From Sputnik to Sanctions: Inside Russia’s Space & Satellite Industry 2025

Key Facts

• Soviet Legacy & Workforce: Russia’s space sector is built on the extensive Soviet space program. Today it comprises 100+ organizations and ~250,000 employees, many tracing their origins to Soviet-era design bureaus ^[1]. This heritage enabled historic firsts (Sputnik 1957, Gagarin 1961), but the 1990s collapse of the USSR led to an 80% funding drop and brain drain before a 2000s revival ^{[2] [3]}.
• Roscosmos Dominance: The Roscosmos State Corporation – formed from the 1992 Russian Space Agency and reorganized in 2015 – now oversees virtually all major space enterprises. Its subsidiaries include RKK Energia (human spaceflight leader, ~22,000 staff ^[4]), Khrunichev (Proton/Angara rockets), TsSKB-Progress (Soyuz rockets), ISS Reshetnev (satellite manufacturing), NPO Lavochkin (interplanetary probes), and NPO Energomash (RD-series engines) ^{[5] [6]}. A nascent private sector (e.g. Success Rockets, SPUTNIX) is emerging but remains small in this state-dominated industry.
• Launch Activity & Global Share: Russia conducted 19 orbital launches in 2023, down 25% from pre-war 2021 and about half the rate of the early 2000s ^[7]. The decline reflects intense global competition (SpaceX, China) and loss of foreign launch contracts due to geopolitics. Roscosmos’ new chief pledged to boost launches to 20+ in 2025 to reverse this trend ^[8]. Russia’s share of commercial launch revenue has eroded significantly, prompting strategic shifts.
• Satellites in Orbit: As of mid-2024 Russia has roughly 244 satellites in orbit ^[9] (civil and military), supporting communications, Earth observation and navigation. The GLONASS navigation constellation (24 active sats) provides GPS-like services, while civilian fleets like Express and Yamal handle communications. Many satellites are aging – over 30 military satellites have exceeded their design life, according to experts, due to launch delays and sanctions impacts ^[10].
• Market Size & Forecast: Despite sanctions, Russia’s space industry had ₽413 billion in revenue in 2023 (~$5–6 billion) ^[11] and plans for ₽492 billion in 2024 ^[12]. The government has approved a massive ₽4.5 trillion (~$57 billion) space investment program to 2030+ to deploy new broadband and imaging constellations ^[13]. One segment, satellite communications, is projected to grow from $1.17 billion in 2025 to $2.15 billion by 2030 (12.9% CAGR) ^[14], reflecting demand for connectivity. Overall, Russia aims to orbit 2,600 satellites by 2036 (35% commercial) in its “Sphere” mega-constellation project ^[15].
• Sanctions Disruptions: Western sanctions since 2014 (escalating after 2022) have severely impacted Russia’s space sector. Roscosmos lost an estimated ₽180 billion (~$2.1 billion) from canceled international contracts ^[16]. Joint projects like the EU–Russia ExoMars mission and Soyuz launches from Europe’s Kourou spaceport were halted ^[17]. “The termination of contracts by unfriendly countries cost Roscosmos 180 billion rubles,” admitted Roscosmos deputy chief Andrei Yelchaninov ^[18]. Export controls now block high-tech components, forcing Russia to accelerate import substitution and pivot to alternate suppliers (often Chinese electronics for satellites ^[19]).
• Regulatory & Policy Landscape: The Kremlin tightly controls space policy – Russian law designates space activities as strategic and dual-use (civil and defense) by nature ^[20]. Roscosmos’ head (recently changed in 2025) holds rank akin to a government minister ^[21]. While private space ventures are now legally permitted via licensing, the state remains the dominant actor. Internationally, Russia adheres to treaties like the Outer Space Treaty and advocates against weaponizing space, even as it tested an anti-satellite weapon in 2021. New legislation and the extended “Space Activities 2013–2030” program aim to modernize infrastructure under sanction constraints ^[22].
• Current Developments (2023–2025): Russia is reorienting its space strategy amid isolation. In 2022 Roscosmos announced plans to exit the ISS after 2024 (later revised to 2028) and accelerate its own Russian Orbital Service Station (ROSS) by ~2027. A new Roscosmos chief, Dmitry Bakanov, was appointed in Feb 2025 after his predecessor was dismissed following launch shortfalls (only 19 launches in 2023 vs. plan of 30) ^{[23] [24]}. The first Russian lunar mission in decades, Luna-25, crash-landed in August 2023 – a high-profile setback ^[25]. On the other hand, Russia deepened cooperation with China, partnering on the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) project and even discussing a joint Moon base with a nuclear power unit by 2035 ^[26]. Notably, NASA and Roscosmos continue to collaborate on the ISS (shared crew flights) despite the Ukraine war, owing to the station’s mutual dependencies ^[27]. In July 2025, the heads of NASA and Roscosmos held their first in-person talks since 2018 to explore “continued cooperation… on the ISS and lunar programs,” signaling efforts to keep diplomatic channels open ^[28].

History of Russia’s Space Industry: From Soviet Pioneers to Post-Soviet Turbulence

Russia’s space enterprise is anchored in the Soviet Union’s legendary space program, which set many historic milestones. The USSR built a formidable space infrastructure – at its peak in 1989, space spending was 1.5% of Soviet GDP ^[29] – achieving the first satellite (Sputnik), first human in orbit (Yuri Gagarin), first spacewalk, and launching robust programs like Soyuz crewed spacecraft and Salyut/Mir space stations. Soviet design bureaus (Energia, Chelomei’s OKB, Lavochkin, etc.) and manufacturing plants sprang up across the union, forming the backbone of today’s industry. The collapse of the USSR in 1991, however, thrust this sprawling space-industrial complex into an existential crisis. Russia inherited most Soviet space assets (though key sites like Baikonur were now in independent Kazakhstan, and some enterprises like Yuzhnoye/Yuzhmash ended up in Ukraine ^[30]).

Funding plummeted in the 1990s “crisis years.” By 1998, Russia’s civil space budget was just 20% of late-Soviet levels ^[31], causing an 80% reduction in spending and workforce contraction from ~400,000 Soviet-era employees to ~300,000 by mid-1990s ^[32]. Major projects were canceled – notably the Buran space shuttle in 1993, immediately idling 30% of the industry’s workers ^[33]. To survive, many Russian space companies turned abroad: they marketed launch services and technology internationally, forged joint ventures, and sold satellite hardware to foreign partners ^[34]. Throughout the 1990s, no centralized space agency existed in the Soviet system – individual design bureaus held sway – so in 1992 the Russian government established the Russian Space Agency (Roscosmos) to coordinate activities ^[35]. Initially, this new agency struggled to assert authority over powerful design bureaus in a chaotic economic environment ^[36].

Entering the 2000s, rising oil revenues improved Russia’s economy, and space ambitions were gradually revived. Federal funding began increasing from ~₽4.8 billion in 2001 (with a priority on restoring GLONASS navigation satellites) to ₽12 billion by 2004 ^[37]. By the mid-2000s, annual civil space budgets surpassed ₽20 billion and grew yearly ^[38]. Foreign cash flows also bolstered the industry: Russia aggressively sold Proton rocket launches on the commercial market via International Launch Services, launched Soyuz rockets from Kourou in partnership with Europe, exported the famed RD-180 engines to the U.S. for Atlas V rockets, and provided ISS crew transport services to NASA at high prices. This infusion of funds in the 2000s allowed Russia to recapitalize aging infrastructure, complete the International Space Station (ISS) with new modules, and pursue an ambitious Federal Space Program 2006–2015 (which included developing the new Angara rocket family and next-gen crew spacecraft) ^{[39] [40]}.

However, systemic issues persisted. A string of launch failures around 2010–2013 (notably Proton-M crashes) exposed management and quality control problems. In 2013, the government undertook a major reorganization of the space sector ^[41]. It created the United Rocket and Space Corporation (URSC) to consolidate space companies and bring them under tighter state supervision, aiming to curb what Deputy PM Dmitry Rogozin called a “failure-prone” sector needing an overhaul ^[42]. By 2015, Roscosmos itself was restructured from a government agency into a state corporation, absorbing URSC – effectively renationalizing the industry under one giant corporate roof ^[43]. This re-centralization was intended to improve efficiency, accountability, and attract investment ^[44].

The 2010s saw mixed fortunes. On one hand, Russia remained a top-tier space power – reliably launching crews to the ISS (especially after NASA’s Shuttle retired in 2011), maintaining a near-monopoly on human spaceflight to orbit until 2020. It also executed high-profile science missions (e.g. modules for ISS; the Nauka lab launched in 2021 after long delays). On the other hand, Russia’s dominance in commercial launch began to erode in the latter 2010s. The rise of SpaceX’s reusable rockets and new competitors slashed Proton and Soyuz’s share of the global market. Compounding this, geopolitical events in 2014 (Russia’s annexation of Crimea) triggered Western sanctions that restricted imports of space-grade electronics and provoked the cancellation of some contracts. For example, U.S. and European export controls stopped the supply of certain satellite components, and Russia in turn banned the export of RD-180 engines (though the U.S. was already moving to replace them). A Foreign Policy Research Institute analysis notes that since the 1990s Russia’s space industry had been “completely dependent on imported components” from the U.S., Europe, Japan, etc., so post-2014 sanctions dealt a heavy blow ^[45]. Projects slowed or stalled as the ruble devalued and plans had to be revised. The massive 2016–2025 Federal Space Program was underfunded – of an originally planned $50 billion, only about $25.7 billion was actually spent by 2020 ^[46]. This underperformance was attributed to both Western sanctions and internal inefficiencies, leaving many goals unmet.

By the early 2020s, Russia’s space sector was at a crossroads: rich in legacy capabilities, but facing aging technology, budget constraints, and fast-moving global competition. The full-scale Ukraine invasion in 2022 and the ensuing wave of sanctions and ruptured partnerships arguably mark the biggest rupture since the 1990s. The period from 2022 to 2025 has seen Russia’s space industry enter a new phase of forced self-reliance and strategic reorientation, which we detail in later sections.

