Washington – November 20, 2025 — A bipartisan pair of U.S. senators, Democrat Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and Republican Rick Scott of Florida, has introduced new legislation aimed at stopping the U.S. Commerce Department from granting exclusive export licenses that effectively turn one company into the only American supplier to a sanctioned foreign customer. [1]
The bill, called the License Monopoly Prevention Act of 2025, targets the way Washington approves exports of advanced technologies — particularly to entities on the Commerce Department’s Entity List, such as Chinese telecoms giant Huawei Technologies. It would force officials to run a formal “competitive market review” before approving any license that could create a de‑facto monopoly for a single U.S. firm. [2]
A Direct Response to the Huawei Chip Licensing Uproar
The push follows a high-profile controversy over Commerce Department decisions that allowed Intel and Qualcomm to sell certain semiconductor chips to Huawei, while similar export licenses were reportedly denied to rivals MediaTek and AMD. [3]
That arrangement, critics said, turned a handful of firms into privileged suppliers to one of the world’s most closely watched tech companies, even as Huawei remained under heavy U.S. sanctions. The situation raised pointed questions on Capitol Hill about whether U.S. export controls were being applied evenly — or whether the government was “picking winners and losers” among American chipmakers. [4]
In 2024, the administration in Washington revoked licenses that had allowed Intel and Qualcomm to ship chips for Huawei laptops and smartphones, underscoring how politically explosive the issue had become and how abruptly the rules for U.S. suppliers can change. [5]
Yet, for lawmakers like Warren and Scott, that reversal did not resolve the underlying problem: the export licensing process itself — and the perception that a single decision inside the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) can funnel billions in potential revenue toward one company instead of its competitors. [6]
What the License Monopoly Prevention Act Would Do
The License Monopoly Prevention Act of 2025 would amend the 2018 Export Control Reform Act to bolt a new, market-focused requirement onto a system that has traditionally centered almost entirely on national security concerns. [7]
According to the draft text, the bill would: [8]
- Define “monopoly licenses” as a problem
Congress formally finds that in recent years BIS has “inadvertently” issued export licenses that gave a single company the exclusive right to sell a specific product to an entity on the U.S. Entity List, without considering the market‑distorting impacts of those monopolies. - Require a “competitive market review” for key tech exports
When BIS reviews an application to export, reexport, or transfer “emerging and foundational technologies” — the most sensitive dual‑use technologies covered by U.S. export controls — the Under Secretary for Industry and Security would have to determine whether issuing that license would make the applicant the sole authorized exporter of that technology for a particular end user or end use. - Limit when an exclusive license can be granted
The Under Secretary could only issue a license that would be the sole authorization if they certify to Congress that:- No other license applications for the same technology, to the same end user or end use, have been received; or
- Other applications exist, but the technologies are different enough that they count as separate products for licensing purposes.
- Force BIS to consult trade officials
The bill would require BIS to consult with the Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade during the competitive market review, tying export control decisions more closely to commercial and trade realities. - Open the door to follow‑on licenses
If BIS does issue a sole license for a technology, it would then be required to approve subsequent applications for the same technology to the same kind of customer — unless approving them would create a “unique risk or concern” that did not exist when the original license was granted.
In practical terms, that last provision is designed to make sure one company cannot lock up a sanctioned customer forever. Once Washington has decided that a particular type of sale is permissible from a national security standpoint, other U.S. firms offering similar technology should ordinarily be able to obtain matching licenses as well. [9]
Why “Monopoly Licenses” Matter for Tech and Security
The bill’s findings section lays out lawmakers’ broader worries about how export licenses intersect with both markets and security. As the number of foreign entities on the Commerce Department’s Entity List has expanded — including private consumer tech firms, not just traditional defense contractors — the stakes of each license decision have grown. [10]
In that context, a monopoly license can do more than just tilt a market. The bill argues that such licenses: [11]
- Distort competition, by giving one company a long‑term commercial advantage in a high‑value export market.
- Exacerbate security vulnerabilities, if that one supplier becomes a single point of failure for a sensitive foreign customer.
- Undermine U.S. credibility, by creating the appearance that BIS favors some firms over others, which can make it harder for Washington to convince allies to align their own export control systems with U.S. rules.
Huawei is a prime example of the kind of buyer at the center of these disputes. The company has been a focus of U.S. national security concerns for years; it was placed on the Entity List in 2019, forcing suppliers to seek special licenses before shipping many products. [12]
At the same time, Huawei remains a significant global customer for advanced chips, networking equipment, and other dual‑use technologies. As policymakers tighten restrictions on where sensitive U.S. technology can go, the question of which American firms get to sell what — and under what conditions — has become almost as contentious as whether those sales should be allowed at all. [13]
Warren + Scott: A Rare Bipartisan Alliance on Tech Export Rules
The legislation pairs two lawmakers who often clash on domestic economic policy but have both been outspoken on issues involving China and corporate concentration.
