Sky Wars: The Satellite Arms Race—Government and Military Satcom Procurement Trends 2025–2035

Governments worldwide are entering a “Sky Wars” satellite arms race – a contest to secure robust military satellite communications (Satcom) for the coming decade. From 2025 to 2035, defense agencies are pouring resources into Satcom as warfighters demand resilient, everywhere-connectivity. The Ukraine conflict underscored Satcom’s importance (e.g. Starlink kept forces online), spurring militaries to accelerate investments. Global government/military Satcom spending is projected to climb steadily (~7–10% annually), rising from roughly $50 billion in 2024 to $64 billion by 2030 ts2.tech ts2.tech. This surge is driven by unprecedented bandwidth needs for data-heavy systems and fears that adversaries could disrupt communications. The result is a procurement boom – from new state-of-the-art satellites and ground terminals to bulk leasing of commercial bandwidth – all aimed at gaining a strategic edge in secure connectivity.

At the same time, the commercial space sector’s boom is reshaping procurement strategies. Traditional military satcom programs (often decades-long, bespoke satellites) are being augmented or even supplanted by agile commercial constellations in low Earth orbit (LEO). Governments are increasingly partnering with private satcom providers to tap cutting-edge technology faster and cheaper. The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, is the world’s largest buyer of commercial satellite capacity and is deeply integrating services like SpaceX’s Starlink into military networks ts2.tech ts2.tech. In this report, we provide a comprehensive overview of global government and military Satcom procurement trends (2025–2035) – spanning hardware and services – across the U.S., NATO/Europe, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Latin America. We highlight key use cases (from ISR to disaster response), emerging public–private models, major vendors, budget priorities, and a region-by-region analysis of strategic programs.

Global Satcom Procurement Trends (2025–2035)

Satellites as Strategic Infrastructure: Satcom has become mission-critical infrastructure for defense, on par with fuel or ammunition. Secure satellite links enable militaries to coordinate across continents, control drones and surveillance assets, connect ships and aircraft, and respond to crises when terrestrial networks fail bcg.com bcg.com. As one U.S. Space Force general put it, connectivity is king – modern forces require the ability to send data “wherever we need to, when we need to” across multiple orbits and frequencies airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com. This reality is forcing a paradigm shift in procurement: instead of a few large, standalone systems, militaries are pursuing “enterprise” Satcom architectures that blend numerous satellites (military and commercial, across LEO, MEO, GEO) into one resilient network gao.gov gao.gov.

Hybrid Military–Commercial Networks: A striking trend is the embrace of hybrid networks – integrating dedicated military satellites with commercial Satcom services. Governments are allocating huge sums to ensure sufficient capacity, yet recognize they can’t meet surging demand with government-owned satellites alone bcg.com. Commercial providers are filling the gap. In the U.S., the Space Force expanded its Proliferated LEO satcom services contract from a $900 million ceiling to $13 billion to accommodate explosive uptake across the Department of Defense airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com. Under this program, Starlink has dominated early orders, winning the bulk of $660 million in task orders (out of 20 approved vendors) airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com. By 2024, nearly 3,000 military users were leveraging LEO-based commercial broadband under new contracts, forcing the Pentagon to vastly increase capacity budgets gao.gov gao.gov. To avoid over-reliance on a single vendor, defense buyers are encouraging competition from emerging LEO constellations – Amazon’s Project Kuiper, Telesat’s Lightspeed, OneWeb (now merged with Eutelsat) – each promising alternatives to Starlink with more government-friendly terms like sovereign capacity pools and terminal-agnostic designs airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com.

Resilience and Multi-Orbit Plans: Across all regions, resilience against jamming or attack is a top priority shaping Satcom procurements. Adversaries have demonstrated anti-satellite weapons and cyber interference, so future systems must withstand a “contested space” environment. This is driving interest in multi-orbit constellations and proliferated networks that are hard to take down. For example, Australia recently pivoted from a single large GEO satellite plan to a “multi-orbit” architecture for greater survivability. In 2024 Australia canceled its $5 billion Lockheed Martin GEO satellite program (JP9102) – which had been intended as its first sovereign milsatcom – in favor of pursuing a distributed LEO+GEO solution that is “more distributed, more resilient” and quicker to deploy thedefensepost.com thedefensepost.com. The Australian Defence Minister explicitly cited new threats (satellite shoot-down weapons) and the success of “thousands of small satellites” providing service (e.g. Starlink in Ukraine) as rationale for the change thedefensepost.com. Similarly, NATO planners have declared that Satcom must evolve from disparate systems to an integrated “fighting SATCOM” enterprise resilient to interference gao.gov gao.gov. Expect 2025–2035 to bring proliferated LEO constellations for military use, laser crosslinks (to bypass jamming), and smarter network routing that can morph between orbits and bands on the fly airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com.

Sovereign Capabilities vs. Shared Services: Nations face a strategic choice: build sovereign Satcom systems or rely on allies and commercial services. Many countries are opting for a mix. On one hand, sovereign milsatcom programs are seen as vital for autonomy – e.g. France’s Syracuse-4 satellites, Britain’s Skynet 6, India’s GSAT-7 series, China’s constellation plans – which ensure control over critical communications. On the other hand, the cost and speed of commercial offerings make them attractive for non-sensitive needs or interim capacity. We see creative public-private partnership (PPP) models emerging: in Europe, the EU’s new IRIS² constellation will be a multi-orbit government Satcom network delivered via a PPP, backed by €2.4 billion in public funds bcg.com. NATO, rather than build its own satellites, recently pooled €1 billion to buy Satcom services from allies’ satellites over 15 years bcg.com. Even smaller states are teaming with industry – Spain’s Ministry of Defense leases capacity on Hisdesat’s Spainsat and allows the operator to commercialize any excess, a win-win arrangement bcg.com. The overall procurement trend is toward flexible models: some purpose-built milsatcom, combined with long-term service contracts and on-demand surge agreements with commercial providers (e.g. the U.S. DoD’s planned Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve for crisis capacity) bcg.com bcg.com.

Big Growth, New Players: The 2025–2035 period will also see major growth in Satcom spending and new entrants in the market. By 2030 the global Satcom market (civil and defense) could double versus mid-2020s levels ts2.tech, and government demand is a significant driver. Established aerospace giants – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Airbus, Thales Alenia – are adapting by offering more flexible, software-defined satellites and working in tandem with “NewSpace” players ts2.tech. Meanwhile, newcomers like SpaceX (Starlink/Starshield), OneWeb/Eutelsat, Amazon, Viasat (after absorbing Inmarsat) are competing to capture defense clients with turnkey services. The result is intensified competition and innovation: militaries can now shop among dozens of Satcom providers globally. However, this also raises interoperability challenges – prompting efforts to develop universal Satcom terminals and standards. The U.S. Space Force and Navy are developing “hybrid” user terminals that can roam across multiple bands and constellations (e.g. switch between a military Ka-band satellite and a commercial LEO system) airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com. In summary, Satcom procurement is more dynamic than ever, with governments acting as both customers (of commercial capacity) and investors (in their own systems) to build the best-of-both-worlds architecture.

Hardware vs. Service Procurement Breakdown

Military Satcom procurements fall into two broad categories: hardware acquisitions (satellites, ground stations, user terminals) and service procurements (bandwidth leases, managed Satcom services). Both are evolving:

