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Ukraine’s Sky Guardians: From MiG-29s to F-16s – Every Fighter Jet Defending Ukraine’s Skies

Ukraine’s Sky Guardians: From MiG-29s to F-16s – Every Fighter Jet Defending Ukraine’s Skies

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Ukraine’s Sky Guardians: From MiG-29s to F-16s – Every Fighter Jet Defending Ukraine’s Skies

Every Jet Defending Ukraine’s Sky: Full Breakdown of Fighter Aircraft Protecting Ukrainian Airspace

Ukraine’s airspace has become a crucible of modern air warfare, where a mix of aging Soviet-era fighters and incoming Western jets hold the line against a larger Russian air force. Since the 2022 full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian Air Force – with help from NATO allies – has fought hard to deny Russia air superiority. In this comprehensive report, we compare all the fighter jets involved in defending Ukrainian airspace, from workhorse MiGs and Sukhois to newly promised F-16s and Mirages. We’ll dive into each jet’s specifications (speed, range, armament, avionics, and more), examine their roles in air-to-air and air-to-ground combat, and analyze how they contribute to Ukraine’s air defense and offensive operations. We’ll also look at the support provided by NATO surveillance planes and patrol fighters just outside Ukraine’s skies, and discuss the status of pilot training, logistics, and what experts say about the challenges ahead. The goal: to understand how each aircraft – old or new – fits into Ukraine’s strategy to defend its skies and turn the air war in its favor.

Ukrainian Air Force Soviet-Era Fighter Jets

Ukraine entered the war flying a fleet of Soviet-designed fighters that have been the backbone of its Air Force for decades. These include the MiG-29 Fulcrum, Su-27 Flanker, Su-24 Fencer, and Su-25 Frogfoot. Though technologically dated, these jets have proven their worth in disrupting Russian operations and protecting Ukrainian airspace. Below we detail each type:

MiG-29 “Fulcrum” – Agile Air Defense Fighter

The Mikoyan MiG-29 is a lightweight, twin-engine air superiority fighter originally delivered to Ukraine in the 1980s. It is highly agile, designed for dogfights and point defense. The MiG-29 can reach speeds over Mach 2.25 (~2,400 km/h) at high altitude armyrecognition.com. However, its combat range on internal fuel is relatively short – roughly 700 km at low altitude armyrecognition.com (about a 350 km radius out and back). This limited range means MiG-29s must operate from bases not far from the front, and they rely on frequent refueling or external tanks for longer patrols. The aircraft has six external hardpoints and is armed with a 30mm cannon plus a mix of short and medium-range missiles armyrecognition.com. A typical loadout includes up to 4 R-73 (AA-11 “Archer”) infrared dogfight missiles and 2 R-27R (AA-10 “Alamo”) radar-guided missiles armyrecognition.com. Early MiG-29 variants like those Ukraine operates were not equipped for advanced precision-ground munitions, carrying only unguided bombs and rockets in the ground-attack role armyrecognition.com.

Role in Ukraine’s Air Defense: Despite their age, Ukraine’s MiG-29s have been frontline air defenders. Their primary mission has been intercepting Russian aircraft and cruise missiles and patrolling Ukrainian skies under the cover of friendly air defenses. The Fulcrum’s Helmet Mounted Sight and agile performance allow skilled pilots to engage enemy fighters in close quarters. But beyond visual range, the MiG-29 is outmatched by Russia’s longer-range missiles and modern radars. To adapt, Ukraine innovated: it managed to integrate U.S.-supplied AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles onto MiG-29s twz.com twz.com. This unexpected SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) capability allows Ukrainian pilots to fire American HARMs at Russian SAM radar sites, something never originally intended for the Soviet-built jet twz.com twz.com. In combat, videos have shown MiG-29s launching HARM missiles and then dropping to extremely low altitudes – “treetop level” flying has become a trademark to avoid Russian surface-to-air missiles twz.com. MiG-29s also carry their standard R-27 and R-73 missiles for aerial patrols, often hunting Iran-supplied Shahed drones or incoming cruise missiles at night (sometimes an expensive way to shoot down drones, but critically important) reuters.com.

Upgrades and Support: Recognizing their limitations, Ukraine and its allies have worked to bolster the Fulcrum fleet. In 2023, NATO countries transferred additional MiG-29s to Ukraine – notably Poland and Slovakia together supplied over a dozen MiG-29s to replace losses and expand the fleet reuters.com. Slovakia handed over its entire retired MiG-29 inventory of 13 jets by April 2023, becoming the second NATO member (after Poland) to answer Ukraine’s plea for fighter aircraft reuters.com. These provided spare parts and a slight numerical boost. Still, experts note the MiG-29’s old avionics and limited radar range (around 70–100 km detection range for a fighter-sized target armyrecognition.com) mean it struggles to target modern Russian jets before being targeted itself. It also cannot carry modern active radar homing missiles like the AIM-120 AMRAAM. Thus, while the MiG-29s helped deny Russia uncontested control of the skies, Ukraine has treated them carefully – using them for quick intercepts or SEAD strikes rather than deep strikes, and usually under cover of friendly ground-based air defenses.

Su-27 “Flanker” – Heavyweight Air Superiority Fighter

The Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker is a larger, longer-range cousin to the MiG-29. Built as a direct rival to the U.S. F-15, the Su-27 offers high speed and firepower. It can exceed Mach 2.3 (up to ~2,500 km/h) at altitude armyrecognition.com and has roughly twice the range of a MiG-29 – with a ferry range over 3,500 km and a combat radius on the order of 1,500 km without refueling armyrecognition.com flyajetfighter.com. Ukrainian Su-27s carry a powerful N001 Zhuk pulse-Doppler radar with track-while-scan capability and an infrared search and track (IRST) system for passive targeting armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. With 10 hardpoints, the Flanker can haul a mix of missiles: typically R-73 short-range IR missiles plus multiple R-27 missiles (including extended-range versions with semi-active radar or infrared guidance) armyrecognition.com. Unlike later Russian Su-30/35 variants, Ukraine’s Su-27s are older models primarily oriented to air-to-air combat – they were not originally wired for advanced air-to-ground munitions. They can, however, drop unguided bombs or fire rockets if needed armyrecognition.com. A single 30mm GSh-30 cannon in the wing root provides strafing fire.

Role in Ukraine’s Air Defense: Ukraine had only a modest number of Su-27s at the war’s outset (estimates range around 25–30). These heavy fighters have served as Ukraine’s top air superiority assets, occasionally scrambling to deter Russian bomber or fighter incursions at higher altitudes where the MiG-29’s smaller radar and shorter range fall short. The Su-27’s longer reach and better radar theoretically allow it to engage enemy aircraft from farther away. In practice, however, Ukrainian pilots still face Russian fighters equipped with modern R-77 and R-37 missiles that outrange the R-27. As a result, Su-27s too have had to fly low and use hit-and-run tactics. On the defensive side, Flankers have contributed by forcing Russian aircraft to stay back behind the frontlines. For example, after Russia began lofting guided glide bombs from Su-34s and Su-35s near the front, Ukraine’s Su-27s and MiGs tried to push those launch platforms farther away by threatening them when possible reuters.com. Ukrainian Su-27s were even seen carrying AGM-88 HARMs in 2022, similar to the MiG-29, indicating they were also modified for anti-radar strikes on Russian SAMs kyivpost.com. Each Su-27 lost or damaged is painful given their small numbers, so Ukraine has used them selectively. Notably, in October 2022 a Ukrainian Su-27 carried out a daring long-range strike on a Russian airbase in occupied Crimea, firing a HARM missile that struck an S-300 air defense site – a rare documented instance of a Ukrainian Flanker hitting a Russian target at standoff range apnews.com apnews.com. Such episodes underscore the Su-27’s value as a fast, long-legged shooter. Overall, the Flankers form a high-end deterrent, preventing Russia’s more advanced fighters from operating with impunity and buying time until Western fighters can join the fray.

Su-24 “Fencer” – Supersonic All-Weather Bomber

The Sukhoi Su-24 is a twin-seat, twin-engine strike fighter-bomber – analogous in role to the retired U.S. F-111. It has a variable-sweep (“swing-wing”) design optimized for low-level penetration at high speed. The Su-24 can reach about Mach 1.35–1.6 at altitude (around 1,550 km/h) consortiumnews.com, though it is subsonic at low level. Its strength is its range and payload: the Su-24 has an unrefueled ferry range over 2,700–3,000 km en.wikipedia.org, and with in-flight refueling (the “M” variant has a refueling probe) it can cover even greater distances. A typical combat radius is ~600 km on a low-level attack mission carrying 3,000 kg of ordnance en.wikipedia.org. Impressively, the Su-24 can haul up to 8,000 kg of bombs or missiles on its eight hardpoints aviamuseum.com.ua. Armament options include iron bombs, cluster bombs, rocket pods, and Soviet guided weapons such as the Kh-25 or Kh-29 air-to-ground missiles (laser or TV guided) and Kh-58 anti-radar missiles. For defense, it has a twin-barrel 23mm cannon. The crew of two (pilot and weapons officer) rely on a terrain-following radar and navigation system to skim the ground at very low altitudes – a tactic to avoid radar detection.

