Internet Kill Switch: Recurring Blackouts in Syria, Iraq, Algeria – And Who’s Next?

Introduction

In parts of the world, authorities are literally switching off the internet on a routine basis. Over the last five years (2020–2025), countries like Syria, Iraq, and Algeria have repeatedly imposed nationwide internet shutdowns – often timed with school exam periods – plunging millions into digital darkness for hours at a time. Governments claim these blackouts stop exam cheating or quell unrest, but evidence shows they inflict huge economic damage and violate basic rights accessnow.org smex.org. In 2023 alone, digital rights monitors counted 283 internet shutdowns worldwide (in 39 countries), the highest ever, with Iraq and Syria responsible for a large share due to exam-related outages hindustantimes.com context.news. This report dives deep into the recurring internet shutdown patterns in Syria, Iraq, and Algeria since 2020 – including any planned shutdowns in 2025 – and then expands to other countries where going offline has become a disturbingly common tactic. We organize the data by country, year, cause, and duration to spot patterns, and cite authoritative sources (Cloudflare, Access Now, NetBlocks, etc.) to ensure credibility.

Syria: Exam-Time Internet Blackouts as an Annual Ritual

Syria’s government has turned internet shutdowns into a grim annual tradition during national exams. Since 2016, every year’s high school exam season in Syria has come with a total nationwide internet blackout each exam day smex.org. The practice began after widespread exam question leaks in 2016, and authorities claim cutting internet access prevents cheating blog.cloudflare.com smex.org. In reality, it means multi-hour connectivity blackouts affecting the entire population, not just students. Even critical services are knocked offline – with tragic consequences (for example, in June 2024 a mother and three children died in a house fire west of Damascus because they couldn’t call for help during an exam-time shutdown) smex.org.

Table 1 below summarizes Syria’s recurring exam-related shutdowns in recent years:

Table 1: Recurring Exam-Related Internet Shutdowns in Syria (2020–2025)

As shown above, Syrian exam blackouts usually last 3 to 5 hours each morning, coinciding with exam session times. Originally, these were truly total internet blackouts (traffic dropped to near-zero nationwide) implemented by withdrawing routes from the national ISP blog.cloudflare.com blog.cloudflare.com. In recent years the shutdowns have been implemented in an “asymmetric” fashion – meaning outbound traffic from Syria can leave during the shutdown, but inbound responses cannot return, effectively cutting off usable internet blog.cloudflare.com. This is evident in Cloudflare’s data: during shutdown hours Syrian requests to DNS (Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 resolver) spike (as devices keep retrying), but no responses come back blog.cloudflare.com blog.cloudflare.com. The result on the ground is the same: no functional internet.

Syria’s government has occasionally floated alternatives. In 2021, the Education Minister announced new measures (encrypting exam papers and using surveillance cameras) and hinted that if successful, they might end the shutdown practice accessnow.org smex.org. However, that promise remains unfulfilled smex.org smex.org – shutdowns continued in 2022, 2023, and 2024 unabated. Authorities maintain this drastic measure is about exam “integrity,” but experts and rights groups note no evidence it stops cheating (exam leaks still happen despite blackouts accessnow.org), whereas the harm to society is immense smex.org smex.org. Essential services from banking to healthcare are disrupted, lives are put at risk (fires, medical emergencies), remote workers lose income, and an already fragile Syrian economy suffers smex.org smex.org. Since 2018, Syria has logged over 60 shutdowns lasting more than 1,100 hours in total pulse.internetsociety.org pulse.internetsociety.org – mostly exam-related. Even outside exam periods, Syria’s regime has in the past leveraged its tight control over telecom infrastructure to cut internet during military operations or protests, underscoring the broader motive of information control accessnow.org smex.org.

With 2025’s first exam session, Syrian Telecom once again scheduled internet cuts daily – confirming that, absent international pressure, the “exam blackout” has become an annual fixture. The #KeepItOn coalition continues to urge Syria to stop flipping the kill-switch for exams, calling the practice disproportionate and ineffective pulse.internetsociety.org smex.org.

