ago ^[73] ^[74]. Management pointed out that if not for one-time China tariff costs, gross margin would have actually expanded by about 55 basis points ^[75] ^[76]. But the reality is those tariff costs did hit – we’ll delve into tariffs in the next section – bringing gross margins down. Normalized gross margin was 34.5%, also down ~90 bps year-over-year ^[77]. This broke Newell’s streak of gross margin expansion (the company had achieved eight consecutive quarters of 100+ bps gross margin improvement through Q2 2025) and underscores how external cost pressures reversed that positive trend.

Operating margin told a slightly better story: GAAP operating margin improved to 6.6% in Q3 (versus –6.2% a year prior) ^[78] ^[79], but that’s because last year’s quarter included the big impairment charge. On a normalized basis, operating margin was 8.9%, a bit below 9.5% last year ^[80] ^[81]. So, excluding unusual items, the core operating profitability did slip, reflecting lower volume and gross profit. The company managed to reduce overhead expenses as a share of sales, but also invested more in advertising/promotion (A&P). In fact, CFO Mark Erceg highlighted that Q3’s A&P spend was at its highest rate in nearly a decade as Newell tries to boost its brands ^[82] ^[83]. He noted this was a strategic choice to support innovation and brand equity even amid sales softness.

Looking at segments: Newell’s largest unit, Home & Commercial Solutions (Rubbermaid, etc.), saw net sales down ~9.8% core, and its normalized operating margin fell to 6.8% (from 11.7% a year ago) ^[84] ^[85]. The Learning & Development segment (which includes Writing brands like Sharpie and Elmer’s, as well as baby gear) had a 5.6% core sales decline, but managed to improve operating margin to 19.1% (vs 21.5% prior) ^[86] ^[87] – indicating some resilience in profitability. The smaller Outdoor & Recreation segment (Coleman camping gear, etc.) was roughly flat in sales (–0.9% core) and significantly narrowed its operating loss ^[88] ^[89].

Another area of concern is cash flow and debt. Through the first nine months of 2025, Newell generated only $103 million in operating cash flow ^[90], compared to $346 million in the same period of 2024 ^[91] ^[92]. This steep drop was attributed to working capital usage (partially reversing last year’s inventory reductions), cash paid for tariffs, and timing of bonus payouts ^[93] ^[94]. Newell’s debt load remains high at ~$4.8 billion ^[95], with only $229 million cash on hand ^[96]. With interest rates up, Newell’s interest expense rose to $83 million in Q3 (versus $75 million last year) ^[97]. This combination of weak cash flow and heavy debt is worrisome – the company must improve cash generation in Q4 and 2026 to avoid straining its balance sheet.

In summary, Q3 showed that Newell’s cost cuts and efficiency gains are not yet overcoming the drag from lower sales and tariffs. The quarter wasn’t a disaster on earnings (a 5% miss on EPS), but the revenue shortfall and margin compression were worse than anticipated, setting the stage for the guidance cut that followed.

Tariff Troubles and Outlook Cut

One of the central themes of Newell’s current challenges is the impact of tariffs on goods imported from China. Newell sources a significant portion of its products (or components) from China, and the continuation of U.S. import tariffs (from the trade war era) has meaningfully increased its costs. In Q3, Newell estimated that tariffs compressed its gross margin by 55 basis points, essentially turning what would have been margin expansion into a decline ^[98] ^[99]. The company quantified a $24 million one-time tariff cost in Q3 alone ^[100] ^[101].

Looking ahead, Newell is bracing for a much bigger hit: incremental tariff costs of about $180 million for full-year 2025 (compared to 2024) ^[102] ^[103]. Of that, roughly $115 million will reduce gross profit (before any mitigating actions) – equivalent to about $0.23 per share after tax ^[104] ^[105]. These numbers were provided in Newell’s updated outlook, and they underscore why the company dramatically cut its profit forecast. Essentially, tariffs are acting like a giant new expense line for Newell, forcing it to either raise prices (which risks losing sales) or eat the costs (which hurts margins). The company did raise prices on many products, but as CEO Peterson noted, those “tariff driven pricing actions” moderated consumer demand ^[106] ^[107]. It’s a tough balancing act.