Hardware Investments: Satellites, Ground Stations & Terminals

• Next-Gen Satellite Payloads: Governments are ordering satellites with digital, reprogrammable payloads that can adapt to shifting missions. For example, the UAE’s Yahsat (which serves government/military needs) has contracted Airbus to build two new GEO satellites (Al Yah 4 & 5) with fully software-defined payloads, allowing coverage and frequencies to be reconfigured in-orbit airbus.com airbus.com. Such flexibility is crucial for 2025–2035 needs – a single satellite might support wide-band tactical comms one day, and regional ISR data backhaul the next. Militaries also demand multi-band payloads (e.g. X, Ka, UHF on one satellite) to support different forces. The new Yahsat birds are multi-band and will replace aging 2011–2012 satellites with far more capacity airbus.com airbus.com. In addition, higher frequency bands (Q/V-band, optical laser links) are being explored to unlock more throughput and jam-resistance in future hardware.
• Proliferated Smallsats: On the other end of the spectrum, there’s a push for quantity over size. LEO smallsat constellations for military communication are emerging, inspired by Starlink’s success. Smaller satellites (tens or hundreds of kg) in large constellations can provide low-latency, ubiquitous coverage and are harder to disable en masse. China is investing heavily here – a state-backed firm launched the first batch of a “Thousand Sails” LEO constellation, aiming for over 15,000 satellites by 2030 reuters.com. This is explicitly to rival SpaceX’s Starlink and ensure China’s military has its own global broadband network reuters.com. The Chinese military studied Starlink’s use in Ukraine and labeled it a “serious threat” if left unmatched reuters.com. In response, by 2025 China plans 648 LEO comsats in orbit, with global coverage by 2027 and thousands more to follow reuters.com. Western militaries are also experimenting with proliferated LEO – the U.S. Space Development Agency’s Transport Layer will deploy dozens (eventually hundreds) of small communication satellites in LEO to link sensors and shooters on the battlefield in near-real-time. These efforts mark a shift from a few exquisite satellites to many distributed nodes.
• Ground Segment Upgrades: New satellites are only useful if ground infrastructure keeps pace. Modern ground stations are being built with automation and resiliency in mind – including dispersed teleport sites, hardened control centers, and antennas that can operate amid electronic attack. There’s also movement toward optical ground links (laser terminals on the ground to talk with sat lasers securely). In addition, allies are linking ground systems: for instance, as part of Europe’s GovSatcom program, countries are interconnecting their Satcom ground stations to share resources. Mobility is key as well – forces are procuring portable and on-the-move terminals so that units in the field can connect anywhere. India recently “finalized a deal for 160 mobile secure Satcom terminals” – suitcase-sized kits for troops in remote border areas – along with hundreds of manpack and vehicle-mounted terminals to replace older gear economictimes.indiatimes.com economictimes.indiatimes.com. These terminals are secure, anti-intercept, and will vastly improve communications for units on the move, whether along the Himalayas or in jungles economictimes.indiatimes.com economictimes.indiatimes.com. The U.S. and NATO are similarly investing in next-gen tactical Satcom terminals (vehicle-mounted and airborne) that can track multiple satellites (including LEO) and switch frequencies seamlessly.
• Protected and Anti-Jam Tech: For strategic communications (nuclear C3, etc.), militaries continue to deploy hardened satcom systems. The U.S. Advanced EHF satellites (and upcoming Evolved Strategic Satcom) use frequency-hopping and anti-jam waveforms to ensure connectivity even under extreme jamming or nuclear scenarios. Europe and others are exploring EPFD (extremely high frequency) and laser comms to add anti-jam links. The goal by 2035 is to have jam-resistant, agile Satcom – potentially using narrow steerable beams, frequency agility, and quantum encryption for maximum security ts2.tech ts2.tech.

Service Procurements: Leases & Managed Satcom Services

• Long-Term Capacity Leases: Rather than buying only hardware, governments frequently lease transponder capacity or managed service packages from commercial operators. This model has grown since it enables rapid access to satcom without waiting for a new satellite launch. NATO’s aforementioned 15-year contract essentially buys wholesale capacity from allies’ satellites bcg.com. The U.S. DoD spends billions annually on leasing commercial bandwidth – historically about 40% of its satcom budget – via entities like the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) airforce-technology.com airforce-technology.com. Going forward, we see multi-year service agreements becoming standard, providing assured capacity at bulk rates. For example, Telesat’s Lightspeed is marketing to militaries the idea of purchasing a “capacity pool” – a block of Mbps that a government owns across the constellation, which it can flexibly allocate to different regions as needed airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com. Such arrangements essentially treat satcom “as-a-service” with guaranteed slices for defense use.
• On-Demand Surge Contracts: A newer concept is contracting for surge capacity only when needed (crisis or wartime). The U.S. CASR (Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve) model would pre-agree with operators in peacetime so that if an emergency is declared, DoD can rapidly commandeer additional bandwidth or coverage bcg.com bcg.com. This is akin to an insurance policy – paying a retainer to commercial satcom firms to stand ready. Such flexible contracting requires changes in procurement policy, which traditionally favored static leases. However, policymakers are warming to it; funding for CASR-like mechanisms is expected in upcoming U.S. defense budgets bcg.com. Other nations may follow suit, especially those with less organic capacity – effectively pre-booking priority access on commercial constellations for contingencies.
• Managed Services & Turnkey Solutions: In many cases militaries don’t just want raw bandwidth, but a managed end-to-end service. This can include ground terminals, network management, and integration with existing military networks. Companies like SES, Inmarsat (Viasat), and Airbus offer “military satcom as a service” where the contractor ensures a certain level of connectivity (using its satellites or even dedicated payloads) and the military simply uses it. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps recently piloted using commercial satcom “as a Managed Service” – the provider delivered agile, secure comms on demand, bundling space segment and ground support ts2.tech ts2.tech. This relieved the Marines of having to manage the satellite network themselves. We anticipate more such contracts, where vendors guarantee X amount of throughput in theater, 24/7, and handle the rest. It’s attractive for tasks like humanitarian operations or training missions, conserving dedicated milsat resources for front-line warfighting.
• Public-Private Collaboration Models: Several innovative collaboration models blur the line between hardware and service procurement. Hosted payloads are one – government comm payloads “hitchhiking” on commercial satellites, saving cost. Anchor tenancy is another – a government commits to be the first/biggest customer of a new comsat system, which encourages industry to build it. The EU’s IRIS² will leverage commercial investment under EU oversight (a form of anchor tenancy/PPP) bcg.com. Allied pooling of service contracts can also achieve economies of scale, as seen in joint procurement by groups of nations. Overall, service-centric procurement is trending toward greater flexibility, multi-party arrangements, and performance-based contracts, departing from the old fixed, long-term leases.

Regional Procurement Trends and Strategic Programs

To understand the arms race in milsatcom, we examine key regions – each with distinct drivers yet converging on the need for more capacity and resilience.

United States

The U.S. leads in military Satcom spending and is aggressively modernizing its architecture. Priorities (2025–2035) for the U.S. include: building an integrated “hybrid space architecture” that combines government satellites with commercial constellations, hardening networks against interference, and scaling capacity for data-heavy operations worldwide airandspaceforces.com gao.gov. The U.S. Space Force (USSF) and other DoD agencies are executing a multipronged strategy:

• Deploying Next-Gen Milsatcom: The U.S. is upgrading its traditional constellations. The Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) system (used for high-capacity X/Ka-band) received international partner funding for additional satellites (e.g. from Canada, who along with others shares in WGS) ts2.tech ts2.tech. A follow-on Wideband program is in planning stages, aimed at even higher throughputs. For protected communications, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites (global, anti-jam) are operational, and the Evolved Strategic Satcom (ESS) program is being pursued to eventually replace AEHF for secure strategic links into the 2030s. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), a narrowband UHF constellation for troops on the move, is also being sustained, with talk of augmenting it via hosted payloads or smallsats to expand coverage. In summary, the Pentagon is keeping its dedicated milsatcom constellations funded (with line items in Space Force budgets for “Protected Satcom” and “Wideband Satcom” R&D) while looking to diversify how those capabilities are delivered.
• Embracing Commercial Satcom at Scale: As mentioned, the U.S. is massively increasing use of commercial satcom services. Space Force’s Commercial Satellite Communications Office (CSCO) now manages ~150 active contracts with commercial providers and has made it easier for military units to buy commercial bandwidth on demand gao.gov gao.gov. The flagship effort is the Proliferated LEO (PLEO) services contract, which grew tenfold in budget to $13 billion due to demand airandspaceforces.com gao.gov. Under this, Starlink has been fielded to Air Force units in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to provide agile connectivity in remote locales airandspaceforces.com. The Pentagon is also experimenting with SpaceX’s “Starshield” – a militarized version of Starlink – awarding a $70 million contract in 2023 for early use airandspaceforces.com. Other commercial partners include Viasat/Inmarsat (satcom for aviation and VIP jets), Iridium (satellite handsets and IoT), SES (O3b MEO services), and soon Amazon Kuiper. A key policy is to avoid vendor lock-in: officials are encouraging multiple options so the DoD isn’t dependent on one constellation airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com. By 2030, the U.S. envisions a “satcom marketplace” where military users can roam across government and commercial networks, with automated management systems allocating resources optimally airandspaceforces.com.
• Transformative Programs: The U.S. Space Development Agency’s Transport Layer (part of the National Defense Space Architecture) is a headline program for 2025+. This will put hundreds of small LEO satellites with laser crosslinks into orbit to create a resilient mesh network for military data transport. It’s not a traditional satcom service (it’s more like a space internet to link sensors and weapons), but it will greatly augment communications for warfighters – effectively giving them additional relay paths and low-latency links. The first batches (Tranche 0/1) are already launching by 2025. Additionally, the DoD is standing up the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR) as noted, which is expected to secure funding by 2025–26 bcg.com. Legislative support for these efforts is strong: Congress has generally increased funding for space resilience and encouraged public-private satcom efforts (e.g. language in the FY2024 defense policy bill pushed for DoD to report progress on integrating commercial Satcom) gao.gov gao.gov. The U.S. Space Force budget for FY2025 included $4.26 billion in procurement (for all space systems) saffm.hq.af.mil, with significant portions allocated to satcom programs and new satellites.
• Key Vendors and Suppliers: U.S. military satcom procurement engages a who’s-who of aerospace and telecom. Lockheed Martin and Boeing have long provided DoD satellites (e.g. Boeing built WGS; Lockheed built AEHF and MUOS). Northrop Grumman is involved in ground systems and potentially future payloads. On the services side, SpaceX is now a major defense supplier with Starlink/Starshield capacity. Viasat (which merged with Inmarsat in 2023) provides both satellites and network services, especially for airborne and expeditionary comms. SES (through its U.S. subsidiary SES Space & Defense) has decades of experience feeding commercial capacity to the U.S. military airandspaceforces.com. Amazon’s AWS may become a player via Kuiper, and L3Harris and General Dynamics Mission Systems are key for user terminals and modems. The U.S. is also leveraging allies’ industries: for example, Airbus U.S. Space & Defense was tapped to build some satellite buses (the ARROW smallsat bus for SDA’s LEO constellations) and brings European tech into U.S. programs. Overall, the U.S. approach is highly collaborative – working with allies, buying commercial, and advancing its own space assets in parallel to ensure its forces have overwhelming satcom superiority by 2035.