Iraq: Nationwide Outages to Prevent Exam Cheats – A Growing Trend

Iraq has also embraced exam-related internet shutdowns, especially in the last few years, turning them into a recurring policy. Iraq first experimented with cutting internet for exams around 2015 smex.org. After some hiatus and public debate, the government has firmly returned to this tactic since 2023, ordering nationwide internet shutdowns for several hours on each exam day in high school and even university exams blog.cloudflare.com netblocks.org. Unlike Syria’s longer outages, Iraq’s exam shutdowns are generally shorter (around 2 to 4 hours each morning), but often spread across many days and multiple exam rounds.

Table 2 summarizes recent internet shutdown activity in Iraq related to exams:

Table 2: Internet Shutdowns in Iraq During Exams (2020–2025)

Iraq’s use of exam blackouts has escalated quickly. In May 2023, the Ministry of Communications initially vowed not to shut down the internet for exams blog.cloudflare.com, but this stance was overruled by the Education Ministry and Cabinet within weeks. From June 2023 onward, Iraq implemented a series of multi-hour shutdowns covering most of the country (Baghdad and all governorates except the Kurdish region) during each exam session blog.cloudflare.com blog.cloudflare.com. NetBlocks confirmed the first outage hit on June 1, 2023 – the first day of finals – and similar blackouts continued on subsequent exam days netblocks.org netblocks.org. Each shutdown lasted about 4 hours (4 a.m. to 8 a.m. local), repeatedly slicing morning connectivity to zero. Even after the main high school exams, Iraqi authorities continued with a “second round” of exam shutdowns in August 2023, again cutting internet for the retake exams across most provinces netblocks.org netblocks.org. The autonomous Kurdistan region, while not affected by Baghdad’s kill-switch, imposed its own localized outages (e.g. 6–8 a.m. in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok on certain days) to cover local exam schedules blog.cloudflare.com.

The result: Iraq led the world in 2023 for internet shutdown incidents. According to Freedom House, Iraqi authorities (including the Kurdistan regional government) implemented 66 internet outages in 2023, “with most occurring during academic exams.” freedomhouse.org freedomhouse.org This number is higher than even India’s count by some metrics. Independent analyses noted that exam-related shutdowns alone made up nearly half of all shutdowns tracked globally that year pulse.internetsociety.org. In 2024, Iraq normalized the practice further – the government proactively announced the exam shutdown schedule ahead of time (a public notice on the ministry website) and treated the outages as a standard operating procedure pulse.internetsociety.org pulse.internetsociety.org. By 2025, the Internet Society’s observers noted exam shutdowns have become “ritual,” happening without fail at each exam period pulse.internetsociety.org.

These outages in Iraq have broad impacts. Though each instance is shorter than Syria’s, the frequent repetition (dozens of days across multiple months) amplifies the damage. Businesses, banks and online services nationwide go offline every morning during the weeks of exams, leading to significant economic loss. The Internet Society’s NetLoss model estimates that each day of national internet shutdown costs Iraq’s economy around $4.2 million in GDP and even cuts about 45 jobs, not to mention intangible hits to investor confidence pulse.internetsociety.org pulse.internetsociety.org. In mid-2023, a coalition of NGOs (Access Now, SMEX, et al.) pleaded with Iraqi authorities in an open letter to reconsider, noting the lack of evidence that shutdowns prevent cheating and highlighting the violation of Iraqis’ rights pulse.internetsociety.org. Nevertheless, the government persisted into 2024 and 2025, valuing “exam security” over digital freedoms.

It’s worth noting Iraq has also resorted to internet shutdowns for other reasons in recent years. For example, during mass anti-government protests in October 2019 (just before our 2020–2025 focus), Iraq shut down the internet for over a week to stem unrest and media coverage. In 2023, beyond exams, Iraqi regulators temporarily blocked entire social media platforms (such as Telegram) and websites on security grounds freedomhouse.org. However, exam blackouts have been the most recurrent, government-sanctioned outages on a national scale in the 2020s. The trend in Iraq shows how a one-time “exceptional” measure can quickly become routine – a dangerous precedent for digital rights. Observers warn that once a country normalizes shutdowns in one context (like exams), it becomes more likely to use them again for other purposes context.news accessnow.org.