In the Q3 press release, Peterson described how retailers responded to tariffs by adjusting inventory – many retailers reduced their orders and shifted to just-in-time import models to avoid holding high-cost inventory ^[108] ^[109]. This exacerbated Newell’s volume decline in the quarter. The CEO believes this inventory correction is one-off, with retailer inventories now right-sized after absorbing tariff-related cost increases ^[110]. If he’s correct, there could be a bounce-back in orders in coming quarters (all else equal). Indeed, Peterson said, “We believe the retailer inventory adjustment was a one-time event… Looking ahead, we expect our international business to return to growth in the fourth quarter” ^[111]. The company also noted that it has been altering its sourcing – moving some production out of China where possible – to reduce tariff exposure long-term ^[112] ^[113]. For example, Newell’s Writing instruments manufacturing was relocated to the U.S. (Tennessee) for domestic supply ^[114].

Despite these efforts, the immediate reality is that tariffs forced management to lower expectations for the rest of 2025. On October 31, alongside Q3 results, Newell cut its full-year guidance on multiple fronts:

Net Sales: Now expected to decline 4.5% to 5.0% in 2025 ^[115], worse than the previous outlook of –2% to –3% ^[116]. In dollar terms, this guides to roughly $7.20–$7.24 billion in revenue for 2025 ^[117], below prior estimates (~$7.35 billion) and reflecting a steeper drop in Q4 sales than initially hoped.
Normalized EPS: Cut to $0.56–$0.60 for 2025 ^[118] ^[119], down from $0.66–$0.70. This is a sizable downgrade (about ~15% at the midpoint) and puts EPS well under last year’s levels. Notably, the new forecast is below the average analyst estimate of $0.67 ^[120] ^[121], indicating the Street was caught off guard by how much tariffs and weak sales are crimping profits.
Operating Cash Flow: Target for 2025 was slashed to $250–$300 million ^[122], from a prior ~$400 million. That’s a dramatic reduction, signaling that Q4 will see much lower cash generation than originally anticipated. Tariffs on inventory (the cost to stock goods ahead of holiday season) are a factor here ^[123]. If Newell ends 2025 with ~$250 million in cash flow, that barely covers its dividend (~$120 million annually after the cut) and some debt servicing, leaving little room to pay down debt meaningfully.
Q4 Specifics: Management’s Q4 2025 outlook is for net sales down (1% to 4%) and normalized EPS of $0.16–$0.20 ^[124]. For comparison, Q4 2024 had ~$2.1 billion sales and $0.16 normalized EPS, so Newell is essentially saying Q4 will be roughly flat to slightly down vs last year (with EPS at best up a few cents, at worst flat). However, analysts had expected Q4 2025 EPS more in the mid-$0.20s, so this Q4 guide was a disappointment. It suggests the holiday season – normally Newell’s biggest quarter – won’t provide much lift, due to the lingering headwinds.

The market reacted brutally to these outlook cuts. Shares dropped over 13% in pre-market trading on Oct. 31 when the news first hit ^[125], and losses deepened to >30% by the end of the day as investors digested the implications ^[126]. The phrase “new all-time low” is not one shareholders ever want to hear, but Newell’s closing price around $3.25 on Oct. 31 indeed marked the lowest point since the company’s formation (Newell Rubbermaid’s merger in 1999 and subsequent Newell Brands restructuring) ^[127].

In summary, tariffs have created a one-two punch of higher costs and lower demand, forcing Newell to cut its earnings outlook and leaving investors questioning how soon the company can recover. The company’s guidance reset may be an attempt to “rip off the Band-Aid” and reset expectations to a level it can meet or beat going forward. If the tariff impact truly is one-time and moderating, and if retailer ordering patterns normalize, Newell could stabilize. But for now, the outlook is for continued sales declines and only modest profits, which is a tough backdrop for a heavily indebted firm.