NATO/Europe

Europe and NATO allies are likewise scaling up Satcom capabilities, motivated by both defense needs and a desire for technological sovereignty. The region’s trends center on secure European-owned systems, collective programs, and blending commercial with sovereign assets.

• European Union GovSatcom & IRIS²: A major development is the EU’s resolve to have an independent secure Satcom infrastructure. The GovSatcom initiative laid the groundwork by pooling governmental satellite services among member states. Now, the EU has moved to implement IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite) – a sovereign multi-orbit constellation to be deployed by 2030 bcg.com. Backed by €2.4 billion in EU funds, IRIS² will involve partnerships with commercial operators to field a network across GEO, MEO, and LEO. It’s envisioned to support government and military communications (among other uses) with coverage for Europe, Africa, and beyond. Initial services will start by 2025 using existing national satellites’ spare capacity, and new IRIS² satellites will follow later in the decade spacenews.com. This program is strategic – it reduces reliance on U.S. or other foreign satcom and bolsters Europe’s space industry (Airbus, Thales, OHB and others are all angling for roles). In short, IRIS² represents Europe’s “big leap” in satcom, akin to Galileo for navigation but for secure communications.
• National Milsatcom Programs: Key European nations have their own projects, often in coordination. France operates the Syracuse satellites (the latest, Syracuse 4A/B, provide new-gen hardened Ka and X-band links for French and NATO use). Italy has SICRAL satellites; Britain has the Skynet constellation (Skynet 5 series currently, with Skynet 6A under construction by Airbus to launch ~2025). Germany, Spain, and others typically partner or buy services rather than full independent systems. For instance, Spain’s Spainsat NG (two satellites, built by Airbus/Thales for launch mid-2020s) is a PPP between government and Hisdesat to serve Spanish defense and friendly nations. Luxembourg funded a satellite (GovSat-1, with SES) that provides X/EHF bandwidth to NATO. Belgium and others sometimes buy “slices” of allies’ satellites. Notably, NATO itself doesn’t own comms satellites but coordinates access from members – e.g. the UK, France, Italy provide capacity to NATO missions. By 2035, European militaries will likely access a mix of national and EU satellites plus commercial. European defense budgets have grown since 2022, with some funds directed to space; for example, France’s defense budget (2024–30) increases include hundreds of millions for space systems (comms and surveillance) as part of its Space Command expansion. Germany is also investing in secure communications (looking at joining IRIS² and potentially gaining its own milsatcom after relying on partners). Across NATO Europe, there’s consensus on improving protected communications for operations in contested environments (as per NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept).
• Allied Satcom Cooperation: NATO allies are deepening cooperation on Satcom. NATO’s NCIA (agency) has sought industry input on augmenting Satcom services for the alliance, indicating plans to leverage commercial LEO networks for NATO ops ncia.nato.int. Multinational projects include the “European Satellite Communications Procurement Cell” which aggregates demand to get better deals from commercial providers. Also, as mentioned, Luxembourg’s partnership on WGS gave European nations access to the U.S. Wideband constellation in exchange for funding one satellite – a model of transatlantic cooperation ts2.tech ts2.tech. We can expect more cross-pollination such as European countries joining U.S. programs (there was talk of Norway and Denmark getting access to MUOS, etc.). NATO’s new space policy recognizes satcom as essential and promotes joint development – future NATO missions will likely use a blend of IRIS², national systems, and commercial beams seamlessly.
• Key Vendors in Europe: Europe’s satcom industrial base is led by Airbus Defence and Space and Thales Alenia Space on the manufacturing side – they build most of the national milsatcom (e.g. Skynet, Syracuse, Spainsat NG, Yahsat’s, etc.). Airbus also provides end-to-end services via its Secure Communications division (which runs the Skynet constellation under contract and sells capacity worldwide). Thales similarly offers defense satcom networks (and has products like SYNAPS satcom radio integration). SES (Luxembourg) and Eutelsat/OneWeb (France/UK) are crucial commercial operators – SES’s O3b and GovSat units, and Eutelsat’s tie-up with OneWeb’s LEO network, are poised to serve European militaries with broadband and low-latency links. Telespazio (Italy, joint Leonardo/Thales) provides services and ground segment expertise. Hisdesat in Spain and ND Satcom in Germany are other players. A notable change is consolidation – the merger of France’s Eutelsat with OneWeb creates a single GEO+LEO operator in Europe that can compete for defense deals globally. By 2030, Europe will have a robust vendor ecosystem offering both sovereign hardware and outsourced services, and European governments will aim to support domestic suppliers in this strategically important field.

Asia-Pacific

The Asia-Pacific region’s military satcom landscape is diverse, ranging from China’s expansive programs to smaller nations reliant on partners. The overarching theme is a race for independent capabilities between major powers (China, India, Japan) and efforts by U.S. allies to augment their communications in the face of regional threats. Key regional trends and programs include:

• China’s Rapid Expansion: China is aggressively building out military Satcom to support the PLA’s global ambitions. It has deployed multiple families of military comsats in GEO – the Fenghuo series for tactical communications-on-the-move, and Shentong series for strategic secure links chinaspacereport.wordpress.com chinaspacereport.wordpress.com. Second-generation Fenghuo-2 and Shentong-2 satellites launched in the 2010s, providing PLA forces with dedicated X/Ku-band capacity chinaspacereport.wordpress.com chinaspacereport.wordpress.com. Additionally, China operates Tiantong-1, a mobile satcom system (similar to Inmarsat/Thuraya) for handheld terminals, with the first satellite launched in 2016 and more since en.wikipedia.org. Going forward, China is focusing on mega-constellations: the government-approved Guowang project aims for a national network of tens of thousands of broadband satellites in LEO by 2030 reuters.com reuters.com. This includes the “Thousand Sails” constellation (15,000 sats) and others from state enterprises and even commercial players like Geely. The strategic goal is to match or surpass U.S. capabilities and ensure Chinese forces have robust communications globally (including in any potential Pacific conflict where undersea cables might be cut). Beijing is pouring resources into this – considering it as critical infrastructure – and coordinating civilian and military efforts (the lines blur, as commercial constellations can be commandeered by the state if needed). By 2035, expect China to have an enormous multi-layer Satcom architecture: a backbone of updated GEO sats (perhaps Shentong-3 series) for secure comms, regional high-throughput sats (similar to WGS) for theater capacity, and thousands of LEO satellites providing ubiquitous coverage. Chinese vendors like CASC/CAST (China Academy of Space Technology) produce the satellites, and state-owned China Satcom operates many under the “ChinaSat” branding (some of which are known cover designations for military payloads).
• India’s Sovereign Capability Drive: India has been steadily developing its own Satcom assets for defense under its Integrated Space Cell doctrine. It launched GSAT-7 “Rukmini” in 2013 (built by ISRO/Antrix) to serve the Navy, covering Indian Ocean regions with secure UHF/Ku-band links. This was followed by GSAT-7A in 2018 for the Air Force, linking airbases, AEW aircraft, and drones. Now, India’s Ministry of Defence has approved GSAT-7B for the Army and GSAT-7C for the Air Force as well economictimes.indiatimes.com. GSAT-7C, slated for launch by 2025–26, will enhance network-centric warfare abilities of the IAF economictimes.indiatimes.com. These satellites together give India a triad of dedicated milsatcom for each service branch, improving operational security versus reliance on commercial or friendly foreign sats. On the tactical side, India is equipping troops with domestic satcom gear (as noted, hundreds of portable terminals from BEL/DRDO) to exploit these satellites economictimes.indiatimes.com economictimes.indiatimes.com. India is also eyeing LEO constellations: the government-owned company Bharti Enterprises is a major investor in OneWeb, and there’s interest in leveraging OneWeb’s LEO network for military use once fully deployed. Additionally, ISRO has discussed a potential smallsat constellation for defense communications and “multi-domain awareness”. India’s motivation is partly to keep up with China and have assured comms in any regional conflict (e.g. high in the Himalayas where satellite links are vital). Indian defense budgets have started allocating funds for space – e.g. the Defence Space Agency received a boost and plans for ~$1.5 billion in defense space projects including satcom and surveillance satellites over 5 years.
• Japan and Allies in East Asia: Japan operates the X-band Defense Communications Satellite System (DCSC), which consists of the Kirameki-1, -2, -3 satellites (the first launched in 2017) to serve its Self-Defense Forces. These are run in partnership with a commercial firm under a PPP, providing Japan with dedicated encrypted comms for its units at home and abroad. Japan is considering augmenting with a quasi-Zenith satellite system for mobile comms and possibly collaborating with the U.S. on future satcom technology. South Korea recently obtained its first dedicated milsatcom, ANASIS-II, launched in 2020 (built by Airbus as an offset for Korea’s F-35 purchase). This gives the ROK military its own secure Ka-band satellite instead of leasing from foreign systems. South Korea may add another by 2030 as it expands C4I capabilities. Australia, as discussed, is pivoting to a multi-orbit approach. After canceling Lockheed’s GEO satellite, Australia might partner with allies or commercial providers to field a network; it’s exploring options including joining U.S. LEO constellations or regional collaborations. Australia and New Zealand also participate in the U.S. Wideband and MUOS programs to some degree. Smaller Asia-Pacific nations (e.g. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) usually rely on commercial satcom (Thaicom, Measat, etc.) or ally-provided capacity for their military needs, though some (like Singapore) invest in advanced terminals and may finance a payload on a commercial sat if needed.
• Russia (Asia-Pacific Perspective): Although not “Pacific”, it’s worth noting Russia’s military satcom efforts as part of the broader strategic picture. Russia historically fielded the “Blagovest” high-bandwidth satellites and Meridian series (Molniya orbit) for Arctic comms, and is reportedly developing a new “Sphere” constellation which includes Satcom components (like “Skif” LEO broadband satellites). However, Western sanctions and budget constraints have slowed some of Russia’s space projects. Still, Russia aims to have independent satcom coverage (especially over its vast territory and polar regions) to support operations and reduce reliance on foreign tech. This contributes to the “arms race” element, as Russia and China seek to ensure their communications cannot be cut off by others.

