Turkey’s Gas Revolution: Erdogan’s LNG Pivot Threatens Russia & Iran’s Energy Grip

Dramatic Gas Shift: Turkey is racing to replace pipeline gas from Russia and Iran with domestic output and liquefied natural gas (LNG). By 2028 it could meet over half its ~53 bcm annual gas needs from local production and LNG, sharply cutting reliance on Moscow and Tehran ^[1] ^[2].
Deals Worth Billions: Ankara has inked long-term LNG contracts worth ~$43 billion with U.S. suppliers, including a 20-year deal with Mercuria (~4 bcm per year) signed in September ^[3]. Preliminary agreements extend to other producers (e.g. Australia’s Woodside for 5.8 bcm from 2030) as Turkey diversifies its import portfolio ^[4].
Pipeline Contracts Expiring: Russia’s major pipeline deals (Blue Stream and TurkStream, 22 bcm/year total) are nearing expiry, as is Iran’s 10 bcm contract in mid-2026 ^[5]. Turkey is expected to renew some volumes, but on more flexible, smaller terms – leveraging contract deadlines to reduce dependence ^[6].
U.S. Pressure Mounts: Washington and G7 allies have urged Turkey to curb Russian energy purchases. At a September 25 White House meeting, U.S. President Donald Trump praised President Erdoğan but bluntly demanded Turkey stop buying Russian oil and gas ^[7]. The G7 likewise called to “maximize the pressure” on Russia’s energy revenues ^[8].
Energy Balancing Act: Turkey still heavily relies on Russian fuel – 66% of its oil imports came from Russia in 2024 (up from 41% in 2022) as Ankara capitalized on Russian crude sold up to 15% below world prices under sanctions ^[9]. Cheap Russian supply gives Turkey a price edge and supply security that it is reluctant to forgo ^[10].
LNG Infrastructure Boom: Turkey has built ample LNG import capacity (≈58 bcm/year, equal to total demand) and added storage – including floating terminals at Dörtyol and Saros – to handle surging imports ^[11]. This enables it to reroute gas flows and even re-export LNG to Europe, positioning itself as a regional hub ^[12] ^[13].
Russia & Iran at Risk: With Europe largely off Russian gas since 2022, Turkey is Moscow’s last big market in Europe ^[14]. Long-term U.S. and Australian LNG deals threaten to erode Russia’s market share and influence in Turkey, just as EU demand for Russian gas shrinks ^[15]. Iran, facing renewed sanctions, may lose one of its few export outlets if Turkey trims imports after 2026 ^[16].
Market Impact: Russia’s Gazprom could face further revenue hits as Turkish purchases dwindle. Its shares have already languished – trading around ₽116–118 in early October 2025 ^[17] – reflecting investor concerns over lost European markets. In contrast, U.S. LNG suppliers are bullish: for example, Cheniere Energy (NYSE: LNG) stock hovered near $233 in early October ^[18] amid optimism for growing exports to Turkey and others.

Turkey’s Gas Pivot: LNG Deals and Domestic Production

Turkey is undertaking a strategic overhaul of its gas supply. Once overwhelmingly dependent on pipeline gas from Russia and Iran, Ankara is now doubling down on alternative sources. State energy company BOTAŞ has struck a flurry of long-term LNG deals with a range of suppliers. In September, it signed a landmark 20-year agreement with Mercuria to import about 4 bcm of U.S. LNG annually starting in 2026 ^[19]. This single deal will total roughly 70 bcm over two decades. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar hailed it as a “milestone” for Turkey’s energy security, enabling BOTAŞ to play a bigger role in global LNG trade ^[20]. A separate preliminary pact with Australia’s Woodside will add ~5.8 bcm over nine years from 2030 ^[21]. These agreements underscore Ankara’s intent to lock in diverse gas supplies for the long haul.