Management Commentary and Turnaround Initiatives

Despite the grim near-term results, Newell’s management insists that a turnaround is in progress. CEO Chris Peterson, who took the helm in May 2023 (after serving as CFO/President), has been spearheading a multi-year plan to simplify Newell’s operations and reignite growth. In the Q3 press release, Peterson struck a cautiously optimistic tone, stating: “Our turnaround continues to advance, even as Newell and the broader industry navigated significant trade disruptions in the third quarter.” ^[128]. He highlighted that the team responded to challenges “swiftly with strategic measures including sourcing changes, pricing actions, and productivity initiatives” to blunt the tariff impact ^[129]. Peterson acknowledged the hit from tariffs and reduced retailer orders, but said, “We believe the retailer inventory adjustment was a one-time event… Looking ahead, we expect our international business to return to growth in the fourth quarter.” ^[130]. In particular, he pointed out that competitive pricing moves are starting to pay off in key categories like Writing instruments, where Newell’s domestic production (e.g., Sharpie markers made in the USA) gives it an edge to fight back against imports ^[131]. Overall, Peterson expressed confidence that the “decisive actions” underway will pave the way for a return to sustainable top-line growth in the future ^[132].

CFO Mark Erceg (who joined Newell in 2022) provided additional color on the turnaround efforts. Erceg noted several positives in Q3: Without the one-time tariff costs, gross margin would have expanded by 55 bps – indicating underlying productivity gains ^[133] ^[134]. He also pointed out Newell is investing for the future, citing that advertising and promotion spend was at its highest rate (as % of sales) in nearly 10 years ^[135] ^[136], supporting new product launches and brand campaigns (like the Yankee Candle and Sharpie initiatives noted earlier). At the same time, Newell has aggressively cut overhead: Erceg was pleased to report that normalized overhead expenses (SG&A) as a percent of sales dropped ~120 bps, the first such decline in three years ^[137] ^[138]. He expects this trend of improved overhead efficiency to continue as the company “deploy[s] leading edge AI tools across the organization” to streamline operations ^[139] ^[140]. This mention of AI implies Newell is using advanced analytics/automation to optimize areas like supply chain, demand forecasting, and administrative tasks – a modern twist to cost-cutting.

Central to Newell’s turnaround are its restructuring programs. The company has undertaken a series of restructuring and savings initiatives:

In January 2023, Newell announced “Project Phoenix”, a sweeping plan to simplify its organizational structure and reduce costs. This included consolidating business units, outsourcing some functions, and layoffs. Project Phoenix aimed to achieve $220–$250 million in annualized cost savings by end of 2024, and early indications suggest it’s on track ^[141] ^[142]. The plan reduced Newell’s workforce by about 13% globally ^[143] ^[144], eliminated redundant roles across brands, and targeted efficiency improvements in manufacturing and distribution.
In 2024, building on Phoenix, Newell undertook a “Realignment Plan” (announced in January 2024) to further reorganize its business into more focused segments and cut bureaucracy ^[145]. This included moving from five operating segments to three and centralizing certain back-office functions. The Realignment Plan is expected to drive additional savings (the exact target wasn’t publicly stated, but it’s part of achieving the ongoing overhead reduction).
Newell also identified a range of “other restructuring and cost saving initiatives” ^[146], such as rationalizing its product assortment (cutting underperforming SKUs), optimizing its supply chain (e.g., shifting production out of China to avoid tariffs and reduce logistics costs), and closing some facilities.

These efforts have come with upfront costs (Newell has incurred restructuring charges for severance, etc.), but are crucial to improving profitability longer term. The company’s goal is not just cost-cutting, however. Management frequently emphasizes investing in product innovation and brand development as the other side of the turnaround coin. For example, the relaunched Sharpie marker and the new Yankee Candle collections are part of revitalizing top-line momentum. Newell is also focusing its portfolio – in recent years it divested smaller, non-core brands (like selling the Pure Fishing and Jostens businesses in 2019) to streamline around its best franchises.

Another aspect of the turnaround is capital allocation. Newell’s decision to slash the dividend in May 2023 was a difficult but telling choice ^[147]. By cutting the quarterly payout from $0.23 to $0.07, the company freed up over $300 million annually. Those funds can be used to pay down debt (reducing interest costs) and invest in restructuring/growth initiatives. Indeed, Newell’s net debt remains high, but it has avoided taking on significantly more debt this year despite cash flow challenges – in part by saving money from the dividend cut. However, this move also alienated some income-oriented investors who had held Newell for its previously high yield. Management effectively prioritized the long-term survival and health of the business over short-term shareholder payouts.

