CapitaLand Investment Limited (CLI) has spent 2025 quietly but aggressively rewiring itself into a fee-driven, asset‑light real estate investment manager with a strong Asia focus. As at 8 December 2025, its share price is still stuck around the S$2.60 mark, yet the company has closed a US$650 million lodging fund, launched a RMB5 billion China master fund, expanded into self‑storage and industrial real estate, and become the subject of merger chatter with Mapletree Investments. [1]
For investors watching CapitaLand Investment’s stock, the gap between a sluggish share price and increasingly ambitious fund platforms is the main story heading into 2026.
CapitaLand Investment at a Glance in 2025
CapitaLand Investment Limited is a Singapore‑headquartered global real estate investment manager listed on the SGX under the ticker 9CI and on Reuters under CAPN.SI. The group operates two main economic engines:
- Fee‑Income Related Business (FRB) – listed and private funds management, lodging (Ascott), and commercial property management.
- Real Estate Investment Business (REIB) – a global portfolio of income‑producing assets (retail, office, industrial, logistics, self‑storage, lodging and data centres) that seed its funds. [2]
According to Reuters and company data compiled by analysts, CLI manages roughly S$117 billion of funds under management (FUM) and operates across about 45 countries and 270 cities, making it one of Asia’s largest diversified real asset managers. [3]
The shareholder base is also unusual for a listed manager:
- Private companies (primarily CapitaLand’s Temasek‑linked holding vehicle, Bartley Investments) own around 54% of the shares.
- The general public owns 34%, while direct insider holdings are under 1%. [4]
That high strategic stake gives CLI strong sponsor support, but it also tends to keep free float limited and can dampen trading interest.
Share Price Snapshot: Where CapitaLand Investment Trades Today
As of mid‑day on 8 December 2025, CapitaLand Investment is trading around S$2.60–S$2.61 per share on the SGX. [5]
Key market metrics:
- 52‑week range: S$2.37 to S$2.87. [6]
- 1‑year price performance: roughly –3% over the past 12 months, underperforming the FTSE Developed Asia Pacific index by more than 20 percentage points, according to Stockopedia. [7]
- Dividend yield: CLI has paid a S$0.12 dividend per share for each of 2023, 2024 and 2025. At a share price of about S$2.60–2.61, that implies a trailing dividend yield of roughly 4.5–4.6%. [8]
So, on the screen CapitaLand Investment looks like a mid‑yield, modest‑growth Asian real estate name that the market hasn’t re‑rated yet—despite some fairly material strategic moves.
Big 2025 News: Funds, Deals and Strategic Shifts
1. Lodging Private Fund CLARA II Closes Above Target
On 5 November 2025, CLI announced the final close of CapitaLand Ascott Residence Asia Fund II (CLARA II), its value‑add lodging private fund. The fund raised about US$650 million in total equity commitments and co‑investments, exceeding its US$600 million target. [9]
Key points:
- CLARA II will add around US$1.6 billion in assets under management when fully deployed.
- The investor base spans institutional investors, pension funds and financial institutions from Asia, Europe and North America, signalling broad global appetite for CLI’s lodging strategy. [10]
- Roughly half of the committed equity has already been deployed across three assets in Japan and Singapore. [11]
Earlier in June, CLARA II and its co‑investors acquired a prime mixed‑use asset in Shinjuku, Tokyo for about ¥30 billion (roughly S$260–270 million), widely reported to be the “Hundred Stay Tokyo Shinjuku” building, which combines hotel, residential, office and retail space. [12]
The CLARA II story matters because:
- It boosts higher‑margin fee income as CLI earns management and performance fees rather than tying up its own balance sheet.
- It leverages Ascott’s operational know‑how in repositioning under‑performing buildings into higher‑yielding lodging assets across Asia‑Pacific. [13]
For a group trying to be valued like a global asset manager rather than a land‑banking developer, this kind of fund close is pretty central to the narrative.
2. RMB5 Billion Onshore Master Fund in China
On 21 May 2025, CapitaLand Investment launched its first onshore master fund in China, the CLI RMB Master Fund, in partnership with a major domestic insurance company. [14]
Highlights:
- Equity commitment:RMB5 billion (about US$690–920 million depending on FX).