Crucially, Turkey isn’t just buying more LNG – it’s boosting domestic production too. The state oil/gas company TPAO is rapidly developing new gas fields (including sizeable Black Sea discoveries) to feed the grid ^[22]. Thanks to this twin approach, Turkey’s combined domestic output and contracted LNG imports are projected to exceed 26 bcm/year by 2028, a huge jump from ~15 bcm in 2025 ^[23] ^[24]. That would cover more than half of Turkey’s forecast gas demand, dramatically shrinking the amount it must buy via pipeline ^[25]. In fact, if these plans bear out, Turkey would only need around 26 bcm of pipeline gas in 2028, far below the 41 bcm it currently contracts from Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan ^[26]. This opens the door for BOTAŞ to let some old contracts lapse or renegotiate them on better terms.

To absorb all this incoming gas, Turkey has upgraded its infrastructure at breakneck speed. It now has LNG import terminals capable of handling 58 bcm per year, enough to meet 100% of national demand if needed ^[27] ^[28]. New floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) at ports like Dörtyol (Mediterranean) and Saros (Aegean) allow flexible intake of LNG cargoes ^[29]. Meanwhile, expanded underground storage at Silivri and Tuz Gölü helps balance seasonal swings ^[30]. Ankara’s investments mean it can swiftly scale up LNG imports and even re-export surplus gas onwards to Europe. Indeed, Turkey has already started acting as a mini-hub: BOTAŞ recently signed deals to supply small gas volumes to Hungary and Romania ^[31]. By importing LNG (from the U.S., Qatar, Algeria, etc.) and piping out to neighbors, Turkey is positioning itself as the crossroads of a new Eurasian gas trade.

Officials frame this shift as a win-win. It bolsters Turkey’s energy security after decades of vulnerability to external suppliers ^[32], and it dovetails with Turkey’s ambition to become a regional energy hub. “Turkey has been signalling that it will take advantage of the global LNG abundance,” notes energy analyst Sohbet Karbuz ^[33]. The logic is simple: with LNG readily available on world markets, Turkey prefers not to be locked into inflexible pipeline contracts. Instead, it seeks a diversified supply basket it can draw from or even resell. By 2028, when a European ban on Russian gas is slated to take full effect, Turkey could be in a sweet spot – burning cheaper Russian/Iranian gas at home while re-exporting its own gas and imported LNG to Europe ^[34]. This strategy could turn Turkey from a mere consumer into a critical transit and trading node for gas, redefining its role in the energy landscape.

U.S. and G7 Pressure vs. Turkey’s Reality

Turkey’s eastward gas pivot isn’t happening in a vacuum – it aligns with strong nudges (and shoves) from Western allies. The United States and European partners have been pressuring Ankara to sever or scale back its energy ties to sanctioned Russia (and Iran) ^[35]. This came to a head on September 25, 2025, when President Erdoğan met U.S. President Donald Trump in the Oval Office. In an unusual exchange, Trump heaped praise on Erdoğan as “very respected” – then pointedly urged him to stop buying oil and gas from Russia ^[36]. Not long after, the G7 issued a joint statement calling it time to “maximize the pressure on Russia’s oil exports” – essentially asking countries like Turkey to fall in line with the West’s sanctions regime ^[37]. Washington’s message is clear: Turkey, as a NATO ally, should not be underwriting Moscow’s war revenues through energy purchases.

Ankara’s public response has been muted – a careful balancing act. President Erdoğan did not directly rebuke Trump’s demand, but neither did he acquiesce. And for good reason: Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy is immense and not easily unwound ^[38]. Energy Minister Bayraktar has repeatedly stated that Turkey “must source gas from all available suppliers, including Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan,” even as he acknowledges U.S. LNG offers attractive pricing ^[39]. In private, Turkish officials bristle at what they see as Western overreach into their energy sovereignty. As Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov remarked (after the Trump-Erdoğan meeting), Turkey is “a sovereign state” that will make its own choices on cooperating with Russia ^[40].

