Singapore – 2 December 2025
Wilmar International Limited’s share price is sitting in a very uncomfortable sweet spot: operationally strong, legally embattled, and priced by the market as if both stories might be true at once.
On 2 December 2025, Wilmar (SGX:F34, ticker WLIL on some platforms) traded around S$3.22, down about 0.9% on the day, with an intraday range of S$3.20–S$3.28 and a 52‑week range of S$2.78–S$3.38. At that level the agribusiness giant carries a market capitalisation of about S$20.3 billion, trades on a trailing P/E of ~13.5x, a forward P/E of ~13.1x, and offers a dividend yield of roughly 4.3% based on S$0.14 per share paid over the last 12 months. [1]
The stock’s modest decline today comes right after another bearish broker call – and it lands in the middle of a complex mix of legal, strategic and governance developments investors now have to digest.
Share price snapshot on 2 December 2025
According to data from Investing.com and StockAnalysis, Wilmar’s Singapore‑listed shares: [2]
- Closed at S$3.22 on 2 December 2025, down S$0.03 (-0.92%) from the prior close.
- Traded between S$3.20 and S$3.28 during the session.
- Have gained about 4.6% over the last 12 months, excluding dividends.
- Sit roughly mid‑range in the 12‑month band of S$2.78–S$3.38.
- Are supported by a trailing twelve‑month (TTM) dividend of S$0.14 per share, implying a yield of around 4.3% at current prices. [3]
The over‑the‑counter ADR, Wilmar International Ltd (WLMIY), last closed around US$25 on 1 December 2025, having slipped slightly in recent sessions in line with the Singapore line. [4]
In short: price action is calm; the news flow is not.
New ‘sell’ call: Aletheia Capital targets S$2.50 on legal risk
The headline development on 2 December 2025 is a high‑profile downgrade from independent research house Aletheia Capital.
In a note highlighted by The Business Times, Aletheia cut Wilmar from “buy” to “sell” and slashed its target price to S$2.50 from S$3.49. That implies roughly 23% downside from the current S$3.22 level. [5]
Key points from Aletheia’s argument:
- A Chinese court recently ruled that a unit of Wilmar’s China‑listed arm was guilty of contract fraud and held it jointly liable for losses of about 1.88 billion yuan (≈S$345.6 million). [6]
- Aletheia believes the ruling “obscures the earnings recovery narrative”, elevates reputational risk, and reduces balance sheet flexibility, particularly because China contributes more than half of Wilmar’s earnings. [7]
- The firm applies a more than 20% valuation discount to industry medians and values Wilmar at 10x forward earnings, down from the 13x multiple previously used. [8]
The downgrade sits on top of an already crowded legal docket: a major Indonesian graft case and a string of investigations around rice mislabelling and export controls. [9]
Q3 2025: headline loss, strong underlying business
Wilmar’s latest quarterly numbers, for 3QFY2025 (three months to 30 September 2025), are a study in contrast.
According to Wilmar’s own announcement and coverage from The Edge Singapore and The Business Times: [10]
- The group reported a net loss of US$347.7 million, versus a net profit of US$254.4 million a year earlier.
- The loss was almost entirely driven by an IDR 11.9 trillion payment (~US$712 million) ordered by Indonesia’s Supreme Court, which overturned earlier acquittals in a cooking oil export‑permit graft case dating back to 2021. [11]
- Stripping out that penalty, core net profit jumped about 71–72% year‑on‑year to roughly US$357 million, supported by stronger performance in all core segments and higher contributions from joint ventures and associates. [12]
- Revenue rose about 7.4% to US$19.1 billion, helped by better results in China’s oils, flour and rice businesses, robust soybean crushing margins on the back of a strong South American harvest, and steady volumes in tropical oils. [13]
- For the first nine months of FY2025, core net profit reached about US$941 million, although reported earnings were much lower after legal charges. [14]
On the balance‑sheet side, leverage looks manageable:
- Net debt stood at around US$16.48 billion at end‑September, with net gearing of 0.82x, down from the prior year. [15]
- Credit analytics platform martini.ai currently assigns Wilmar an A3 credit rating with a one‑year probability of default of about 0.06%, noting that the company’s credit spreads and risk metrics have improved significantly over the past year despite the legal hit. [16]
That split personality – strong operating engine, heavy one‑off legal penalties – is driving divergent analyst views.