Current State of the Russian Space Industry

Today, Russia’s space industry remains one of the world’s most extensive, albeit now largely inward-focused. Roscosmos, as the central hub, controls the majority of programs, funding, and industrial facilities. It operates both as the national space agency (setting strategy, representing Russia in international projects) and as a conglomerate owning key companies. As of 2023, Roscosmos reported consolidated revenues of ₽413 billion ^[47] and oversees everything from rocket design to astronaut training. The industry structure is a network of design bureaus, manufacturing plants, and research institutes mostly under Roscosmos’ umbrella:

• Major State-Owned Players: RKK Energia in Korolyov is the prime contractor for crewed spacecraft and space stations (developer of Soyuz capsules, Progress cargo ships, and ISS modules) ^[48]. TsSKB-Progress in Samara builds the workhorse Soyuz launch vehicles, and has been developing new medium rockets (the canceled Rus-M, now the Soyuz-5 project) ^[49]. Khrunichev Center in Moscow produces the heavy Proton-M rocket (a mainstay of GEO satellite launches) and the new modular Angara rocket family ^[50]. Khrunichev also developed upper stages like Briz-M. ISS Reshetnev Company in Zheleznogorsk, Siberia, is Russia’s largest satellite manufacturer, known for building GLONASS navigation satellites and Express communications satellites (it has built over 1,200 satellites in total) ^{[51] [52]}. NPO Lavochkin leads deep-space and planetary probes (e.g. lunar landers, the failed Fobos-Grunt Mars probe) and also makes Earth observation satellites (Electro-L weather sats). NPO Energomash (near Moscow) produces world-renowned liquid engines, including the RD-180 and RD-191 series used on Atlas and Angara rockets ^[53]. Dozens of other specialized entities (e.g. OKB Fakel for electric propulsion, Keldysh Center for advanced propulsion research, TsNIIMash for R&D) support the ecosystem ^[54].
• Human Capital and Facilities: Russia retains a highly skilled talent pool, though aging. The industry employs around 250k people ^[55], but workforce rejuvenation is a concern as veteran Soviet-trained engineers retire. The country operates several major spaceports: Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan (leased through 2050) is the main launch site for crewed missions and heavy launches; Plesetsk Cosmodrome in northern Russia handles polar orbit and military launches; and the newer Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Far East is being developed to reduce reliance on Baikonur. Vostochny saw its first launch in 2016 and is slated for future Angara and Soyuz-5 missions, though construction delays and corruption scandals there have been notorious. Russia also maintains mission control centers, training facilities like Star City for cosmonauts, and design/test centers across the country.
• Private and Commercial Ventures: Unlike the U.S. or even China, Russia’s private space sector is minimal but slowly growing under state encouragement. In recent years, startups such as Success Rockets (SR Space), founded in 2020, have begun developing small orbital and suborbital launchers, and even conducted test micro-launches ^[56]. In December 2021, a small private rocket (Nebo-25 by Success Rockets) was reportedly test-launched, a milestone for Russia’s NewSpace movement ^[57]. Other notable firms include SPUTNIX, which builds cubesats and smallsat tech, and Dauria Aerospace, which launched a couple of small satellites in the mid-2010s. Large state-adjacent companies like Gazprom Space Systems (operating Yamal comms satellites) and Russian Satellite Communications Company (RSCC), while technically commercial, are government-aligned. Legal barriers and financing constraints have hindered private ventures – until 2018, only the government could officially conduct space launches. Even now, private firms must obtain licenses and work closely with Roscosmos (for example, using military test ranges for launches). A high-profile startup, KosmoKurs, aimed to build a suborbital tourist spacecraft but shut down in 2021, citing an inability to get regulatory approvals for a launch site. This underscores that the regulatory climate, while improving, remains challenging for independent players. The government has signaled support for commercialization – e.g. by 2025 assembly-line satellite production is being introduced (even involving private firms) ^[58] – but in practice Roscosmos and the Defense Ministry dominate all missions.
• Defense Integration: The line between civil and military space in Russia is blurry. Roscosmos coordinates with the Russian Aerospace Forces’ Space Troops, which operate military satellites and the early-warning system. Certain launches (especially from Plesetsk) are military and some design bureaus historically fell under the Ministry of Defense. In 2022–2023, with heightened security needs due to the Ukraine war, the government directed more resources to military satellite projects (reconnaissance, secure communications, etc.). Analysts estimate Russia’s military space budget for 2023 at no less than ₽110–120 billion (~$1.7 billion) ^[59], on par with its civil space spend. Many assets (like GLONASS navigation satellites, Geostationary communications, and weather satellites) have dual-use roles, serving both civilian and military customers. Russian space law explicitly lists “defense and security” as key goals of space activity ^[60].

Financially, the industry is under strain. Roscosmos has run at a net loss in recent years, requiring federal bailouts. In 2022 it posted a ₽50 billion net loss (about $730 million), which even after emergency subsidies still amounted to an ₽18 billion loss ^[61]. The trend continued in 2023 with a reported ₽15 billion loss ^[62]. These figures indicate that many programs are not profitable and rely on state support. Commercial revenue has fallen with the loss of foreign launch contracts. Roscosmos leadership has acknowledged the “financial black hole” and the need for “multi-billion cash flows” to keep operations stable ^[63]. On the positive side, Roscosmos claims the overall industry remains “relatively stable” despite sanctions ^[64], noting that productivity per worker has been rising. In a mid-2024 address, then-CEO Yury Borisov cited a ₽413 billion revenue in 2023 and stated “the industry’s operations are relatively stable” under sanction pressure ^[65]. Nevertheless, he also admitted Russia has halved its off-budget (commercial) revenues and must adapt its international business to “today’s geopolitical realities” ^[66].

In summary, Russia’s space sector in 2025 is a study in contrasts: a heavyweight infrastructure and storied legacy grappling with modern challenges. It retains full-spectrum capabilities – human spaceflight, launch vehicles across all classes, satellite design, deep-space ambitions – but now largely serving domestic and strategic needs in a constrained environment. Next, we examine key industry segments in detail, from launch services to satellites and defense projects.

Industry Segmentation and Key Markets

Launch Services and Human Spaceflight

Launch Vehicles: Russia fields a diverse fleet of orbital launchers, though many designs date back decades. The venerable Soyuz rocket (first flown in 1966) remains the backbone of medium-lift launches, capable of sending ~7 tons to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Variants like Soyuz-2.1a and 2.1b (and the human-rated Soyuz-FG/Soyuz-2.1a) execute both crewed and unmanned missions regularly. For heavy payloads, the Proton-M (in service since the 1960s in earlier forms) can lift ~22 tons to LEO or ~6 tons to geostationary transfer orbit. Proton was a pillar of Russia’s commercial launch business, lofting many Western communications satellites over 1995–2015. However, Proton uses toxic propellants and is being phased out in favor of newer rockets.

The Angara family is Russia’s long-delayed next-generation launcher. In development since 1995, Angara finally had its maiden flight in 2014. It uses modular, environmentally cleaner LOX/kerosene stages. The heavy variant Angara-A5 (comparable to Proton’s lift class) and the light Angara-1.2 have flown a few test missions from Plesetsk, mostly carrying dummy payloads or military sats. Yet Angara is not fully operational – production is slow and unit costs are high. Even Roscosmos’s chief conceded that Angara was “old-fashioned even before becoming operational,” reflecting the protracted development cycle ^[67]. Nonetheless, by the late 2020s Angara-A5 is expected to be the only heavy launcher available to Russia for large satellites, especially military ones ^[68]. Plans exist to launch Angara from the new Vostochny Cosmodrome (its first launch from there is imminent). Meanwhile, Soyuz-5 (also called Irtysh) is a medium rocket in development to replace Ukraine-designed Zenit. Its first flight, originally target 2023, has slipped to ~2025–26. The Soyuz-5 will use a Russian RD-171 engine and support Kazakhstan’s Baikonur “Baiterek” project, giving Kazakhstan a modern launcher at Baikonur.

Looking further ahead, Russia has sketched designs for a super-heavy rocket (Yenisei) for lunar missions, but that project was put on hold due to cost. Instead, a smaller “Amur” methane-fueled reusable rocket is in early design, aiming to compete with Falcon 9 by late 2020s. The “Amur-SPG” medium launcher would have a reusable first stage and use LNG fuel ^[69]. However, funding for Amur is uncertain under current budget realities.

Launch Infrastructure & Services: Russia operates three active cosmodromes for orbital launches. Baikonur (in Kazakhstan’s steppe) handles the bulk of missions, including all crewed Soyuz launches to the ISS and many commercial or international launches. Plesetsk (inside Russia, Arkhangelsk region) is a military-run site used for polar-orbit launches, often for reconnaissance and communications satellites, and for Angara test flights. Vostochny (Amur region of Russia’s Far East) is the newest – intended to secure independent access to space. Thus far, Vostochny has hosted a handful of Soyuz launches (starting 2016) and is preparing for Angara flights; it will also host the Soyuz-5. Additionally, Russia maintains the Sea Launch platform (a mobile seaport launch pad acquired by private company S7), though it has been dormant since 2014 and its future is unclear.

In terms of market, Russia’s launch services have suffered a steep decline in global share. Two decades ago, Russia conducted 30–40% of the world’s launches; now it is in the single digits. In 2022, for example, Russia performed 22 orbital launches (behind only the U.S. and China), but SpaceX alone launched 61 times that year, vastly outpacing Roscosmos. Western sanctions further cut Russia out of many contracts – notably OneWeb, a British satellite operator, canceled its remaining Soyuz launches in 2022 amid the Ukraine fallout, forfeiting dozens of paid-for rockets. The European Space Agency also terminated Soyuz launch collaborations; ArianeSpace had been using Soyuz from Kourou for medium missions, but that ended abruptly in 2022 ^[70]. As a result, Roscosmos lost significant revenue. The agency is striving to replace these clients by courting partners in Asia, the Middle East, and BRICS nations. According to Roscosmos, over 70% of its export income now comes from building satellite systems for foreign nations (often developing countries) rather than launching Western payloads ^{[71] [72]}. For example, Roscosmos has helped countries like Angola (Angosat telecom satellite) and Iran (Khayyam remote-sensing satellite launched in 2022) to get their satellites into orbit. It is also pitching launch and satellite solutions to Gulf states and others near the Equator (who could host launch pads) ^[73]. But Roscosmos officials acknowledge it’s hard to break into these markets given strong Chinese and Indian competition ^[74].