The cold economics explain Ankara’s hesitation to cut the cord. Russia has effectively been subsidizing Turkey’s energy bill since the Ukraine war. With European buyers shunning Russian oil, the Kremlin has been offloading crude to Turkey at deep discounts – up to 15% below international prices ^[41]. As a result, Turkey now buys an overwhelming two-thirds of its oil from Russia ^[42]. This bargain supply saved Ankara billions and eased inflation pressures at home. Halting those imports overnight, as the G7 demands, would not only imperil Turkey’s fuel security but also “eliminate this clear price advantage,” notes Turkish energy expert Necdet Pamir ^[43]. The same goes for natural gas: in 2024, about 41% of Turkey’s gas came via Russia ^[44], often at relatively competitive rates thanks to long-term contracts. Walking away would mean Turkey paying more on the spot market or facing potential shortages – a political and economic risk Erdoğan can ill afford.

Thus, Erdoğan has pursued a middle path. Rather than openly defy or obey Washington, Ankara is quietly diversifying while keeping the Kremlin placated. “Experts do not expect Turkey to stop importing energy from Russia in the coming years. Instead, Ankara is pursuing a quiet strategy: diversification,” reports Deutsche Welle ^[45]. This strategy is playing out: Turkey signs new LNG deals with the U.S. and others (to gradually reduce the share of Russian gas) but continues buying large volumes of Russian oil and gas for now. In essence, Erdoğan is trying to have it both ways – reassuring the West by incrementally cutting reliance on Russia, but not so fast as to upset Ankara’s energy calculus or Putin’s goodwill. It’s a delicate dance. Turkey’s continued import of Russian gas at full tilt has in fact drawn praise from the Kremlin. Moscow noted that flows through the TurkStream pipeline are still “operating at full capacity” and vowed not to interrupt supplies as long as it’s “beneficial” to Turkey ^[46]. The subtext: Russia values Turkey as a customer and partner, even if Ankara shops elsewhere on the side.

Meanwhile, Erdoğan can point to tangible steps that align with Western goals. Beyond LNG deals, Turkey has also ramped up renewable energy and even discussed nuclear cooperation with U.S. firms (to diversify from Russia’s Rosatom monopoly) ^[47]. Such moves earn Ankara some credit in Washington and Brussels. Still, complete weaning off Russian energy is not imminent. As Bayraktar bluntly put it, Turkey will continue buying Russian gas because it’s “price-competitive” and gives BOTAŞ leverage over other suppliers ^[48]. In other words, Turkey is leveraging cheap Russian gas as a bargaining chip – if Azerbaijan or LNG traders know Turkey has ample Russian supply in its back pocket, they’ll think twice before driving a hard bargain on price ^[49]. This pragmatism is at the heart of Erdoğan’s balancing act: he’ll cut deals with the U.S. and diversify, but he won’t abandon the comfortable cushion of Russian energy unless he’s absolutely forced to.

Russia and Iran’s Last European Stronghold Weakens

For Russia and Iran – both starved of many export options – Turkey’s gradual shift is unwelcome news. Turkey represents the last sizable “European” gas market still accessible to them after the Ukraine invasion. Most EU nations severed or severely slashed Russian gas imports post-2022 ^[50], and Iran has long been barred from European trade by sanctions. Turkey, however, kept its doors open, buying imported Russian gas (via Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines) and 10 bcm a year from Iran’s Tabriz pipeline. This made Turkey a crucial lifeline: as of early 2025, Russia still supplied about 37% of Turkey’s gas – making Turkey Gazprom’s biggest remaining customer west of the Caspian ^[51]. Iran likewise counts Turkey as virtually its only major gas client abroad (aside from minor sales to Azerbaijan and Armenia). That’s why Ankara’s new direction is so alarming for both Moscow and Tehran.

