CapitaLand Investment Limited (SGX: 9CI) Stock: Q3 2025 Results, New Funds, Merger Talk and Analyst Forecasts to 2026

CapitaLand Investment Limited (CLI), the Temasek‑backed real estate investment manager listed on the Singapore Exchange under ticker 9CI, is ending 2025 in a curious position: the business is leaning harder into fee income and global funds, analysts overwhelmingly rate the stock a “buy”, yet the share price is still trudging along in the lower half of its trading range. As of 2 December 2025, the stock trades around S$2.65–2.66, with a market cap of about S$13.3 billion, a trailing P/E of ~30.7x, forward P/E near 20x, and a dividend yield of roughly 4.5%. ^[1]

Across multiple data providers, 12‑month target prices cluster between about S$3.40 and S$3.90, implying 30–45% upside from current levels if the bullish case plays out. ^[2]

This article pulls together the latest news, results and forecasts available as at 2 December 2025 for readers following CapitaLand Investment on Google News and Discover.

1. Where CapitaLand Investment’s share price stands now

On 2 December 2025, CapitaLand Investment’s share price sits around S$2.65, down modestly on the day and hovering in the lower half of its recent range. Beansprout’s live quote page shows S$2.65 at 09:20 SGT, while StockAnalysis reports a day range of S$2.64–2.67, a 52‑week range of S$2.37–2.87, and a market cap of S$13.27 billion. ^[3]

Key current valuation metrics from StockAnalysis: ^[4]

Revenue (ttm): S$2.49 billion
Net income (ttm): S$435 million
EPS (ttm): S$0.09
P/E (ttm): 30.67x
Forward P/E: 20.06x
Dividend per share (ttm): S$0.12 (yield ~4.53%)
Beta: ~0.52 (less volatile than the broader market)

In other words, the market is paying a growth‑style multiple on trailing earnings, but only a moderate multiple on expected earnings, with a REIT‑like dividend yield on top.

The stock has not been a star performer in 2025. A Smart Investor article on blue‑chip laggards flagged CLI among Singapore’s underperforming blue‑chip stocks in September, reflecting investor caution around global real estate and higher rates. ^[5]

2. What CapitaLand Investment actually does (in one mouthful)

CLI is not a traditional property developer that lives and dies on selling units. It’s positioned as a global real asset manager with a strong Asia focus. Its business model has two main engines: ^[6]

Fee income–related business (FRB) – fund management, lodging management and commercial management fees from listed REITs, business trusts and private funds.
Real estate investment business (REIB) – returns from directly owned properties and balance‑sheet investments.

Funds under management (FUM) are large and growing: CLI reported S$117 billion of FUM as at 13 August 2025, and Business Times notes this increased to around S$120 billion by early November 2025. ^[7]

Assets span retail, office, lodging, logistics, industrial, business parks, data centres and “new economy” assets across Asia‑Pacific, Europe and the US. ^[8]

If you think of classic CapitaLand as a bricks‑and‑mortar landlord, CLI is the “asset‑light, fee‑hungry” cousin that wants to manage more assets than it owns.

3. Q3 2025 business update: fee income up, property revenue down

CLI’s 3Q 2025 business update (released on 6 November 2025) is the key recent set of numbers. Media coverage and research reports agree on the broad picture: fee income is growing, direct property revenue is shrinking, and the group has been aggressively raising and recycling capital. ^[9]

3.1 Top‑line: headline decline, underlying low‑single‑digit growth

Depending on which lens you use, you get two superficially conflicting headlines:

Business Times: 9M 2025 total revenue plunged 25.5% to about S$1.6 billion, from S$2.1 billion a year ago, largely due to the deconsolidation of CapitaLand Ascott Trust (CLAS) and divested assets. ^[10]
The Edge Singapore: 9M FY2025 total revenue grew 7% year‑on‑year to S$1.568 billion, based on the company’s 3QFY2025 business update. ^[11]

Phillip Securities squares the circle: their 10 November 2025 note says 9M25 revenue of S$1.57 billion was down 25% year‑on‑year, but would have risen about 2% if you strip out CLAS, which is no longer consolidated. ^[12]

So, mechanically:

Reported revenue is sharply down because CLI is deconsolidating certain lodging assets and selling properties.
On a like‑for‑like basis, the business is growing modestly, which is what the “+7%” / “+2%” type numbers are trying to capture.