Human Spaceflight: Russia remains one of only three nations capable of human spaceflight (alongside the U.S. and China). The Soyuz crew spacecraft has been a linchpin of the ISS program. From 2011 (shuttle retirement) until 2020, Soyuz was the sole means of transporting astronauts to the ISS, with NASA buying seats (at ~$80 million each). This era ended when SpaceX’s Crew Dragon began operations. However, Russia still launches typically two Soyuz missions with crew per year, carrying international partners under barter agreements. In 2023–2025, integrated crew swaps have continued: NASA and Roscosmos fly each other’s astronauts/cosmonauts on Dragon and Soyuz respectively, to ensure redundancy – a rare sign of cooperation surviving the political rift ^[75]. As of 2025, Russia flies its standard Expedition crews to ISS (usually 2–3 cosmonauts per Soyuz, joined by potentially one foreign astronaut under seat-sharing deals). The ISS partnership itself has been strained – in summer 2022, then-Roscosmos chief Yuri Borisov announced Russia would “leave the ISS after 2024” due to geopolitical tensions ^[76]. Later clarifications indicate Russia will likely remain until 2028 (when it hopes its own station might come online). In August 2025, Roscosmos and NASA heads even met and “discussed further work on the ISS” and ways to maintain the “longstanding relationship” despite the war ^{[77] [78]}. This suggests that pragmatism is keeping the ISS collaboration alive for now. The ISS is expected to operate through 2030 with international consensus, but Russia’s commitment beyond 2028 is uncertain.

Roscosmos has started developing the next-generation crewed spacecraft “Orel” (formerly called Federatsiya). This capsule would carry 4 cosmonauts and potentially fly beyond low Earth orbit (e.g. cislunar missions). Orel’s first flight has slipped repeatedly (originally set for mid-2020s). Without Orel, Russia cannot execute its Moon-landing ambitions, so this project’s delay is a bottleneck for future human exploration.

Space Tourism: Russia was a pioneer in space tourism, flying the first fee-paying tourists to ISS between 2001 and 2009 (in partnership with Space Adventures). After a decade hiatus, Russia flew two Japanese private tourists (Yusaku Maezawa and Yozo Hirano) to ISS in Dec 2021 on Soyuz, and a film crew earlier that year. These flights resumed the tourism program, but the Ukraine war and loss of some foreign clientele put such initiatives on hold. A U.S. astronaut was scheduled on one 2022 tourist Soyuz as a swap, but that got rearranged. In 2023, Roscosmos hinted at new tourist flights for 2024–25, including spacewalk opportunities for ultrarich clients, but no concrete plans have materialized publicly. Notably, space tourism remains a niche – one forecast suggests Russia’s space tourism market could be only on the order of tens of millions of USD in annual revenue in the mid-2020s ^[79], tiny compared to satellite launches or government contracts.

Launch Rate and Trends: The decline in Russia’s launch cadence is a significant trend. In 2023, Roscosmos fell short of its planned launch manifest, completing only 19 orbital launches ^[80]. This was “three fewer than in 2022” and a far cry from the early 2010s when 30+ launches per year were routine ^[81]. The war-related economic strain and reduced commercial demand contributed to this drop. The Kremlin took this seriously: in February 2025, President Putin dismissed Roscosmos CEO Yuri Borisov reportedly in part over the launch decline and uncertain costs of new projects ^{[82] [83]}. He was replaced by Dmitry Bakanov, an economist, indicating a drive for better management. Bakanov quickly promised to reinvigorate the launch schedule – by June 2025 he vowed Russia would attempt “more than 20 orbital launches in 2025”, reversing the downward trend ^[84]. Whether this target is met remains to be seen, but it reflects pressure on Roscosmos to deliver tangible successes and maintain Russia’s relevance in the launch sector.

Satellite Manufacturing and Technology

Russia has an extensive history of satellite manufacturing, but it faces new pressures to modernize and indigenize this segment. The hub of satellite production is JSC Information Satellite Systems (ISS) Reshetnev, located in Krasnoyarsk Krai. This Soviet-founded company has built satellites for communications, navigation, and geodesy since the 1960s ^[85]. It produced the Molniya and Raduga satellites of the USSR, and later the first generation of GLONASS satellites in the 80s/90s ^{[86] [87]}. Today, Reshetnev is responsible for GLONASS-K navigation satellites, Geostationary communications satellites (Express series for RSCC, Yamal for Gazprom, etc.), and low-orbit comsats like Gonets (for messaging/IoT). It employs ~6,500 people and is the largest satellite maker in Russia ^[88].

A key challenge has been the reliance on imported electronics for satellite payloads (processors, sensors, etc.). Western parts were commonly used in Russian satellites (e.g. British solar cells, American microchips) because domestic electronics lag in performance. With sanctions, those supply lines are cut. Roscosmos has therefore mandated an aggressive import substitution program. Reshetnev is developing the first fully “domestic” communications satellite, Express-AMU4, using only Russian-made components – a landmark move ^[89]. Assembly of this satellite starts in late 2023 and is due by 2026 ^[90]. This is a trial by fire for Russian component suppliers; success would signal some degree of technological independence. Additionally, Reshetnev and other factories are investing in new production techniques – such as automation and AI-assisted manufacturing ^[91] – to improve efficiency.

To meet future demands (especially the planned Sphere mega-constellation), Russia is adopting assembly-line production for satellites. In mid-2025, First Deputy PM Denis Manturov announced that Reshetnev had launched mass production lines for satellites up to 100 kg in weight ^[92]. “Satellites are being produced using an assembly line approach… at JSC Reshetnev,” he noted, adding that even some private manufacturers are adopting this to cut costs ^[93]. The goal is to output satellites in large batches, drastically reducing unit costs and timelines – a response to SpaceX’s Starlink factory-like model. Roscosmos’s Bakanov revealed an ambitious plan under the new National Space Project: to deploy 886 “Rassvet” broadband internet satellites (likely part of Sphere’s communications component) and 114 Earth observation satellites, backed by ₽4.5 trillion funding from the Finance Ministry ^[94]. Work on this program began in late 2023 by Putin’s order ^[95]. If fully realized, it would revolutionize Russian satellite constellations by the mid-2030s.

Beyond Reshetnev, other satellite manufacturers include NPO Lavochkin, which, besides science probes, also built Elektro-L weather satellites and some Earth observation spacecraft; VNIIEM corporation, which produces smaller Earth observation sats like Kanopus-V; and ISS* – not to be confused with Reshetnev, but Information Scientific Center – which handles some experimental cubesats. There are also specialized entities like Technospace for military satellites, though information is sparse due to secrecy.

One notable private entrant in satellite tech is SPUTNIX, a startup that built Russia’s first private nanosatellite (TabletSat-Aurora launched in 2014). SPUTNIX and others are working on cubesat platforms and educational satellites. Also, companies like ScanEx (a private firm) specialize in satellite imagery processing and ground stations, showing some value-chain diversification.

Satellite Categories: Russia’s satellite portfolio can be segmented into:

• Communications Satellites: These include Geostationary satellites such as Express-AM and Express-AT series operated by RSCC for TV, broadband and trunk communications; Yamal satellites operated by Gazprom Space Systems for commercial telecom (some Yamal models were built in cooperation with Europe). Russia also deploys highly-elliptical orbit (HEO) satellites to cover high latitudes – the legacy Molniya orbit concept. A next-gen HEO project, Express-RV, is planned under Sphere to provide Arctic coverage. Additionally, Gonets (meaning “messenger”) is a constellation of low-earth orbit satellites for data relay/IoT (18 currently, being expanded to “Gonets-M” and eventually replaced by Marathon IoT). The domestic satcom market is modest but strategic – serving remote Siberian regions, military comms, and broadcasting across Russia’s vast territory. The Russia Satellite Communications market is estimated at $1.17 billion in 2025, forecast to nearly double to $2.15 billion by 2030 amid growing demand for broadband and IoT connectivity ^[96]. This robust ~13% CAGR reflects how critical satellites are for bridging the digital divide in Russia’s geography.
• Earth Observation (EO) Satellites: Russia operates a suite of Earth-observation and meteorology satellites, though fewer in number and generally lower in capability than U.S./European peers. Notable systems include Resurs-P optical imaging satellites (high-resolution Earth imagers for mapping natural resources), Kanopus-V small EO satellites for disaster monitoring and multispectral imaging, Persona and Bars-M series (military reconnaissance satellites with high-res optics, largely classified), Arktika-M satellites in HEO for Arctic weather observation, and Meteor-M series for meteorology (one Meteor-M was lost in a launch failure in 2017, highlighting reliability issues). Many of Russia’s EO satellites are aging: for instance, only one Meteor-M is currently operational after others failed. The need for modern EO is recognized; hence plans for 100+ new imaging sats under the national program ^[97]. Russia also historically excelled in radar satellites (e.g. Kondor series), but has only a couple in orbit now. The “Sphere” program’s Earth-observation component includes sub-constellations named Berkut (for optical, radar, and infrared monitoring) totaling dozens of satellites ^{[98] [99]}. If implemented, this will give Russia a comprehensive EO capacity for both civilian and military uses. Commercial applications of EO (like selling imagery) remain limited; companies like Sovzond and TerraTech market some data, but Western sanctions restrict international sales (e.g. Western firms now avoid buying Russian satellite imagery).
• Navigation Satellites: The GLONASS system is a crown jewel for Russia – a 24-satellite GNSS analogous to GPS, providing global positioning services. Maintained by Reshetnev-built satellites (GLONASS-M and newer GLONASS-K/K2 models), it is critical for both military targeting and civilian navigation in Russia. GLONASS is fully operational but many satellites are past their warranty life, and new GLONASS-K2 launches have been slow (in part due to Western electronics issues). Funding shortfalls are apparent: originally ₽484 billion was earmarked for GLONASS modernization from 2021–2030, but only ₽158 billion is budgeted through 2026 ^[100]. This underfunding raises concern about GLONASS’s sustainability, although Russia may allocate more in later years or seek help from India (a GLONASS partner) and others. Notably, GLONASS remains one area Russia considers non-negotiable for strategic autonomy – it even launched GLONASS satellites during the tense 2022–2023 period, albeit using stored foreign components.
• Scientific & Exploration Spacecraft: While not a large “market” segment revenue-wise, science missions are key for prestige. After a long hiatus, Russia sent the Luna-25 lander to the Moon’s south pole in August 2023 – attempting to beat India’s Chandrayaan-3 to that region. Unfortunately, Luna-25 crashed during descent ^[101], highlighting the difficulties of reconstituting deep-space expertise. The failure was a blow to Roscosmos (and likely contributed to leadership shake-ups), but the program continues: Luna-26 orbiter and Luna-27 lander are planned for late 2020s in partnership with Europe (though ESA pulled out after 2022). Other upcoming science missions include ExoMars (the rover mission with ESA that got suspended), possible Venera-D Venus mission with U.S. cooperation (likely shelved due to sanctions), and Spektr space observatories (Russia launched Spektr-R radio telescope in 2011 and had X-ray telescope Spektr-RG in 2019 with Germany, but Germany shut its instrument off in 2022). In essence, Russia’s once-formidable interplanetary program is now reliant on international cooperation or is delayed.

