USA Rare Earth (USAR) Stock on December 4, 2025: New Supply Deal, Stillwater Magnet Plant, and Russell 2000 Inclusion

Snapshot: Where USA Rare Earth Stock Stands Today

USA Rare Earth, Inc. (NASDAQ: USAR) has turned into one of the noisiest small caps in the critical minerals space in 2025 – part national‑security story, part SPAC saga, part good old‑fashioned speculative growth stock.

As of mid‑day on December 4, 2025, USAR is trading in the mid‑$16s, up roughly 18% on the day, with a market cap around $2.2 billion. The 52‑week range is wild: roughly $5.56 to $43.98, and analysts tracked by StockAnalysis list the stock as a “Strong Buy” with a 12‑month consensus target of $18, about 9% above the latest quote. ^[1]

Short‑term technicians see a high‑beta roller coaster: the stock climbed from $13.64 to $14.02 on December 3 (+2.8%), has risen in 6 of the last 10 sessions, but is still down around 8% over that 10‑day window. ^[2]

At the same time, USA Rare Earth is pre‑revenue, deeply loss‑making and burning cash – which makes today’s rally and the latest newsflow especially important to understand before anyone gets too romantic about rare earth magnets.

What USA Rare Earth Actually Does

USA Rare Earth is trying to build a “mine‑to‑magnet” supply chain entirely (or mostly) on Western soil:

Round Top Project (Texas): rights over the Round Top Mountain deposit near Sierra Blanca, Texas, which hosts a broad suite of critical minerals, including 16 of the 17 rare earth elements, plus lithium, gallium and other tech metals. ^[3]
Stillwater Magnet Plant (Oklahoma): a neodymium‑iron‑boron (NdFeB) permanent magnet facility in Stillwater, Oklahoma, designed to be one of the first large‑scale magnet plants in the U.S., with targeted capacity around 1,200 metric tons per year once fully ramped. ^[4]
Less Common Metals (LCM – U.K.): a November 2025 acquisition of Less Common Metals Ltd., a long‑standing producer of light and heavy rare‑earth metals and alloys in the U.K. LCM supplies high‑grade NdFeB alloy feedstock and strip cast products for magnet makers. ^[5]

The company went public in March 2025 by merging with SPAC Inflection Point Acquisition Corp. II, listing on the Nasdaq under ticker USAR. ^[6]

So on paper, USAR wants to mine ore in Texas, refine and process it, manufacture magnets in Oklahoma, and feed Western defense, EV, robotics, and energy markets that want to depend less on China.

That’s the dream. The news on December 4 is about whether the pieces are actually snapping together.

Today’s Big Catalyst: LCM–Arnold–Solvay Supply Pact

The immediate spark for USAR’s move higher is a fresh supply agreement announced this morning.

The deal in plain English

On December 4, 2025, USA Rare Earth announced that its newly acquired subsidiary Less Common Metals (LCM) has signed a supply agreement with Solvay and Arnold Magnetic Technologies, a long‑running magnet producer owned by Compass Diversified. ^[7]

Key points:

LCM will provide rare‑earth metals and alloys into Arnold’s advanced magnet production.
The parties explicitly frame this as an “ex‑China” supply chain for sensitive sectors like aerospace, defense, automotive, and energy.
LCM will continue serving its global customer base while also feeding USA Rare Earth’s Stillwater plant, which is “on track” for Q1 2026 commissioning. ^[8]

Benzinga notes that USAR shares surged this morning as traders digested the partnership, with the stock trading around $15–16 and up ~10% intraday as the news crossed. The article highlights management’s claim that magnet demand is “locked into 2033” and that raw‑material security has been a key bottleneck. ^[9]

Why it matters:

It de‑risks feedstock for Stillwater’s magnet production – a big market worry after years of promises but no commercial volume.
It gives Arnold, a real industrial name, a deeper tie‑up with USAR’s supply chain rather than yet another small “MOU”‑style customer.
It reinforces the narrative that USAR is plugging into a Western alliance of rare‑earth players (LCM in the U.K., Solvay’s processing in Europe, Stillwater in the U.S.).

For a company that still has no meaningful product revenue, this kind of contract is the difference between “interesting slide deck” and “maybe this actually turns into cash flow one day.”