Contract timelines add urgency. Russia’s two main gas contracts with Turkey (totaling 22 bcm/yr) are nearing expiry in the next couple of years ^[52]. Iran’s 25-year supply contract (10 bcm/yr) ends in 2026 ^[53]. Normally, these might be routinely extended given Turkey’s growing energy needs. But now Turkish officials hold the cards. With new LNG and domestic volumes coming online, Turkey can afford to play hardball. Analysts doubt Ankara will renew Iran’s deal on the same generous terms – if at all ^[54]. “Ankara is unlikely to renew it under the same terms as it seeks greater flexibility and diversification,” Reuters reported ^[55]. In effect, Turkey might tell Tehran: accept a smaller, short-term deal or face losing the market entirely. For Iran, already grappling with sanctions, that would mean one of its most reliable export outlets slipping away ^[56]. Tehran could try to find other buyers, but infrastructure is a hurdle – without pipelines to new markets or large LNG capacity, that gas could simply stay in the ground.

Russia faces a slower bleed, but a bleed nonetheless. Even if Turkey doesn’t cut off Gazprom, it is poised to import far less Russian gas by the late 2020s than today. By 2028 Turkey’s need for Russian (and Azeri) pipeline gas may drop to ~26 bcm, well below current contracted volumes ^[57]. Gazprom could see its Turkish sales sliced by a third or more. Already, its share of Turkey’s gas pie has been shrinking – from over 60% twenty years ago to just 37% now ^[58]. Long-term U.S. LNG inflows will accelerate that decline. And it’s not just direct sales: Turkey was also a transit route for Russian gas into southern Europe (via TurkStream). If Turkey itself takes less gas, the excess may not find buyers further west, given Europe’s stance. As energy writer Charles Kennedy notes, Moscow’s long-term leverage is eroding: Turkey’s pivot “raises the risk of lost market share for Gazprom and weakens Russian leverage” at a time when European demand is already shrinking ^[59].

The financial implications for Russia are significant. Gazprom has been reeling from the loss of most of its EU business – its gas exports to Europe have plunged to multi-decade lows, and the company slid into red ink last year ^[60]. (It posted a massive ₽1.07 trillion loss in 2024 under international accounting, though its oil subsidiary cushioned results under Russian metrics ^[61] ^[62].) Turkey was a relative bright spot in early 2025 – Gazprom even cited higher sales to Turkey (and China) as helping offset lost Ukrainian transit volumes ^[63]. But that respite may be short-lived. If BOTAŞ scales back purchases or negotiates steep discounts under threat of going elsewhere, Gazprom’s revenue will suffer further. Investors see the writing on the wall: Gazprom’s stock has sagged, barely above ₽118 per share in October 2025 ^[64], roughly one-third of its pre-war level. Russian officials are scrambling for alternatives – boosting exports to China (via Siberian pipelines) and proposing new pipelines to South Asia – but those are years away and fraught with obstacles.

Iran, for its part, could be hit even harder. Gas exports were one of the few sanction-compliant income sources Iran had (gas is not as easily shippable as oil, so sanctions targeting oil hit Iran’s oil exports, but gas to Turkey continued). Losing Turkey would all but eliminate Iran’s gas export revenue, save for some swap deals. Iran might attempt to pivot east to sell gas to Pakistan or others, but lacking pipelines or LNG tech, it’s challenging. In Tehran, officials worry that Turkey’s hub aspirations will leave Iran out in the cold, diminishing Tehran’s influence. Can Selçuki, an analyst at Iran International, noted that Tehran’s last major European market could be “eroded as Turkey repositions itself as a regional gas hub.” ^[65] In other words, Turkey is doing for gas what it did for oil flows in recent years – using its strategic location to become an energy gateway. That could ultimately undercut Iran’s strategy of leveraging energy ties for political goodwill with Ankara.