Role in Ukraine’s Air Defense & Offense: The Su-24 fleet has seen high-intensity use and high losses. Ukraine entered the 2022 war with a limited number of Su-24M bombers (perhaps 12 active). In the first furious month of fighting, low-flying Su-24s attempted unguided bombing runs on Russian forces and suffered heavy attrition – reportedly over half the fleet was lost in the first month reddit.com. Yet the Fencer has since gained a second life, thanks to Western munitions. In 2023, Ukraine ingeniously integrated British/French-made Storm Shadow (SCALP-EG) long-range cruise missiles onto its Su-24s armyrecognition.com twz.com. This adaptation – accomplished in weeks rather than years, according to officials en.defence-ua.com – allows the Su-24 to launch precision strikes from well within Ukrainian airspace. Each Storm Shadow/SCALP can hit targets 250+ km away with meter-level accuracy. Ukrainian Fencers armed with these NATO-standard missiles have destroyed high-value Russian targets far behind the front lines twz.com ukdefencejournal.org.uk. An official photo in mid-2023 confirmed Su-24s carrying these stealthy cruise missiles twz.com. Additionally, Su-24s can drop the U.S.-supplied JDAM-ER guided bombs (joint direct attack munitions with extended range) if configured. In effect, the Su-24 has become Ukraine’s makeshift strategic bomber, delivering the longest-range air-launched strikes in Ukraine’s inventory.

On the defensive side, Su-24MR reconnaissance variants have likely been used for spotting targets and battle damage assessment. The Su-24’s presence in the air also forces Russia to consider a wider threat envelope. However, keeping the remaining Su-24s flying is challenging – maintenance is tough for such an old platform, especially under wartime stress. Still, as of 2024, Ukraine actively employs them for key missions. With Western upgrades, the venerable Fencer now packs a modern punch, proving that even a 1970s-era bomber can be deadly when equipped with 21st-century weapons defensenews.com.

Su-25 “Frogfoot” – Rugged Close Air Support Jet

The Sukhoi Su-25 is a single-seat, armored close air support jet – essentially Russia’s answer to the A-10 Warthog. It is a subsonic attack aircraft built to destroy ground targets and support troops. The Frogfoot’s top speed is around 950 km/h (≈Mach 0.8) at sea level en.wikipedia.org facebook.com. It has relatively short range: roughly 750 km on internal fuel (and a combat radius on the order of 375 km or less when loaded) armyrecognition.com. External fuel tanks can extend its range somewhat, but the Su-25 is meant to operate near the front. It carries a heavy 30mm GSh-30-2 twin-barrel cannon under the fuselage, ideal for strafing armored vehicles. There are eight underwing pylons supporting up to about 4,000 kg of ordnance armedassault.fandom.com. Typically, a Su-25 will carry unguided S-8 rocket pods, 250 or 500 kg dumb bombs, and perhaps older guided missiles like the Kh-25ML (laser-guided 280 kg missile) for attacking hardened targets. For self-defense, it can mount a pair of R-60 (AA-8) short-range air-to-air missiles, though these are of limited effectiveness. What truly sets the Frogfoot apart is its toughness: the cockpit is encased in a titanium bathtub of armor and critical systems are redundantly protected armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. It was built to survive hits from bullets and shrapnel while flying low and slow in support of ground forces.

Role in Ukraine’s Air Defense & Offense: Ukraine’s Su-25s have been workhorses of close air support throughout the war. They roar in at low altitude to unleash rockets or cannon fire on Russian positions, especially when other options (like drones or artillery) are unavailable or too slow. Videos frequently show Ukrainian Frogfoots doing pop-up rocket attacks at treetop height and rapid egress to avoid enemy air defenses. Such missions are perilous – MANPADS (man-portable air defense missiles) and SAMs have downed many Su-25s on both sides. Ukraine has likely lost dozens of Su-25s, although precise figures are kept secret. To compensate, allies have helped: in mid-2022, North Macedonia quietly donated four Su-25s (which had been retired from its own fleet) to Ukraine euromaidanpress.com euromaidanpress.com. These additional airframes (even if not immediately airworthy) provided spare parts or could be refurbished to bolster Ukraine’s assault squadrons. The Frogfoot’s contributions are mostly on the offensive side – supporting Ukrainian counterattacks, hitting Russian ground units, and occasionally hunting drones or helicopters. Their presence forces Russian troops to contend with the threat of sudden air strikes, even if those strikes are relatively inaccurate compared to guided weapons.

On the defensive side, Su-25s do not play a direct role in air-to-air combat or air defense (they lack radar and have only basic heat-seeking missiles). But by attacking frontline enemy positions, they indirectly relieve pressure on Ukraine’s ground-based air defenses and troops. Moreover, the Su-25’s rugged design aligns well with Ukraine’s austere operating conditions: they can take off from damaged runways or improvised airstrips and be serviced in relatively rough environments. This high sortie-rate, resilient attack jet remains a valuable tool for Ukraine, albeit one that operates in the dangerous envelope below a few thousand meters altitude. So long as Ukraine can keep them flying with enough pilots and spare parts, Su-25s will continue to “fly low and hit hard,” supporting Ukraine’s defenders on the ground.

Western Fighter Jets Delivered or Pledged to Ukraine

To modernize its air force and better counter Russia, Ukraine has been striving to acquire Western fighter jets. As of 2025, this effort is finally bearing fruit. Several NATO countries have committed to sending Western-designed fighters – marking the first time Ukraine will operate non-Soviet combat aircraft. Below we examine the key Western jets being delivered or considered, their capabilities, and what they mean for Ukraine’s war effort:

F-16 Fighting Falcon – Multirole Game-Changer

The General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon (now built by Lockheed Martin) is a legendary multirole fighter, and it’s set to become the backbone of Ukraine’s future air force. The F-16 is a single-engine, highly maneuverable 4th-generation jet known for its versatility. It can fly at Mach 2+ (about 2,120 km/h, similar top speed to the MiG-29) and has a combat radius of roughly 500–600 km on attack missions (significantly farther with drop tanks and mid-air refueling) flyjetify.com. What makes the F-16 so valuable is its modern avionics and broad weapons compatibility. Even older F-16s (the kinds Ukraine is getting) come with a pulse-doppler multi-mode radar (APG-66/APG-68 series) far more advanced than the radars in MiG-29s or Su-27s. They can track multiple targets and guide active radar homing missiles – namely the AIM-120 AMRAAM. The F-16 carries up to 6 AMRAAMs (advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles) in some configurations, along with heat-seeking AIM-9 Sidewinders, a 20mm Vulcan cannon, and an array of air-to-ground munitions. This includes precision-guided bombs (like JDAMs), anti-ship missiles, and anti-radiation missiles (like the AGM-88 HARM). In total, it has 9 hardpoints (11 on some variants with fuselage stations) to mix and match ordnance.

Status of Delivery: After much lobbying, Western allies agreed in mid-2023 to supply F-16s to Ukraine. A coalition of countries led by the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Belgium will provide retired F-16AM/BM models (upgraded F-16A/B). By late 2024, the first small batch of F-16s arrived in Ukraine reuters.com reuters.com. In fact, about six F-16s were delivered as an initial batch (according to reports in August 2024) reuters.com, with many more to follow. In total, Western pledges exceed 70 F-16s so far reuters.com breakingdefense.com. The Netherlands and Denmark transferred dozens of their surplus F-16s, Norway added some, and other nations may contribute to reach an expected total of around 80 F-16s for Ukraine breakingdefense.com. This would equate to roughly three to four squadrons – a massive boost for an air force that has been flying at the ragged edge. However, deliveries will be staggered over 2024 and 2025, aligning with the pace of training new crews.