Algeria: Multi-Hour Disconnects During Exams – and Evolving Tactics

Algeria has a notorious record of flipping the “kill switch” during its annual Baccalaureate (high school diploma) exams. In fact, Algeria was an early adopter of exam shutdowns, pioneering the tactic in 2016 after exam questions leaked online that year blog.cloudflare.com smex.org. Since then, every year from 2016 through 2023 saw Algeria impose nationwide internet disruptions during the week of final exams accessnow.org smex.org. These outages are highly disruptive – Algeria often implemented two shutdowns per day (coinciding with morning and afternoon exam sessions) in some years blog.cloudflare.com blog.cloudflare.com. However, Algeria’s approach has evolved: from full blanket blackouts initially, to more targeted throttling and blocking of services in recent years to mitigate economic harm blog.cloudflare.com blog.cloudflare.com.

Table 3 summarizes Algeria’s exam-time shutdown pattern:

Table 3: Internet Shutdowns in Algeria During National Exams (2016–2025)

Algeria’s exam shutdowns have drawn particular ire because of their sweeping impact on daily life and the economy. Unlike Syria or Iraq, where conflicts and instability overshadow digital issues, Algeria is a relatively connected society (over 33 million internet users, ~75% of the population) smex.org. When the internet is “turned off” even for a few hours, every sector is hit: businesses halt online operations, media outlets cannot publish, remote workers and freelancers lose income, and ordinary citizens are cut off from communication. Journalists in Algeria describe the exam shutdown week as “the most difficult time of the year” – they cannot research or file stories on deadline smex.org smex.org. Content creators and digital marketers similarly report significant losses in engagement and revenue during the outage days smex.org smex.org. All of this for a measure that, by many accounts, has not actually stopped cheating – it’s mostly viewed as a PR gesture by the government to show it’s “doing something” about exam leaks, while avoiding deeper education reforms smex.org smex.org.

Economically, the cost has been staggering. Algeria’s national economy lost an estimated $388 million USD due to the 2020 exam shutdowns alone smex.org. In 2021, experts calculated that each hour of nationwide outage cost around 500 million dinars (~$3.5 million) in lost GDP blog.cloudflare.com. Local businesses, from tech startups to e-commerce ventures, have voiced outrage that the government keeps sacrificing economic activity for a blunt-force solution accessnow.org smex.org. The policy even contradicts Algeria’s own digital development goals – it’s hard to build a robust digital economy when the internet gets unplugged on the state’s whim each year smex.org smex.org.

In terms of technique, Algeria’s pivot to throttling and platform blocks in 2022–2023 suggests an attempt to balance censorship with connectivity. By blocking major social media (Facebook, WhatsApp, etc.) and slowing traffic to a crawl during exams, the government can claim it didn’t “fully” shut off the internet, even though the practical effect for users (especially those needing social media, video, or search) was nearly as bad as a blackout. Cloudflare’s analysis in 2023 noted the absence of BGP route withdrawals in Algeria (meaning ISPs didn’t drop all connections), but the traffic graphs still showed steep drops – a sign of pervasive filtering blog.cloudflare.com blog.cloudflare.com. Algerian journalists reported that even VPNs could not help during these periods in 2023, as VPN use itself was recently curbed by regulators (VPN services must be licensed, and many were blocked) smex.org smex.org.

Heading into 2025, Algeria faces growing calls to end the annual shutdown ritual. Civil society groups condemn it as collective punishment that “harms everyone and fails to prevent cheating” smex.org smex.org. Algeria regularly ranks among the top offenders in internet shutdown trackers (usually behind only India) and endures heavy criticism each year from the #KeepItOn coalition and others smex.org. So far, however, authorities remain defiant – exam blackouts continue to be politically easier than the alternatives (like improving exam security or prosecuting leaks in a targeted way). In essence, Algeria has normalized the idea that internet access is a privilege that can be revoked for something as routine as school tests. This normalization, digital rights advocates warn, is a slippery slope toward broader censorship and repression pulse.internetsociety.org smex.org.