Overall, Asia-Pacific will see more indigenous milsatcom capacity by 2035 – China leading quantitatively, India and Japan with targeted regional systems, and U.S. allies like Australia, Korea, Japan linking into a “Pacific communications partnership” with the U.S. to ensure interoperability. Key vendors here include domestic agencies/contractors: CAST/CASC in China, ISRO/Antrix and BEL in India, Mitsubishi Electric and NEC in Japan (which built the Kirameki sats), Airbus for South Korea’s satellite, and likely U.S. companies for Australia’s future needs. Commercial providers like Starlink are already in talks with Asian militaries (e.g. SpaceX discussing Starlink use for Saudi Arabia’s border security and other countries) tacticalreport.com, and OneWeb’s global footprint will extend to Asia via its new owner (Bharti/Airtel in India). Thus the region will blend local and external solutions as it militarizes satcom.

Middle East

The Middle East is rapidly expanding its space and satcom capabilities, driven by security concerns and the prestige of sovereign technology. Key trends include nations launching their own military communication satellites, partnering with Western firms for advanced systems, and exploring new LEO services to supplement coverage. Highlights by country/initiative:

• Gulf States (UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia): The United Arab Emirates is a regional leader via Al Yah Satellite Communications (Yahsat). Yahsat operates a fleet of satellites (Al Yah 1 and 2 launched 2011–2012) that provide secure Ka-band communications for the UAE Armed Forces, in addition to commercial services. In 2024, Yahsat ordered two new GEO satellites (Al Yah 4 & 5) from Airbus with cutting-edge flexible payloads and multi-band coverage to eventually replace the older sats airbus.com airbus.com. These will serve UAE government needs across Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Asia with reconfigurable beams and are slated for launch in 2027–28 airbus.com airbus.com. Notably, the contract also includes two small LEO satellites (Airbus ARROW platform), signaling UAE’s intent to provide multi-orbit solutions and not rely solely on GEO airbus.com airbus.com. This mirrors the global trend of GEO+LEO integration. The UAE also acquired Thuraya (mobile satcom operator) to complement Yahsat, and works closely with U.S./French partners on space. Saudi Arabia has ambitions to be a space player as well. It launched SGS-1 (SaudiGeoSat-1/HellasSat-4) in 2018 (a joint satellite with Greece/Cyprus) which has modern Ka-band payloads “ready to withstand interference” (suggesting anti-jam features) airforce-technology.com atalayar.com. The Kingdom is investing in its Saudi Space Commission and has a stake in regional operator Arabsat (which operates the BADR satellites used for comms and broadcasting) airforce-technology.com. For military-specific needs, Saudi Arabia historically leased services (including from Arabsat and Thuraya) but is now moving toward more sovereign control. Recent reports indicate Saudi MoD is in talks with SpaceX to use Starlink for border security and defense communications tacticalreport.com. If finalized, that could bring LEO-based service to augment Saudi’s ground networks, which is critical given missile/drone threats that could target comms. Saudi Arabia is also likely to procure a dedicated military satellite in coming years, possibly with help from U.S. or European contractors (there were past discussions with Lockheed and others). Qatar launched the Es’hail satellites (Es’hail-2 in 2018 carries military UHF comm payload for Qatar in addition to commercial transponders). Bahrain, Oman generally piggyback on neighbors’ systems or commercial ones. The GCC countries have even mulled a joint satcom system for collective security, but bilateral efforts (like UAE’s Yahsat, KSA’s plans) are currently more prominent.
• Israel: Israel’s military satcom largely uses Israeli commercial satellites with defense transponders. The AMOS series of comm satellites (owned by Spacecom) carry encrypted channels used by the IDF. Israel also has highly developed field communication systems that can uplink via commercial sats when needed. Given Israel’s emphasis on independence, it wouldn’t be surprising if a future “Ofek” military commsat (analogous to their Ofek reconnaissance sats) is considered, but publicly available info is limited. However, Israel has worked with partners – e.g. an agreement to access WGS was reportedly arranged via U.S. channels, and Israel is interested in new tech like laser comm (for airborne drone downlinks etc.). Israeli firms like IAI and Rafael also produce satcom equipment (antennas, modems) that they export.
• Turkey, Egypt, Others: Turkey uses the TURKSAT satellites (which are state-owned but mainly commercial) for some military communication needs, and has secure communication capabilities through them. Turkey is enhancing its space prowess (recently establishing TurkSat 6A to be Turkey’s first indigenous commsat by 2024). There’s also talk of a dedicated defense comsat eventually, especially as Turkey grows its defense industry. Egypt made a big leap with Tiba-1, a secure commsat launched in 2019 built by Airbus/Thales, reportedly for government and military use (with advanced anti-jam K-band). This gives Egypt independent Satcom for its armed forces across North Africa. Iran has limited Satcom (it likely relies on Chinese/Russian help and small local satellites for tactical links), but it’s developing space capability too.

Overall, Middle Eastern states are increasingly prioritizing satcom in defense planning – for command/control across dispersed operations (Yemen conflict, counterterror ops in deserts, naval comms in Red Sea/Persian Gulf, etc.), and as backup for fragile terrestrial telecom. They are blending sovereign assets (like Yahsat, Tiba-1) with alliances and commercial deals (e.g. GCC-US cooperation, Starlink). Key industry partners are Airbus and Thales (they built many of the region’s satellites), Lockheed Martin (which has provided ground systems and probably eyed contracts like KSA’s aborted program), and regional operators like Yahsat, Arabsat. By 2035, the Middle East will have a much expanded satcom footprint – with new national satellites online and likely use of global constellations to ensure redundancy.