Importantly, Turkey is not severing all Russian energy links – far from it. While gas imports may dip, Turkey’s overall energy relationship with Russia remains deep. Moscow is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant (the $20 billion Akkuyu project) which ties Turkey to Russian technology and fuel for decades ^[66]. Russia is also Turkey’s top supplier of coal (for power) and diesel fuel ^[67]. And despite pressure, Turkey continues to import Russian crude oil in large volumes, as mentioned earlier, because of the favorable pricing. President Erdoğan has cultivated a personal rapport with President Vladimir Putin, and Turkey has not joined Western sanctions on Russia. These factors mean Russia will retain significant energy trade with Turkey, even if gas volumes ebb. In fact, some speculate that Turkey could use any freed-up LNG capacity to re-export Russian gas indirectly to Europe (blended or swapped to dodge “Russian origin” labels) – essentially acting as a middleman for Moscow. However, any such scheme would be legally and politically risky as EU regulations tighten.

In the near term, Gazprom is unlikely to be completely shut out. Russian gas still flows “at full capacity” into Turkey as of late 2025 ^[68]. Even the most optimistic forecasts suggest BOTAŞ might reduce but not eliminate Russian purchases by 2028. Alexey Belogoryev of Moscow’s Institute for Energy and Finance believes technically Turkey “could, in theory, stop imports from Moscow in two to three years” if LNG and domestic projects ramp up ^[69]. “However, it won’t do so,” he adds – Russian gas is cheap and gives BOTAŞ bargaining power vis-à-vis other suppliers ^[70]. In essence, Turkey benefits from keeping some Russian gas in the mix to play suppliers off each other. This suggests that Russia will remain a player in Turkey’s market, albeit on Turkey’s terms. Putin’s leverage via energy – once formidable – is thus diminishing. The proposed Russia-Turkey gas hub idea (floated by Putin in 2022 to reroute Russian gas to Europe via Turkey) has effectively fizzled; Gazprom reportedly abandoned the plan by mid-2025 as Turkey charted its own course ^[71].

For Iran, the outlook to maintain gas exports to Turkey appears dim unless it agrees to flexible, possibly short-term arrangements. Turkey might still import some Iranian gas, especially in winter peaks or if prices are attractive. But the days of a binding long-term Iran-Turkey supply pact are likely over. Already, Turkey has intermittently reduced Iranian gas intake due to pricing disputes and technical outages in winter. With ample LNG at hand, Ankara can use that as leverage to demand Iran lower its prices or risk being cut out. Iran’s energy ministry will be watching nervously as 2026 approaches.

Outlook: Turkey’s Energy Hub Ambitions and Global Impact

Looking ahead, Turkey’s balancing act – between affordability, supply security, and geopolitical allegiances – will continue to define its energy policy. In the short term, Erdoğan will try to extract maximum benefit from all sides: cheap gas from Russia and Iran, investment and LNG from the U.S. and allies, and transit fees or regional clout as a gas corridor. This multi-vectored strategy is a hallmark of Erdoğan’s foreign policy, often described as “neo-Ottoman equilibrist.” Energy, being vital to Turkey’s economy, is no exception. We can expect Turkey to extend some of the expiring pipeline contracts, but likely in reduced volumes or with clauses allowing it to scale down if needed. As Bayraktar hinted, Turkey wants “greater flexibility” in future gas deals ^[72] – a shift from rigid take-or-pay contracts of the past. That might mean seasonal contracts, options to divert cargoes, or shorter durations that let Turkey continually shop the market.

By 2028, a confluence of factors could cement a new era in the region’s gas trade. Europe’s planned full ban on Russian gas imports by 2028 will formally close the EU market to Gazprom ^[73]. If Turkey by then has built a thriving LNG-based system, it could capitalize on Europe’s hunger for non-Russian gas – possibly re-exporting American or Qatari LNG into Southeast Europe through swaps and pipeline links. Ankara has already tested the waters by sending small gas supplies to Hungary and Romania ^[74]. Those volumes could grow, especially if new interconnectors are built (for instance, a future extension from Turkey into Bulgaria or Serbia beyond the existing lines). Additionally, Turkey has explored projects like an Israel-Turkey undersea gas pipeline from the Eastern Mediterranean and importing gas from Iraq or Turkmenistan via Azerbaijan. While these are long-shot projects at the moment, they illustrate Turkey’s intent to be an energy bridge between East and West.