Capabilities and Impact: The F-16s are poised to transform Ukraine’s air war. These jets will give Ukraine true beyond-visual-range air-to-air capability for the first time. An AIM-120 AMRAAM missile launched from an F-16 can hit targets dozens of kilometers away autonomously, allowing Ukrainian pilots to shoot-and-scoot without having to keep the enemy painted on radar until impact (unlike their old semi-active R-27s). “It will provide some air defense and depth capacity, potentially also help intercepting Shaheds (Iranian drones) and cruise missiles, although it is a very expensive way of doing that,” notes Justin Bronk, a senior airpower analyst at RUSI reuters.com. Indeed, F-16s armed with modern sensors can better detect and engage low-flying drones or missiles – something Ukraine has struggled with using MiG-29s at night. Each intercepted drone might cost an AMRAAM missile, but protecting cities from attacks makes it worthwhile despite the cost reuters.com. Beyond defense, F-16s will greatly improve Ukraine’s offensive strike precision. These jets can deliver Western PGMs like the AGM-154 JSOW or paveway laser-guided bombs, hitting targets that previously required risky Su-24 or TB2 drone missions. Valeriy Romanenko, a Ukrainian aviation expert, points out that F-16s will also serve as high-quality launch platforms for Ukraine’s existing air-to-surface weapons reuters.com. He notes if Ukraine is provided shorter-range (~95 km) missiles, the F-16s might focus on air defense and chasing Russian attack aircraft at the front; but if longer-range (~180 km) munitions are provided, F-16s could attack Russian warplanes (like Su-34s) that launch guided bombs from standoff distances reuters.com. In other words, equip the F-16s with long-range AAMs or anti-radiation missiles, and they can finally threaten the Russian jets that have been bombing Ukrainian lines from afar.

Challenges – “No Silver Bullet”: Experts caution that F-16s, while a game-changer, are not a magic solution on their own. Russia has had over a year to prepare for their arrival, fortifying its air defenses and adjusting tactics reuters.com. “You can have lots of fast jets, but if they don’t have effective weapons and crews able to employ them with good tactics, they will just be shot down in large numbers,” Justin Bronk emphasizes reuters.com. Training Ukrainian pilots (and ground crew) is the crucial factor. As of late 2024, about 20 Ukrainian pilots were expected to be fully trained on the F-16 by year’s end reuters.com. More pilots are in the pipeline, but initially Ukraine may actually have more F-16 airframes than qualified pilots reuters.com. Dozens of experienced pilots started training in 2023 under a European training coalition (with instructors from countries like Denmark, Romania, the UK, and the U.S.) breakingdefense.com. The training timeline has been a point of contention – Ukraine wanted it accelerated, while NATO officials urged realism and noted training capacity was stretched reuters.com. Beyond piloting, maintenance and logistics present an even greater hurdle. “Most repairs and maintenance will need to happen inside Ukraine, and Kyiv will probably have to rely on foreign contractors who know the aircraft,” Bronk warns reuters.com. Establishing a supply chain for F-16 spare parts, armaments, and technicians in an active warzone is a monumental task. Additionally, Russia is already targeting infrastructure that could support the F-16s – launching near-daily strikes on Ukrainian air bases, fuel depots, and runways to hamper their deployment reuters.com reuters.com. Ukraine will need to invest significant effort into hardening or concealing its F-16 operating bases, perhaps deploying extra air defenses like Patriots and NASAMS specifically to guard them reuters.com. Despite these challenges, the consensus is that once operational in sufficient numbers, F-16s will push back the Russian Air Force. “As soon as we build up our flight capabilities, we will push their planes back and the terror will stop,” says Serhii Kuzan, a Kyiv-based defense analyst – though he acknowledges the first few months of integrating F-16s will be “truly difficult” under Russian pressure reuters.com.

In summary, the F-16s represent Ukraine’s leap into modern combat aviation. They bring radar, weapons, and networking (Link 16 datalinks, if enabled) that should integrate Ukraine more tightly with NATO systems. As French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu noted, a major advantage of Western jets is their ability to interface with NATO munitions like the Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles and various guided bombs, as well as with common air-to-air missile stockpiles defensenews.com. In Ukraine’s hands, the F-16s will serve as high-performance multi-role fighters – interceptors by day, bombers by night – gradually tilting the aerial balance. They are not invincible, but used wisely alongside Ukraine’s ground-based air defenses, F-16s will make the skies over Ukraine a much more dangerous place for Russian aircraft in the months and years ahead.

Mirage 2000 – French Fourth-Gen Fighter in Ukrainian Service

The Dassault Mirage 2000 is a French-made fourth-generation fighter that Ukraine is now adding to its arsenal, making it the second Western jet type to enter Ukrainian service (after the F-16). In a surprise development, France announced in mid-2024 that it would donate a number of surplus Mirage 2000s to Ukraine defensenews.com. By February 2025, the first Mirage 2000 fighters – flown by Ukrainian pilots trained in France – arrived in Ukraine and were officially added to combat operations defensenews.com. Specifically, France has provided the Mirage 2000-5F variant, an air-superiority model, with a total commitment of six jets (the first three delivered in early 2025, and three more to follow) defensenews.com. For Ukraine, which has never operated French aircraft, this marks a notable broadening of support.

Specifications and Armament: The Mirage 2000 is a single-engine, delta-wing fighter famed for its simplicity and performance. It boasts a maximum speed over Mach 2.2 at altitude defensenews.com. Its combat radius is on par with the F-16 in the few-hundred-kilometer range; Dassault Aviation cites that it can remain on station for 2 hours 40 minutes at 150 nautical miles (280 km) from base defensenews.com – indicating good endurance for air patrols. The Mirage 2000-5 is armed with two internal 30mm cannons and nine external hardpoints for weapons defensenews.com. Ukraine’s Mirages are being delivered with a potent weapons suite: MBDA MICA air-to-air missiles (both radar-guided and infrared versions) for air combat, SCALP-EG cruise missiles (the French name for Storm Shadow) for long-range strikes, and AASM “Hammer” precision-guided bombs for ground targets defensenews.com. In essence, these Mirages come equipped to conduct both air defense and strike missions. The MICA missile is highly respected – an all-aspect, beyond-visual-range weapon with ranges of 50–80 km depending on the version, giving Ukrainian pilots another advanced AAM to supplement AMRAAMs. The SCALP cruise missiles and AASM glide bombs extend Ukraine’s strategic strike options (similar to how Su-24s use Storm Shadow). French technicians also reportedly upgraded these Mirages with new equipment for air-to-ground combat and electronic warfare protection before delivery, since the -5 variant was originally optimized for air superiority defensenews.com. The operating cost of the Mirage 2000 is lower than that of an F-16 (around €17,000 per flight hour vs. ~$27,000 for an F-16, per reports) defensenews.com, which could be a consideration in sustained operations.

Role and Strategic Impact: For Ukraine, the Mirage 2000s are a valuable addition, even in small numbers. Think of them as a “silver spear” to complement the F-16 “Swiss army knife.” The Mirages can perform high-speed interceptor duties and reinforce the air defense umbrella with their MICAs. These missiles give Ukrainian pilots another tool to engage Russian aircraft at standoff distances, possibly catching the enemy off-guard with their multi-directional launch capability (MICA can be fired in lock-on after launch modes, including an infrared version for silent interception). The Mirages themselves have modern radars and self-protection suites (the Mirage 2000-5 has the Thales RDY radar, capable of tracking multiple targets and guiding several missiles simultaneously). French Armed Forces Minister Lecornu stated that Ukrainian Mirage 2000-5s were outfitted to defend against electronic warfare and to deliver ground strikes effectively defensenews.com. In ground-attack, a Mirage carrying a couple of SCALP-EG missiles effectively adds to the Su-24/Storm Shadow strike force, meaning more simultaneous targets can be hit deep in Russian-held territory. The addition of AASM guided bombs is also significant – these are modular glide bombs with ranges up to 60 km and precision guidance, useful for hitting front-line fortifications or air defense sites from a safe distance.

Another important aspect is pilot training and integration. Ukrainian pilots trained for several months in France in late 2024, learning to fly the Mirages and adapt to Western flight standards defensenews.com. The first jets even ferried to Ukraine with Ukrainian crews at the controls defensenews.com – a sign of confidence. Culturally and logistically, operating Mirages introduces complexity (different spare parts, ground equipment, etc.), but NATO has coordinated to help. Notably, NATO allies had initially been wary of giving Ukraine too many different aircraft types at once – they wanted to focus on F-16s first breakingdefense.com. The Mirage donation indicates that by late 2024, enough progress had been made on F-16 training that adding a second type was feasible. France’s decision also likely factors in that the Mirage 2000 is being phased out in favor of Rafales, so supplying a half-squadron’s worth to Ukraine doesn’t compromise French defense. Ukrainian officials celebrated the Mirage’s arrival, with the Defense Ministry posting “Already in Ukraine” alongside images of a Mirage 2000 in Ukrainian colors defensenews.com.