Stillwater Magnet Plant: Progress, Timeline and Capacity

A separate note from Zacks, published on Nasdaq’s site this morning, fleshes out how Stillwater is progressing. ^[10]

According to that report and the company’s Q3 results:

Commissioning target: Stillwater is still targeted for commercial‑scale commissioning in Q1 2026.
2025 progress:
- Installation of core production equipment.
- Assembly of “Line 1a” and preparation for commissioning.
- Hiring and training engineers and technicians to run the plant.
Capacity goal: when Line 1a and Line 1b are complete, Stillwater is slated to produce roughly 1,200 metric tons of NdFeB magnets per year.
Cash to build it: USAR has over $400 million in cash as of early November, funded through a $125 million equity raise, a $75 million PIPE, and aggressive warrant exercises. ^[11]

In the Q3 press release, management emphasized that:

The Stillwater build‑out is the centerpiece of the strategy.
The LCM acquisition plus an emerging swarf‑recycling flow sheet (recycling machining waste) are intended to “close the loop” between raw material, magnet production, and recycling.
A pre‑feasibility study for Round Top is now scheduled for H2 2026 – which means the mine itself is still years away from potential commercial production. ^[12]

So the near‑term investment case isn’t “we are a miner” – it’s “we’re a magnet manufacturer first, and maybe later a miner as well.”

Financial Snapshot: Q3 2025 Results and Balance Sheet

The Q3 2025 numbers (for the quarter ended September 30) underline just how early‑stage USAR still is. ^[13]

Headline figures:

Revenue: effectively $0 – Stillwater is not yet in commercial production.
GAAP net loss (Q3):$156.7 million, or $1.64 per share, driven heavily by non‑cash changes in the fair value of warrants and earn‑out liabilities.
Adjusted net loss (Q3):$25.6 million, or $0.25 per share, after backing out warrant and earn‑out revaluation effects.
Nine‑month adjusted net loss:$53.6 million.
Cash and cash equivalents:$257.6 million as of Sept 30, with management stating that cash was “over $400 million” after further warrant exercises subsequent to quarter‑end.
Debt: the company reports no significant debt, but it does carry very large non‑cash warrant and earn‑out liabilities.

The press release explicitly flags “substantial doubt” about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern over the next 12 months, citing dependence on successful warrant exercises, future capital raises, and execution risk at Stillwater and Round Top. ^[14]

That sounds alarming at first, but it’s common language for pre‑revenue SPACs that rely on equity‑financed buildouts. Practically, it means USAR is still in “venture financing in public markets” mode, not in a stable, self‑funded business phase.

Russell 2000 Inclusion: Why Indexes Suddenly Care About USAR

On November 26, 2025, USA Rare Earth announced that it has been included on FTSE Russell’s preliminary list for addition to the Russell 2000 index, with the change expected to become effective December 22, 2025, pending the usual review. ^[15]

Membership in the Russell 2000 means:

Automatic inclusion in the Russell 3000 and relevant growth/value style indices.
Passive buying pressure from index funds and ETFs benchmarked to those indices.
More attention from small‑cap managers who screen off the Russell universe.

In practical terms, this usually translates into higher baseline liquidity, some incremental demand from small‑cap indexers, and more sell‑side coverage – all positives for a volatile name that has occasionally traded like a meme stock.

Policy Backdrop: U.S.–China Tensions and Government Money

You can’t understand USAR without the geopolitical backdrop. Rare earths are basically the spices of modern technology – you use tiny amounts, but without them the dish tastes like sadness.

A few big policy threads are converging:

China’s export moves
- China has long dominated rare‑earth mining and processing. Recent reporting indicates Beijing is re‑shaping its export licensing regime for rare earths, moving toward more streamlined but potentially more politically sensitive approvals. ^[16]
- Other coverage this fall highlighted China’s willingness to tweak export rules as a lever in broader U.S.–China negotiations on trade and defense technology. ^[17]
U.S. federal support
- The U.S. Department of Energy announced up to $134 million of new funding on December 1, 2025, for projects that strengthen domestic rare‑earth supply chains, including recovery of REEs from mine tailings and e‑waste. ^[18]
- A separate Reuters special in November described how USA Rare Earth’s September acquisition of LCM is part of a broader wave of private‑sector investments that Washington is increasingly encouraging to counter China’s dominance. ^[19]
White House conversations
- In October, Reuters reported that USAR hit an all‑time high after CEO Barbara Humpton mentioned that the company was in “close discussions with the White House” regarding potential support, following the administration’s decision to take equity stakes in other critical‑minerals projects. ^[20]

Put together, USAR sits squarely in the crosshairs of U.S. industrial policy: if Washington is serious about reshoring magnet production, companies like USAR and MP Materials become strategic chess pieces.