In summary, Russia’s satellite manufacturing segment is at a pivotal transition. The capability to build large, complex satellites is still there – ISS Reshetnev has delivered hundreds of spacecraft. But to remain viable and competitive, the sector must adapt to lack of imported parts and scale up production for constellations. The government’s hefty investment plans, if executed, could rejuvenate this segment and even open new commercial avenues (e.g. offering satellite constellations “as a service” to other countries – something Roscosmos is actively pitching ^[102]). Much will depend on funding continuity and whether technical hurdles (like microelectronics) can be solved domestically or via new partners.

Satellite Communications and Broadcasting

Satellite communications is one of the more commercially developed space segments in Russia. It encompasses fixed satellite services (TV broadcast, trunk telephony, VSAT networks), mobile satellite services, and broadband internet via satellite. The Russian domestic satcom market serves not only a population spread over 11 time zones (with many remote communities) but also government needs for secure communications.

The main operators are:

• RSCC (Russian Satellite Communications Company): A state-owned enterprise operating the Express series of geostationary comsats. As of 2025, RSCC has a fleet of ~12 Express satellites (Express-AM, AT, and newer Express-80/103, etc.) covering Russia and neighboring regions. These provide DTH television, radio broadcasting, and communication links for commercial and governmental clients. RSCC was expanding with new satellites like Express-AMU3 and AMU7 launched in 2021–22.
• Gazprom Space Systems (GSS): A subsidiary of gas giant Gazprom, GSS runs the Yamal satellites. It started as a commercial venture to provide communications to Gazprom’s own far-flung operations (pipelines, rigs) and also leases capacity to others. Yamal satellites (named after the Yamal peninsula gas region) cover Russia, parts of Europe, Middle East, etc. GSS had international partnerships (the Yamal-402 satellite was built by Thales Alenia Space), but since sanctions, they’ll likely rely on domestic manufacturers. GSS also planned Yamal broadband satellites possibly under Sphere.
• Others:Gonets Satellite System (recently integrated into Roscosmos) operates the Gonets-M low-orbit satellites for store-and-forward messaging, mainly used by energy, scientific and remote monitoring applications. New Skif and Marathon satellite networks are in development as part of Sphere: Skif will be a set of 12 medium-orbit satellites for broadband internet, and Marathon IoT will be 264 small sats for Internet of Things connectivity ^{[103] [104]}. A contract for 132 Marathon satellites was signed in 2023 ^[105], and first launches are expected by 2025. If realized, these constellations could transform Russia’s digital landscape (providing Starlink-like services domestically) and allow it to offer communications services globally (the name “Sphere” suggests an all-encompassing network).

The demand for satellite broadband in Russia is rising, particularly for connecting rural areas, Arctic sea routes, inflight connectivity, etc. However, Russia faces stiff competition in the global satcom arena from the likes of Starlink (which, notably, is not authorized in Russia – in fact, Russia tried to jam Starlink signals in conflict zones). This geopolitical angle means Russia wants its own LEO broadband constellation for sovereignty. The Sphere program, announced by President Putin in 2018, explicitly aims to compete with OneWeb/Starlink ^[106]. Originally conceived as 640 satellites by 2030 ^[107], Sphere was later scaled to ~162 satellites in a first phase due to budget constraints ^[108]. Now, with new funding, it appears to be back on a growth track (the mention of 886 Rassvet satellites likely corresponds to Sphere’s comms component ^[109]).

Financially, the satellite communications segment is one of the few in Russia that can attract private investment and generate hard currency. For instance, RSCC rents transponder capacity to foreign clients (some Express satellites carry transponders for Eutelsat and others). Before 2022, western companies also paid for use of Russian satellites for coverage in certain regions. Those deals have dwindled due to sanctions, but Russia is instead focusing on offering packages to friendly states – e.g. helping Iran and Angola build and launch communication satellites, then training their operators. Over 70% of Roscosmos’s export revenue now comes from such deals, essentially turnkey satellite systems for foreign partners ^[110]. This includes building the satellite, launch, and ground segment. Countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America with “unfriendly” relations to the West might choose Russian satellites for secure communications.

One interesting development: Russia and China have discussed integrating their satcom networks. In 2021, China’s Great Wall Industry Corp signed some MoU with Roscosmos on communications cooperation. Moreover, with BRICS emphasis, Russia could align Sphere with similar efforts from India or others to create a non-Western satcom backbone.

In summary, the satcom segment in Russia is active, with a strong domestic footprint and growth potential via Sphere. The market size being around $1–2 billion is modest globally, but within Russia it is crucial for connecting the nation and earning export revenue. Over the next decade, the big question is whether Russia can field its planned large constellations (Skif, Marathon, etc.) in time and on budget, as these will define its competitiveness in satellite communications.

Earth Observation and Remote Sensing

Russia’s Earth observation (EO) sector is driven largely by government and military requirements, with a smaller commercial component. Historically, the Soviet Union had a robust reconnaissance satellite program (film-return satellites, etc.) and a meteorological satellite network shared with other Warsaw Pact countries. In modern Russia, EO has not been a top commercial priority compared to comms, but it’s vital for intelligence, weather, and scientific monitoring over Russia’s huge territory.

Key EO systems and programs include:

• Resurs-P: A series of civilian high-resolution imaging satellites (up to 1 m resolution in panchromatic) used for mapping, agricultural monitoring, and emergency response. Three were launched (2013–2016); currently at least one is operational, others have had issues. An upgraded Resurs-PM series is planned.
• Kanopus-V: Small satellite constellation (about 500 kg each) providing multispectral imagery for disaster management, land use, etc. Russia has launched several Kanopus-V and Kanopus-V-IK satellites, sometimes with international cooperation (UK had some technology in earlier ones). More Kanopus are planned, including specialized ones for Arctic surveillance.
• Meteor-M: Polar-orbiting meteorology satellites providing cloud imaging, atmospheric data, etc. Meteor-M No.2-3 launched in 2019 is working; a previous unit was lost in launch. Russia also has Electro-L satellites in geostationary orbit for weather (similar to U.S. GOES), which provide full-disk images of Earth (Electro-L No.3 is in orbit as of 2019).
• Arktika-M: A novel system – highly elliptical orbit satellites that hover for long durations over the Arctic regions to provide continuous coverage (where geostationary sats can’t reach). Arktika-M No.1 launched in 2021 to monitor Arctic weather and communications. More are in production.
• Ocean Reconnaissance & Radar: In Soviet times, “Raduga” and “Legenda” satellites tracked naval targets. Modern Russia has Liana system (comprising Pion-NKS radar satellites) intended to track ships. The first Pion-NKS launched in 2021. There’s also Kondor-FKA series, small radar satellites for all-weather imaging; one Kondor was launched for South Africa (as a commercial deal) in 2014. The radar program faces challenges due to high-tech import needs.
• Military Reconnaissance: Highly secret but likely includes electro-optical imaging sats named Persona (three launched, possibly one or two operational now, with ~0.5 m class resolution) and newer designs possibly in development. Also, signal intelligence satellites (like Lotos series) are flown under the Liana program.
• Mapping and Geodetic: Russia maintains satellites for geodesy (the Soviet-era Kometa and Musson series might have modern equivalents) and for space-based cartography. These are dual-use as well, aiding ICBM targeting and civil mapping.

The EO fleet has suffered from aging and some mission failures. A 2023 analysis noted Roscosmos “is no longer able to launch some satellites as planned, while over 30 satellites for military use have surpassed their warranted lifetime” ^[111]. This highlights a backlog in refreshing Earth observation and spy satellites. Western embargoes on satellite cameras, sensors, and even launch access (Europe used to launch some of these on Vega or share data) have made it harder for Russia. Consequently, Roscosmos is prioritizing building a domestic supply chain for optics and is exploring cooperation with countries like Iran (which Russia helped by launching an Iranian high-res imaging sat in 2022, likely in exchange for Iran’s satellite tech or drone tech).