- Sen. Rick Scott has repeatedly argued that export controls should protect American manufacturing and national security rather than “funnel billions” to a few large companies. In announcing the bill, he framed it as a way to stop foreign adversaries from exploiting U.S. technology while still allowing healthy competition among American firms. [14]
- Sen. Elizabeth Warren has long focused on anti‑monopoly policy and corporate power. She has criticized Commerce for issuing export licenses that give “a small number of big businesses” an unfair edge over competitors, saying licensing decisions must not distort markets or create monopolies that ultimately harm consumers. [15]
An AI-generated summary of the press release from the data platform QuiverQuant captured the bill’s core message: the senators want BIS to conduct competitive market analyses on export applications for sensitive technologies, with the explicit goal of preventing monopoly licenses and boosting transparency. [16]
The unusual Warren–Scott alliance signals that concerns about export licensing have widened beyond traditional national security hawks to include lawmakers focused on fair competition and market structure. That mix could increase the bill’s chances of attracting more co‑sponsors, even as it faces the same procedural hurdles as any other piece of Senate legislation.
How the Bill Fits into the Bigger Huawei and Export Control Story
The United States has already imposed a complex web of restrictions on Huawei, aiming to limit the company’s access to advanced chips and network infrastructure that could be used for espionage or military purposes. [17]
Even under tight controls, however, Huawei and other listed entities have sometimes managed to source U.S. technology through carefully structured licenses. Over the past several years: [18]
- Suppliers have received licenses worth billions of dollars to continue shipping components and software to Huawei.
- A particularly controversial license allowed Intel to sell laptop processors to Huawei for years, despite concerns in Congress.
- Qualcomm, meanwhile, received permission to sell older 4G chips for Huawei handsets, while continuing to earn licensing revenue from its portfolio of 5G patents.
By May 2024, mounting pressure from lawmakers led to the revocation of key licenses for Intel and Qualcomm, signaling a tougher line on exports to Huawei — but also highlighting how discretionary and unpredictable the licensing process can be for U.S. companies. [19]
The License Monopoly Prevention Act doesn’t change what technologies the U.S. can approve for export. Instead, it aims to change how those approvals are handed out, adding a new layer of accountability any time BIS risks turning one exporter into the only American player allowed to serve a sensitive foreign customer. [20]
Potential Impact on Chipmakers and Global Supply Chains
If enacted, the bill could reshape how semiconductor and advanced‑tech companies think about doing business with sanctioned foreign buyers:
- Less room for quiet one‑off deals
A mandatory competitive market review, combined with congressional certification, would make it harder for any single exporter to quietly secure a highly lucrative sole license without competitors — or Congress — knowing that such a monopoly is being created. [21] - More predictable access for rival U.S. firms
The requirement that BIS generally approve subsequent applications for the same technology, unless a new risk emerges, could give companies like AMD or MediaTek a clearer path to compete for business that once might have been effectively closed off to them. [22] - Additional compliance and review steps
On the flip side, exporters may face longer review timelines and more documentation requirements as BIS consults internally and with the International Trade Administration on the competitive implications of each license. For firms operating on tight design and production cycles, that added friction could itself become a competitive factor. [23] - Signal to allies and partners
By foregrounding fair competition and transparency in U.S. export controls, Washington may seek to persuade allies in Europe and Asia to align their own licensing systems more closely with U.S. rules — not only on whichtechnologies are controlled, but how approvals are granted and monitored. [24]
Ultimately, the bill sits at the intersection of three powerful trends: intensifying U.S.–China tech rivalry, the growing use of export controls as a strategic tool, and a renewed focus on domestic competition policy in concentrated high‑tech industries.
What Happens Next in Congress
For now, the License Monopoly Prevention Act is at the starting line. The draft legislation has been introduced and referred to the appropriate Senate committee, where it would need hearings, a markup, and a committee vote before reaching the Senate floor. From there, it would still have to clear the House and be signed by the president to become law. [25]
Given its narrow focus, the bill is unlikely to be the last word on export controls or on the broader U.S. strategy toward Huawei and other Chinese tech champions. But it does attempt to answer a pointed question raised by the Huawei chip saga:
If the United States is going to use export controls as one of its main tools in a global tech contest, who inside the country should benefit — and on what terms?
For Warren and Scott, the answer is clear: national security must come first, but when sales are allowed, the process should not quietly crown a single corporate winner.
References
1. www.reuters.com, 2. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 3. www.reuters.com, 4. www.reuters.com, 5. www.reuters.com, 6. www.reuters.com, 7. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 8. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 9. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 10. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 11. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 12. www.congress.gov, 13. www.reuters.com, 14. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 15. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 16. www.quiverquant.com, 17. www.congress.gov, 18. www.reuters.com, 19. www.reuters.com, 20. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 21. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 22. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 23. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 24. www.rickscott.senate.gov, 25. www.rickscott.senate.gov