Latin America

Latin American militaries have traditionally had less indigenous Satcom capacity, but this is changing slowly. The primary trend is towards dual-use communications satellites that serve civilian needs (rural broadband, telecom) while reserving capacity for defense – a cost-effective approach for nations with limited defense budgets. Additionally, partnerships with U.S. and European providers remain crucial. Notable developments:

• Brazil’s Strategic Satcom: Brazil, the region’s largest defense spender, deployed the Geostationary Defense and Strategic Communications Satellite (SGDC-1) in 2017. This dual-use GEO satellite carries X-band payload for the Brazilian Armed Forces and Ka-band for national broadband internet thalesgroup.com. It was built by Thales Alenia Space and is operated by Telebrás (the telecom company) with Visiona (Embraer’s space joint venture) – exemplifying a PPP model. SGDC-1’s military slice provides Brazil secure communications across its vast territory (Amazon, borders) and for international deployments. The program’s goal is explicitly to reinforce Brazil’s sovereignty and independence in communications thalesgroup.com thalesgroup.com. A second satellite, SGDC-2, was planned to expand capacity; however, as of 2021 it faced delays due to cost and procurement hurdles en.wikipedia.org. Brazil is likely to revisit SGDC-2 by late 2020s as SGDC-1 fills up (indeed Telebrás has reported SGDC-1 is near fully utilized) and the demand for military bandwidth grows bnamericas.com. If SGDC-2 proceeds, it will add more X/Ka-band for defense and possibly include new tech like laser links. Brazil’s military also uses C-band and Ku-band leases from commercial satellites for routine comms and has a network of transportable terminals for that. But SGDC is the strategic core and Brazil is investing in related infrastructure (control stations, etc.) and local industry tech transfer thalesgroup.com thalesgroup.com.
• Other South American Nations: Many rely on commercial or allied satcom. Chile and Colombia, for example, don’t have dedicated milsatcom satellites; they subscribe to services (like Intelsat or regional sat operators) for their needs. Chile at one point considered an armed forces communication satellite as part of its Satcom/observación plan, but likely put resources into earth observation first. Argentina has the ARSAT satellites (state-owned company) primarily for civil telecom, though government users (including military) can use them. Argentina has also cooperated with Brazil in space and could potentially partner on future comm satellites. Mexico had the MEXSAT program – it launched Mexsat-3 (also called Mexsat Bicentenario, civilian) and attempted Mexsat-1 (lost), then successfully deployed Mexsat-2 (Morelos-3) in 2015, which is a GEO satellite with both civil and military L-band/Ka-band payload for Mexico’s secure communications (built by Boeing). So Mexico does have at least one functional government satcom (Morelos-3) primarily for agencies like national security and disaster response. Peru and others have bought high-bandwidth terminals and tap international partners (e.g. U.S. Southern Command initiatives provide some satcom support for regional exercises and disaster relief).
• US and Allied Support: Latin American militaries often rely on partnerships for satcom, especially for operations abroad or advanced capabilities. For instance, some countries get access to U.S. satcom during joint operations or via agreements (Colombia, a major non-NATO ally of the US, likely can use some US capacity in certain cases). There have been discussions of wider WGS access for allies – notably, Peru, Brazil, and others joining a “WGS partnership” similar to what some European and Pacific allies did. In 2022, Peru signed a memorandum with the U.S. to explore satcom cooperation, which could pave the way for more usage of WGS or commercial LEO for Andean region defense communications. Meanwhile, companies like SES and Viasat actively offer services in Latin America – for example, Brazil’s Amazon region battalions use Inmarsat BGAN terminals; and OneWeb is partnering with regional telcos which the military could piggyback on.

In summary, Latin America’s procurement trend is cautious but upward: leveraging commercial satellites with defense carve-outs (due to cost efficiency), and gradually building national satcom programs where feasible (as Brazil and Mexico have done). The region will also benefit from the global LEO constellations as they come online – Starlink is already available in parts of Latin America and was even used in Amazon rescue operations. So by 2025–2035, Latin American militaries will have more options: a mix of own satellites, regional cooperation, and global commercial services to ensure connectivity. The strategic driver here is not an arms race per se, but rather modernizing command and control and improving disaster-response comms, which indirectly also strengthens defense readiness.

Table 1 – Regional Satcom Procurement Priorities (2025–2035)

(Sources for table data are drawn from preceding cited references in text)

Key Use Cases Driving Military Satcom Demand

Military Satcom procurement is ultimately justified by critical use cases that require reliable beyond-line-of-sight communication. From 2025 through 2035, the following use cases will dominate requirements (often overlapping), influencing both technology and procurement priorities:

• Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR): Modern ISR platforms – drones/UAVs, reconnaissance aircraft, remote sensors – generate enormous volumes of data (electro-optical imagery, video feeds, radar scans). Satcom is the lifeline that sends this ISR data to commanders in real time from remote areas. For example, a high-altitude MQ-9 Reaper drone relies on satcom links to stream live video across continents. This creates huge bandwidth demand: “UAVs alone create huge quantities of data … increasing demand for bandwidth on military satellites far outstripping what is available” airforce-technology.com airforce-technology.com. Militaries must procure high-capacity channels (often using commercial satcom) to handle these feeds. There’s also a need for low-latency links so ISR data can be acted on quickly – a factor driving adoption of LEO constellations. Additionally, secure satcom ensures ISR assets can be tasked and controlled from anywhere. For instance, U.S. distributed common ground stations receive satellite-relayed drone data, and intelligence is shared via satellite networks among allies. As sensor resolution and collection rates increase toward 2035 (e.g. 4K full-motion video, hyperspectral data), the pressure on Satcom capacity will grow. Procurement trend: high-throughput satellites and use of commercial HTS for ISR backhaul, plus dedicated ISR satcom modes (on-demand prioritization of ISR traffic, etc.). Notably, much UAV imagery today “goes through commercial satellites”, raising questions of classification vs. capacity – but necessity often dictates using whatever bandwidth is available airforce-technology.com. Future milsatcom plans (like U.S. PTS) specifically account for handling “big data” ISR needs securely.
• Battlefield/Tactical Communications: Satcom enables command and control in the field, linking deployed forces with headquarters. Whether it’s an infantry platoon with a manpack satcom radio, a tank battalion receiving orders, or special forces teams coordinating via satellite phone deep behind enemy lines – Satcom is often the only option beyond line-of-sight. The networked battlefield concept (digital battle management systems, sensor-to-shooter links) all rely on robust comms, and satellites are the glue when terrestrial radios can’t cover the distance or terrain. For example, during operations in Afghanistan’s mountains, small teams depended on satcom for both voice and data to call for air support or medevac. In future conflict zones with degraded infrastructure, this will be even more critical. Recognizing this, militaries are fielding more portable Satcom kits (as India did for troops on the China border economictimes.indiatimes.com economictimes.indiatimes.com) and vehicle-mounted terminals on tanks, APCs, and even handheld devices that can link to satellites or aerial relays. Tactical satcom needs to be fast to set up, resistant to jamming, and interoperable across coalition forces. Protected tactical waveforms (anti-jam tech for use on both mil and commercial satellites) are being adopted by NATO and allies to ensure that even tactical satcom links can survive interference. The procurement implication is heavy investment in terminal equipment and related training, and often procuring satcom as a managed service for deployed brigades so they have guaranteed bandwidth. The U.S. for instance has a Global Tactical Advanced Communication Systems program to equip units with multi-band satcom-on-the-move. In sum, battlefield comms are a primary driver behind every milsatcom program – it’s about giving the “digital soldier” the ability to stay connected anywhere. Future concepts like networked autonomous systems and IoT sensors on the battlefield will further amplify demand for satcom links that can handle myriad nodes and bursts of data.
• Maritime and Aviation Operations: Naval and air forces, by nature, operate beyond terrestrial network coverage and thus lean heavily on Satcom. Maritime: Every modern warship is a node in a floating network, requiring Satcom for secure connectivity to fleets and command centers. Satcom supports everything from routine logistics comms to real-time intelligence sharing for carrier strike groups. For example, U.S. Navy ships use WGS satellites and commercial INMARSAT/Iridium services for different tiers of comms. Maritime patrol aircraft and submarines (when surfaced or via specialized antennas) also use Satcom to send surveillance results back. In the 2025–2035 timeframe, navies are investing in new multiband satcom terminals that can connect to LEO constellations in addition to GEO, ensuring Arctic communications and mitigating satellite outages. The advent of maritime broadband (VSAT) systems means even smaller vessels (patrol boats, merchant marine in auxiliary roles) can be tied into the network. Aviation: Air forces and army aviation rely on Satcom for beyond-line-of-sight comm, especially important for long-range deployments and for UAV control. Fighters and bombers historically used line-of-sight datalinks, but with newer satellite-based IP connectivity, even tactical aircraft are coming online. E.g., the F-35 can receive mission data via satcom when distant from AWACS coverage. Transport and tanker aircraft use Satcom for route comms and inflight retasking. A big growth area is cockpit satcom for UAVs and manned aircraft – allowing high-rate data exchange (for instance, live video from a surveillance aircraft direct to ground via satellite). Commercial aviation satcom tech is bleeding into military: electronically-steered flat antennas on aircraft for Ku/Ka-band, enabling high-speed internet in the sky ts2.tech. By early 2030s, it’s expected that military aircraft connectivity spending will double from mid-2020s levels ts2.tech. Procurement is responding with contracts for “in-air connectivity” services (the USAF has used Starlink in Europe and Pacific on transport jets, for example airandspaceforces.com). For both maritime and aviation, satcom ensures coverage over open oceans, in the Arctic, and across global theaters – areas where no other comm exists. So militaries will continue to invest in robust Satcom for these domains, including possibly dedicated narrowband satellites for polar coverage (Russia and Canada have interests here, and the U.S. is working with Norway on Arctic comm satellites).
• Disaster Response & Humanitarian Ops: One use case that garners political support for satcom funding is its role in emergency situations. When natural disasters strike – hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires – ground communication networks are often knocked out. Satcom is the immediate fallback for both military responders and civil agencies to coordinate rescue efforts. For example, during the 2023 Maui wildfires, cellular service failed and people couldn’t call for help; only satellite SOS or satcom terminals could bridge the gap bcg.com bcg.com. Militaries are often first on scene in disaster response, deploying portable satcom to enable communications for themselves and local authorities. Thus, governments procure satcom gear (from satellite phones to portable VSATs) specifically for crisis response scenarios. Programs like the EU’s IRIS² also pitch resilience for disaster communications as a benefit bcg.com bcg.com. As climate-related disasters increase, this use case is sadly growing in importance. Expect defense organizations to justify satcom investments partly by this dual-use value – e.g. a military satcom constellation can also provide backup internet to remote communities or disaster zones. This ties into homeland security and civil-military cooperation. Procurement trends include pre-positioning satcom kits in disaster-prone regions, contracting rapid-access satellite capacity (some agencies have priority arrangements with satcom operators for emergencies), and developing direct-to-cell satellite systems (so that ordinary smartphones can receive emergency messages from satellites – an area of active development by commercial firms and of interest to governments for early warning). In summary, satcom’s role in saving lives and maintaining continuity of government in disasters makes it a politically salient use case driving continued funding.
• Space-Based Internet & Emerging Connectivity: Lastly, the broader vision of a “space-based internet” for everyone has defense implications. As companies launch constellations to provide global broadband (Starlink, OneWeb, Kuiper), militaries see an opportunity to leverage that for their own communication needs – effectively piggybacking on the space internet. For example, direct-to-device connectivity: in the near future, standard military radios or even smartphones could connect straight to LEO satellites (several ventures like Lynk, AST SpaceMobile are demonstrating this). Militaries are tracking this closely, as it could allow soldiers to use smaller, low-power devices that tap a space-based internet for data, without needing extensive infrastructure. Additionally, a space-based internet can provide resilient networking – nodes in space can route around damaged ground networks. The concept of Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT), where sensors and weapons are interconnected, will rely on satellite links to cover dispersed areas. Space-based connectivity is also critical for supporting the growing reliance on cloud computing and AI at the tactical edge – troops will need high-throughput links to reach data centers or AI tools often hosted remotely. This drives requirements for latency and throughput that only modern satcom can meet (thus pushing adoption of LEO/MEO). Another emerging aspect is multinational operations: coalitions can all connect via a common commercial network in space, easing interoperability (NATO has experimented with using commercial satcom as a common network for units from different countries). Given all this, defense ministries are closely watching commercial broadband deployments and in many cases subsidizing or fast-tracking them. For instance, the UK considered investing in OneWeb (which it did in 2020) partly for secure connectivity benefits; and Canada, France, others have programs to use satcom for rural broadband which align with defense needs for Arctic or remote area comms. By 2035, the “space internet” might be as integral to military comms as dedicated milsatcom, especially for lower classification or logistical traffic – freeing up the bespoke systems for top-secret and strategic uses. Procurement will hence involve not just traditional defense contracts but also collaborative agreements with commercial broadband providers, spectrum sharing arrangements, and new standards so that military and civilian networks in space can interoperate safely and securely.