For global markets, Turkey’s pivot is mostly a positive development. It creates another large buyer in the LNG market, encouraging supply investment. U.S. LNG developers, in particular, benefit: Turkey’s $43 billion in deals will support export terminals and upstream gas drilling in places like Texas and Louisiana ^[75]. It’s telling that Cheniere Energy’s stock – a leading U.S. LNG exporter – has been trading near record highs around $230/share ^[76], buoyed by long-term demand from importers like Turkey. European gas prices could also stabilize as Turkey’s hub smooths out regional supply crunches (for example, Turkey could import extra LNG in summer and pipe it to Balkans in winter). However, there are wildcards. If Turkey over-commits to LNG and global prices spike (due to, say, an especially cold winter or surging Asian demand), it could find itself paying steep prices – whereas pipeline contracts often provided steadier rates. This risk was evident in 2022–2023 when spot LNG prices hit record highs; Turkey will want to avoid such volatility by maintaining a balanced portfolio, including some pipeline gas at fixed prices.

Politically, Turkey’s energy maneuvers will reverberate beyond economics. Cutting dependence on Russia even marginally is a win for Western sanctions policy, potentially bringing Turkey a step closer to Western alignment on the Ukraine issue. U.S. officials have lauded Turkey’s recent LNG purchases as supporting “energy diversification and independence” – diplo-speak for loosening Putin’s grip. Closer energy ties with Washington (and U.S. companies) could also help mend frayed U.S.-Turkey relations. As one expert noted, these gas deals with the US have a strategic dimension in healing a strained partnership ^[77]. On the other hand, Erdoğan will be careful not to alienate Putin. He likely calculates that as long as Turkey continues buying significant volumes of Russian oil and gas (and proceeds with joint projects like Akkuyu nuclear), Moscow will tolerate Turkey’s partial pivot. Indeed, Putin and Erdoğan have a transactional understanding; Turkey’s refusal to join oil sanctions and its help in routing some trade for Russia have been invaluable to the Kremlin. So long as Erdoğan doesn’t threaten Russia’s core interests, Putin may accept Turkey’s reduced gas purchases as an inevitable consequence of Moscow’s own geopolitics.

In sum, Turkey is entering a new era of energy autonomy – but not energy isolation. Come 2028, the country could very well be the only NATO nation still importing Russian gas, even as it concurrently serves as a key transit hub for non-Russian gas into Europe. Erdoğan will tout this as proof of Turkey’s unique geopolitical importance – able to talk to all sides, East and West, and derive benefit from each. For Russia and Iran, it’s a warning that even “friendly” partners like Turkey won’t stay over-reliant on them forever. As one Moscow-based analyst quipped, Turkey’s message to Gazprom is: “We don’t need you as much anymore, but we’ll take your gas if it’s cheap” ^[78]. That new dynamic shifts power towards Ankara in any future negotiations.

Energy forecasts often prove tricky, but one safe bet is that diversification will continue. Turkey has learned the hard way – through currency crises and import price shocks – that over-reliance on one supplier or one fuel is dangerous. So it is embracing everything: LNG from many sources, pipeline gas from whomever is willing (Azerbaijan, Iraq, maybe Turkmenistan via the Caspian), domestic drilling, plus renewables and even nuclear. This broad strategy hedges Turkey’s bets. It also sets a template other mid-sized powers are watching: how to leverage great-power competition to secure better energy deals. If Erdoğan can pull it off, Turkey might enjoy plentiful gas supply at competitive prices, all while enhancing its strategic clout. That truly would be a gas revolution – one that redraws the energy map in Russia’s backyard and gives Turkey the role it has long coveted: an indispensable energy hub between continents.

Sources: Reuters ^[79] ^[80] ^[81], Deutsche Welle ^[82] ^[83], Iran International ^[84], OilPrice ^[85], TS2 Tech ^[86], Anadolu Agency ^[87], Chronicle Journal (markets) ^[88].