In combat, we can expect Ukrainian Mirage 2000s to serve alongside F-16s in mixed formations. They might take on high-altitude intercepts and CAP (combat air patrol) duties, leveraging their speed, while F-16s handle more of the SEAD and low-level strike tasks – though both can do a bit of everything. The Mirages’ impact is also psychological: it signals to Russia that Ukraine is gaining not just one, but multiple Western air capabilities. From a deterrence standpoint, every additional modern jet complicates Russia’s calculations. As of early 2025, Ukraine has a modest but growing “Western Air Wing” consisting of F-16s and Mirage 2000s, with potentially more types to come.

JAS 39 Gripen – Potential Swedish Fighter for Ukraine

The Saab JAS 39 Gripen (pronounced “GREE-pen”) is not yet in Ukrainian hands, but it is often cited by military analysts as an ideal fighter for Ukraine’s situation breakingdefense.com. The Gripen is a light single-engine multirole fighter developed by Sweden, famous for its ease of maintenance and ability to operate from short, austere airstrips – even highways. This characteristic aligns perfectly with Ukraine’s needs, given the constant threat of Russian missile strikes on air bases. In 2023, Sweden allowed a group of Ukrainian pilots to perform orientation flights on the Gripen, effectively test-driving the jet and beginning familiarization training aviacionline.com reddit.com. The results were reportedly positive, and Sweden has been “keeping the door open” to a possible transfer of Gripen C/D fighters to Ukraine at a future date euromaidanpress.com breakingdefense.com. As Saab’s CEO Micael Johansson said in early 2025, he is optimistic that a first squadron (perhaps 12–14 Gripen C/D jets) could be delivered “sooner rather than later,” pending political approval breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com. Notably, Sweden has even donated spare parts for Gripens (valued at $214 million) to Ukraine already, as a preliminary step so that if the fighters are sent, they can be kept operational breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com.

Capabilities: The Gripen C is comparable to an F-16 in performance: maximum speed about Mach 2.0, a combat radius around 800 km, and equipped with a modern pulse-Doppler radar (PS-05/A). It carries a wide range of weapons, including AIM-120 AMRAAMs, IRIS-T or AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range missiles, and an assortment of smart bombs and anti-ship or anti-radar missiles. Newer Gripen variants can even fire the Meteor missile – an ultra-long-range air-to-air missile – which would outrange anything Russia has. A key design point is that Gripen was built for rapid turnaround and dispersed operations: a team of 5–6 conscript mechanics can refuel and rearm it on a road within minutes. This means Ukraine’s existing practice of dispersing aircraft to remote airstrips or highway runways would be well supported by Gripen. The RUSI defense think-tank back in 2022 actually labeled the Gripen as “by far the most suitable candidate” among Western fighters for Ukraine breakingdefense.com. Their report highlighted that Gripens could minimize the risk of Russian long-range strikes, since they can operate from “dispersed bases” and use “low-level tactics” similar to what Ukrainian pilots already employ breakingdefense.com. In essence, the Gripen is built for exactly the kind of guerrilla-style air war Ukraine has been fighting.

Prospects: As of mid-2025, Sweden has not formally committed to sending Gripens, partly because the Swedish Air Force has a limited number and is transitioning from older C/D models to the new Gripen E. However, pressure is mounting. The head of Sweden’s Air Force said the door isn’t closed in the long term, but that NATO allies asked Sweden to hold off until Ukraine had implemented the F-16s first breakingdefense.com. The logic is to avoid overwhelming Ukraine’s logistics with too many jet types initially (since already Ukraine will be operating MiGs, Sukhois, F-16s, and Mirages). But once F-16s are integrated, Gripens could be the next step. Saab’s CEO even suggested that eventually Gripen E (the latest version) could be supplied to Ukraine “over time” breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com. High-level statements indicate that politically, Sweden is waiting for the right moment – likely after a long-term agreement with NATO partners – to potentially make the transfer. If/when it happens, Ukraine could quickly field at least one squadron of Gripens, since spare parts are already earmarked and some pilots have basic training on them breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com.

In summary, the Gripen remains a “dark horse” candidate that many believe Ukraine will eventually receive. It’s the jet that could complement the F-16s – not overlapping too much, but adding resilience (through dispersed ops) and possibly access to European munitions like the Meteor missile. For now, it’s a capability on the horizon. If geopolitical and production factors align, we may see Ukrainian Gripens in the coming years, further strengthening Ukraine’s mixed fleet of Western fighters.

(Note: Other Western jets have been discussed – for instance, Ukraine showed interest in used F/A-18 Hornets from countries like Canada or Finland, and there were even rumors about Eurofighter Typhoons. As of 2025, however, no deals on those have materialized, so we focus on the aircraft either delivered or seriously likely.)

NATO and Allied Air Support: Patrols, Deterrence, and Intel Sharing

While Ukrainian pilots dogfight in MiGs and soon F-16s, they are not alone in the skies. NATO and allied air forces have been actively supporting Ukraine’s defense – not by flying in Ukrainian airspace (to avoid direct confrontation with Russia), but by patrolling just beyond Ukraine’s borders and providing critical intelligence. This international air presence forms an often-overlooked layer of Ukraine’s air defense strategy, effectively extending Ukraine’s “eyes and ears” and deterring Russia from escalating the air war beyond Ukraine.

AWACS: Eyes in the Sky

One of NATO’s most important contributions comes from its fleet of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) surveillance aircraft. Since early in the war, NATO E-3 Sentry AWACS planes (recognizable by the rotating radar dome on top of a Boeing 707 airframe) have flown continuous orbits over Eastern Europe – especially Poland, Romania, and the Black Sea – to monitor the skies over Ukraine and western Russia ukdefencejournal.org.uk ukdefencejournal.org.uk. In mid-2024, NATO even reinforced these deployments, sending additional AWACS to airbases in Poland and Romania as the conflict ground on ukdefencejournal.org.uk kyivpost.com. These AWACS can detect aircraft hundreds of kilometers away, tracking both friendly and hostile movements ukdefencejournal.org.uk. While officially the data they gather is shared among NATO members, it’s an open secret that NATO intelligence from AWACS is quickly passed to Ukraine in some form ukdefencejournal.org.uk. A former RAF officer noted that everyone knows Western AWACS and other ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) data “offers Ukraine the ability to respond a wee bit quicker” to incoming threats ukdefencejournal.org.uk. For example, when Russia launches waves of cruise missiles or drones, NATO radar aircraft often detect them almost immediately after launch. This information can be relayed to Ukrainian command, giving air defense crews precious extra minutes to sound alarms and prepare interceptors. Essentially, NATO AWACS provide a real-time picture of the aerial battlefield, far beyond what Ukraine’s own radars could cover.

Furthermore, AWACS support helps coordinate the patrols of NATO fighters along the alliance’s eastern flank. NATO’s spokesperson Oana Lungescu emphasized that these surveillance flights are a key part of NATO’s deterrence posture, underlining resolve to defend “every inch” of allied territory ukdefencejournal.org.uk. By keeping an unblinking watch on Russian air activity, AWACS make it much harder for Russia to stage any surprise air incursions near NATO borders or mass aircraft undetected. They also likely feed targeting data to Ukrainian fighters indirectly – for instance, a Ukrainian MiG-29 could get vectors toward a low-flying cruise missile based on NATO radar tracks, even if Ukrainian ground radar coverage is patchy at low altitude.

Recon and Electronic Surveillance Planes

In addition to AWACS, a fleet of specialized NATO reconnaissance planes has been patrolling off Ukraine’s borders. These include RC-135 “Rivet Joint” electronic surveillance jets from the US and UK, RQ-4 Global Hawk high-altitude spy drones, and other intelligence aircraft. Their mission: to suck up electronic emissions and communications from Russian forces and feed that intelligence to Ukraine. Justin Bronk explains that the RC-135 Rivet Joint is a “particularly capable spy plane” and that Russian authorities “really hate” how it can snoop on the war from afar apnews.com. These jets can intercept radar signals, radio chatter, and even datalink traffic, building a picture of Russian deployments and tactics. Bronk noted that aside from providing “real-time intelligence that theoretically could be shared with Ukrainian partners,” NATO surveillance flights also give the West “fantastic insight” into how Russia’s military operates in a real conflict apnews.com apnews.com. In one notable incident, a Russian Su-27 fighter aggressively tried to interfere with a British RC-135 over the Black Sea in September 2022 – going so far as to fire a missile (which fortunately malfunctioned) near the British plane apnews.com. This highlighted how vital – and sensitive – these NATO intel flights are. After that, the UK reportedly began escorting its RC-135s with fighter cover, underscoring the close coordination between NATO surveillance and combat air patrols.