Other Frequent Internet Shutdown Offenders (2020–2025)

While Syria, Iraq, and Algeria illustrate a pattern of scheduled exam-related shutdowns, many other countries have frequently shut down the internet in recent years for a variety of reasons – from stopping protests to countering insurgencies or even during elections. Below, we survey some of the worst offenders and notable trends from 2020 through 2025:

India: World Leader in Internet Shutdowns

India holds the dubious distinction of being the global leader in internet shutdowns for six years running hindustantimes.com hindustantimes.com. Authorities in India – at national and especially state levels – routinely cut off internet access to maintain public order during protests, riots, or militant attacks, and sometimes even to prevent cheating in local exams. According to Access Now’s data, India accounted for a staggering 53% of all shutdowns worldwide since 2016 hindustantimes.com. In 2023 alone, India imposed 116 internet shutdowns, which was 41% of all global incidents that year hindustantimes.com. (By comparison, the next highest were Myanmar with 37 and Iran with 34 in 2023 hindustantimes.com.)

Most Indian shutdowns are regional and targeted – for example, cutting mobile internet in a city or district during protests or ethnic violence. India’s legal framework (the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services Rules) allows state governments to order shutdowns, and this has been used liberally. In 2023, shutdowns affected at least 16 of India’s 28 states/territories; some states like Manipur endured an almost continuous blackout for 212 days amid civil unrest hindustantimes.com. Others like Jammu & Kashmir and Haryana saw dozens of shorter outages. Notably, Manipur’s internet was shut from May to December 2023 due to ethnic violence, illustrating how shutdowns are now used as a blanket security measure with grave humanitarian implications hindustantimes.com.

The reasons in India vary: preventing riots or protests is common. For instance, authorities shut down internet in parts of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh during farmer protests in 2021, and in Rajasthan and Maharashtra during communal clashes. Elections and politically sensitive events also see blackouts (e.g. West Bengal during elections, 2021). India has even resorted to exam-related shutdowns on occasion: for example, Rajasthan state has repeatedly cut internet during competitive recruitment exams to curb cheating blog.cloudflare.com. This mirrors the MENA exam shutdown phenomenon, but at a state level.

The scale and cost of India’s shutdowns are immense. One report noted India had over 1,300 hours of shutdowns affecting tens of millions in 2022, costing the economy an estimated $820+ million worldpopulationreview.com. In the first half of 2023 alone, internet blackouts reportedly cost India about $1.9 billion USD and significant foreign investment losses hindustantimes.com. The long-running shutdown in Kashmir since 2019 (following the region’s autonomy revocation) was one of the longest ever in a democracy, lasting months of complete blackouts followed by years of throttling. Human rights observers have slammed these as collective punishment and a violation of free expression. Nonetheless, Indian authorities defend shutdowns as necessary for preventing the spread of rumors and inflammatory content that could spark violence.

Recent data suggests a slight decline in the absolute number of Indian shutdowns in 2024 (84 incidents, down from 116) context.news context.news, but India still easily tops the list. The practice is ingrained; local officials often order mobile data off at the first hint of unrest. Courts in India have begun reviewing the legality of arbitrary shutdowns, and in 2020 the Supreme Court ruled internet access is integral to freedom of expression, requiring that shutdown orders be temporary, necessary, and proportionate. Despite that, implementation of safeguards has been patchy. As of 2025, India’s use of the internet kill-switch remains a major concern, especially as it normalizes network disruptions in the world’s largest democracy.

Myanmar: Post-Coup Digital Darkness

Myanmar exemplifies how internet shutdowns can be used as a tool of military control. After a military coup in February 2021, Myanmar’s junta launched an unprecedented crackdown on internet access – at one point imposing a nightly nationwide internet curfew and shutting down mobile data for over a year in some areas accessnow.org accessnow.org. The coup regime has frequently cut off the internet to stifle protests and hide human rights abuses, particularly during armed conflicts with resistance forces. In 2023 and 2024, Myanmar actually surpassed India in some counts: it experienced 85 shutdown incidents in 2024, the most of any country, mostly in conflict zones context.news context.news. These included deliberate blackouts coinciding with military operations – e.g. at least 17 shutdowns occurred just before or during airstrikes on villages by the junta context.news context.news.