Public-Private Partnerships and Sovereign Satcom Initiatives

Balancing the use of commercial Satcom with sovereign capabilities is a persistent theme in 2025–2035. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly seen as the sweet spot to deliver capacity quickly and cost-effectively while retaining government control where needed. We observe several models of collaboration and sovereign development:

• Public-Private Satcom Constellations: The EU’s IRIS² is a prime example of a PPP – EU funds will de-risk the project, private industry will design, launch, and operate the constellation, and European governments get assured access in return bcg.com. Similarly, Luxembourg’s GovSat-1 was a PPP with SES: Luxembourg paid for the satellite, SES operates it and can sell excess capacity, but the gov’t and NATO get first priority usage. This model is attractive because it shares costs and encourages innovation from industry (they can monetize the asset commercially too). Spain’s Hisdesat leasing arrangement (MoD pays €15 M/yr for X-band on Spainsat and in exchange Hisdesat can sell unused capacity) is another variant bcg.com. In the U.K., Skynet 5 was actually a PFI (private finance initiative) with Airbus – the company financed, built, and managed the satellites and the MoD bought services. For Skynet 6A, the MoD moved to a more traditional contract but still leverages industry expertise heavily. We anticipate more PPPs for next-gen milsatcom: possible candidates include NATO’s future satcom needs (perhaps a jointly funded PPP constellation among member states) and maybe U.S. partnerships for niche capabilities (the U.S. might involve commercial firms in building part of its pivot to enterprise satcom, akin to how NASA uses commercial crew). Countries that cannot afford full systems alone may band together – e.g. there’s talk of an Arab Satcom Network where Gulf states each contribute (possibly using Yahsat’s upcoming satellites as a regional asset).
• Sovereign Capability Development: Despite the lure of commercial services, countries remain keen on sovereign satcom for critical communications. Sovereign capability means having satellites, control stations, and crypto that you fully control, which is crucial in wartime or for nuclear C3. Thus, we see even smaller nations trying to launch their own milsatcom if they can. For instance, Australia’s original JP9102 (now pivoted) was about having an Australian-owned satellite rather than leasing from Intelsat. Brazil’s SGDC explicitly was about sovereignty in secure comms thalesgroup.com thalesgroup.com. Turkey’s planned milsatcom and Egypt’s Tiba-1 also fall under this desire for independent capability. Governments justify the expense by national security and sometimes by spin-off benefits to local industry (tech transfer, jobs). Additionally, some nations tie this to cyber sovereignty – controlling your own comm satellite reduces exposure to foreign signal interception or shutoff. That said, building sovereign satcom is challenging for countries without a space industrial base, so they often incorporate PPP elements or buy turnkey systems from foreign primes with guarantees. There’s also a middle route: hosted sovereign payloads on a partner’s satellite (maintaining control of just that payload). For example, Norway’s Arctic Satellite broadband mission has a U.S. military communications payload onboard – not sovereign for Norway in that case, but a model of shared investment the other way around (ally hosting U.S. payload). We may see more creative deals: perhaps ally-sharing of LEO constellations where each country contributes satellites but the network is jointly used (similar to how Galileo navigation has contributions).
• Legislative and Policy Support: On both sides of the Atlantic, policymakers are adjusting frameworks to enable these collaborations. The U.S. Congress, for instance, has urged DoD to work with commercial satcom providers under more flexible terms bcg.com, and to report annually on progress integrating commercial Satcom (GAO recommended this to ensure accountability) gao.gov gao.gov. In Europe, the European Commission carved out the legal and budgetary basis for IRIS² relatively quickly in 2022–2023, indicating political will to push through a complex PPP. Many countries have updated their national space strategies to include defense communications – e.g. France’s Defence Space Strategy 2019, Germany’s space security strategy – which often highlight public-private cooperation. There’s also movement on standardizing interfaces and security requirements so that commercial systems can meet government needs (for example, NATO has standards for commercial satcom usage in operations, and the US is working on certifying commercial networks for certain classifications of traffic). Governments will likely offer incentives like tax breaks or direct investment into domestic companies developing new satcom tech (phased arrays, optical comm, smallsat constellations) to ensure a strong supplier base.
• Commercial Initiatives Aimed at Govt: On the flip side, commercial providers are creating offerings tailor-made for governments, effectively meeting public entities halfway. SpaceX’s Starshield is a great example: it’s marketed as a government-exclusive version of Starlink with added security, encryption, and the ability to host government payloads on the satellites airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com. This kind of product eases government adoption since it addresses concerns like data security and operational control. Similarly, OneWeb has emphasized its service for “government and enterprise” users, differentiating from purely consumer-focused systems airandspaceforces.com. Companies like Telesat have gone as far as designing their business plans (e.g. offering sovereign capacity pools) to align with what governments want airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com. By essentially pre-configuring PPP-ish options, they accelerate public-private cooperation. We can expect future contracts where a government might, say, buy a dedicated slice of a commercial constellation (almost like a virtual satellite of their own within a larger network).
• Allied & International Cooperation: Beyond private industry, governments are collaborating with each other in satcom procurement. One example is the combined WGS partnership involving the U.S., Canada, UK, Australia, Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand, and others – they pooled funds to build WGS satellites and share the capacity ts2.tech airandspaceforces.com. Another is the Europeans providing satcom support to NATO missions in a coordinated way to avoid duplication. Looking ahead, one could envision an arrangement like a “NATO Satcom Pool” where member states each contribute something (a satellite, a ground station, money for leases) and in return all get access to a larger capability. The seeds of this are in the NATO 15-year services contract mentioned (with France/Italy/UK/US) bcg.com. Such cooperative procurement can be very cost-effective and politically binding (strengthening alliances). It’s also a hedge against any one commercial entity – by spreading across multiple allied assets, you get resilience. So diplomatic initiatives and MoUs are an important part of the procurement trends mosaic. We already see US-Japan, US-Australia dialogues on space, Europe-Japan cooperation on QZSS (nav) that could extend to comms, etc.