3.2 Fee income vs real estate income

The mix is shifting decisively toward fees:

Fee income–related business (FRB)
- Revenue around S$882–900 million for 9M 2025, up roughly 6.5–7% year‑on‑year, helped by higher event‑driven fees from listed funds and contributions from new funds such as SC Capital Partners. ^[13]
Real estate investment business (REIB)
- Revenue about S$753 million, down roughly 12% year‑on‑year (or as much as 47% on some bases), as CLAS was deconsolidated and some assets were divested. ^[14]

FRB now makes up more than half of total revenue (~54%), and brokers like Phillip explicitly highlight this as a key reason they prefer CLI in a choppy property cycle: more fees, less balance‑sheet risk. ^[15]

3.3 Fund‑raising, capital recycling and balance sheet

CLI has been busy on the capital front in 2025:

Equity raised YTD (to early Nov 2025): about S$3.7 billion, including:
- S$2.1 billion via private funds, with ongoing series like Ascott Lodging II, Asia Credit II and India Logistics.
- S$1.6 billion via listed funds, notably the CapitaLand Commercial C‑REIT (CLCR) IPO in Shanghai. ^[16]
Capital recycling: roughly S$2.2 billion of assets monetised for the year to early November through portfolio optimisation and value‑unlocking transactions. ^[17]

The balance sheet is not screamingly stretched:

Debt headroom: about S$6.4 billion.
Net debt/equity: approximately 0.43x.
Interest coverage ratio: about 3.8x.
Average debt maturity: ~3.2 years. ^[18]

These metrics suggest CLI can keep seeding funds and co‑investing without immediately hitting a leverage wall, assuming rates don’t spike again.

3.4 Lodging and commercial operations

Lodging remains a key growth engine:

Lodging management FRR: about S$259 million, up roughly 5% year‑on‑year, with 13,500 units signed across 64 properties year‑to‑date. ^[19]
RevPAU (revenue per available unit): up 2% year‑on‑year, supported by higher occupancy and room rates as travel demand continues recovering. ^[20]

On the commercial side, fee‑related revenue from managing offices and mixed‑use assets ticked up to about S$282 million. ^[21]

The operational story, in short: the parts of CLI that earn fees on other people’s capital look healthy; the bits that own bricks directly are being shrunk, recycled or restructured.

4. New funds and growth platforms: China, India and lodging

CLI has spent 2025 quietly building out platforms that don’t scream in the share price yet but matter a lot for long‑term fee income.

4.1 CLARA II: US$650 million Asia lodging fund overshoots target

On 5 November 2025, CLI announced the final close of CapitaLand Ascott Residence Asia Fund II (CLARA II), its second value‑add lodging private fund. ^[22]

Key points:

Total commitments and co‑investments: US$650 million, beating its US$600 million target.
Expected to add about US$1.6 billion to FUM once fully deployed.
Investors include institutional investors, pension funds and financial institutions across Asia, Europe and North America.
CLI is committing a 20% sponsor stake, aligning its own capital with LPs. ^[23]

Roughly half the equity is already deployed into three assets:

Citadines Shinjuku Tower Tokyo
lyf Shibuya Tokyo
lyf Bugis Singapore

The latter two are co‑living properties, tying into trends like “bleisure” travel and flexible work‑and‑stay arrangements cited by CLI’s management. ^[24]

CLARA II builds on the first Ascott lodging fund, where assets such as lyf Ginza Tokyo and lyf Funan Singapore reportedly delivered above‑target returns for investors. ^[25]

4.2 CLI RMB Master Fund: tapping onshore Chinese capital

Back in May 2025, Reuters reported that CLI launched its first onshore master fund in China, CLI RMB Master Fund, with 5 billion yuan (about US$690 million) of equity commitments. ^[26]

The fund:

Targets business parks, retail, rental housing and serviced residences in China.
Has a local insurance company holding a majority stake, reflecting growing insurer allocation to Chinese real estate.
Is expected to add around 20 billion yuan to CLI’s FUM when fully invested. ^[27]

Strategically, this is a “domestic‑for‑domestic” play: raise local capital to invest in local assets, bringing fee income back to a Singapore‑listed manager.