Myanmar’s shutdowns take various forms: nationwide outages (like the total disconnect on coup day Feb 1, 2021, and subsequent multi-day blackouts), recurring region-specific shutdowns (the junta often cuts internet in specific states/townships where anti-coup militias are active), and platform blocking (the junta blocked Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram early on). In 2022–2023, mobile internet was permanently cut in several conflict areas (parts of Sagaing and Chin states, etc.), essentially turning those regions into information black holes. By late 2024, Myanmar’s tally of shutdowns remained extremely high as the civil war continued context.news.

The impact in Myanmar has been devastating. During shutdowns, civilians cannot call for help or access information amid military raids. For example, after Cyclone Mocha in 2023, the junta kept the internet off in western Myanmar, hindering disaster relief efforts context.news. Myanmar shows how shutdowns are used not just to prevent cheating or quell protests, but as a weapon of war – to isolate communities and prevent evidence of atrocities from reaching the world accessnow.org context.news. External actors have condemned these blackout tactics; nevertheless, Myanmar’s generals have entrenched a digital control regime. As of 2025, Myanmar remains one of the least connected places during conflict, and it is likely to continue imposing shutdowns as long as the junta stays in power.

Iran: Blackouts and Throttling to Crush Protests

Iran has repeatedly shut down or severely throttled the internet to counter dissent, particularly during large anti-government protests. Notably, in November 2019 Iran imposed a near-total nationwide internet blackout for about a week amid mass protests over fuel prices, an action that cut off ~80 million people from the global internet accessnow.org accessnow.org. More recently, during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests against the regime’s policies, Iran didn’t go completely dark nationwide but did something subtler: extensive regional and mobile network shutdowns and platform blocks. For example, in September 2022, authorities heavily throttled mobile data and blocked platforms like Instagram and WhatsApp (the main communication tools for protesters) context.news context.news. Connection speeds in protest hubs were reduced to near-unusable levels, especially at night when demonstrations peaked – a form of internet “curfew”.

In 2023, Iran still experienced at least 34 shutdown incidents (the third highest globally) hindustantimes.com. These were mostly localized disruptions during flare-ups of protests or during sensitive anniversaries when the regime feared gatherings. For instance, on protest anniversary dates in 2023, internet in parts of Tehran and Kurdish regions was reportedly shut off or severely throttled. Additionally, Iran has kept certain social platforms blocked long-term (Twitter, Facebook have been banned for years; WhatsApp and Instagram joined the blacklist in 2022). This persistent censorship is another form of “internet shutdown,” albeit targeted at services rather than entire networks.

Iran’s strategy highlights throttling as a tool: by slowing the internet to a crawl (without fully disconnecting), the government can deny effective communication while claiming it didn’t completely deprive citizens of access. During 2022–2023 protests, live-streams and video sharing were rendered impossible due to bandwidth throttling, limiting the spread of protest footage accessnow.org accessnow.org. At the same time, the regime has explored internet alternatives like the National Information Network (intranet) to be able to sever global connectivity while keeping some domestic sites up.

The human rights and economic impact in Iran has been severe. Businesses reliant on Instagram (hugely popular for small commerce in Iran) lost income when it was blocked accessnow.org. Protesters and activists have been left in dangerous blackouts unable to call attention to crackdowns. The U.S. and EU have sanctioned Iranian officials for internet shutdowns, and companies have tried to provide circumvention (e.g. Starlink satellite internet, though at limited scale). Still, when faced with internal unrest, Tehran consistently reaches for the internet kill-switch as part of its playbook.

Sudan: From Exams to Coups – Frequent Outages

Sudan has been another frequent offender, using shutdowns both for exam cheating prevention and to suppress political opposition. On the exam front, Sudan started cutting internet for high school exams around 2019, following the model of its Arab neighbors. In 2020, Sudan’s authorities disrupted mobile internet for 3 hours on each exam day (Sept 13–24) accessnow.org. In 2021, they repeated this: the Attorney General ordered mobile internet shut off from 8:00–11:00 a.m. daily during exams in June 2021 accessnow.org accessnow.org. Telecom companies even sent SMS warnings to users in advance. As in other countries, the justification was preventing leaks, and it was limited to mobile data (fixed lines seemingly stayed up), which still caused chaos since most Sudanese access via mobile accessnow.org. The Sudanese public reacted with outrage at these exam outages, which halted online banking and business each morning accessnow.org accessnow.org. Despite this, Sudan continued the practice in 2022 (exam shutdowns in June 2022 for two weeks) blog.cloudflare.com blog.cloudflare.com.