The U.S. has also flown regular sorties of MQ-9 Reaper drones and even maritime patrol aircraft like the P-8 Poseidon over the Black Sea to watch Russian naval and air activity. A famous incident occurred in March 2023 when Russian fighters harassed a U.S. MQ-9 drone, dumping fuel on it and eventually colliding with it, causing the Reaper to crash – all in international airspace apnews.com apnews.com. Despite Russian provocations, NATO continued these flights. Each flight is a piece of the larger puzzle: AWACS watches the skies, Rivet Joints and Global Hawks gather signals intelligence, and all that data flows into allied networks that augment Ukraine’s situational awareness. It can be said that Ukraine’s air defenders on the ground and in the cockpit are never truly alone – they effectively have NATO’s advanced sensors “on their shoulder,” even if indirectly.

NATO Fighter Patrols (Air Policing and Deterrence)

In response to the war, NATO has dramatically stepped up fighter patrols along the eastern flank, both to reassure allies and to deter any Russian overreach. Countries like Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states – once relatively light on advanced jets – now host a rotating cast of NATO fighters. This has included U.S. F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters, British and German Eurofighter Typhoons, French Rafales, and others performing Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) duty. For example, Britain’s Royal Air Force deployed Typhoon FGR4 jets to Poland as part of NATO’s enhanced Air Policing missions (sometimes even flying alongside Swedish Gripens in joint drills) newsweek.com facebook.com. The U.S. Air Force sent F-35As to Estonia and also to Romania and Poland for extended rotations, starting right after the invasion in early 2022 airandspaceforces.com businessinsider.com. As an illustration of scale: NATO scrambled fighter jets over 500 times in 2022 to intercept or monitor Russian military aircraft near NATO airspace, and over 300 times in 2023 apnews.com. These encounters often involve shadowing Russian Tu-95 bombers or fighter jets that approach the borders. Most intercepts have been professional and without incident, but they send a clear signal: NATO’s airspace is off-limits, and even approaching it will get a swift response apnews.com.

NATO’s forward deployments have grown more sophisticated over time. In late 2023, as Russia increased missile strikes near the Polish border (targeting supply hubs in western Ukraine), NATO initiated a major air shielding operation. Starting in September 2023, Dutch and Norwegian F-35s were deployed to Poland to fly 24/7 patrols specifically to cover critical infrastructure and supply routes into Ukraine businessinsider.com businessinsider.com. It was the first time the state-of-the-art F-35 was operated from Polish soil under direct NATO command, marking a step up from earlier F-16 rotations businessinsider.com businessinsider.com. These F-35s, with their advanced sensors, contribute both to air defense and intelligence-gathering – a former NATO official noted they bring “greater capability for air defense and intelligence gathering, especially at a moment when Russia is sending as many as 700 drones and ballistic missiles a night against targets in Ukraine” businessinsider.com. (That figure might be an exaggeration, but it reflects the scale of the threat.) The F-35 patrols serve to deter Russian drones or missiles from straying into NATO territory – a real concern after debris from Russian attacks repeatedly landed inside Poland and Romania. “As Russia’s strikes edge closer to the Polish border, there’s the danger of more Russian drones and missiles landing inside Poland itself,” warned Jamie Shea, a former NATO official businessinsider.com. The F-35s and other fighters effectively create a safety buffer.

For Ukraine, NATO’s air policing means they can concentrate on defending their own skies without worrying that Russia might attempt some reckless expansion of the air war westward. It also means Russian pilots must be cautious near NATO borders, constraining how far west they dare to fly. There have been instances of Russian missiles accidentally crossing into NATO airspace (like a stray Ukrainian air defense missile hitting Poland in late 2022, and fragments of Russian drones falling in Romania in 2023). Each time, NATO has reinforced air defenses in that sector. For example, after drones crashed in Romania, NATO moved more AWACS flights and combat air patrols over the Black Sea region apnews.com kyivpost.com. In essence, NATO’s posture ensures the war remains geographically contained in the air.

Intelligence Sharing and Coordination

One of the less visible but crucial aspects of allied support is the real-time intelligence-sharing mechanism established between NATO and Ukraine. According to media reports, Ukraine has been given access to certain NATO data links and sensor feeds, albeit in a controlled manner intelligenceonline.com. By late 2022, Ukraine was poised to tap into NATO’s secure Link 16 tactical data-sharing network, which would allow its aircraft and ground centers to receive target data from NATO assets intelligenceonline.com. This is significant – it means, for instance, a Polish F-16 or AWACS detecting a hostile aircraft could quietly transmit the track to a Ukrainian fighter pilot’s display, even if the pilot’s own radar hasn’t picked it up. Such integration greatly improves reaction time and situational awareness, force-multiplying Ukraine’s outnumbered fleet.

Western AWACS and ground stations have also helped coordinate Ukrainian air defenses by sharing early warning of incoming air raids. Many Ukrainian officials have credited allies with providing quick alerts that have saved lives during missile barrages. The fact that Ukraine can shoot down a high percentage of Russian cruise missiles and drones nowadays is partly thanks to this fused network of NATO and Ukrainian sensors.

Finally, allied support extends to logistics and repairs. Some Ukrainian aircraft damaged in combat have reportedly been repaired in neighboring countries (for example, certain Mi-24 helicopters and likely some jets were taken to East European NATO states for overhaul and sent back). This behind-the-scenes assistance keeps Ukraine’s planes flying when domestic capacity is strained.

In summary, NATO’s air contribution may be indirectly felt, but it is highly effective. By patrolling the periphery and feeding Ukraine information, NATO aircraft have created an extended air defense zone that blunts Russia’s aerial options. It’s a layered approach: Ukraine’s own jets and SAMs defend inside Ukraine, while just outside, NATO’s vigilant fighters and sensors create a virtual fence. The result is that Russia’s air force largely avoids western Ukraine and hasn’t dared to challenge NATO in the sky – a testament to allied airpower acting as a powerful deterrent and shield.

Training, Logistics, and Infrastructure for Western Jets

Delivering modern jets to Ukraine is only half the battle – the other half is ensuring Ukraine can use and sustain them effectively. This requires extensive pilot training, preparation of ground crew and maintenance infrastructure, and hard thinking about how to base and protect these valuable assets under fire. Here we assess the status and challenges of integrating Western jets into Ukraine’s war effort post-2022:

Pilot Training and Readiness

Training combat pilots is a time-intensive process even in peacetime; doing so rapidly, during an ongoing war, is unprecedented. Ukraine has had to compress timelines while still producing proficient aviators. The initial focus has been on training a cadre of instructors and experienced pilots on Western jets (F-16s, and some Mirage and Gripen familiarizations). Under a multinational plan, Ukrainian pilots began F-16 training in summer 2023 at facilities in Europe – primarily in Denmark and Romania, with support from the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and the U.S. breakingdefense.com. These pilots were mostly already seasoned on MiG-29s or Su-27s, which shortened the conversion training somewhat. Still, Western officials projected it would take around 6 months to a year for an experienced pilot to become combat-ready in the F-16, including language training (many had to improve their English to understand Western flight instruction). By late 2024, Ukraine expected to have its first 20 F-16-qualified pilots ready reuters.com. Lawmaker Oleksandra Ustinova noted that initially Ukraine would have more F-16 aircraft than pilots, reflecting the training bottleneck reuters.com. This is one reason deliveries have started small – there’s no point flooding in jets that sit idle for lack of aircrew.

The training covers not just basic flight, but advanced combat tactics: beyond-visual-range engagements, using NATO weapons systems, and coordinating with ground controllers in a Western manner. Justin Bronk cautioned that tactics are as important as equipment – Ukraine needs pilots adept at exploiting the F-16’s strengths without exposing themselves carelessly to Russian defenses reuters.com. To accelerate learning, some training has moved to the United States for a handful of pilots (especially for more advanced instruction and instructor pilot courses). There’s also a simulation component – Ukraine received or will receive F-16 simulators so that pilots can practice in-country.

For the Mirage 2000, France trained a smaller group of pilots in late 2024. Impressively, those pilots were able to ferry the Mirages to Ukraine themselves by February 2025 defensenews.com, indicating confidence in their ability to handle the jet. France likely used an accelerated program since the numbers were small (six jets’ worth of pilots, perhaps 6–8 pilots total trained).