So far, how successful is the turnaround? The results are mixed. On one hand, Newell has managed to improve its gross margin structure up until the tariff hit – prior to Q3, gross margins had been rising thanks to pricing actions and cost savings. It has also maintained most of its market share in key categories (there’s no indication Newell’s brands are being dramatically displaced; the issue is more overall demand softness). On the other hand, sales continue to decline, and the external challenges (inflation, tariffs, shifting consumer behavior) have undermined a lot of the internal progress. Analysts remain skeptical – many are in “wait and see” mode to verify that Newell can actually stabilize revenue and earnings.

It’s worth highlighting that Newell’s current CEO and CFO are both relatively new and come from strong backgrounds (Peterson held senior roles at Procter & Gamble and was COO at Revlon; Erceg was previously CFO at Tiffany & Co and Canadian Pacific). They have a credibility-building task with investors. If they can guide the company to meet or beat these newly lowered expectations in coming quarters, confidence may start to rebuild.

Analyst Perspectives and Valuation

In the wake of Newell’s latest bad news, Wall Street analysts have been updating their models and recommendations. The consensus view on NWL can be summarized as cautiously neutral. According to MarketBeat and Benzinga data, out of roughly 9–11 analysts covering Newell, the majority have Hold ratings, with a few Buys and at least one Sell ^[148]. The average 12-month price target is around $7–7.50 per share ^[149] ^[150]. That target implies significant upside (over +100%) from the current ~$3.30 price – normally that would signal a strong Buy, but in Newell’s case it more reflects how far the stock has fallen. In fact, some of those targets have not yet been updated post-Q3; we may see downward revisions.

Recent analyst actions include:

JPMorgan (Oct 23, 2025) – Maintained an Overweight rating but cut the price target from $7 to $6 ahead of earnings ^[151]. JPM’s analyst Andrea Teixeira acknowledged near-term headwinds but seemingly still saw long-term value at that time. It will be interesting if JPM keeps an Overweight now that the stock is $3 – they might, on the thesis that the selloff was overdone.
Citigroup – Has been Neutral on Newell. In October, Citi’s analyst Filippo Falorni lowered the target from $6 to $5.50 ^[152]. Citi’s target was the low on the Street going into earnings, and Newell has now even undercut that.
Canaccord Genuity (Aug 4, 2025) – Had a Buy rating and a $9 target (down from $11 prior) ^[153]. Canaccord was relatively bullish, likely betting on turnaround success. That target will likely be revisited after the Q3 miss.
Wells Fargo (July 2025) – Rated Equal Weight, had a $6.00 target (up from $5.00) ^[154]. Wells Fargo was in the hold camp, not expecting big moves either way.

As of the end of October, Benzinga’s analyst compilation showed a consensus target of $7.38 (high $9, low $5.5) across 11 analysts ^[155], and a consensus rating that is effectively Hold/Neutral. That suggests analysts on average see Newell eventually drifting back up to the mid-single digits, but not regaining anywhere near its former glory in the near term.

From a valuation standpoint, Newell’s stock looks extremely cheap on many metrics – but with big asterisks. At ~$3.30 per share, the company’s market cap is around $1.5–$2.0 billion. With expected 2025 sales of ~$7.2 billion, that’s a price-to-sales ratio of just 0.2–0.3×. By comparison, many consumer goods companies trade at 1× sales or higher. Even troubled peers trade at higher multiples (for instance, Spectrum Brands at ~$55 has ~0.6× sales, and historically Newell itself traded at ~1× sales or more in better times). On a P/E basis, using the new guidance midpoint (~$0.58 EPS for 2025), NWL trades around 5.5× forward earnings – extremely low. However, one must consider that:

Newell’s earnings are depressed and could fall further (or even go negative again) if the turnaround falters.
The company has a heavy debt load (enterprise value EV is much larger than market cap). Looking at EV/EBITDA gives a more balanced view: for 2025, if we assume ~$800 million EBITDA, EV/EBITDA might be around 7–8× at the current price – not as absurdly cheap as the P/E suggests, but still on the low side for this sector.
The dividend yield is high (~8–9%), but as noted, that’s after a cut and could be at risk if things worsen.