The Indonesia cooking oil case: mostly priced in, but still painful
The Indonesian case stems from allegations that several Wilmar subsidiaries profited illegally from the evasion of export controls on cooking oil and palm oil during a supply crunch in 2021. [17]
A key moment came when Indonesia’s Supreme Court overturned earlier acquittals in September 2025 and effectively triggered forfeiture of a security deposit of about US$729 million that Wilmar had lodged in June 2025. [18]
Broker RHB Securities responded by downgrading Wilmar to “Sell” with a target price of S$2.50, estimating that the forfeiture could reduce FY2025 forecast earnings by around 65% and warning of broader ESG and reputational fallout. [19]
Interestingly, after Wilmar booked the Indonesian penalty and published its Q3 update, several analysts argued that the “case overhang” was finally being cleared, allowing investors to refocus on core earnings. An early‑November roundup from SGinvestors noted multiple brokers turning more positive following the 72% year‑on‑year jump in core net profit and the formal conclusion of the Indonesia cooking oil case. [20]
That fragile optimism has now collided with a new China‑related legal overhang.
China contract‑fraud ruling: a new, large overhang
In late November, The Business Times reported that a Wilmar China subsidiary had been found jointly liable for roughly 1.88 billion yuan in losses in a contract‑fraud case linked to palm oil trades. Wilmar has said the unit will appeal the judgment. [21]
Chairman Kuok Khoon Hong publicly rejected the conviction as “inconceivable”, saying in an interview cited by SGinvestors that if he had actually done such a thing, his famous uncle Robert Kuok “would expel [him] from the family.” [22]
The sequence since then:
- 20 Nov 2025 – BT reports the China unit’s conviction and 1.88 billion yuan liability; Wilmar signals intent to appeal. [23]
- 23 Nov 2025 – Follow‑up coverage highlights Kuok’s strong denial and the company’s assertion it will fight the ruling. [24]
- 28 Nov 2025 – A further update notes that the China subsidiary has formally submitted an appeal. [25]
- 2 Dec 2025 – Aletheia’s downgrade explicitly links the China case to heightened reputational risk and a structural valuation discount, triggering today’s selling pressure. [26]
For now, the Chinese judgment is an uncapped risk: the full timeline, cash impact and potential for negotiated settlement are not yet clear. This uncertainty is exactly what’s driving more cautious targets.
Governance shift: risk committees handed to independents
Against this legal backdrop, Wilmar has moved to tweak its board‑level oversight.
On 1 December 2025, the company announced that chairman Kuok Khoon Hong will step down as a member of the Board Risk Management Committee and the Board Sustainability Committee. [27]
In his place:
- Former Singapore foreign minister George Yeo joins the Risk Management Committee.
- Veteran director Soh Gim Teik joins the Board Sustainability Committee.
Wilmar explained that the goal is to ensure these key committees are made up entirely of independent non‑executive directors, to provide “more robust and objective oversight of risk‑related matters.” [28]
From a governance and ESG lens, fully independent risk and sustainability committees are a clear positive, especially while the group is under legal scrutiny in multiple jurisdictions. Whether investors treat this as a meaningful derisking move or just necessary housekeeping remains to be seen.
India expansion: taking control of AWL Agri Business (ex‑Adani Wilmar)
While courts keep lawyers busy, Wilmar is quietly reshaping its footprint in one of the world’s most important food markets: India.
The transaction
On 11 November 2025, Wilmar announced that its wholly owned Singapore subsidiary Lence Pte Ltd had agreed to acquire a 13% stake in India‑listed AWL Agri Business Limited (formerly Adani Wilmar) from Adani Commodities LLP at ₹275 per share. The deal is valued at about ₹46.5 billion (≈US$529 million / ≈S$0.72 billion). [29]
Key mechanics and follow‑ups:
- Lence is purchasing about 169 million shares, lifting its stake from roughly 44% to about 57% of AWL’s equity once the 13% block is fully integrated. [30]
- The transaction is funded through a mix of internal cash and bank borrowings. [31]
- India’s Competition Commission cleared the deal on 11 November, and by 19 November 2025 multiple outlets, including S&P‑linked MarketScreener and NDTV, reported that the 13% stake sale had completed via an off‑market block, worth around ₹4,646 crore. [32]
- Earlier announcements suggest Lence has scope to acquire up to 20% from Adani in total, which would push its stake towards roughly 64% if fully exercised, cementing Wilmar’s control over the Indian venture. [33]
What is AWL Agri Business?
AWL Agri Business (previously Adani Wilmar) is a major FMCG and agri‑products company, best known for edible oils but active across staples and packaged foods in India.
Its latest reported quarter (Q2 FY2025, to September) showed:
- Net profit down about 21% year‑on‑year to ₹244.85 crore.
- Revenue up roughly 22% year‑on‑year to ₹17,604.6 crore, reflecting stronger volumes and pricing but thinner margins. [34]
Following the Adani Group’s full exit from AWL in late November, AWL shares fell about 4.3% to ₹265 as investors digested the new ownership structure. [35]
For Wilmar, consolidating control of AWL is strategically significant:
- It strengthens Wilmar’s exposure to India’s fast‑growing edible oils and staples market.