- Majority owned by the Chinese insurance partner, consistent with CLI’s asset‑light approach. [15]
- Capital will be deployed via sub‑funds into business parks, retail, rental housing and serviced residences in China. [16]
- Once fully invested, the fund is expected to add around RMB20 billion to CLI’s funds under management. [17]
This structure lets CLI tap domestic Chinese capital — especially insurers boosting real estate allocations — while monetising its existing operating platform. The trade‑off: more fee income and scale, less direct ownership, which shows up later in forecast revenue trends.
3. Self‑Storage, Logistics and European Assets
In the second half of 2025, CapitaLand Investment has been busy at the “alternative” real estate fringes where yields tend to be more attractive:
- CLI’s self‑storage platform is committing around S$100 million into self‑storage assets in Singapore and Japan, according to MarketScreener and MT Newswires. [18]
- On 15 October 2025, CLI completed the acquisition of three freehold self‑storage facilities in Tokyo, further deepening its presence in that niche. [19]
- A CapitaLand Investment unit also secured seven properties in Europe in October, broadening the group’s industrial/logistics footprint there. [20]
The pattern: CLI is recycling out of more mature, lower‑yielding assets and building up exposure to self‑storage, logistics and specialised industrial, which benefit from e‑commerce, supply‑chain reconfiguration and demographic trends.
4. New GCC Industrial Development Fund
On 30 September 2025, SC Capital Partners Group and CapitaLand Investment launched an inaugural GCC real estate industrial development fund aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 program, focused on industrial and logistics assets in the Gulf region, particularly the UAE. [21]
While financial details are limited, the vehicle:
- Gives CLI a capital‑light way to participate in Middle East industrial growth, without over‑stretching its own balance sheet.
- Positions the group as a multi‑region institutional partner for sovereign and regional capital — a useful credential in global fundraising.
5. Cross‑Border Retail: Coronation Square Mall in Johor Bahru
On 24 November 2025, CapitaLand Investment announced it will partner Coronade Properties to shape the retail vision for Coronation Square Mall in Johor Bahru City Centre (JBCC), part of a RM5 billion integrated development within the planned Johor–Singapore Special Economic Zone (JS‑SEZ). [22]
Key takeaways:
- The development spans 9.6 acres and comprises eight towers, including the Ascott Coronation Square Johor Bahru hotel, premium offices, a fully sold residential component, and about 1.25 million square feet of retail space. [23]
- CLI will bring its tenant network and mall operating expertise, while Ascott manages the hotel component.
Together with the CLARA II lodging fund and Singapore‑centric REITs, this project reinforces CLI’s cross‑border Singapore–Malaysia tourism and retail strategy, especially as travel flows normalise and the JS‑SEZ concept evolves.
6. Sustainability: Quantifying the Financial Return of Green Investments
In late 2025, CapitaLand Investment released its 16th Global Sustainability Report and rolled out a framework to quantify the financial returns from green investments, according to ESG News coverage. [24]
The framework aims to:
- Link energy savings, carbon reductions and green certifications directly to financial outcomes, such as rent premiums, occupancy resilience and funding costs.
- Support CLI’s broader sustainability targets and its use of sustainable financing, where the group already has hundreds of millions of dollars in “green” or sustainability‑linked funding lines. [25]
For investors, the important bit isn’t the buzzwords; it’s that ESG performance is increasingly baked into CLI’s internal return models, not treated as a side project.
7. Leadership: New CEO for Alternatives and India Platform
In November 2025, CapitaLand Investment appointed Kishore Kamlesh Moorjani as CEO, Alternatives, Private Funds and Chairman, CLI India, effective 18 November 2025. [26]
That appointment matters because:
- CLI has explicitly identified India as a critical growth engine and is exploring an India REIT, while aiming to more than double India funds under management from S$7.4 billion by 2028. [27]
- The “Alternatives & Private Funds” remit pulls together lodging, private equity‑style vehicles, credit and other non‑REIT strategies — the very businesses that drive higher‑margin fee income. [28]
In other words, CLI is putting senior leadership squarely where its growth capital is supposed to go.