On Gripen, Sweden conducted evaluation flights with a few Ukrainian pilots. By mid-2023, media reported Ukrainian pilots had completed an introductory training on Gripen and did well euromaidanpress.com. However, no full conversion training has started yet because there’s no political green-light to send Gripens as of now. Saab’s CEO advocated that pilot training in Sweden should start sooner rather than later, even if the decision to send jets comes later breakingdefense.com. In his view, getting Ukrainian aircrew fluent in Gripen operations and even in technical English is a prerequisite, so it’s better to begin early breakingdefense.com. This reflects a broader truth: human capital is the scarcest resource. Ukraine had a limited number of pilots to begin with, and not all of them speak English or are young enough to retrain easily. They have brought some retired pilots back into service and even allegedly sent some pilots to the U.S. for language and fundamentals training ahead of flying F-16s.

A sobering aspect is that while Ukraine trains pilots, it is also losing pilots in combat. Several seasoned Ukrainian pilots have been killed in action over the past year while flying Soviet jets. Each loss is not just a tragedy but also a reduction in the pool of candidates for Western jets. Western allies are keenly aware of this and thus aim to cycle pilots out for training stints where possible, to preserve their lives for when they will fly more capable jets later.

In summary, Ukraine’s pilot training program is racing against time. The country aims to produce dozens of F-16 pilots in 2024, and eventually triple-digit numbers in subsequent years to fully utilize the pledged jets (some analysts say Ukraine ultimately wants around 60–120 F-16s in service for a meaningful capability reuters.com). Patience is required: the first combat missions by Ukrainian F-16s will likely be flown by a small elite group, with more pilots joining as they rotate back from training. Over time, Ukraine could also start training new pilots from scratch on Western types, but that’s a longer-term project (measured in years). In the interim, quality over quantity is the approach – a few well-trained pilots can make a larger impact than many poorly trained ones, especially given the lethality of modern air warfare.

Maintenance, Logistics, and Infrastructure

Transitioning to Western fighters is not like flipping a switch; it demands heavy logistical preparation. Ukraine must set up supply lines for spare parts, armaments, and fuel that are completely different from their Soviet stockpiles. For instance, the F-16’s Pratt & Whitney F100 engines and the Mirage’s Snecma M53 engines will need overhauls at regular intervals – where will that be done? Likely in European facilities, at least until (or if) Ukraine develops domestic overhaul capacity. That implies careful planning to send components out of country and back in wartime. Bronk highlighted that maintenance may be an even more pressing challenge than pilot training reuters.com. The reason: Ukrainian technicians are not familiar with Western aircraft, and training ground crew often takes longer than training pilots. Each F-16 squadron will need dozens of specialized maintainers (avionics techs, engine mechanics, ordnance handlers, etc.). To bridge the gap, Ukraine will rely on foreign contractors and retired Western military maintainers who volunteer or are employed to work on Ukrainian soil reuters.com. Indeed, there are reports that private companies from NATO countries are preparing teams to assist Ukraine with F-16 upkeep in-country. This is sensitive, as it puts foreign personnel in harm’s way, but steps are being taken to mitigate risk and keep their presence low-profile. In parallel, Ukrainian ground crews are being trained in places like the Netherlands and Norway on how to service F-16s.

On the infrastructure front, air bases are a critical vulnerability. Russia knows that Ukraine’s adoption of F-16s and other jets could tilt the war, so it has intensified missile strikes on likely F-16 base locations reuters.com. Over the latter half of 2024, Russia frequently targeted airfields in western and central Ukraine, using drones and missiles to try to crater runways or destroy fuel and ammo depots. Kuzan, the Ukrainian analyst, observed that these strikes “have not paused for the last two months, at least,” as of mid-2024 reuters.com. Recognizing this, Ukraine has been hardening and dispersing its air operations. It repaired damaged runways in a matter of days or even hours. It also likely built decoy aircraft and fake runways to confuse Russian recon. To host F-16s, some existing bases have been upgraded with NATO-standard shelters and power supplies (rumors suggest a few airfields in western Ukraine were quietly outfitted in late 2023). Another strategy is dispersal: operating small numbers of jets from multiple smaller airstrips or highway strips, moving them around as needed. The Swedish concept of dispersed basing (familiar with Gripens) could be emulated even for F-16s, though F-16s are a bit less forgiving on rough airstrips due to their air intake placement. Still, in extremis, an F-16 can take off from a straight stretch of highway if properly prepared.

Protecting the jets on the ground is paramount. Ukraine will need to allocate some of its precious air defense units (like Buk, NASAMS, or even a Patriot battery) to cover the bases where Western jets are clustered reuters.com. This is a trade-off, as those air defenses then can’t be used to protect cities or front-line units. But Ukraine may have no choice – as Kuzan noted, each base with F-16s “would need at least two Patriot and two NASAMS batteries to secure it” reuters.com. That’s a heavy requirement, and frankly Ukraine doesn’t have that many to spare. Therefore, the plan might be to keep most Western jets in relative safe zones in western Ukraine, where the distance from Russia’s launch points is greatest (giving more time for early warning and interception of incoming strikes). They can then surge forward when needed for missions, using highways or forward operating locations for quick refuels or arming, then returning to safer airfields to hangar at night.

This cat-and-mouse for basing will be ongoing. We might see Ukraine temporarily station jets abroad for training or even maintenance. Poland had once floated the idea of hosting all Ukrainian MiG-29s at a base in Poland (back in March 2022), but that was scrapped due to escalation fears. However, smaller-scale cooperation is plausible: for example, if a Ukrainian F-16 needs a complex repair, flying it to a base in Poland or Romania might be quietly done under a training/pre-arranged agreement.

Another logistical element is munitions supply. Western jets use Western calibers and weapons, so Ukraine needs a steady inflow of missiles (AIM-120, AIM-9, MICA, etc.) and bombs. Many of these come from U.S. or European stocks; for instance, the Netherlands and Denmark not only gave F-16s but also a stock of AMRAAM missiles to arm them. France provided MICA missiles with the Mirages defensenews.com. Keeping an eye on usage rates and resupply will be important – especially given how quickly air-to-air missiles can be expended in modern combat (in one engagement, a fighter might launch 2–4 missiles to ensure a kill, and those missiles are pricey and finite). The West seems willing to continuously supply these as long as Ukraine uses them effectively.

Delivery Timelines

The timeline for Western jet integration spans multiple years. Here’s a snapshot as of mid-2025 and expected future milestones:

  • 2023: Coalition forms for F-16 training; small number of pilots begin training in summer. In the fall, approvals are given for actual transfer of jets (after the U.S. gives export permission). Some initial training completes late 2023.
  • 2024: Early in the year, training intensifies. By mid-2024, first Ukrainian pilots likely flying solo in F-16s in training environments. August 2024, reports of first 6 F-16s delivered quietly to Ukraine (likely used for training and familiarization, not yet in combat) reuters.com reuters.com. End of 2024, ~20 pilots ready, more jets (perhaps two dozen) delivered by allies (the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway each contributing in batches) reuters.com. Ukraine starts building initial operational F-16 capability.
  • 2025: Ukraine’s first F-16 squadron (12-16 jets) achieving combat readiness. Additional deliveries continue; the Dutch plan to give more in 2025 from their retired fleet defensenews.com. Mirage 2000 unit (6 jets) becomes operational by spring 2025 defensenews.com. More pilots complete training in waves. By end of 2025, potentially Ukraine fields two F-16 squadrons (around 30 jets) and the Mirage flight, integrated into air defense duties.
  • 2026 and beyond: If plans hold, the full complement of ~80 F-16s might be delivered by end of 2026 breakingdefense.com, creating four squadrons. If Gripen gets approved, training could start by 2025 and jets delivered 2026 onwards for an initial squadron of 14 Gripens breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com. Ukraine could also seek additional types or more of the same as losses occur or needs grow.

Of course, all these timelines depend on the war’s course and political support. There is urgency – Ukraine needs better air defenses now – but also a realization that building a modern air force can’t be done overnight. Thus the Western jets are arriving on a gradual ramp. In the meantime, Ukraine must keep its Soviet fleet in the fight to plug the gap. The “legacy” fleet and the “new” fleet will operate side by side for years. Over time, expect the share of missions flown by MiGs and Sukhois to decrease as F-16s and others increase.

One positive side effect of the long timeline is that Ukraine can incorporate lessons from the field into training. Pilots training now are doing so with real combat experience or real intel on Russian tactics. NATO instructors incorporate Ukrainian front-line experiences (like how Russians engage, what SAM threats they face) into the curriculum. This makes the training more relevant than generic peacetime training.