In sum, public-private and international collaboration is how many satcom goals will be achieved in the next decade. Nations will guard their most sensitive comms (through sovereign means), but for the bulk of capacity they will increasingly act as smart consumers – shaping the market with their requirements and dollars/euros to deliver the needed capability via partnerships. The “arms race” in satcom is not just country vs. country, but also a race of business models and alliances to see who can field the most robust networks efficiently. Those who harness both government might and commercial innovation will likely come out on top.

Key Industry Players and Evolving Supplier Landscape

The military satcom sector involves a broad ecosystem of suppliers, from satellite manufacturers to launch providers, service operators, and equipment vendors. As demand grows, traditional defense contractors are jostling with NewSpace upstarts, and consolidation is reshaping the market. Here are the key players and trends:

• Satellite Manufacturers (Primes): These are the big aerospace companies building the spacecraft. Lockheed Martin and Boeing in the U.S. have decades of milsatcom heritage (Milstar, AEHF, WGS, etc.), and continue to win contracts for next-gen systems (Lockheed is developing prototypes for Protected Tactical Satcom, Boeing received WGS-11, etc.). Northrop Grumman has also entered this arena (it built payloads for Advanced EHF and is investing in flexible satcom tech). In Europe, Airbus and Thales Alenia Space dominate, producing national satcom for France, UK, Italy, Spain, as well as export models. They’ve pioneered digital processor payloads and electric propulsion which are now almost standard for new satellites. Mitsubishi Electric (MELCO) in Japan produces the DSN X-band satellites for the Japanese MoD. ISRO in India builds the GSAT series. CASC/CAST in China is churning out large numbers of comm sats for both domestic and export (China has even started marketing communications satellites to other countries as part of its Belt & Road Initiative). A notable trend is primes teaming up with commercial specialists: e.g. Airbus is working with OneWeb on small LEO satellites (it mass-produced ~600 OneWeb sats, leveraging that for military smallsat designs), and Lockheed partnered with startups like Omnispace (for a hybrid GEO/LEO network concept). This cross-pollination means the lines between pure “defense” manufacturers and “commercial” are blurring.
• Launch and Deployment Partners: Getting all these satellites up is its own challenge. The U.S. and allies are ensuring they have assured launch for military sats (SpaceX and ULA launch most U.S. milsats now). Meanwhile, commercial constellations like Starlink have essentially created a continuous launch rhythm that defense can benefit from (for example, SpaceX’s rapid launch cadence could be used to quickly reconstitute satcom if war losses occur, by launching spare sats – a service they might provide the Pentagon in future). In Europe, Arianespace (with Ariane 6 coming) will loft some IRIS² and national birds, but Europe may also lean on SpaceX given schedule pressure. India and Japan have domestic launchers for their sats. An emerging idea is responsive launch for milsatcom – smaller rockets that could pop up a few smallsat relays on short notice if needed; companies like Rocket Lab or Virgin Orbit (until its demise) were exploring that with defense customers.
• Commercial Satcom Operators: These are arguably the most disruptive entrants. SpaceX with Starlink is the elephant in the room – over 4,000 satellites launched, many directly supporting military users (Ukraine as a vivid case, plus U.S. and allies). SpaceX’s ability to iterate quickly and offer global service has forced others to react and governments to engage with them seriously. OneWeb, now combined with Eutelsat, forms a major competitor with a completed LEO constellation of 600+ sats and GEO fleet combined (they will likely tailor offerings to governments under Europe’s banner). Viasat (which acquired Inmarsat in 2023) is another powerhouse: it operates high-throughput GEO satellites (ViaSat-2, ViaSat-3 constellation coming) and the legacy Inmarsat fleets (with L-band and Ka-band used by many militaries for airborne and maritime). Viasat/Inmarsat also runs services like the Global Xpress which was designed with the UK MoD – that’s a commercial Ka-band network often used by US/NATO forces as well. SES has its GEO fleet plus O3b MEO; SES Government Solutions has long been a Pentagon contractor. Iridium provides a unique LEO narrowband service (used for sat phones, trackers) that is integral for many tactical users; its next-gen constellation (Iridium NEXT, fully deployed) is being leveraged for new capabilities like push-to-talk radios for soldiers. Telesat is a smaller player but with Lightspeed LEO (if it gets deployed by ~2026), it aims explicitly at government and enterprise markets rather than consumers airandspaceforces.com. In the Middle East, Yahsat and Arabsat are important operators catering to government needs regionally. China Satcom operates Chinese comm satellites which also sell capacity commercially in Asia/Africa (some Belt & Road countries use China’s Apstar/ChinaSat for government comms – a geopolitical angle). Consolidation: We’ve seen big mergers (Viasat-Inmarsat, Eutelsat-OneWeb). There are rumors of further consolidation – e.g. SES and Intelsat have flirted with merging. A more consolidated industry might simplify government contracting (one-stop-shop for GEO+LEO if SES/Intelsat merged, etc.), but also raises concerns about competition (fewer bidders). Governments will likely keep multiple providers in play via contracts to avoid dependency. One interesting factor: national security regulations – e.g. the U.S. often requires satcom providers serving DoD to have a proxy board or U.S. subsidiary (to ensure no foreign control issues), which has influenced deals like Brits buying OneWeb or Viasat buying UK’s Inmarsat (CFIUS review, etc.). We may see some operators more or less nationalized by necessity (OneWeb is now partly an EU asset, Starlink might get special USG oversight if critical, etc.).
• Ground Equipment and Integrators: Often overlooked, but companies providing ground tech are crucial. L3Harris, Raytheon, General Dynamics, BAE all produce satellite terminals for troops, ships, aircraft. Kymeta and Viasat innovate flat-panel antennas – Kymeta’s u7/u8 flat antenna is used by e.g. U.S. SOCOM for on-the-move comms thedefensepost.com. GetSat, iDirect (ST Engineering), Cobham, Honeywell (for aero satcom units) are among key suppliers. As networks get complex, network integrators and software players become important: companies developing the management software to switch seamlessly between satcom links (there’s a push for AI-driven satcom network management). The Space Force’s vision of automated satcom allocation will require industry solutions (possibly from traditional defense IT firms or new space startups).
• New Tech Entrants: With new needs come new companies: startups focusing on things like laser communications (e.g. Mynaric, Tesat) to enable inter-satellite optical links; Quantum encryption via satellite (a few startups plus Chinese state efforts); antenna innovations (metamaterials, phased arrays like those from Phasor/Ubiquiti now part of Isotropic). These tech firms often partner with primes or operators to bring their solutions to market. The defense sector is trying to tap into this innovation by hosting experiments (the U.S. SDA is flying some laser comm payloads from startups, etc.). By 2035, some of these could become mainstream suppliers if their tech proves critical.

In summary, the supplier landscape is broadening and becoming more competitive. The “arms race” metaphor extends to companies racing to deliver the best capacity or secure service to governments. One estimate noted governments are leveraging a “mix of military and commercial tech”, such as tapping Starlink for battlefield use or hosting military payloads on commercial satellites ts2.tech. This hybrid approach benefits companies who are agile. It’s plausible that by 2030, the Pentagon’s primary satcom provider for certain needs might be a company that barely existed a decade prior (e.g. a software-defined network operator or a mega-constellation firm). However, the trusty big defense contractors will remain in the game, especially for the most sensitive programs.

A key dynamic to watch is how vendor lock-in vs. diversification plays out: right now SpaceX is ahead, but governments want an ecosystem of multiple viable providers airandspaceforces.com airandspaceforces.com. That means from a procurement perspective, they will fund or encourage competitor technologies (like Telesat Lightspeed got Canadian government investment, Amazon Kuiper has some U.S. Air Force interest) to ensure no single point of failure in supply.

Ultimately, the winners will be those who can meet defense requirements for security and reliability while matching commercial pace. Given the growth projections and the vital importance of satcom, the pie is large enough that many players – old and new – will have roles if they innovate.