Some investors might view NWL as a deep value play, essentially a bet that the market has overshot on pessimism. The Financhill analysis earlier in 2023 argued that at ~0.45× sales and 10× forward earnings, Newell looked undervalued if one believes earnings will rebound ^[156]. But it also cautioned that continued negative growth could justify those low multiples ^[157] – which indeed seems to be happening.

From the “expert commentary” side, we see a split: value-oriented analysts say Newell’s brands and assets are worth more than $3 a share, whereas skeptics point to the consistent underperformance and execution risk. A quote that encapsulates the bear case comes from the Financhill piece: “Ultimately, Newell Brands may be a good candidate to sell at this time… Newell’s falling sales, negative earnings and debt load all make the stock riskier than its potential upside seems to justify.” ^[158]. The author notes that even though Newell likely will eventually recover (owing to its strong brands), the opportunity cost of waiting through a potentially long slog – while other stocks perform better – is high ^[159] ^[160]. In other words, an investor’s capital might be better put to work elsewhere until Newell shows real improvement.

On the other hand, some contrarians might argue that with the stock at all-time lows and the bad news now “out in the open,” Newell could be nearing a bottom. If management can hit their reset guidance (albeit much lowered) and demonstrate progress in Q4 and early 2026, sentiment could start to turn. The presence of activist investors or a takeover is also a possibility (though nothing public on that front right now). 92% of Newell’s stock is owned by institutions (including notable holders like Carl Icahn, who in the past was a major shareholder, though he reduced his stake in recent years) ^[161] ^[162]. Any activist agitation or strategic moves (like divesting a division) could also influence the stock.

For now, most analysts are in “show me” mode – maintaining neutral stances until there is clearer evidence of a turnaround bearing fruit. The next few quarters will be key for Newell to prove that it can stabilize revenue, execute on cost cuts without damaging its brands, and manage its debt responsibly.

Industry and Competitors Comparison

Newell Brands operates in a broad consumer goods arena, touching categories from kitchen appliances to baby strollers to markers and candles. This puts it somewhere between the Consumer Staples and Consumer Discretionary sectors. Lately, companies in these areas have faced a mix of challenges: post-pandemic shifts in spending, inflation in raw materials, supply chain disruptions, and for those dealing internationally, the strong U.S. dollar and tariffs.

To gauge Newell’s performance in context, let’s consider a few peers and related companies:

Spectrum Brands (SPB): Spectrum is a mid-sized consumer products company (owning brands like Kwikset locks, Remington appliances, Cutter insect repellent, etc.). In some ways it’s analogous to Newell – diversified products, some similar categories (Spectrum used to own Rayovac batteries and hardware divisions it sold off). Spectrum’s latest quarter (fiscal Q3 2025) saw net sales down ~10% and an adjusted EBITDA decline, citing retailer destocking as well ^[163]. SPB’s stock over the past year went from a high of ~$96 to a low around $50 ^[164]. It currently trades near the low-$50s ^[165]. So Spectrum is down ~40-45% from its 52-week high – a big drop, but still far better than Newell’s ~70% slide from its 52-week high of $11.78 ^[166]. Spectrum also pays a dividend (though a smaller yield ~3%) and has faced its own activist pressures. The comparison shows that Newell’s decline is more severe, perhaps because Newell has more exposure to discretionary consumer purchases (like Yankee Candles or outdoor gear) whereas Spectrum has some steadier categories (locks, pet supplies after acquiring Trupanion). Both firms are contending with retailer inventory tightening. Newell’s sharper drop may indicate either deeper issues or simply that it had farther to fall (Newell was more richly valued a few years ago than Spectrum).
Clorox (CLX): Clorox is a large consumer staples company (cleaning products, Brita filters, Glad bags – notably GladWare competes with Newell’s Rubbermaid in food storage). Clorox’s business is more defensive (demand for bleach and trash bags is steady), yet it too had a setback: a cyberattack disrupted Clorox’s supply chain in mid-2023, causing a big earnings miss and a 30% stock plunge at one point. Clorox’s stock in 2025 is down roughly 15-20% year-to-date. That’s painful for a blue-chip like CLX, but again, not nearly on the scale of NWL’s drop. Clorox also trades at a high multiple (~25× earnings) and pays a consistent dividend – very different profile. The reason to compare is to highlight that even solid consumer companies are facing cost issues and one-off shocks, but Newell’s volatility is greater due to its debt and discretionary product focus.
Hasbro (HAS) and Mattel (MAT): These toy companies overlap a bit with Newell (Newell’s “Learning & Development” segment includes baby and arts/crafts, but not traditional toys). Both Hasbro and Mattel struggled in 2022–2023 with weak toy demand post-pandemic, and their stocks slumped (Hasbro cut its dividend by 40% in early 2023). However, in 2025 with the movie “Barbie” boosting Mattel and some turnaround at Hasbro, those stocks have stabilized somewhat. Year-to-date, Mattel is about flat and Hasbro down ~10%. It shows that turnarounds can happen – Mattel was in a dire spot a few years ago and managed to recover by refocusing on core brands and cost discipline. Newell is attempting something analogous.
Tupperware Brands (TUP): A cautionary tale in Newell’s orbit is Tupperware. Tupperware sells food storage and kitchen containers – directly competing with Newell’s Rubbermaid food storage products. After years of declining sales and an overly leveraged balance sheet, Tupperware filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in July 2024 ^[167]. Its iconic brand couldn’t overcome the loss of relevance (competition from cheaper alternatives and a shift in how consumers get reusable containers – e.g., free restaurant takeout containers, as a Reuters piece noted ^[168]). Tupperware’s collapse highlights the dangers for legacy consumer brands that fail to adapt. For Newell, it’s a stark reminder to keep its brands relevant and its debt in check. The good news: Newell is far larger and more diversified than Tupperware was, and Newell still has positive cash flow. But certain Newell categories – like traditional food containers – are indeed under pressure from changing consumer habits. Rubbermaid has tried to innovate with newer lines, but the threat from low-cost rivals (GladWare by Clorox, store brands) is real ^[169].
Private Label and Niche Competitors: In many of Newell’s categories (e.g., cookware, coolers, baby gear, writing instruments), competition includes private label/store brands and smaller specialists. Private label (store brands) often undercut on price. Newell’s advantage is brand strength – for example, a consumer might pay more for a Rubbermaid Brilliance container or a Coleman cooler because of perceived quality. But during inflationary times, shoppers trade down to cheaper alternatives. This dynamic likely hurt Yankee Candle (consumers opting for cheaper home fragrances) and perhaps Oster/Mr. Coffee appliances (as off-brand kitchen gadgets proliferate online). Newell’s strategy to combat this is to emphasize quality and innovation in its premium brands while also offering value lines. The success of that strategy will determine if it can hold shelf space against private labels.
Macro Factors: It’s also important to mention the overall consumer environment. Persistent inflation, especially in staples, means consumers have less disposable income for non-essentials. Newell sells a mix of essentials (e.g., baby car seats, food storage) and non-essentials (scented candles, premium coolers). The company noted “softness in international markets” and general demand moderation ^[170]. High interest rates might also dampen housing-related purchases (affecting things like Calphalon cookware or home decor items). However, there are some positives: U.S. employment remains solid, and if inflation continues to come down, consumer confidence could improve. The upcoming holiday season (Q4) will be a critical test – categories like Writing (Sharpie/Elmer’s) and Baby (Graco) often get a boost from back-to-school and holiday sales.

In sum, compared to its competitors and the industry, Newell is viewed as an underdog right now. It is more exposed to discretionary spending than many staples peers, and its recent performance has lagged badly. But it also has a diverse range of strong brands that, under better conditions, could produce stable cash flows. Management’s task is to bridge the gap between Newell and the pack by executing on cost savings and returning the company to at least modest growth.