8. Merger Speculation with Mapletree Investments
In early November, the Wall Street Journal and other outlets reported that Temasek‑linked Mapletree Investments and CapitaLand Investment were exploring a potential business combination that could create an Asian real estate giant with more than US$150 billion in assets under management. [29]
CapitaLand Investment’s response was careful:
- In a bourse filing and subsequent commentary, CLI said it is aware of market speculation but does not comment on rumours or speculation, and that it routinely evaluates opportunities aligned with its strategy. [30]
So, as of 8 December 2025, there is no announced deal, just strategic optionality. For investors, the scenario analysis runs roughly like this:
- A combination could create a huge, more liquid, Temasek‑anchored regional champion, with greater scale in logistics, data centres and overseas assets.
- It could also introduce significant integration risk, governance complexity and potential restructuring across multiple listed REITs and funds.
For now, it’s a background theme rather than an investable fact.
How the Numbers Look: 2024 Results and 9M FY2025 Update
Full‑Year 2024 Snapshot
Reuters data shows that for FY2024 CapitaLand Investment generated: [31]
- Revenue: about S$2.815 billion (slightly above 2023’s S$2.784 billion).
- Net income: about S$479 million, versus S$181 million in 2023.
The big swing in profit reflects lower valuation hits and a steadier contribution from fee‑income businesses, even as parts of the China and office portfolios remained under pressure.
On the balance sheet, 2024 figures indicate: [32]
- Total assets: ~S$24.7 billion (down from S$34.1 billion in 2023).
- Total debt: ~S$7.9 billion (down from S$12.6 billion).
- Total liabilities: ~S$11.2 billion (down from S$19.8 billion).
The shrinking balance sheet is largely by design: CLI has been monetising assets and deconsolidating vehicles to tilt more toward FUM‑based fee income.
9M FY2025: Revenue Rebound Driven by Fees
For the nine months ended 30 September 2025 (9MFY2025), multiple sources summarising the company’s business update report: [33]
- Total revenue: about S$1.568 billion, up 7% year‑on‑year.
- Fee‑related revenue (FRR): roughly S$882 million, boosted by event‑driven fees from listed funds and new private funds.
- REIB revenue: about S$753 million, down 12% year‑on‑year following the deconsolidation of CapitaLand Ascott Trust (CLAS) and other asset recycling.
Earlier, in 1QFY2025, CLI reported: [34]
- Revenue of S$496 million, lower year‑on‑year due to deconsolidation.
- Net debt‑to‑equity: around 0.39x.
- About S$480 million of sustainable financing.
- About S$7.4 billion of capital available for deployment.
Put together, the 2024 and 9M 2025 numbers support three ideas:
- The fee‑income engine is working – FRR is growing faster than overall revenue.
- The balance sheet is less stretched, with materially lower debt than a few years ago.
- Accounting revenue growth will likely be modest or even flat over time, because CLI keeps selling assets into its own and third‑party vehicles.
That last point becomes important when we look at the forecasts.
Analyst Ratings, Price Targets and Valuation
Across multiple data providers, CapitaLand Investment currently sits firmly in the “buy” camp.
Street Ratings and Targets
- Investing.com (CAPN.SI) shows a “Strong Buy” consensus from 15 analysts, all of whom rate the stock a buy, with:
- Average 12‑month target:S$3.43
- Range: S$3.03 (low) to S$4.30 (high)
- Implied upside of about +31% from S$2.61. [35]
- TipRanks (SGX:9CI) aggregates 3 analysts over the past three months, also at “Strong Buy”, with:
- Average target:S$3.87
- Range: S$3.65–S$4.30
- Implied upside of roughly +48% from S$2.61. [36]
- Regional broker research:
- DBS and Phillip Securities (POEMS) have reiterated BUY calls with a S$3.65 target price, emphasising CLI’s move into a “next phase of growth” and expecting a stronger second half of FY2025 as capital recycling and fee income accelerate. [37]
- Other aggregators like Fintel and AlphaSpread report an average analyst target around S$3.47, with a wide range extending above S$4.50, broadly consistent with the data above. [38]
Local platform Beansprout calculates a consensus target of about S$3.75, implying roughly 40–45% upside from around S$2.61 as of 8 December 2025. [39]
So there’s a rare thing here: broad agreement across brokers that the stock is undervalued, even if the exact target differs.