Beyond exams, Sudan has used full blackouts during major political events. Most prominently, during the October 25, 2021 military coup, the internet in Sudan was shut down entirely as the army seized power accessnow.org accessnow.org. That shutdown lasted 25 days – from the coup through most of November 2021 – and was only lifted under international pressure. The goal was to paralyze pro-democracy mobilization and hide the junta’s crackdown. Similarly, in April 2023, when war erupted between rival military factions in Khartoum, internet connectivity in Sudan was severely disrupted. There were reports of weeks-long outages in parts of the country amid the fighting. And in October 2023, authorities again ordered national mobile internet shutdowns during large anti-government protests accessnow.org accessnow.org. Sudan’s recurring outages (5 separate shutdown episodes in 2021, multiple in 2022–2023) underscore a government habit of pulling the plug whenever authority is threatened accessnow.org.

The effects in Sudan have been dire. During the 2021 coup blackout, not only were protest organizers unable to communicate, but everyday people couldn’t even access cash or basic services. The economy, already fragile, lost tens of millions due to the prolonged outage smex.org smex.org. In 2023, as conflict broke out, internet cuts compounded the humanitarian crisis by cutting off information flows for those trying to flee or seek aid. Sudan demonstrates that once a state justifies shutdowns for something “benign” like exams, it readily applies them to more overtly repressive ends like silencing opposition.

Ethiopia: Conflict Blackouts and Exam Shutdowns

Ethiopia has employed internet shutdowns primarily in the context of conflict and security, but also to prevent exam cheating. On the conflict side, Ethiopia inflicted one of the world’s longest shutdowns in the Tigray region: from November 2020 until mid-2022, during the Tigray civil war, the entire region had virtually no internet or telecommunication – a blackout lasting over 18 months accessnow.org. This was aimed at isolating Tigray during military operations, and it created a de facto information blackout of atrocities in that war. Even after a ceasefire, connectivity was only slowly restored. Additionally, Ethiopia has periodically shut down internet or social media in other regions facing unrest (e.g. Oromia).

On the exam front, Ethiopia has at times mirrored its neighbors. Notably in July 2016, Ethiopia cut nationwide internet for several hours to secure university entrance exams (after an earlier leak). And in 2017 and 2018, there were reports of social media blocks during exams. In June 2020, Ethiopia again reportedly shut down internet countrywide during national exams, as confirmed by Reuters blog.cloudflare.com. These exam outages were similar 3-4 hour morning shutdowns. Though not as regular as Syria or Sudan, Ethiopia has demonstrated willingness to do this each time exams were deemed at risk.

The economic toll on Ethiopia from shutdowns is significant. Each day of national outage costs millions in lost GDP for a developing economy. The long Tigray blackout had immeasurable human costs, severing families and crippling businesses in an entire region. Ethiopia’s government faced international criticism for using connectivity as a weapon – both to contain dissent (during protests) and to control narratives during war. As of 2024, Ethiopia had eased some restrictions (Tigray regained internet), but parts of the country still experience on-off blackouts due to security operations. And like others, Ethiopia remains on the #KeepItOn radar for any hint of exam-period shutdown (the education ministry has flirted with it whenever leaks occur).

Other Countries and Patterns

Jordan – Jordan typically hasn’t fully shut off the internet nationwide in recent years, but it has repeatedly throttled or restricted social media during both exams and protests. For example, in 2020 and 2021, Jordan blocked all communication apps in and around exam halls during the Tawjihi high school exams accessnow.org accessnow.org. It also has a history of briefly slowing down live-streaming services and Facebook Live during political protests accessnow.org. So while not complete blackouts, Jordan uses targeted shutdown tactics. It imposed at least three localized shutdowns in 2020 accessnow.org and even an overnight national outage during protests in early 2021 accessnow.org. This shows a “graduated” approach – not outright kill-switch, but heavy-handed censorship when the state feels challenged.