Historical Performance and Dividend History

Newell Brands has a long history (the company dates back over 100 years in various forms), and its stock has seen dramatic swings. Historically, Newell was considered a steady growth and income stock – it owned durable brands and reliably paid a dividend. In the 2010s, Newell embarked on a major expansion by acquiring Jarden Corporation (parent of brands like Coleman, Yankee Candle, Crock-Pot, etc.) in 2016. The merger doubled the company’s size but also saddled it with debt. Initially, Newell’s stock hit an all-time high around $55 in mid-2017. However, integration missteps and turnover in leadership led to a sharp decline by 2018–2019, down to the teens. Activist investor Starboard Value got involved in 2018, and Carl Icahn accumulated a large stake, pushing for changes. Newell did divest several units (as mentioned) and reduced debt somewhat. But just as it was stabilizing, the pandemic and subsequent supply/inflation crises hit.

From 2020 through 2022, NWL shares oscillated between about $13 and $30. The company benefited initially from pandemic demand for home products (people were cooking at home, doing DIY projects, etc.), hitting around $30 in mid-2021. But inflation and a post-COVID demand drop saw the stock grind down again. By early 2023, Newell was in the high single digits. The dividend cut in May 2023 was a pivotal moment: until then, Newell had been yielding over 10% with its $0.23 quarterly dividend – a red flag that the payout was likely unsustainable. Indeed, on May 16, 2023, Newell’s board slashed the dividend to $0.07 and “updated its capital allocation strategy” ^[171] ^[172]. This 70% cut saved cash at the expense of income investors. The stock actually popped slightly on the announcement (perhaps as investors applauded the prudence), but soon continued its decline.

Dividend history: Newell had a strong track record of dividends prior to this. It consistently raised its dividend in the 2000s and 2010s, reaching $0.23/quarter by 2017. It maintained that level until 2023, even through the pandemic (though it suspended share buybacks). The cut to $0.07 was the first reduction in decades. At the new rate, the annual dividend is $0.28, which at the current stock price yields roughly 5.6% when the stock was ~$5 ^[173] – and now closer to 8-9% with the stock around $3.50 ^[174]. Newell’s payout ratio was previously very high relative to earnings (sometimes over 100% of GAAP earnings, hence the negative payout ratio during loss periods). After the cut, the payout ratio is more reasonable on a normalized earnings basis (~50% of 2025E EPS). The company likely will not consider raising the dividend until it has significantly deleveraged and is confident in stable earnings. In fact, further cut isn’t expected in the immediate term (since they already aligned it with what the business can support), but if a severe downturn happened, Newell could temporarily suspend it. For now, the dividend provides some yield for patient investors, but it’s no longer the ~15%+ yield trap it once was.

Shareholder returns beyond dividends have been lacking – Newell hasn’t done share buybacks in recent years due to debt focus. The stock’s trajectory has unfortunately eroded a lot of shareholder wealth. An investor who bought 10 years ago (when NWL was ~$30) would have seen the stock half that now, even after collecting dividends. The stark fall in 2025 to multi-decade lows is hopefully the nadir. Long-time shareholders and insiders might argue the stock is deeply undervalued at these levels given the brand assets, but the market clearly is waiting for execution to improve.

The Road Ahead: Can Newell Rise from the Ashes?

After the October crash, the critical question is whether Newell Brands can recover and rebuild trust with investors. The company does have a few things going for it:

Portfolio of well-known brands: Names like Rubbermaid, Sharpie, Graco, Coleman, Yankee Candle, Paper Mate, Oster, and Elmer’s are leaders or strong contenders in their categories. This brand equity is a competitive moat – retailers still carry these brands because consumers recognize them. When economic conditions normalize, Newell’s brands should benefit from any uptick in consumer spending.
Turnaround plan in action: The combination of Project Phoenix, the Realignment Plan, and other efficiency moves are carving out costs and simplifying the business. By 2026, Newell expects to see the full annual savings from these actions. If sales can even hold flat, those savings would boost margins. Management has essentially “set the bar” with the new low guidance – and they will be highly motivated to meet or beat those numbers to restore credibility.
Signs of stabilization by late 2025?: The CEO’s outlook for Q4 includes a return to growth in international markets and some traction from pricing adjustments ^[175]. While the Q4 guidance was conservative, it implies that the worst declines might be past (core sales in Q4 projected to be down only ~3-5%, which is better than Q3’s –7%). If Newell can hit the midpoint, it would show sequential improvement.
Reduced inventory and channel fill: The retailer inventory destocking that hurt 2025 results won’t last forever. Large retail partners like Walmart, Target, and Amazon are likely now carrying lean inventories of Newell’s products. In 2026, they could start ordering more in line with end consumer demand rather than shrinking their stock on hand. This could give Newell a modest volume bump (provided consumer demand doesn’t deteriorate further).