Expert Commentary on Sustainability

Experts often highlight that sustaining an advanced air force might be Ukraine’s biggest test of logistical endurance. A Western defense official quipped, “we’ve given them a zoo of different equipment – now they have to be zookeepers for all of it.” Managing MiG-29s (Russian-built) alongside F-16s and Mirages (NATO-built) truly means running parallel supply chains. But Ukraine has proven remarkably resourceful. They kept old MiGs flying without factory support for years, and early in the war, they reportedly scoured the world for spare parts – even sourcing Mig-29 parts from as far as North Africa and the Middle East via intermediaries. With NATO’s backing, getting spare parts for F-16s and others should actually be easier in some ways, because many countries operate them and production lines or depots exist.

One worry is that Russia will prioritize destroying the new jets. When only a few F-16s are operational, they could become high-value targets. Russia might attempt long-range ambushes or focus missile strikes on any base they suspect houses F-16s. Ukrainian strategy will likely cloak the movements and deployments of these jets in secrecy, especially early on. We might not even hear about their first combat sorties until after the fact, to avoid giving Russia propaganda or targeting info. A poignant example: When Ukraine lost one of its newly delivered Mirage 2000s in a crash (reported in mid-2025), it was a reminder that accidents and attrition happen even outside combat twz.com. Each Western jet is precious, so Ukraine will employ them judiciously rather than risk them recklessly.

In conclusion, Ukraine is gradually overcoming the training and logistical hurdles to field Western fighters. It’s a complex, long-term investment, but one that will pay strategic dividends. As pilots earn their wings on F-16s and Mirages, as maintenance crews gain confidence, and as bases adapt to new jets, Ukraine moves closer to a truly modern air force – one that can stand toe-to-toe with Russia’s, at least on quality terms. The transition period is the most dangerous time (when only a handful of new jets are out, making them vulnerable), but by late 2025, if all goes well, Ukraine should have a robust hybrid fleet: still flying its hardy Soviet-era planes but now augmented by top-tier Western fighters that bring new capabilities to the battlefield.

Strategic Analysis: How Each Aircraft Shapes Ukraine’s Air Defense

Having examined each aircraft in detail, we can step back and assess the bigger strategic picture. How do all these jets – old and new, Ukrainian and allied – fit together in defending Ukraine’s airspace and aiding its overall war effort, especially after 2022?

Denial of Russian Air Superiority

At the outset of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, many expected Russia’s much larger air force to sweep Ukrainian skies and establish dominance (air superiority) within days. That didn’t happen – and the diverse fighter fleet of Ukraine is one big reason why. Ukraine’s Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-27s, though outnumbered and outranged, stayed operational and contested the air. They dispersed to highways, popped up to fire missiles or chase away Russian aircraft, and never presented an easy target. This forced Russia to remain cautious; Russian pilots largely avoided flying deep into Ukraine where they could be ambushed or fall into a SAM trap. Justin Bronk famously called it “the mysterious case of the missing Russian Air Force” – highlighting how Russia failed to capitalize on its numerical advantage due to a mix of Ukrainian resistance and Russian doctrine issues. Ukrainian fighters often worked in tandem with ground-based air defenses (like the S-300P and Buk-M1 systems) to create uncertainty for Russian flyers. If a Russian Su-34 bomber flew at medium altitude, a Ukrainian fighter might threaten it from one side while a SAM threat loomed from another, complicating the Russian’s escape. Thus, even aging jets had an outsized effect by denying the Russian Air Force the confidence to loiter or strike freely.

Each type of Ukrainian jet contributed differently: MiG-29s tackled low-altitude threats and drones, Su-27s deterred higher-altitude incursions, Su-25s hit advancing ground columns (blunting Russia’s initial thrusts around Kyiv and elsewhere), and Su-24s attempted deep strikes on supply lines. This combined effort, paired with heroic tactics and admittedly some Russian missteps, kept Ukraine’s skies contested. Strategically, that meant Russia could not deploy mass guided bomb attacks or helicopter swarms far beyond the front lines. Ukrainian troops could move during daytime without constant fear of Russian aviation – a stark contrast to some conflicts where one side’s air force terrorizes ground forces with impunity.

Evolution Post-2022: From Defense to Offense

As the war ground on into 2023 and 2024, Ukraine’s air strategy evolved. Initially, it was air denial – make the sky as dangerous as possible for Russians. This was largely successful; Russia shifted to firing stand-off weapons from within its own territory or very close to the front (e.g., launching glide bombs from 40+ km away, launching missiles from bombers over Russia or the Black Sea). In effect, Russia gave up trying to control Ukraine’s airspace and settled for contesting it via missiles and drones. Ukraine, lacking long-range fighters, could not fully stop those stand-off strikes. That’s where the infusion of Western jets aims to change the game.

With F-16s and Mirages, Ukraine will be able to mount limited offensive counter-air operations – i.e., actively hunting and shooting down Russian aircraft that launch munitions from stand-off range. For example, Russian Su-34 bombers often drop guided glide bombs (UPAB-1500B, etc.) from ~50 km away inside Russian-held territory. An F-16 with AIM-120C-7 AMRAAMs (range ~100 km) might be able to threaten those bombers without crossing the front line, forcing them to retreat or fly lower (where Ukrainian Buk or NASAMS might reach them). This could significantly reduce Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian frontline positions with precision. Similarly, if Russian helicopters (like Ka-52s) operate near the front, a Ukrainian F-16 could dash in at low altitude, use its radar to pick them out and fire a couple of AMRAAMs or even infrared-guided AIM-9X from a safe distance – a capability Ukraine currently lacks. As one Ukrainian security analyst put it, at least 60 Western fighters are needed to really push back Russian aviation from the battlefront and protect the area near the borders reuters.com. With current pledges, Ukraine is on track to get there in a few years.

Another shift is in strike capability. Ukrainian jets, particularly the Su-24 and Su-25, were mostly defensive or tactical in effect early on (hitting nearby targets with unguided weapons). Now, enhanced by Western weapons, Ukrainian airpower is reaching operational-level targets. Storm Shadow missiles launched by Su-24s have hit Russian ammo depots, command posts, and bridges far behind the lines (for instance, strikes on Russian bases in Luhansk and Crimea). These are high-impact blows that weaken Russia’s logistics and command – effectively an air-powered supplement to Ukraine’s ground offensives. As more Western jets come online, Ukraine can increase the tempo and range of such strikes. The Mirage 2000 bringing SCALP cruise missiles adds redundancy and more launch vectors. If one platform is grounded or risky to use, another can pick up the mission.

The presence of Western jets also forces Russia to adjust its strategy and allocate resources. For instance, the threat of F-16s has reportedly prompted Russia to move additional long-range S-300/S-400 air defense systems closer to the front and even bring old MiG-31 interceptors with R-37M missiles to patrol more frequently. Those interceptors armed with 200+ km range missiles are a threat to Ukrainian jets, but they too rely on not getting too close to Ukrainian air defenses. It becomes a duel of long-range capabilities. Western fighters will have the advantage of superior sensors and (with AWACS help) situational awareness, whereas Russian fighters still cannot safely penetrate Ukrainian-controlled airspace at medium altitudes. The dynamic is complex, but basically, each Western jet delivered forces Russia to be more defensive and expend more effort on counter-air missions, which could otherwise be used for ground attack. If Russia chooses to commit more air assets to direct combat with Ukrainian F-16s, those assets then are not using their weapons on Ukrainian ground forces – it’s a win for Ukraine either way.

Allied Support – A Quiet Force Multiplier

NATO’s patrolling fighters and AWACS have a subtler strategic effect. They act as a safety net. In the worst case that a Russian aircraft or missile strayed into NATO territory, allied jets would intercept or shoot it down, preventing a broader incident. This safety net reassures not just NATO members but also Ukraine – they know NATO is containing the conflict’s spread. Moreover, the intelligence from AWACS and other platforms basically gives Ukraine a form of “over-the-horizon radar.” Ukraine’s own radar coverage at low altitude is limited (especially after many legacy radars were struck in initial salvos of the war). But with NATO AWACS watching, Ukraine essentially has a continuous picture of what’s flying near its borders and beyond ukdefencejournal.org.uk apnews.com. Strategically, that’s invaluable for planning air defense. It means surprise air attacks from directions like the Black Sea or Belarus are much harder for Russia to pull off undetected. It’s often said that in modern war, information is as important as firepower – here, NATO provides information superiority to Ukraine in the air domain, which partially offsets Russia’s advantage in sheer aircraft numbers.