Pakistan – Pakistan has increasingly resorted to shutdowns in the last five years. In May 2023, after the arrest of former PM Imran Khan sparked unrest, Pakistan enacted a nationwide mobile data shutdown for nearly 3 days, and also blocked major platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube context.news context.news. This was one of Pakistan’s most extensive outages, cutting off millions and costing an estimated $60+ million per day. Pakistan had 7 shutdowns in 2023 by one count hindustantimes.com and 21 shutdowns in 2024 (its highest ever) context.news context.news. Many of these are targeted: authorities often shut mobile internet in specific cities during protests, religious processions, or security operations. For instance, Pakistan regularly turns off internet in parts of the tribal areas during anti-terror raids. It also shut down internet on the day of a regional election in 2022 for “security.” The pattern suggests Pakistan’s government is more and more willing to pull the plug on connectivity to manage crises, despite the damage to its digital economy.

Bangladesh – Bangladesh hasn’t done nationwide blackouts in recent years, but it has repeatedly restricted mobile internet and social media at sensitive times. During mass student protests in 2018, the government throttled mobile internet speeds to 2G for days. In the October 2023 general election buildup, Bangladesh reportedly slowed or cut mobile internet in parts of the capital to deter protest mobilization. The government also blocked applications (like WhatsApp, Facebook) during exam periods or political events on a few occasions. So, while Bangladesh’s actions are more limited in scope, they follow the same logic: disrupt networks to control information.

Africa (various) – Several African countries have gained notoriety for repeated shutdowns:

• Nigeria: In 2021, during the #EndSARS protests against police brutality, parts of Nigeria saw social media access restricted (Twitter was officially banned for seven months). Earlier, in 2019, Nigeria shut down mobile internet in certain northern states during communal violence.
• Uganda: The Ugandan government has a history of election-related shutdowns. Notably, during the January 2021 general election, Uganda shut down the internet entirely for five days, and Facebook remains blocked in Uganda ever since that election context.news context.news. These moves were intended to curb the opposition’s organizing and reporting of alleged fraud.
• DR Congo: The Democratic Republic of Congo turned off the internet for 20 days around its December 2018 general election (into January 2019), aiming to control unrest and information about the results. It also imposed regional shutdowns during a 2021 insurgent attack.
• Chad: Chad is infamous for a 16-month social media blackout (2018–2019) under the previous regime, and it has intermittently cut internet during protests or elections. For example, in 2021 after disputed election results, Chad went dark for days.
• Belarus: During the August 2020 Belarus elections and mass protests against President Lukashenko, the government used deep-packet inspection to shut down much of the internet for ~61 hours accessnow.org. Even after restoring, they continued blocking social networks for weeks to stifle protest coordination.
• Kazakhstan: In January 2022, Kazakhstan faced violent protests and a state of emergency. The government responded with nationwide internet blackouts for several days (and SMS/call restrictions), effectively silencing news of the clashes. This was one of the largest shutdowns in Central Asia’s history, used to regain control amid unrest.
• Russia: Russia historically did not use full shutdowns domestically, but since the Ukraine war, it has amped up platform-specific blocks (e.g. Facebook, Instagram banned) and local shutdowns in occupied Ukraine. In 2023, Russia recorded 10+ shutdown events, mostly regional blocks in restive areas like Dagestan or during anti-mobilization protests, as well as deliberate cyber-related outages in Ukraine territory context.news context.news.
• Others: Countries like Turkey and Egypt haven’t pulled the plug nationwide recently but do engage in temporary social media throttling after terror attacks or political incidents (Turkey did so after a 2023 bombing – throttling Twitter). Eswatini (Swaziland) shut down internet during pro-democracy protests in 2021. Cuba disrupted mobile internet during the July 2021 protests to hamper organizers. Iraq’s Kurdistan region (as discussed) does local shutdowns for its own exams and occasionally during protests. Kenya in 2023 tried a new angle: it didn’t shut the whole internet, but blocked Telegram for several weeks during national exams to stop exam leaks on that app netblocks.org netblocks.org – a partial shutdown strategy.