4.3 CLCR: landmark China retail REIT listing

In September 2025, CLI’s sponsored CapitaLand Commercial C‑REIT (CLCR) listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. ^[28]

Highlights:

Capital raised: 2.29 billion yuan (≈US$322 million) via 400 million units at 5.718 yuan each, 7% above initial expectations.
Oversubscription: offline institutional demand 254.5x, retail subscriptions 535.2x.
CLI retains about a 20% stake.
CLCR is billed as China’s first internationally sponsored retail REIT, aligning with CLI’s strategy of tapping onshore capital for fee‑earning vehicles. ^[29]

This listing directly contributes to the S$1.6 billion of equity CLI raised via listed funds in 2025 and should drive recurring management fees and potential performance fees over time. ^[30]

4.4 India: massive bet on Maharashtra and “new economy” assets

CLI has also doubled down on India, particularly Maharashtra:

On 12 August 2025, CLI signed an MoU with the Maharashtra state government to invest 192 billion rupees (≈US$2.19 billion, or about S$2.83 billion) in Mumbai and Pune by 2030. ^[31]
The plan is to scale its India funds under management from over S$8 billion to around S$15 billion by 2028. ^[32]
Capital will go into business parks, data centres, logistics and industrial parks, executed through CLINT (CapitaLand India Trust), private funds and the Ascendas‑Firstspace platform. ^[33]

The Economic Times notes that this announcement coincided with the launch of CLI’s first India data centre in Navi Mumbai, and that CLI has already deployed over ₹6,800 crore (~S$1 billion) across 10 assets in the state over the past decade. ^[34]

India is explicitly described by management as a “core market”, and the combination of IT parks, data centres and logistics fits CLI’s “new economy” tilt.

5. Merger talk with Mapletree: big if, big implications

On 3 November 2025, Business Times, citing a Dow Jones report, said that CapitaLand Investment and Mapletree Investments are exploring a potential business combination. The mooted merger would create one of Asia’s largest real estate firms with over US$150 billion under management. ^[35]

Important caveats:

The talks are described as preliminary, with clear warnings that a deal may or may not happen.
Both CLI and Mapletree are Temasek‑linked entities, and the process is framed as part of Temasek’s broader effort to reshape portfolio companies into stronger global champions. ^[36]

CLI’s public response to Bloomberg on the report was very “IR‑101”:

It “regularly explores and evaluates various investment opportunities” that align with its strategy.
It is aware of market speculation but “does not comment on rumours or speculation”. ^[37]

If such a deal ever materialised, it would raise crunchy questions:

Scale vs complexity – a combined platform would be huge, but integration of teams, funds and strategies across overlapping markets would be non‑trivial.
Regulatory and competition considerations, especially in Singapore and key overseas markets.
Cost synergies vs culture clashes – you can’t spreadsheet your way out of everything.

For now, the merger story is a potential upside wildcard, not something investors can base a thesis on.

6. Analyst ratings and price targets: overwhelmingly bullish

Despite the noisy macro backdrop, the analyst community is almost comically one‑sided on CLI right now.

6.1 Local broker targets

Beansprout aggregates several Singapore brokers and shows, as of 2 December 2025: ^[38]

Consensus target price: S$3.75
Implied upside vs S$2.65: ~41.5%

Individual calls in that table include (all BUY ratings):

DBS Research – TP S$3.66 (23 Apr 2025)
Maybank Research – TP S$3.30 (28 Feb 2025)
OCBC Investment – TP S$3.67 (2 May 2025)
Phillip Securities – TP S$3.65 (2 May 2025)
UOB Kay Hian – TP S$3.95 (3 Mar 2025) ^[39]

SGinvestors, which focuses on recent reports (past three months), shows an average target of S$3.547, implying about 34% upside, based on DBS, Maybank, OCBC, Phillip and UOB Kay Hian – all with BUY recommendations. ^[40]

Phillip’s latest note on 10 November 2025 reiterates BUY with a S$3.65 SOTP target price, highlighting: ^[41]

Robust, growing recurring fee income streams (54% of revenue)
CLI’s asset‑light strategy
Expected benefit from a lower interest‑rate environment, which should revive fund‑raising and transaction activity, driving FRB growth further.

6.2 Global data providers

International aggregators echo the bullish stance:

Investing.com (consensus estimates page) – rates CLI a “Strong Buy”, with 15 out of 15 analysts on Buy, and an average 12‑month target of about S$3.426 (range S$3.03–S$4.30). ^[42]
Smartkarma – notes 16 Buy recommendations, 0 Holds, 0 Sells, and gives CLI a composite Smart Score of 3.4/5, with strong sub‑scores on Value (4/5), Dividend (4/5) and Resilience (4/5), but weaker Momentum (2/5). ^[43]

TipRanks (via earlier snapshots) shows an average target in the S$3.80–3.90 range, implying around 45–47% upside vs the current share price. ^[44]

Put differently: analysts are almost unanimously positive on the stock, but acknowledge that price momentum has lagged fundamentals.

7. Earnings and revenue forecasts: growth in profits, flat revenue

Forecasts for CLI are more nuanced than the “Strong Buy” label suggests.