On the commercial side, companies like ScanEx offer satellite imagery services. ScanEx has a network of ground stations and historically had ties to receive data from SPOT (French) and IRS (India) satellites, and even U.S. Landsat. After 2022, accessing Western satellite data might be restricted, raising the importance of domestic EO satellites. There is also Sovzond, which provides GIS and remote sensing solutions. But overall, Russia’s share of the global commercial EO market is quite small.

One bright spot: with climate change and Arctic development, there’s more internal demand for environmental monitoring. Projects like Sfera’s “Berkut” constellations plan a range of EO satellites:

• Berkut-O for optical imaging,
• Berkut-VD for hyperspectral,
• Berkut-X and Berkut-XLP for radar, and
• Berkut-C for infrared ^{[112] [113]}.

These would total dozens of satellites aimed at comprehensive monitoring (the Arctic is a priority). For example, Berkut-X is envisioned as an X-band SAR (synthetic aperture radar) constellation to provide all-weather imaging of northern latitudes. If funded and built, these could bring Russia back into a competitive position in EO by the 2030s.

To quantify, the EO segment’s market value in Russia is hard to isolate (most funding is government-driven). But it ties into agriculture, forestry, oil and gas monitoring (pipeline surveillance via satellites is important), and disaster response (wildfires in Siberia are tracked by satellites). The expansion to 114 new EO satellites by mid-2030s ^[114] suggests a significant ramp-up, meaning billions of rubles earmarked just for remote sensing spacecraft and their infrastructure.

In conclusion, Russia’s EO segment is strategically significant, though currently somewhat underserved (few modern satellites, reliance on aging assets). The planned investment wave and new constellations under Sphere/Sfera indicate recognition that “information from space” (intelligence, climate data, etc.) is as crucial as communications. Achieving those plans will require overcoming technology gaps and possibly leveraging partnerships with countries like China (which might share some EO satellite components or data – indeed, BRICS are exploring a joint EO satellite constellation as announced in 2023).

Defense and Dual-Use Space Systems

Military and dual-use applications have been a driving force in the Russian (and previously Soviet) space program. In Russia’s doctrine, space is an extension of the strategic battlefield and a critical domain for intelligence, navigation, communications, and deterrence. As noted, Russian space policy explicitly lists defense as a core purpose ^[115].

Key defense-related space systems include:

• GLONASS – mentioned above as dual-use, it provides encrypted positioning signals for the Russian military (similar to GPS’s coded signals). Maintaining GLONASS operational is vital for Russian precision-guided munitions and military logistics. Given the war context, Russia has been pushing to keep GLONASS fully populated (24 sats) and upgrade to newer models (GLONASS-K2 will have improved accuracy and presumably more resistance to jamming). The challenge is largely funding and electronics for these satellites, as each GLONASS satellite historically used some non-Russian parts.
• Early Warning Satellites: To detect missile launches, Russia deploys the Kupol (EKS) satellite network, replacing the old Oko system. These are in Molniya orbits looking for ICBM launch heat signatures. A number of EKS satellites have been launched since 2015, giving Russia some coverage against missile threats. This is entirely defense-focused and funded by the Ministry of Defense.
• Communications (Military): Secure military communications satellites include the Meridian series (in Molniya orbits for Arctic comms) and Blagovest high-bandwidth geostationary sats (for the Russian Aerospace Forces). Also, older satellites like Molniya-3 and Raduga-1M provided military comms. The new Sfera program’s communications part (Skif, Marathon) will certainly be used by both civilian and military users – e.g. Marathon IoT could support military asset tracking, and Skif broadband could provide on-demand links for forces in remote areas.
• Reconnaissance and Imaging: Covered under EO, satellites like Persona (optical spy satellites) and Bars-M (cartographic reconnaissance) are operated by the military. Russia likely has only a handful of high-resolution spy satellites in orbit at any time (far fewer than the U.S.), hence the reliance on dual-use satellites and even at times purchasing commercial imagery. There were reports that during the Syria conflict and more recently, Russia obtained images from private satellite firms (like in China or from its ally Belarus’ satellite) to augment its own limited fleet.
• Electronic Intelligence (ELINT): Russia operates ELINT satellites such as Lotos-S as part of the Liana system, to eavesdrop on radar and communications emissions from ships, bases, etc. A couple of Lotos satellites are in orbit, giving Russia some “eyes and ears” from space to cue its forces.
• Anti-Satellite (ASAT) and Space Control: On the offensive side, Russia has demonstrated anti-satellite capability. In November 2021, it conducted a direct-ascent ASAT test, destroying one of its defunct satellites (Cosmos-1408) with a missile and creating a cloud of debris – an act widely condemned internationally. This showed that Russia can target low-orbit satellites (which could threaten adversary recon or communications sats in wartime). Russia also has “co-orbital” inspector satellites that can approach other satellites (e.g. Cosmos-2542, which in 2020 maneuvered near a U.S. spy sat). These highlight a space control program, likely under the Ministry of Defense, that runs in parallel to Roscosmos’s civil efforts.
• Dual-Use Technology: Many Russian satellites serve both civil and military users. For example, Resurs-P civilian imaging sats can provide photos to the military; Arktika-M weather sats help both civilian forecasts and military Arctic operations. The legal framework explicitly uses the term “dual-use space technology” ^[116]. This means funding often comes jointly. The FPRI assessment of Russia’s 2013–2020 space spending found about ₽221 billion (~$3.6 billion) of expenditures were essentially military space projects outside the civil programs ^[117]. That averages to roughly ₽27 billion ($450 m) per year on purely military space. However, if one includes GLONASS and shared programs, the military-related spending is much higher (as referenced, at least ₽110 billion in 2023) ^[118].
• Human Spaceflight for Defense: Though the current ISS missions are peaceful, Russia’s military could leverage human spaceflight know-how for future projects (e.g., there’s talk of military applications for the planned ROSS station, such as observation or as a platform for quickly assembling or servicing spy satellites). During the Cold War, the Soviets had the Almaz military space station program. There’s no confirmed modern equivalent, but a militarized spin-off of ROSS is conceivable.
• Defense against Space Threats: Russia also invests in tracking space objects (space situational awareness). It has the Krona space surveillance system and others. Interestingly, Roscosmos companies have proposed exotic tech like a “laser cannon” to clear space debris by vaporizing it with a ground-based laser ^[119] – a concept that blurs debris removal and ASAT, frankly.

International sanctions have explicitly targeted military space links. For instance, the U.S. Commerce Department in 2022 moved to strictly deny exports that support Russian “commercial space launch activities” if they could benefit the military ^[120]. This effectively tries to choke off any Western tech that might indirectly aid Russia’s defense space.

In response, Russia is leaning on self-reliance and allies. Some reports suggest Russia might seek Chinese microelectronics for its military satellites (though China is also careful to avoid secondary sanctions). Additionally, Russia has mooted deeper cooperation with China’s PLA Strategic Support Force in sharing satellite data.

A crucial aspect is that the Ukraine war (2022–present) has underscored the importance of space assets – and their vulnerabilities. Russia has relied on space for recon (but had gaps, forcing it to use drones and other means). Conversely, Ukraine, aided by Western commercial satellite imagery and Starlink communications, gained a battlefield edge. This likely accelerated Russia’s urgency to bolster its military space capabilities. Putin even commented in late 2022 about increasing the satellite constellation for the Armed Forces.

In conclusion, defense and dual-use systems remain a cornerstone of Russia’s space rationale. The space industry not only supports the economy but underpins national security. The trend is toward integrating military needs into every new program (e.g. Sphere’s dual-use nature, ROSS possibly having strategic roles). Funding for defense space is more assured than for pure science; as Reuters noted, after Ukraine isolation “Russia… boosted investments in military space efforts while nearly all joint space exploration projects with the West collapsed” ^[121]. We can expect Russia to prioritize reconnaissance, targeting, and secure communications satellites in the near term, and to keep demonstrating that it can defend and offense in space (though hopefully through international norms, rather than more debris-creating tests).

Market Size and Outlook in Numbers

Despite the challenges, Russia’s space sector still commands a multi-billion dollar scale. Combining government budget, commercial launch contracts, satellite manufacturing, and services, the Russian space economy is estimated at roughly $4–6 billion per year in 2023–2025 (for comparison, the U.S. space budget alone is ~$24 billion for NASA plus much more for military, and the global space economy was ~$570 billion in 2023 ^[122]).

Looking at specific figures and forecasts:

• Government Spending: Russia’s federal space budget (civil) has hovered around ₽170–200 billion annually in recent years (this includes the Roscosmos subsidy and related programs) ^[123]. Military space spending is largely classified but likely adds another ₽100+ billion. The combined state space spending might be on the order of ₽270–300 billion ($3.5–4 billion) per year in 2023. However, ruble values can be misleading due to inflation and exchange rate fluctuations (the ruble fell significantly in 2022). For context, the 2013–2020 space program spent ₽1.39 trillion (~$25.7 billion at average rates) ^[124], and the plan for 2021–2025 was set higher but may not fully materialize due to economic constraints ^[125].
• Roscosmos Revenue: As noted, Roscosmos reported ₽413 billion in revenue for 2023 ^[126], up from ~₽389 billion in 2022. For 2024, it targets ₽492 billion ^[127] – a substantial 19% increase, which assumes new projects and foreign deals. This revenue includes not just budget money but any commercial and export earnings by Roscosmos and its subsidiaries. It is essentially the size of the industry under Roscosmos. ₽492 billion at current exchange rates (~90 RUB/USD as of mid-2024) is about $5.5 billion. By 2025 and beyond, if Sphere and other projects ramp up, this annual revenue could exceed ₽600+ billion (though part of that is internal government spending).
• Growth Forecasts: A true market “forecast” is complex due to sanctions unpredictability. However, the Kremlin’s commitment of ₽4.5 trillion (~$57 billion) through the national space project suggests an average of perhaps ₽500 billion per year over the next 9–10 years earmarked for space ^[128]. If realized, that implies the Russian space sector could roughly double in nominal size by the early 2030s. In dollar terms, much depends on the ruble’s strength. But even assuming depreciation, Russia might sustain a ~$5–7 billion/year space spend rate, keeping it the #2 or #3 globally in government space expenditure (currently, the U.S. is #1, China and Russia traditionally contest #2/#3). Space Foundation rankings in 2023 still listed Russia among the top five space-spending nations ^[129].
• Commercial Markets: The launch services market for Russia has shrunk – from a peak of earning ~$1 billion/year in the 2010s from commercial launches to perhaps only a few hundred million now (mostly from Soyuz launches for Arianespace and OneWeb that were pre-paid, and some small contracts with India or others). Unless Russia can attract new launch clients (e.g. emerging space nations), its launch revenue will rely on domestic institutional demand. Launch remains important though for cost-saving: Russia launching its own satellites avoids paying foreign providers.
• Satellite manufacturing and exports: Russia occasionally sells satellites or technology abroad. In the 2010s, it sold a telecom satellite to Indonesia (Palapa-D), helped build a satellite for Belarus (Belintersat), and supplied parts to others. With Western players largely absent now, Russia may capture more such deals in the Global South. For instance, Roscosmos said over 70% of its export revenue comes from building space systems for other countries ^[130]. This could grow if Sphere’s technology is offered to friendly nations as a package (imagine Roscosmos building a mini-constellation for, say, a Latin American country’s remote sensing needs).
• Downstream services: One should note that downstream space services (satellite TV, navigation services, etc.) do contribute to Russia’s economy but are often counted in other sectors. E.g., satellite TV (Tricolor TV and others) has millions of Russian subscribers, generating revenue that depends on satellites but is counted as telecom sector revenue. Similarly, GLONASS-enabled services (vehicle navigation, precision farming) are growing; Russia mandates GLONASS in certain industries (like all new Russian-built smartphones must support GLONASS). These indirect markets are significant but not always captured as “space sector” in narrow terms.
• International Cooperation and Funding: Russia’s isolation means it cannot count on large inflows from ISS partners or NASA like it did in the 1990s/2000s. Instead, it might partner with China to share costs on big projects (e.g. lunar base) or with UAE, India, etc., to co-fund missions. For example, Russia is training an Indian astronaut for India’s Gaganyaan mission and provided life support systems – such partnerships bring in modest revenue and strengthen ties ^[131]. But the real game-changer would be if BRICS or SCO countries decide to collectively invest in space infrastructure with Russia (there’s talk of a BRICS satellite constellation for remote sensing, which might involve Russian contribution).

In conclusion, the Russian space market is resilient but constrained. It is not collapsing – the state ensures a baseline funding – but growth is limited by sanctions and the need for costly self-reliance. The next decade’s outlook hinges on the success of large programs like Sphere and ROSS. If those proceed, Russia will essentially be investing heavily in domestic capacity (satellite internet, new station, etc.) which could spur innovation and some economic return (e.g. bridging the digital divide could have multiplier effects). However, such projects come with high risk. As one expert succinctly put it, “Russia still does not know how to save its manned space program, and for satellite manufacturing, it must rely primarily on consumer-grade electronics, which are imported” (often illicitly) from China or the West ^[132]. Overcoming that dependency is crucial for the projected market growth to materialize.

Regulatory and Policy Framework

Russia’s space activities operate under a centralized policy framework that aligns closely with national strategic goals – and has had to adapt to international sanctions and shifting alliances.

Governance Structure: The Russian president and government set space policy priorities, often through multi-year programs. Roscosmos, as a state corporation, answers directly to the government (the Prime Minister oversees the Military-Industrial Commission which includes space). The Kremlin often personally intervenes – President Putin holds meetings about space developments (for instance, he chaired a meeting on space at Bauman University in 2023 to address industry problems ^[133]). The Roscosmos Director General is a high-profile appointment (previous DGs like Rogozin and Borisov were Deputy Prime Ministers or defense officials). This reflects how space is seen as a matter of national prestige and security at the very top. According to Russia’s space law, “the Kremlin is the principal decision-maker in space-related programs” and the head of Roscosmos is not just a bureaucrat but “an influential politician” coordinating space and security policies ^[134]. Indeed, Dmitry Rogozin (Roscosmos chief 2018–2022) was known for his fiery political statements as much as for running the agency.

Legal Basis: Russia’s core space law is the Law on Space Activity (1993), which has been updated over time. It lays out allowed space activities, licensing requirements, and Russia’s adherence to international treaties ^[135]. Notably, it states that space must be used in interests of defense and security (Article 2) and acknowledges “dual-use” tech (Article 4) ^[136]. All entities – including private companies – must be authorized by the state to conduct launches or operate spacecraft, aligning with Outer Space Treaty obligations for state supervision. In 2016, some amendments were made to facilitate private spaceflight (allowing non-government launches, etc.), but practical implementation has been cautious. The law also confirms that international treaties (like the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, Liability Convention, etc.) are part of Russian law, meaning Russia abides by norms like not claiming celestial bodies, registering space objects, etc. ^[137].

Export Controls and Sanctions: Since 2014, and especially after 2022, Western nations have imposed strict controls on exports to Russia’s space and defense sector. The U.S. EAR (Export Administration Regulations) were amended so that any high-tech item for Russia’s space program is denied if it could support military use. Initially, the U.S. made a minor exception for “civil” space cooperation (to keep ISS going), but by 2022 even that window closed, except for ISS-related hardware already agreed ^[138]. The EU similarly bars sending space-grade electronics or software to Russia. Consequently, Russian satellites can no longer legally source European sensors or American chips. Russia has tried to pivot by increasing imports from China or developing domestic substitutes. This is a slow process and has caused project delays (e.g. the Meteor weather satellites had European components that needed replacing, causing multi-year delays).

Sanctions also hit services: insurance companies in London stopped covering Russian launches; Arianespace froze payments; OneWeb not only canceled launches but Russia responded by confiscating some of OneWeb’s equipment in Baikonur. Another aspect is financial sanctions – Roscosmos and subsidiaries are on Western sanctions lists, limiting their ability to transact in dollars or euros. For instance, after 2022, Roscosmos had to ask all foreign customers to pay in rubles or other currencies because many Russian banks were cut off from SWIFT.

International Cooperation and Isolation: As of 2025, Russia’s space cooperation is bifurcated. Ties with the West are largely severed except for the ISS and a few scientific collaborations (some Russian instruments still fly on ESA’s ExoMars rover sitting in storage, but that mission is unlikely to proceed with Russia). The ESA-Roscosmos partnership on lunar projects (Luna-25/27) was canceled by ESA after Luna-25’s launch due to sanctions, meaning Russia had to develop its own landing cameras which possibly contributed to the crash. The long-standing NASA-Roscosmos cooperation on ISS continues carefully; both sides emphasize professional collaboration and keep it insulated from politics as much as possible ^[139]. The summer 2025 meeting of agency heads was surprising and seen as a sign that neither side wants an abrupt end to civil space ties ^[140]. However, the U.S. has made it clear that new partnerships (like Artemis) are off-limits to Russia due to its actions in Ukraine.

In contrast, Russia is strengthening cooperation with China and other non-Western countries. In March 2021, Roscosmos and the China National Space Administration (CNSA) signed an MoU to jointly create an International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) by the 2030s. This is envisioned as a series of robotic missions and eventually a base at the Moon’s south pole. In March 2024, Roscosmos and CNSA agreed on some specifics, such as possibly bringing a nuclear power unit to the Moon in 2033–2035 for the base ^[141]. They plan complementary missions: e.g. Russia’s Luna-26 orbiter and Luna-27 lander in late 2020s, and China’s Chang’e-7 and -8, will all contribute to ILRS. This partnership is a direct rival to the U.S.-led Artemis program (Russia had been invited to Artemis talks early on but chose not to join, citing concerns over the U.S.-centric legal framework). Instead, Russia often speaks on forums with China against U.S. “hegemonic” space plans and pushes for a multipolar approach.

Besides China, Russia works with India (training Indian astronauts, potentially flying them to ISS or supporting India’s upcoming space station; also Russia supplied parts for India’s Gaganyaan spacecraft ^[142]). With Iran, Russia helped launch an imaging satellite and may collaborate on navigation (Iran could host GLONASS ground stations for better accuracy). With Gulf states, Roscosmos signed agreements (e.g. UAE bought a Soyuz seat in 2019 to ISS; Saudi Arabia has shown interest in Russian rockets for small satellites). In Latin America and Africa, Russia offers basic space training and infrastructure – e.g. Roscosmos built a satellite integration center in Vietnam, and is discussing one in South Africa. These are part of Russia’s soft-power diplomacy via space.

Export Regulations (Russian side): In response to Western moves, Russia too has banned some exports – notably the sale of RD-180 and RD-181 engines to the U.S. was stopped in 2022 (although U.S. companies had already moved on or had stockpiles). Russia also said it will no longer service RD-180s in U.S. inventory. Roscosmos threatened to halt Soyuz-ST launches from Kourou even before ESA did, effectively stranding some European Galileo satellites (which ESA then had to launch on other rockets). Furthermore, Russia has tightened controls on Baikonur – it demanded guarantees that OneWeb satellites wouldn’t be used militarily (an excuse used to freeze that launch in 2022). Domestically, Russia has security rules that prevent sharing too advanced technology even with partners (for instance, during the NASA cooperation era, there were always delicate negotiations over export-controlled tech in both directions).

Regulatory Support for Private Sector: On paper, Russia has tried to encourage private space companies via the “Space 2030” strategy and Skolkovo innovation center grants. They introduced a licensing regime for commercial launches in 2020, and in 2021 gave Success Rockets a license to launch suborbital rockets (which it did). The government also can co-fund projects (e.g. the National Technology Initiative had a program for smallsat constellations). Still, high barriers remain – private firms complain of bureaucratic red tape, lack of investors (Russian venture capital in space is minimal, partly due to sanctions scaring off foreign investors), and competition with subsidized state firms. A Room Journal analysis quipped that Russian private space entrepreneurs face “a long road to the stars” due to these hurdles ^[143].