That’s the macro tailwind bulls are betting on.

The Bull Case on USA Rare Earth Stock

Pro‑USAR arguments, as laid out by bullish analysts and commentators, cluster around a few themes.

1. Vertically integrated “mine‑to‑magnet” story

Pro‑USAR analysts emphasize that Stillwater + LCM + Round Top could create a fully integrated Western supply chain for NdFeB magnets, from ore to finished magnet. ^[21]
A recent Seeking Alpha piece called USAR “the small cap sitting at the center of America’s rare earth competition with China,” arguing that Round Top’s heavy rare‑earth mix and the Stillwater plant align tightly with U.S. national‑security priorities. ^[22]

2. Government tailwinds and “too strategic to fail” thinking

Between DOE funding opportunities, earlier Pentagon support for peers like MP Materials, and the White House’s explicit interest in critical minerals, bulls see a rising probability of grants, contracts, or back‑door guarantees that help USAR bridge the gap from capex burn to revenue. ^[23]
Some commentators explicitly frame USAR as one of a handful of rare‑earth companies “the U.S. government doesn’t want to fail.” ^[24]

3. Cash war chest vs. pre‑revenue risk

With $257 million in cash at quarter‑end and over $400 million after warrant exercises, USAR currently has enough liquidity to finish Stillwater, integrate LCM, and push Round Top through pre‑feasibility, assuming no major cost overruns. ^[25]
That’s unusual for a company that still hasn’t sold product – and it gives management a chance to prove the model before tapping markets again.

4. Recent price collapse as a “reset”

After spiking above $40 earlier this year and then plunging roughly 50% around Q3 earnings, some bulls argue the stock has “come back to earth,” resetting expectations and offering a more reasonable entry for a very high‑risk story. ^[26]
A late‑November Seeking Alpha piece titled “Back To Earth” characterized USAR as a speculative buy: high risk, but with outsized upside if Stillwater ramps and Round Top proves viable. ^[27]

In short, the bull case says: “Yes it’s messy, but this is exactly the sort of messy project the U.S. will eventually subsidize into existence.”

The Bear Case: Short Sellers, Round Top Skepticism and Promotion Concerns

Of course, the story would be boring if everyone agreed.

On August 19, 2025, short‑seller Night Market Research (NMR) published a blistering report titled “USA Rare Earth: ‘Mine to Magnet’ Is A Pipe Dream. Round Top Is A Dead‑End, Low‑Grade Mine. Magnet Manufacturing Hasn’t Progressed in 5+ Years. 75% Downside.” ^[28]

An Activ8Insights summary and the original report highlight several key criticisms:

1. Round Top ore quality and economics

NMR argues that Round Top’s rare‑earth grades are extremely low, around 0.06% total rare earth oxides (TREO) – by their calculation, roughly 1/100th the grade of MP Materials’ Mountain Pass mine, and only a few times higher than natural background levels. ^[29]
The report claims multiple operators have walked away from Round Top over decades, and that prior technical studies assumed unrealistic production volumes for obscure elements like thulium and lutetium.

2. Magnet manufacturing doubts

NMR says USAR’s core Stillwater equipment was second‑hand machinery acquired from Hitachi Metals, allegedly without access to the proprietary software and IP needed to run it competitively.
Industry experts quoted in the report describe parts of the equipment as effectively “scrap metal” and question whether USAR can produce anything more than low‑value commodity magnets. ^[30]

3. Questionable partnerships & stock promotion

The report highlights early‑stage or very small customer relationships and suggests USAR has over‑sold their commercial significance.
It also documents a campaign of paid stock promotion via influencer marketing, including a third‑party promoter with a poor track record.
Activ8 notes that insiders and SPAC sponsors have already sold tens of millions of dollars’ worth of stock, including a large disposition by sponsor Michael Blitzer in August, which matches subsequent MarketBeat reporting on insider sales. ^[31]

4. Governance and going‑concern language

The bear case leans heavily on USAR’s own filings: the going‑concern warnings, persistent operating losses, and reliance on equity and warrants to fund the capex heavy plan. ^[32]

In parallel, other skeptical voices have appeared:

Jim Cramer recently told viewers to avoid USA Rare Earth “for now”, citing volatility and execution risk. ^[33]
Some commentators focus on the SPAC structure, insider unlocks, and warrant overhang as structural headwinds until the capital stack stabilizes. ^[34]

The short‑seller narrative, boiled down, is: “This is a beautifully marketed story built on weak assets and promotion; gravity will win.”