The Big Picture – An Integrated Air Defense System

At this point, Ukraine’s air defense is a multi-layered system with many moving parts. High-altitude long-range threats (e.g., ballistic missiles or high-flying jets) are countered by systems like Patriot and S-300, plus potentially fighters like Su-27 or in future F-16. Mid-altitude cruise missiles and aircraft are engaged by medium-range SAMs (NASAMS, Buk) and by fighters like MiG-29 or F-16. Low-altitude threats (drones, helicopters, low-flying attack jets) are tackled by short-range SAMs (IRIS-T, Strela, Gepard guns) and by opportunistic fighter passes or even attack helicopters. Overarching all this, allied ISR feeds target data in real time, making each shooter more effective. The addition of Western jets extends Ukraine’s protected airspace umbrella: instead of only being able to shoot down enemies when they come close, Ukraine will be able to patrol and reach out further to engage threats at greater distances. Essentially, Ukraine is inching toward something NATO calls “integrated air and missile defense.” It’s not 100% there – gaps remain, especially against hypersonic missiles or against massive saturation attacks – but it’s far better than the ad-hoc situation of early 2022.

From a deterrence perspective, every improvement in Ukraine’s air defense reduces Russia’s options and increases the cost if Russia’s air force tries to assert itself. We’ve already seen that Russia refrained from sending strategic bombers over Ukraine; they launch cruise missiles from afar. If Ukraine’s fighters and SAMs become deadly enough, Russia might even have to pull its tactical aircraft further back from the front. There are indications that as Ukraine fielded more Western short/mid-range air defenses in late 2022 (NASAMS, IRIS-T), Russian manned aircraft activity did decrease, especially over the Black Sea and frontline areas apnews.com. The introduction of fighters like F-16 should continue that trend.

Risks and Unknowns

It’s important to note that while Western fighters will help, they will not instantly sweep the Russian Air Force from the sky. Russia still retains a large fleet of modern fighters (Su-30SM, Su-35S) and a dense integrated air defense of its own. The battle for air superiority, if it comes, would be complex and potentially costly. We should temper expectations: as Reuters headlined, F-16s are “no silver bullet” for Ukraine reuters.com reuters.com. It’s the combination of tools that brings success. If Ukraine tried to use a handful of F-16s without SAM support to take on the Russian Aerospace Forces head-on, they could suffer. But Ukraine is unlikely to do that; instead, they will use the F-16s in a coordinated way with ground-based defenses and decoys.

Another risk is escalation – though Western jets are defensive in nature (Ukraine using them to protect its own airspace), Russia may portray their deployment as a major provocation. We might see attempts at striking at training bases or logistical nodes in NATO countries via covert means (cyber attacks or sabotage). NATO’s vigilance will need to remain high to prevent any spillover.

For the Ukrainian Air Force itself, managing the transition means juggling two fleets. That’s a strain on personnel and budgets. But the grim reality of war is also phasing out the older jets by attrition. Ukraine has lost a considerable number of MiG-29s, Su-24s, Su-25s, and Su-27s over time. Those will likely continue to dwindle. Western jets are not just an upgrade; they are also a replacement strategy for an air force that would otherwise erode to nothing in a few years. So this infusion is timely to keep Ukraine in the fight long-term.

Expert Views

Military aerospace experts generally agree that without modern jets, Ukraine cannot achieve air superiority and will struggle to support large-scale offensive operations. Conversely, Russian sources often express concern that deliveries of F-16s could enable Ukraine to “punch holes” in Russian air defenses or shoot down more attack aircraft, which would degrade Russia’s ability to use guided bombs and close air support on the battlefield. Some Western analysts, like Douglas Barrie of IISS, have noted that F-16s give Ukraine “a better chance to protect its skies against cruise missiles and to contest the airspace over the battlefield,” but that effect will grow gradually as numbers build. Another analyst, Mykola Bielieskov in Kyiv, has said Western jets will force Russia to reinforce its fighter patrols and perhaps even prompt them to pull older MiG-29s and Su-27s out of storage to have enough planes to cover their front – stretching their logistics as well.

In essence, by acquiring Western fighters, Ukraine is turning the asymmetric air war (where they were at a steep disadvantage) into a more symmetric one. It likely won’t result in Ukraine achieving total air dominance – Russia’s air defense over its own territory is too dense, and Ukraine has no intent (or spare jets) to try to bomb Moscow or the like. But it will allow Ukraine to secure a shield over its troops and cities, and occasionally wield a sword to strike high-value targets behind enemy lines.

Looking Ahead

As the war continues, the role of fighter jets could become even more prominent if stalemates on the ground persist. Air power might then be used to tip the balance – for example, rapid strikes to break a fortified line or to interdict a major troop movement. If Ukraine’s new fighters are integrated by then, they could play a key role in such scenarios (think: a coordinated blitz where F-16s suppress enemy air defenses and communications while Ukrainian ground forces maneuver – something currently hard for Ukraine to do but conceivable with a modern air force).

All in all, each aircraft type we’ve discussed is a piece of the air defense mosaic. The old Soviet jets provided the initial shield that kept Ukraine in the fight. The donated MiGs and Sukhoi parts extended that shield. The Western jets are now beginning to reinforce it with stronger, longer-range pieces. NATO’s outside assistance forms the frame holding the mosaic together by providing intelligence and security on the flanks. Combined, this multi-faceted approach has allowed Ukraine to withstand a numerically superior foe in the air for over two years – a situation few predicted at the war’s outset.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s defense of its skies has been nothing short of extraordinary. Against a larger and in many ways more advanced Russian Aerospace Forces, Ukraine leveraged every advantage it could find – from the ruggedness of Su-25s braving enemy fire, to the adaptability of MiG-29s firing American HARMs, to the watchful presence of NATO AWACS in the background. This report has detailed the contributions and characteristics of each fighter jet in that effort: the Soviet-era stalwarts (MiG-29, Su-27, Su-24, Su-25) that held the line in the darkest early days and continue to provide critical capabilities, and the new Western arrivals (F-16s, Mirage 2000s, and potentially Gripens) that promise to elevate Ukraine’s air power to the next level.

Each aircraft fills a niche – together, they create a layered defense and offense: MiG-29 Fulcrums scrambling on short notice to take down cruise missiles or drones, Su-27 Flankers standing guard at high altitude, Su-25 Frogfoots roaring in for close support of troops, Su-24 Fencers striking high-value targets with newfound precision, and soon F-16s and Mirages patrolling with advanced radars, ready to throw a protective bubble over Ukraine’s cities and frontlines while also spearheading pinpoint strikes. Above them, NATO’s invisible hand guides, informs, and deters – from AWACS radar tracks to F-35s quietly reassuring on the horizon.

The ongoing modernization – training pilots, building maintenance depots, and delivering jets in tranches – will be a deciding factor in Ukraine’s long-term ability to defend itself. It is, in effect, the birth of a new Ukrainian Air Force, forged in combat and equipped for the future. Challenges abound: training takes time, logistics are complex, and Russia will do everything to destroy these assets on the ground if it can. But Ukraine has shown ingenuity and resilience at every turn, and with international support, it’s steadily addressing those challenges reuters.com reuters.com.

For the public, it’s important to realize that control of the air can profoundly influence the war on the ground. Every Russian drone shot down means lives saved in a Ukrainian city. Every enemy fighter kept at bay means Ukrainian brigades can maneuver with less fear. And conversely, every improvement in Ukraine’s air force increases the pressure on Russia’s military, potentially hastening the day when large-scale offensives can achieve breakthroughs.

In the big picture, the fighter jets defending Ukraine’s airspace are more than just machines – they are a symbol of Ukraine’s refusal to be dominated. From the Cold War relics pushed to their limits by daring Ukrainian aces, to the cutting-edge Western jets arriving with the solidarity of many nations behind them, these aircraft represent Ukraine’s past survival and its future hope. President Zelensky put it dramatically when lobbying for jets: “Wings for freedom.” Now those wings – MiG wings, Sukhoi wings, Falcon wings, and Mirage wings – are increasingly aloft over Ukraine.

As this aerial evolution continues, observers will witness a unique moment in military history: a nation in the midst of conflict completely transforming its air force on the fly. The success of this endeavor could very well help decide the outcome of the war. If Ukrainian and allied efforts succeed, the phrase “no-fly zone” might take on a new meaning – not one declared by foreign powers, but one enforced by Ukraine itself, through the skill of its pilots and the strength of its multi-national arsenal of fighter jets. That, ultimately, would secure the skies of Ukraine and protect its people from the terror that rains down from above.

Sources:

LIM Center, Aleje Jerozolimskie 65/79, 00-697 Warsaw, Poland

+48 (22) 364 58 00

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