Debris and Arms Control: Russia has historically taken positions in the UN advocating a “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)” and, with China, proposed draft treaties to ban space weapons. However, their 2021 ASAT test undermined that moral high ground. Russia is also part of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) and has debris mitigation guidelines, but implementation is spotty (Proton rockets still drop stages in uninhabited areas, sometimes causing environmental concern ^[144]). After the ASAT test, Russia did not join the U.S.-initiated pledge to not conduct destructive ASATs.

Human Spaceflight Policy: Russia is focusing on preserving an independent human spaceflight capability. A top policy goal is to ensure that Russian cosmonauts remain in orbit continuously even after the ISS retires ^[145]. That drives the ROSS station project. Borisov in 2022 said ROSS would be implemented by 2028–2030 and open to “friendly nation” partners (possibly BRICS) ^[146]. Funding ROSS is challenging – estimates suggest the first phase (two modules) might cost ₽150 billion through 2025–2027 ^[147]. The policy rationale is strategic: not to lose the expertise and international prestige of human spaceflight.

Leadership Changes and Policy Continuity: With the ousting of Borisov (who was in office only 18 months) and hiring of Bakanov, some policy shifts may occur. Borisov was frank about problems – he publicly acknowledged that “Russia has no clear space strategy” and had to devise an “emergency plan” in 2023 with more funding ^[148]. He was also pragmatic about cooperating with NASA in low Earth orbit while pivoting to China for deep space. Bakanov, being younger and from an economics background, might push for efficiency and revenue generation (as evidenced by talking up assembly lines and export contracts). The Kremlin’s appointment of an economist hints that space policy will be tied more closely to Russia’s industrial economic plans and less about grandiose rhetoric.

In summary, Russia’s regulatory and policy framework is characterized by central control, security orientation, and adaptive responses to sanctions. As one Jamestown Foundation report summarized, the Kremlin is essentially prioritizing “the maintenance of manned and military space programs despite difficulties” ^[149]. This means other areas (like science or pure commercial ventures) take a back seat. If geopolitical conditions improve, Russia could reconnect with Western partners (the 2025 NASA meeting perhaps is a tentative step), but for now, the policy is one of strategic autonomy: go it alone or with non-Western allies, ensure space assets serve national security, and try to spur enough domestic innovation to replace what can no longer be imported.

New Developments and News (2023–2025)

The period of 2023–2025 has been eventful for Russia’s space industry, with a mix of setbacks, restructuring, and hopeful projects:

• Luna-25 Mission Failure (Aug 2023): After nearly 50 years since the last Soviet lunar mission, Russia attempted to land on the Moon’s south pole with Luna-25. The mission garnered huge domestic attention as a symbol of returning to deep space. Unfortunately, on August 19, 2023, communications were lost and Luna-25 crashed into the Moon, apparently due to a thruster malfunction. This was a major blow – Roscosmos not only lost the ~$120 million craft but also some prestige (especially as India’s Chandrayaan-3 succeeded in landing on the Moon just days later). The failure highlighted the erosion of Soviet-era expertise: critical know-how in soft-landing had atrophied. It led to soul-searching within Roscosmos; Yuri Borisov even publicly admitted the failure and said the “accumulated gap” in lunar exploration must be overcome. Plans for Luna-26 orbiter and Luna-27 lander will proceed but likely with more caution and perhaps international help (Roscosmos might seek to bring ESA back on Luna-27 if politics allow, since ESA was to provide key instruments). The incident also reportedly contributed to Borisov’s removal – the Kremlin was unhappy with Roscosmos’s performance and the embarrassment of the crash.
• Leadership Change (Feb 2025): On February 6, 2025, President Putin dismissed Yury Borisov as Roscosmos Director General, as confirmed by the Kremlin ^[150]. The official reason was not explicit, but Russian media (e.g., RBC) cited issues with the costs and implementation of the National Space Center (a huge new Roscosmos HQ project in Moscow) ^[151] and the general stagnation under Borisov. Borisov’s tenure saw fewer launches (19 in 2023 vs 22 in 2022) and program delays ^[152]. In his place, Dmitry Bakanov, previously a Deputy Transport Minister and relatively young (late 30s), was appointed. Bakanov is the third Roscosmos chief since 2022 ^[153], reflecting instability. His mandate appears to be to streamline and commercialize: he immediately talked up raising revenues (e.g., aiming for ₽492 billion in 2024) ^[154] and making Roscosmos more business-like. Bakanov also engaged diplomatically, meeting NASA’s acting administrator Sean Duffy in July 2025 at Kennedy Space Center ^[155]. This unprecedented visit (first since 2018) led to discussions on extending ISS cooperation and perhaps deconflicting lunar ambitions ^[156]. It’s a sign Bakanov may pursue a less confrontational approach than his predecessor Rogozin, focusing on practical gains over fiery rhetoric.
• ROSS – New Space Station: Russia in 2021 announced plans for a Russian Orbital Service Station (ROSS) to succeed the ISS. In 2022, the concept solidified: ROSS will start as a small 4-module station in a high-inclination orbit, allowing observation of Russian territory frequently. The first module (Science-Power Module, originally built for ISS) is to be repurposed for ROSS around 2027 ^[157]. During 2023–24, design work continued and Roscosmos estimated 150 billion rubles needed in the first 3 years for ROSS ^[158]. It’s pitched as more than just national pride – ROSS will enable experiments in material science, medicine, and serve as a base for future lunar spacecraft assembly or servicing. Roscosmos invited friendly countries (perhaps BRICS) to participate, indicating it may not be entirely go-it-alone. Notably, Roscosmos has said ROSS “will be open to international partners” even outside BRICS ^[159], which could be a gesture to, say, UAE or others to join and co-fund. The project is risky given budget constraints, but Russia seems determined not to rely on ISS beyond 2030. In late 2024, Roscosmos even launched a small tech demo satellite (Skif-D) to test comms that could be used in ROSS and Sphere synergy ^[160].
• International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) with China: As cooperation with ESA fell through, Russia doubled down with China. In 2023 and 2024, multiple meetings between Roscosmos and CNSA refined their lunar roadmap. They set up a joint data center for lunar projects and agreed to coordinate missions. A headline announcement was plans to build a lunar base powered by a nuclear reactor by 2035 ^[161]. This likely refers to using a small fission power station to support ILRS operations (something also considered by NASA for Artemis base). In the near term, Russia’s Luna-26 orbiter (planned ~2025) and Luna-27 lander (~2027) will complement China’s Chang’e-6 (2024 sample return), Chang’e-7 (2026 lander/rover at south pole) and Chang’e-8 (2028 tech demo). Both nations will share findings and infrastructure. They’ve invited other countries (China has mentioned Venezuela, South Africa, others might join ILRS MoU). ILRS is a long game – its realization is post-2030 – but it is a centerpiece of Russia’s post-ISS exploration strategy.
• Spacecraft Production Milestones: In mid-2023, Roscosmos reached some notable production outputs: Borisov reported that the industry’s capacity was up to 30 launch vehicles and 40 satellites per year ^[162]. In 2023, they built “30 rockets of different classes and 40 satellites” ^[163] – this suggests Russia is managing to roughly replace or add to its orbital assets even in sanction conditions. By mid-2025, the first satellite assembly line was operational at Reshetnev (for small satellites) ^[164]. Also, in 2024 Roscosmos established a new satellite design bureau to unify smallsat efforts under one roof in Skolkovo. These steps aim to ensure the Sphere constellation can be realized. We should watch 2025–2026 as critical years where Sphere’s first operational satellites (beyond the lone Skif-D demo) are supposed to launch. Indeed, Roscosmos said the first Marathon-IoT nanosatellites would launch in early 2025 as part of a 270+ satellite series ^[165].
• Launch Vehicle Progress: In 2023, Russia launched a few Angara rockets successfully (including perhaps the first Angara launch from Vostochny which was scheduled in late 2023). Also, development continued on Soyuz-5/Irtysh – by 2025 the hardware (engines, stage tanks) were in testing. A new rocket, Soyuz-6, was announced (essentially a derivative of Soyuz-5 likely to use the methalox engine if developed). Meanwhile, older Proton launches were winding down; Proton may have only a couple launches left (one of the last was Lofting the Nauka module in 2021, and another for the MLM Node in 2024). The retirement of Proton will mark the end of an era, leaving Angara-A5 to fill its shoes.
• OneWeb Settlement: One news item: after the OneWeb cancellation in 2022, Russia had seized 36 of OneWeb’s satellites at Baikonur. In 2023, there were reports that a compromise was reached where India (a OneWeb investor) facilitated talks, and Russia might return or use those satellites somehow. It’s unclear, but it underscores the complex fallout of the sanctions in the commercial arena.
• Corruption and Quality Issues: There have been continuing corruption cases. For instance, in 2023 the head of a research center linked to rocket engine production was arrested for embezzlement. The Vostochny Cosmodrome project saw multiple contractors prosecuted over misuse of funds (Putin famously griped about corruption delays there). Roscosmos has been trying to clean house – e.g., a new auditing department was set up, and Borisov even publicly said that by reducing corruption and inefficiency, Roscosmos trimmed its projected net losses for 2022–23 from ₽54 billion to ₽33 billion ^[166]. The National Space Center (a huge new headquarters complex in Moscow for Roscosmos and design bureaus) was behind schedule and over budget, which likely contributed to Borisov’s firing ^[167]. Dmitry Bakanov might accelerate that project since it’s meant to unify Moscow-based engineers in a modern campus.
• Space Diplomacy and Treaties: Interestingly, in 2023 Russia signed the Moon Agreement with Zimbabwe as a cooperative gesture (just a footnote example of outreach). Also, Russia has been vocal in UN COPUOS about the dangers of SpaceX’s Starlink dominance and pushing for regulation of megaconstellations (given that Sphere is smaller, Russia wants to slow down others possibly). Russia has not signed the Artemis Accords (legal framework by the U.S.), and instead is crafting its own principles with China for lunar exploration that emphasize non-appropriation of Moon resources and consensus-based governance (a counter to Artemis Accords that Russia claims are too U.S.-centric).
• Human Spaceflight News: In spring 2023, a Russian cosmonaut (Anna Kikina) flew to the ISS on a SpaceX Crew Dragon – the first Russian to fly on an American spacecraft since 2002. This was part of the seat swap, indicating pragmatic cooperation. In 2024–25, more swaps are scheduled (e.g., American astronauts on Soyuz MS and Russians on Crew Dragon Crew-7, Crew-8, etc.). Also, in late 2023 a Russian film about the 2021 space movie (with actress Yulia Peresild who flew to ISS) was released, garnering public interest. Space tourism saw one development: in 2023, Roscosmos and a U.S. company announced a plan to send two Saudi astronauts (including a woman) on a short ISS visit via Soyuz in 2024 – but this got delayed or canceled, likely due to international politics and cost issues.
• Notable Launches: Some specific launches during this period: In July 2022, Russia launched a classified satellite that U.S. intelligence claimed was an inspector satellite. In 2022 and 2023, a few GLONASS-K satellites were launched to keep the nav system healthy. Russia also launched a new module to the ISS: the Prichal docking node in late 2021, which provided additional docking ports for the Russian segment (this was just before the cut-off in cooperation). In 2023, a Progress cargo ship experienced a coolant leak (similar to an earlier Soyuz MS leak) – these incidents raised concerns about spacecraft aging and led to some changes in operations (an uncrewed Soyuz was launched to replace a damaged one and bring crew home safely). These operational issues were widely reported and somewhat dented Roscosmos’s reliability image, though NASA stood by Roscosmos’s handling of them.