Analyst Ratings, Forecasts and Technicals

Despite the short‑seller noise, Wall Street’s formal coverage is currently skewed positive – though it’s a small sample.

Street targets

Canaccord Genuity recently bumped its price target from $22 to $23 and reiterated a “Buy” rating, implying over 30% upside from the price at the time of that note. ^[35]
Other named firms (William Blair, Cantor, Roth) are mostly in the Buy/Outperform/Overweight camp, with one Sell rating flagged by MarketBeat. MarketBeat calculates a consensus rating of “Moderate Buy” and a consensus target around $26.33. ^[36]
StockAnalysis aggregates four analysts into a “Strong Buy” consensus and a $18 median target, slightly above today’s spike. ^[37]

Quant / technical signals

Relative‑strength metrics from Investor’s Business Daily have recently upgraded USAR’s RS Rating into the low‑80s, placing its price performance ahead of the majority of stocks in the market despite brutal drawdowns this autumn. ^[38]
Short‑term technical services see a high‑volatility, momentum‑driven name: the stock has had multiple double‑digit daily moves, with intraday swings of 8–10% not unusual. ^[39]

The translation: professionals who have actually published targets mostly like the story, but they’re a small group, and the stock trades more like a policy‑sensitive momentum vehicle than like a boring industrial.

Key Risks to the Thesis (Bull or Bear)

Regardless of which side of the debate you lean toward, several risks are obvious from the public record:

Execution risk at Stillwater
- Magnet plants are complex, IP‑heavy and technically demanding. If Stillwater’s Q1 2026 commissioning slips again, or yields low‑quality output, the story takes a hit. ^[40]
Round Top may never be economic
- The company is openly still at pre‑feasibility stage. If long‑term studies confirm the short‑seller view that the ore body is uneconomic at reasonable prices, USAR becomes more of a magnet‑only story, which may be less exciting than the full mine‑to‑magnet narrative. ^[41]
Funding & dilution risk
- Even with >$400m in cash, USA Rare Earth’s plan is capital‑intensive. Additional equity raises or less favorable warrant dynamics could dilute existing shareholders. ^[42]
Policy risk cuts both ways
- The company benefits from U.S.–China tensions and Trump‑era industrial policy, but any future detente or change in administration priorities could cool funding momentum or contract opportunities. ^[43]
Stock‑promotion & reputation risk
- Documented campaigns by promoters and ongoing short‑seller interest mean headline risk is high. Another hit piece, an SEC inquiry, or governance misstep could quickly crush sentiment. ^[44]

What to Watch Next for USAR Investors

If you’re tracking USA Rare Earth from December 4, 2025 onward, the next few quarters boil down to a handful of milestones:

Q1 2026: Stillwater commissioning
- Does the plant actually commission on time?
- Do we see real volumes and real customers, particularly from Arnold or other named partners?
LCM integration and European footprint
- How quickly does USAR expand LCM’s capacity and product mix?
- Does LCM become a profit center or just a strategic input cost? ^[45]
Government contracts / grants
- Any DOE, DoD or other federal awards that explicitly back Stillwater or Round Top would be a major de‑risking event.
- Likewise, inclusion in special financing programs or guaranteed offtake agreements would move the needle. ^[46]
Round Top pre‑feasibility progress
- Look for concrete updates on metallurgy, costs, and economics, not just slide‑deck promises. The pre‑feasibility study due in H2 2026 will be critical. ^[47]
Index inclusion flows
- Watch how trading behaves around December 22, when Russell 2000 inclusion is expected to become effective. Short‑term flows can be choppy, but the longer‑term effect should be higher baseline liquidity. ^[48]

Bottom Line: High‑Conviction Story, High‑Volatility Stock

As of December 4, 2025, USA Rare Earth is:

A pre‑revenue, SPAC‑origin small‑cap with big ambitions and big losses.
The owner of a controversial low‑grade but strategically located deposit in Texas.
The builder of a potentially first‑of‑its‑kind U.S. NdFeB magnet plant in Oklahoma, now backed by a meaningful supply alliance via LCM, Solvay and Arnold.
A magnet for both government interest and short‑seller scrutiny.

For long‑term investors, USAR is less a classic value play and more a binary policy‑and‑execution bet on whether the U.S. is serious enough about rare‑earth independence to carry a risky, capital‑intensive project across the finish line.

References

USA Rare Earth (USAR) Stock on December 4, 2025: New Supply Deal, Stillwater Magnet Plant, and Russell 2000 Inclusion – Is the Mine‑to‑Magnet Bet Worth It?