Fundamental Fair‑Value Views
Simply Wall St’s analysis (which uses S&P Global data) flags CLI as trading below their estimate of fair value, and highlights that earnings are forecast to grow more quickly than the broader Singapore market. [40]
That said, valuation dispersion is high: some models focus on net asset value and see a modest discount; others overweight the fee‑income trajectory and assign a higher multiple similar to global asset managers.
Growth and Earnings Outlook to 2027
Simply Wall St’s consensus model and analyst forecasts point to an interesting mix: rising earnings but roughly flat revenue. [41]
According to their compiled estimates:
- Earnings growth: about 14–15% per year over the next three years, faster than the Singapore market’s roughly 7–8% annual earnings growth.
- Revenue trend: expected to decline slightly (around –0.2% per year) over the same period, reflecting asset sales and deconsolidation rather than operating weakness.
- Forecast ROE: around 5.8% in three years — not spectacular, but decent for a capital‑light real estate manager. [42]
Their model shows earnings rising from 2024’s S$479 million to roughly S$674 million in 2025 and S$752–814 million by 2026–2027, while revenue drifts down from S$2.815 billion to about S$2.27–2.33 billion. [43]
Translated into plain language:
- CLI is trying to become a higher‑margin, fee‑driven platform where profit grows even if reported sales don’t.
- The key to that working is continued fundraising and deployment (CLARA II, the RMB master fund, India and GCC vehicles) and stable or improving operating metrics in its core assets.
Key Drivers and Risks Heading Into 2026
Potential Drivers
- Fundraising momentum
- Successful closes like CLARA II and the China RMB master fund validate CLI’s pitch as a trusted operating partner for institutional capital. [44]
- If similar vehicles emerge for India, data centres or logistics, fee‑related earnings could keep compounding.
- Alternative and “new economy” real estate
- Self‑storage, logistics, data centres and value‑add lodging assets tend to offer better structural growth than traditional offices and malls. CLI’s new platforms explicitly target these. [45]
- India and Southeast Asia growth
- The group’s stated ambition to more than double India FUM by 2028, plus the JS‑SEZ‑linked Johor Bahru projects, give CLI a multi‑year pipeline in fast‑growing markets. [46]
- Optionality from corporate actions
- Even if the Mapletree combination never materialises, the mere fact that such a deal is being discussed suggests that Temasek and the Singapore ecosystem are thinking about scale and consolidation. [47]
Main Risks
- Macro and interest‑rate risk
- Higher‑for‑longer rates compress valuation multiples and make fundraising tougher, especially for core real estate.
- China exposure
- The RMB master fund is clever structurally, but it still relies on Chinese business parks and rental housing performing well over time in a choppy macro environment. [48]
- Execution risk across many platforms
- CLI is juggling lodging funds, China vehicles, GCC industrial, self‑storage, India strategies and a network of listed REITs. Operationally, that’s a lot of moving parts to coordinate.
- Merger complexity
- If a large transaction with Mapletree or another sponsor did proceed, it would likely involve re‑shaping multiple listed vehicles, management contracts and boards, with plenty of room for friction.
None of these risks are unusual for a global real estate manager, but they’re worth keeping in mind when reading bullish target prices.
Bottom Line: How the Market Is Framing CapitaLand Investment Now
Putting all of this together, CapitaLand Investment in December 2025 looks like:
- A deleveraged, Temasek‑anchored real asset manager pivoting hard into fee‑based earnings. [49]
- A company that has closed a large lodging fund, launched a RMB5 billion onshore China fund, expanded into self‑storage, industrial and GCC logistics, and deepened Southeast Asian retail and lodging partnerships in a single year. [50]
- A stock trading around S$2.60–2.61, with a 4–5% dividend yield and 30–50% implied upside in most analyst models, yet still slightly down over the past year. [51]
Whether that gap between fundamentals and price eventually closes will depend on:
- CLI continuing to raise and deploy capital profitably;
- The macro backdrop for interest rates and Asian real estate; and
- How any large‑scale corporate actions (like a potential Mapletree deal) are structured and perceived.
For now, the consensus view from the sell‑side is clear: CapitaLand Investment looks more like a global asset manager at a discount than a traditional brick‑and‑mortar landlord. As 2026 unfolds, the market will decide whether that “discount” is a mispricing or a warning label.
References
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