Looking ahead, late 2025 and 2026 will be crucial to watch. Roscosmos aims to launch ExoMars Kazachok lander (maybe repurposed without ESA’s rover), possibly with an indigenous rover – but that’s uncertain. They also target launching the Oryol (Eagle) spacecraft on an Angara rocket in a test by 2026, a key step to eventual crewed flight on it around 2028. The first elements of ROSS could be in fabrication now for launch by 2027. Internationally, by 2025–2026, the ISS extension has to be formalized – if Russia decided to extend to 2030 or not will be big news.

In summary, the 2023–25 period for Russia’s space program is one of reckoning and recalibration. The industry has absorbed shockwaves (sanctions, lost partnerships, leadership changes) and is trying to chart a new course largely on its own or with new friends. As an industry expert noted, Russia’s space sector in the 2020s is walking “the path of decline?” or possibly transition ^[168]. The coming years will reveal if Russia can turn decline into a different kind of success – one built on self-reliance, strong government backing, and non-Western collaboration – or if it continues to struggle under the weight of its challenges.

Quotes from Experts and Officials

To contextualize Russia’s space market and direction, here are insights from industry figures:

• On Sanctions Impact: “The termination of contracts by unfriendly countries cost Roscosmos 180 billion rubles.” – Andrei Yelchaninov, Roscosmos Deputy Director, acknowledging the steep revenue loss from Western sanctions after 2022 ^[169]. He added that Roscosmos is seeking new business in Asia, Africa, Latin America to compensate, but “competition is strong in all these new markets.” ^[170].
• On Financial Troubles: “For the past year, Roscosmos had a 50-billion-ruble net loss… after governmental aid, the net loss in 2022 was revised to 18 billion rubles, and the net loss in 2023 was 15 billion… These accounting tricks demonstrate that the financial ‘black hole’ of Roscosmos is hardly manageable without emergency multi-billion cash flows from the federal budget.” – Dr. Pavel Luzin, space policy expert, writing in Feb 2024 ^[171]. This underscores the systemic financial strain the corporation is under.
• On Strategy and Technology Gaps: “Russia still does not know how to save its manned space program… and for satellite manufacturing, it must rely primarily on consumer-grade electronics, which are imported from China and the West.” – Pavel Luzin again, highlighting the lack of a clear long-term strategy and the dependence on foreign tech even in 2024 ^[172].
• On Post-ISS Plans: “Undoubtedly, we will fulfill all our obligations to our partners, but the decision to leave the station after 2024 has been made.” – Yury Borisov, then-Roscosmos head, telling President Putin in July 2022 about Russia’s intent to exit the ISS by 2028 ^[173]. (This quote signaled Russia’s pivot toward ROSS and was a bombshell in the middle of ISS partnership tensions.)
• On Industry Stability under Pressure: “Despite the unprecedented sanctions pressure… it is possible to say that the industry’s operations are relatively stable.” – Yury Borisov in July 2024, reporting to the State Duma on the resilience of Russia’s space industry ^[174]. He cited stable production rates and workforce productivity improvements as evidence.
• On NewSpace Developments: “We already have examples of satellites being produced using an assembly line approach… at JSC Reshetnev, satellite production lines have already been launched. Private satellite manufacturers are also working on assembly-line production… essential for reducing costs.” – Denis Manturov, First Deputy PM, June 2025 ^[175], noting a major shift toward mass production techniques in Russia’s satellite sector to achieve economies of scale.
• On International Relations: “The parties discussed further work on the ISS, cooperation on lunar programs, [and] joint exploration of deep space… Such talks could signal thawing relations between the two countries’ civil space programs.” – Reuters report on the meeting between NASA’s and Roscosmos’s chiefs in July 2025 ^[176], highlighting that even amid geopolitical conflict, dialogue for space cooperation is cautiously resuming at the highest levels.

These quotes reflect a candid picture: Russian officials concede the serious challenges (loss of revenue, strategy voids) yet project confidence in stability and adaptation, while experts cast doubt on the sustainability without major changes. The coming years will test whether Russia’s space industry can innovate under isolation and continue its storied legacy in a new era.

Conclusion

In summary, the Russian space and satellite market of 2025 is a study in resilience under strain. Forged from the Soviet space legacy – with its vast infrastructure and technical prowess – Russia’s space industry has faced formidable headwinds from post-Soviet economic turmoil to intense international sanctions today. Roscosmos and its network of companies still anchor a comprehensive space capability spanning launch vehicles, human spaceflight, satellites, and military applications, but they operate in a far more competitive and restricted global environment.

As of 2025, Russia is recalibrating its space strategy towards self-reliance and non-Western partnerships. The industry is segmented into robust niches like launch services (now mostly serving domestic and allied needs), satellite manufacturing (scaling up for megaconstellations but hampered by electronics import bans), satellite communications (poised for growth through the Sphere program to connect Russia’s populace and clients abroad), Earth observation (ripe for expansion to support economic development and defense), and defense/dual-use systems (an enduring priority, ensuring Russia remains a space power in the military domain). The market size, roughly on the order of $5 billion annually, could grow if ambitious government investments – ₽4.5 trillion through 2030 – are fully realized, albeit much of that growth will be state-funded rather than driven by commercial demand.

Looking forward, Russia’s space sector faces a pivotal decade. Success will depend on navigating sanctions by indigenizing key technologies (a challenging feat noted by experts) and securing new international cooperation on its own terms. There are hopeful signs: the assembly-line production of satellites, new launchers on the horizon, and the budding Russia-China space alliance provide avenues for progress. Domestically, the political will to maintain a strong space program remains high – exemplified by leadership shake-ups to improve performance and sustained funding even amid economic pressures from war. Internationally, while Russia is excluded from Western-led endeavors like Artemis, it is carving out a role among emerging space nations and forging a parallel path to the Moon with China.

In essence, Russia’s space industry in 2025 stands at a crossroads of Soviet-era glory and modern-day challenges. It is leveraging its rich heritage – the engineering talent, proven designs like Soyuz, and accumulated experience – to stay relevant, all while having to reinvent aspects of itself under isolation. As the country that ushered in the Space Age with Sputnik, Russia is determined to remain a key player in space, whether by deploying hundreds of home-grown satellites or planting its flag (with partners) on the Moon once again. The coming years will reveal if this storied program can surmount its obstacles and script a new chapter among the stars, or if it will continue to cede ground in a fast-evolving global space race.

Sources:

• Zakharov, Anatoly. Russia’s Space Program After 2024, Foreign Policy Research Institute (July 2024) – Analysis of Russian space budgets and sanction impacts ^{[177] [178] [179]}.
• The Kyiv Independent. “Russia’s space chief Borisov dismissed amid program failures” (Feb 2025) – Report on leadership change, launch rates drop ^{[180] [181]}.
• SpaceDaily/AFP. “Russian space agency says break with West cost $2.1 bn” (Aug 2024) – Quote on 180 billion ruble loss, sanctions fallout ^{[182] [183]}.
• RussianSpaceWeb (A. Zak). Russian space program in 2025 – Details on planned launch cadence, satellite counts ^{[184] [185]}.
• Interfax (via interfax-russia.ru). Borisov Duma speech (July 3, 2024) – Stats on satellites in orbit, industry revenue, export focus ^{[186] [187]}.
• Jamestown Foundation (P. Luzin). “The Future of Roscosmos Unclear as Challenges Mount” (Feb 2024) – Expert commentary on financial losses, strategy issues, import dependence ^{[188] [189]}.
• Reuters (J. Roulette). “US, Russian space chiefs talk moon, ISS cooperation in rare meeting” (Aug 2025) – Noting renewed dialogue, ILRS vs Artemis, war’s impact on space ties ^{[190] [191]}.
• Mordor Intelligence. “Russia Satellite Communications Market – Growth Forecast” (2025) – Market size and CAGR for satcom segment ^[192].
• Global Times (Sputnik). “Satellite Assembly Lines Launched in Russia” (June 2025) – Manturov and Bakanov quotes on production and funding (886 sats, ₽4.5 trn) ^{[193] [194]}.
• Wikipedia. “Space industry of Russia” (accessed 2025) – Background on industry structure and history ^{[195] [196]}.

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