That said, risks remain plentiful:

Tariffs are still in effect and will continue into 2026 unless trade policies change. Newell is mitigating by shifting sourcing (e.g., moving more production to North America or other countries), but that takes time and capital.
The macroeconomic backdrop is uncertain. If there’s a recession or further consumer spending pullback, Newell’s products (especially discretionary ones) could see another dip in demand.
Execution risk: Restructuring can sometimes inadvertently hurt a company if not done carefully (e.g., losing talented staff, harming customer relationships). Newell must execute changes without disrupting its innovation or sales too much.
Competition is not standing still. Private label and other branded competitors will exploit any weakness to grab shelf space or market share. Newell’s strong brands need ongoing marketing and innovation to stay ahead – which the company is doing, but on a tighter budget now.

From an investor’s perspective, 2026 will be crucial. That is when we’ll see if Newell’s turnaround can truly gain traction. The full benefits of cost cuts should be reflected, and the hope is that by then, sales could at least stabilize or even grow slightly as the one-off drags abate. If Newell can generate, say, low-single-digit positive sales growth and expand margins at the same time, the market would likely reward the stock significantly (given how low expectations are now).

On the other hand, if sales keep falling in 2026 and margins don’t improve, the company could face more serious consequences (potentially even covenant issues on debt, or the need for asset sales). It’s a high-stakes situation.

To end on an optimistic note, CEO Peterson stated he is “confident that our decisive actions are paving the way for the company to return to sustainable top-line growth in the future.” ^[176] The phrase “sustainable top-line growth” is key – it’s something Newell hasn’t seen in a while. If Peterson’s confidence is well placed, Newell Brands may yet rise from these ashes (perhaps living up to the “Phoenix” name of its restructuring plan). The stock, at multi-decade lows, arguably prices in a lot of bad news already. Newell’s next earnings and investor communications will be closely watched for any indication that the worst is truly over. In the meantime, shareholders are left with a high dividend yield and a lot of hope that 2025 marked the bottom for this storied consumer products company.

Sources:

Newell Brands Q3 2025 Earnings Press Release ^[177] ^[178] ^[179] ^[180] (Oct 31, 2025) – Company financial results, CEO/CFO quotes, outlook updates.
The Tokenist – “Newell Brands (NWL) Stock Falls 30% on Tariff Pressures and Weak Q3 Sales” ^[181] ^[182] ^[183] (Oct 31, 2025) – News article summarizing earnings miss, guidance cut, and stock reaction.
Zacks Equity Research via Nasdaq – “Newell Brands (NWL) Misses Q3 Earnings and Revenue Estimates” ^[184] ^[185] (Oct 31, 2025) – Earnings miss details and YTD stock performance vs market.
MarketBeat/Benzinga – Analyst consensus and ratings ^[186] ^[187] (Oct 29–31, 2025) – Compilation of analyst targets (avg ~$7.30) and recent rating changes (e.g. JPMorgan, Citi).
Financhill – “Will Newell Brands Stock Recover?” ^[188] ^[189] ^[190] (2023) – Analysis of Newell’s restructuring (Project Phoenix, dividend cut) and long-term outlook from an investor perspective.
Reuters News – Various industry and competitor context: e.g. Tupperware bankruptcy in 2024 ^[191], Newell CEO interview on moving operations from China ^[192], and SEC charges against former Newell CEO in 2023 (not covered above, but part of historical challenges).
Company Investor Relations – Historical price data and press releases (e.g. Yankee Candle product launch on Oct 27, 2025) ^[193]; dividend declarations ^[194]; restructuring announcements ^[195].

Trump tariffs are creating uncertainty: Newell CEO

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References