Defense Budgets and Policy Outlook

Investment in military satcom is on a strong upward trajectory globally, underpinned by both immediate operational lessons and long-term strategic directives. Defense budgets for space are increasing in major nations, and satcom often commands a significant share of those increases. For instance, NATO collectively acknowledged space (including satcom) as a new operational domain in 2019, prompting members to channel funding accordingly. We see a few common policy and budgetary themes:

• Post-Ukraine Prioritization: The extensive use of satellite communications in the Russia-Ukraine war (notably Starlink by Ukraine for C2 and drone operations) has been a wake-up call. Western lawmakers frequently cite this example as justification to bolster national satcom resiliency. In the U.S., Congress has asked DoD to ensure it has a plan if commercial satcom (like Starlink) were denied, and conversely to capitalize on the advantages demonstrated (ease of deployment, rapid scale-up). European governments similarly, in debating budgets, point to the need for owning some secure satcom to avoid being cut off. As a result, funding for programs like IRIS² sailed through EU approvals. Germany’s 100 billion Euro defense fund (launched in 2022) includes space investments that had been delayed, now seen as urgent. Even smaller nations are budgeting for satcom terminals and service contracts after seeing how essential connectivity is to modern warfare.
• Dedicated Space Forces and Commands: The creation of the U.S. Space Force (2019) and similar units (France’s Space Command, UK Space Command, Japan Space Operations Sqn) elevates the profile of satcom at the highest levels. These organizations advocate for larger budgets to defend and enhance space-based comms. The U.S. Space Force budget has grown each year; for 2024 it requested ~$30 billion (covering all space programs) – a portion of which goes to comms satellites and infrastructure. France plans to spend €5 billion on military space through 2025, including satcom upgrades. These new space-focused entities also drive legislative change: in the U.S., the Space Force pushed for acquisition reform to buy tech faster, which Congress granted some leeway for, allowing more agile satcom procurements and prototyping. Policymakers are increasingly literate in space issues, meaning satcom gets attention in defense white papers and strategies as a key enabler.
• Resilience and Anti-Satellite Threats in Policy: Many national security strategies now explicitly mention protecting satcom from interference. For example, the U.S. 2022 National Defense Strategy highlights space as a contested domain and the need for resilient comms. The UK’s Integrated Review 2021 included a commitment to “enhance space resilience including through multi-satellite constellations.” These policy documents trickle down into procurement priorities – funding for things like proliferated LEO (to hedge against ASAT attacks on big GEOs) is justified by them. Legislative bodies have asked for reports on vulnerabilities – the U.S. House Armed Services Committee asked GAO to assess DoD’s satcom enterprise progress (leading to the GAO-25-107034 report in 2024 recommending yearly progress reports to Congress) gao.gov gao.gov. So Congress and parliaments are keeping pressure on defense departments to deliver more secure, interoperable satcom.
• Budget Constraints vs. Requirements: Not all is rosy – some countries face hard choices. For example, if SGDC-2 in Brazil is delayed, it’s likely due to budget trade-offs amid other pressing needs. Australia canceling JP9102’s first iteration was partly to avoid sinking $5B into a possibly outdated approach. Many European nations balance satcom funding with other capabilities; if not for EU’s help, some might not invest in a new satcom at all. That said, the general trend is increasing budgets specifically earmarked for space. Multilateral funding can help – NATO common funding for satcom, EU funding, etc., stretch national dollars. Additionally, commercial services are often paid from operations or O&M budgets rather than big capital programs, which can be a sneaky way to get capability without large acquisition bills hitting procurement budgets. Legislators have started scrutinizing that – ensuring that multi-year service contracts are planned and compete with buying assets. We may see Congress insist on cost-benefit analyses: is it better to lease or buy in each case? (The answer may differ by scenario.)
• Legislative Support for Commercial Integration: In the U.S., there have been specific legislative proposals to strengthen ties with commercial space. One example is the proposed “Satellite Communications Resiliency Partnership Act” (hypothetical name) that would authorize multi-year leases and partnerships – something that historically was limited. The 2023 NDAA allowed DoD to sign leases longer than 1 year for satcom (previously, annual leasing led to inefficiencies airforce-technology.com airforce-technology.com). In Europe, legislation around IRIS² required setting up a new governance model to combine military and civil use – European Parliament and Council had to agree on security accreditation rules that satisfy militaries. These legislative efforts, though bureaucratic, are essential for enabling the new procurement models described.
• Emerging Space-Faring Nations’ Policies: Countries like South Korea, Australia, UAE, etc., have published space strategies that include developing communications satellites. The UAE’s Policy for Space Reconnaissance and Security (2020) listed improving satcom for national security as a goal, which supported Yahsat’s expansion. South Korea’s Defense White Paper mentioned acquiring independent satcom to reduce reliance on the U.S. (hence ANASIS-II). So at policy level, having a commsat equals prestige and strategic autonomy. Latin American countries are including space in their policy roadmaps too (Brazil’s PESE – Strategic Space Program – covers satellites for defense airuniversity.af.edu). The challenge will be sustaining funding beyond initial acquisitions, but at least satcom is on the map.

Looking out to 2035, it’s anticipated that military satcom budgets will remain robust or increase as part of a broader recognition that information dominance is key to warfare. If anything, the risk is not under-investment but perhaps overlap and inefficiency if multiple parallel systems aren’t coordinated (hence efforts to unify architectures). The legislative push for annual reporting and cross-department coordination (like the GAO recommendation) gao.gov gao.gov is aimed at preventing that.

Outlook to 2035 and Conclusion

In the decade ahead, government and military Satcom procurement will be defined by scale, integration, and strategic competition. By 2035, we can expect fivefold increases in satellite network capacity, near-global coverage by multiple constellations, and an unprecedented level of connectivity available to even individual soldiers ts2.tech ts2.tech. The “Sky Wars” analogy captures how space has become the new high ground for militaries: each major power is racing to out-deploy and out-secure the other in the communications realm, seeing it as critical to operational advantage.

Several forecasts can be made:

• The world will likely see a convergence of military and commercial satcom networks. Hybrid architectures will mature such that a message from a deployed unit might hop seamlessly from a military Ka-band GEO to a commercial LEO to an airborne relay, all orchestrated by AI-driven control systems. This could fulfill the vision of an invulnerable “meshed” network that is extremely hard to blackout. Achieving this will require continued procurement focus on interoperability and open standards, which appears to be on track airandspaceforces.com gao.gov.
• LEO mega-constellations will form a critical part of military communications, but they won’t completely replace traditional systems. Instead, forces will have layered options: LEO for high-throughput tactical links, GEO for assured always-on backbone circuits, MEO for specialty regional needs, etc. The U.S. model of a Satcom Enterprise that “allows multiple paths for communications” will be emulated by others gao.gov gao.gov. China’s sprawling constellations, Europe’s IRIS², and others all indicate a multi-layer future.
• The competitive landscape might yield two or three dominant global satcom service consortiums servicing militaries: one Western-led (Starlink + allies’ systems + partners like OneWeb perhaps federated), one Chinese-led (Chinese constellations possibly servicing aligned states), and maybe a neutral/commercial one. Countries will choose according to geopolitics – we already see some nations aligning with one or the other for satellite services (e.g., African nations might get offers from both Starlink and China’s Satcom, akin to 5G bids). This introduces a techno-political element to satcom procurement – it’s not just technology but also alliances that determine whose sat networks you rely on.
• Resilience and defense: unfortunately, the “arms race” means threats will also grow. By 2035, anti-satellite weapons, jammers, and cyber attacks on satcom will be more sophisticated. This will compel continual investment in countermeasures: new frequency bands, rapid satellite replenishment (perhaps even on-orbit servicing or spares in storage ready to launch), and hardened infrastructure. The concept of “fighting SATCOM” – networks that can operate through attacks – will be reality gao.gov gao.gov. Procurement will likely include services like active network monitoring (to detect interference early) and even contracting backup services from allied or commercial networks as contingency.
• Budget and policy support seem durable. Unlike some defense programs that wax and wane, communications are universally recognized as vital and relatively cost-effective for the capability delivered. It’s plausible that even more countries will join the satcom club: by 2035 perhaps new national milsatcoms from countries like Canada (could invest in its own Arctic comms constellation), Poland or other NATO members (some have expressed interest in getting their own small satcom capacity for independence), and regional cooperation satellites (maybe a Nordic satcom system, or ASEAN shared satellite). The result will be a more crowded orbit but also a more connected world.

In conclusion, the period from 2025 to 2035 is set to transform military communications. Governments are taking bold steps – funding cutting-edge satellites, embracing commercial innovation, and forging partnerships – to ensure their forces can shoot, move, and communicate in an increasingly contested battlespace. The investments made in Satcom today will determine whose networks dominate the high ground of space and thus who holds the information advantage in conflict. The “Sky Wars” are not about satellites firing weapons, but about satellites enabling victory on earthly battlefields by knitting together forces and sensors with resilient, high-speed links. As this report has detailed, all major regions are gearing up in this new arms race in the heavens, one that will shape the face of warfare and peacekeeping for decades to come. Staying connected means staying ahead – and that imperative is driving government Satcom procurement into a new era of innovation and intensity.

Sources: Government and industry reports, defense procurement documents, and expert analysis were used to compile this assessment. Key references include: U.S. DoD and GAO reports on Satcom enterprise efforts gao.gov gao.gov, European Commission and NATO announcements on IRIS² and allied satcom funding bcg.com bcg.com, industry analyses of global Satcom market trends ts2.tech ts2.tech, and multiple defense news sources detailing programs like Australia’s JP9102 pivot thedefensepost.com thedefensepost.com, UAE’s Yahsat expansion airbus.com airbus.com, China’s constellation plans reuters.com, India’s GSAT procurements economictimes.indiatimes.com, and more as cited throughout this report. These illustrate the broad, concerted push worldwide to secure the ultimate high-ground communications advantage.