As we can see, the practice of internet shutdowns has spread across regimes authoritarian and democratic alike, for reasons ranging from “preventing cheating” to quelling mass uprisings. The past five years have been the worst on record: 2024 saw roughly 296 shutdown incidents in 54 countries context.news context.news. The triggers break down roughly into four major categories:

• Conflict and war: the leading cause in 2024, with over 100 shutdowns in conflict zones (e.g. Myanmar, Sudan, Gaza by external imposition, Ukraine by external/Russia) context.news context.news.
• Mass protests and civil unrest: dozens of shutdowns (74 in 2024) to control information during demonstrations against governments (from Iran to Mozambique to Kazakhstan) context.news context.news.
• Exam cheating prevention: an increasing trend, with at least 16 shutdowns in 2024 across 7 countries solely for exams context.news context.news (up from 12 in 6 countries in 2023). This includes the repeat offenders Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan and newcomers like Ethiopia, India, and Kenya adopting the tactic in some form blog.cloudflare.com context.news.
• Elections and politics: shutdowns around elections (12 incidents in 2024) to restrict campaigning or mitigate unrest during votes context.news. Examples: internet cut on Uganda’s 2021 election day (with some blocks lasting years), Congo 2019, Azerbaijan 2024 local shutdowns, or partial blocks in Turkey and Tanzania context.news context.news.

The patterns are clear: once a government finds shutdowns “useful” for one excuse, it tends to reuse them. And multiple countries now explicitly plan such disruptions in advance (as seen with Syria/Iraq exam schedules, or curfews during events). The normalization of internet shutdowns has alarmed digital rights advocates. Felicia Anthonio, the #KeepItOn campaign manager, noted that “once a country imposes an internet shutdown, it’s likely to do it again”, and indeed an unprecedented number of countries are now repeat offenders context.news context.news.

Conclusion

Internet shutdowns – whether to prevent exam cheating or to control a restive populace – have become a go-to tool for governments around the world. In Syria, Iraq, and Algeria, we see the establishment of scheduled, recurring blackouts that treat internet access as a tap to be turned off at will. This is a dangerous norm. The past five years have shown that these shutdowns do far more harm than the problems they purport to solve: they disrupt economies, endanger lives, violate fundamental rights, and often fail to achieve their stated aims (cheating still occurs; protests still find a way). As more countries join the shutdown bandwagon – from India’s frequent local outages to Myanmar’s wartime blackouts – there is growing international outrage and calls for action.

Organizations like Access Now, the Internet Society, and NetBlocks are tracking and naming and shaming these shutdowns in real time, pushing for global pressure to #KeepItOn. Encouragingly, some courts (e.g. in West Africa and India) have started scrutinizing shutdown orders, and in a few cases governments have backed down (for instance, Mauritius reversed a planned social media block in 2024 after public backlash) accessnow.org accessnow.org. But the trend is still on the upswing as of 2025.

Ultimately, recurring internet shutdowns underscore a broader contest: the public’s right to connectivity and information versus state control over cyberspace. The exam shutdown phenomenon in Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and beyond reveals how easily a government can normalize curtailing connectivity for something as routine as school tests – setting the stage for using it whenever convenient. As we look to 2025 and beyond, digital rights advocates warn that without stronger norms and perhaps legislation banning such blanket shutdowns, we may see even more “internet off switches” being flipped. The internet is now as essential as electricity for modern life; recurring shutdowns are the equivalent of governments pulling the plug on an entire nation. And as this report shows, no one is immune – whether you’re a student in Damascus, a protester in Tehran, an entrepreneur in Algiers, or a voter in Kampala, the fight to keep the internet on is now a key front in defending fundamental freedoms in the digital age.

Sources: The information in this report is drawn from a range of credible sources including Access Now’s #KeepItOn reports and open letters pulse.internetsociety.org context.news, technical measurements by Cloudflare Radar and NetBlocks blog.cloudflare.com netblocks.org, Internet Society Pulse shutdown tracker updates pulse.internetsociety.org pulse.internetsociety.org, and news reporting from outlets like Al Jazeera, The Guardian, and Reuters on specific incidents blog.cloudflare.com theguardian.com. These sources have been cited inline to provide verification for each factual claim made. All evidence points to the same conclusion: internet shutdowns have become a recurring policy in several countries since 2020, and without concerted pushback, this damaging trend is likely to continue.