7.1 Medium‑term growth expectations

Simply Wall St’s future‑growth page for CLI (last updated 27 November 2025) summarises consensus expectations roughly as: ^[45]

Earnings growth rate: about 14.5% per year.
EPS growth: around 15% per year.
Revenue growth: essentially flat, around ‑0.2% per year.
Future return on equity: ~5.75%.

That combination implies analysts expect:

Profitability to improve (margin expansion, more fee income, less low‑margin rental).
But top‑line growth to be muted, reflecting asset disposals, deconsolidation and a more asset‑light approach.

Earlier in 2025, following an earnings miss where CLI’s EPS fell about 33% short of consensus, Simply Wall St flagged that analysts cut both revenue and EPS forecasts by mid‑teens percentages, even as their average price target stayed around S$3.5–3.6. ^[46]

If you take a ballpark 2025 EPS forecast around S$0.14 (from earlier consensus commentary) and compare it with a share price of about S$2.65, CLI is trading on ~19x forward earnings, which is consistent with the forward P/E near 20x reported by StockAnalysis. ^[47]

7.2 Valuation vs growth

So where does that leave the valuation narrative?

On a trailing basis, P/E >30x looks rich. ^[48]
On forward estimates, ~19–20x earnings with ~14–15% earnings growth and a 4.5% dividend yield looks more reasonable for a capital‑light asset manager, especially if rates drift lower. ^[49]

Some valuation pieces have called out CLI’s P/E of around 30x as potentially expensive relative to peers, prompting debate about whether growth and capital‑light economics justify the premium. ^[50]

As always, the verdict depends on whether you believe the fee‑income story and the macro backdrop.

8. Key risks and what to watch into 2026

No stock is a pure spreadsheet fantasy. For CLI, several real‑world variables can mess with even the best PowerPoint decks:

Interest rates and credit conditions
- A prolonged higher‑for‑longer environment would pressure cap rates, transaction volumes and investor appetite for real assets – all things CLI feeds on.
- On the flip side, most bullish broker notes explicitly lean on the idea that rates will stabilise or decline, helping fund‑raising. ^[51]
China exposure
- CLI is raising and deploying capital in China via the CLI RMB Master Fund and CLCR, both of which depend on long‑term confidence in Chinese commercial real estate and regulation of REITs. ^[52]
India execution risk
- Committing ₹19,200 crore (S$2.83 billion) to Maharashtra by 2030 is ambitious. The payoff hinges on CLI’s ability to execute data centres, business parks and logistics projects on time and on budget, and to recycle into funds at attractive valuations. ^[53]
Merger uncertainty with Mapletree
- A big‑bang merger could unlock scale benefits – or create years of integration drag. For now it’s just speculation, but the mere possibility may influence how investors handicap CLI’s longer‑term trajectory. ^[54]
Momentum and sentiment
- Smartkarma’s low Momentum score (2/5) and CLI’s appearance on “blue‑chip loser” lists suggest investor sentiment is still cautious despite the fundamentals. Re‑rating typically needs catalysts, not just spreadsheets. ^[55]

9. Putting it together: how the story looks as of 2 December 2025

Stepping back, the 2025 picture for CapitaLand Investment looks something like this:

Business model: steadily tilting from owning buildings to managing capital, with FRB now >50% of revenue. ^[56]
Numbers: revenue is down in headline terms due to deconsolidations and divestments, but on a like‑for‑like basis it is inching up, while fee income grows mid‑single digits and earnings are forecast to grow mid‑teens. ^[57]
Growth platforms: new funds like CLARA II, the CLI RMB Master Fund, the CLCR REIT and the India expansion into Maharashtra all expand FUM and future fee pools, while capital recycling keeps the balance sheet reasonably agile. ^[58]
Valuation: the share price around S$2.65 prices CLI at a rich trailing multiple but a more moderate forward multiple, with a respectable yield and a sizeable discount to consensus price targets in the S$3.40–3.90 range. ^[59]
Sentiment: analysts are almost unanimously positive; price action is not.

For investors, CLI is essentially a leveraged bet on three things:

That global capital keeps flowing into Asia‑centric real assets and lodging,
That fee‑based platforms beat owning hard assets on risk‑adjusted returns, and
That rates and property cycles won’t stay hostile forever.

Whether that cocktail suits a particular portfolio is a personal judgement call. From a news‑flow perspective, though, CapitaLand Investment is one of the more structurally interesting stories on the SGX right now: a once‑traditional bricks‑and‑mortar group trying to reinvent itself as a global, capital‑light real asset manager in real time.