- It allows more direct control over branding, pricing and capital allocation.
- It increases earnings volatility in the near term, because AWL’s margins are under pressure even as revenue grows.
Earnings, cash flow and dividends: the fundamental picture
If you abstract away from the legal noise, Wilmar’s fundamentals still look solid:
- Over the last twelve months, Wilmar generated about S$88.3 billion in revenue and S$1.51 billion in net profit, based on data compiled by StockAnalysis. [36]
- For FY2024, revenue was roughly US$67.38 billion, up 0.3% year‑on‑year, while earnings fell about 23% to US$1.17 billion, partly due to weaker margins before the big Indonesia hit in 2025. [37]
- Cash flow is robust: martini.ai estimates that operating cash flow in Q3 alone rose about 70% to US$2.14 billion, helping reduce net debt and reinforcing interest‑coverage ratios above 5x. [38]
On dividends:
- In 2025 so far, Wilmar has paid a final dividend of S$0.10 per share (May) and an interim dividend of S$0.04 (August). [39]
- That S$0.14 total equates to a 2025 yield of roughly 4.3% at today’s share price.
- In 2024, total dividends were S$0.17 (S$0.11 + S$0.06), and 2023 saw S$0.12, giving a multi‑year yield profile in roughly the 4–5% range depending on share price at each year‑end. [40]
Income‑oriented investors thus get a respectable yield from a large‑cap name, but they must decide how comfortable they are owning that yield alongside the legal uncertainties.
What do analysts and models say about Wilmar’s valuation?
Street consensus
Consensus is now firmly in “show me” territory rather than outright bullish.
- Investing.com’s compilation of 12 analysts over the past three months shows an overall “Neutral” stance, with 3 Buys, 7 Holds and 2 Sells. [41]
- The average 12‑month target price is about S$3.19, which actually implies a small downside of around 1% from the current S$3.22. [42]
- Target dispersion is wide: S$2.50 at the low end (RHB and now Aletheia) up to S$3.50–3.90 from more optimistic houses such as Macquarie, which still rates the stock “Buy”. [43]
In other words, there is no strong consensus that Wilmar is cheap, even after the recent legal shocks – but there is also no consensus that it is uninvestable.
Independent valuation models
Different non‑broker models paint a more bullish picture:
- Equity research site Webull recently argued that Wilmar could be about 38% undervalued, estimating a fair value around S$4.93 using a two‑stage discounted cash‑flow model when the stock was trading near S$3.05. [44]
- Fundamental‑modelling platform Simply Wall St forecasts Wilmar’s earnings to grow around 10.7% per year and revenue about 4.6% per year, with EPS rising ~9.8% annually and return on equity trending towards ~8.8% over the next three years. [45]
These models typically assume:
- The Indonesia and China legal issues do not permanently impair Wilmar’s ability to generate cash.
- The company can continue to grow modestly, particularly in branded food in China and India.
Those are reasonable but non‑trivial assumptions.
Technical and credit perspectives
On the technical side:
- Algorithmic site StockInvest.us currently classifies Wilmar as a “Buy or Hold” candidate, highlighting a wide but rising short‑term trend and projecting a potential 16% upside over the next three months, with a 90% probability band between S$3.64 and S$4.02. [46]
- The same model flags support around S$2.95–S$2.93, and sees limited intra‑day reward‑to‑risk while the stock hovers closer to resistance than to those support levels. [47]
From a credit‑risk angle:
- Martini.ai’s A3 rating and declining default probability suggest that bond‑like credit risk remains low, thanks to Wilmar’s scale, diversified operations and strong cash flows, even after the Q3 penalty. [48]
That combination – equity risk rising, credit risk still contained – is exactly what you’d expect for a company facing large but manageable legal settlements.
Bull vs bear case going into 2026
For investors looking at Wilmar from December 2025, the debate roughly splits into two camps.
The bull case
Supporters of the stock tend to emphasise:
- Resilient core earnings: Q3’s 72% jump in core profit and strong cash flow suggest the underlying business is performing well despite legal hits. [49]
- Structural demand: Wilmar sits at the heart of Asia’s food system – edible oils, flour, rice, sugar and downstream branded products – in markets where long‑term demand growth is still robust. [50]
- India upside: Majority control of AWL Agri Business deepens exposure to a huge, underpenetrated, fast‑growing consumer base. [51]
- Improving balance sheet and decent yield: Net debt is falling, cash generation is strong, and investors get a roughly 4–5% dividend yield while they wait. [52]
- Low beta, moderate valuation: With a beta near 0.2–0.3 and a mid‑teens P/E, Wilmar is not priced like a hyper‑growth stock; bulls see this as an opportunity to own essential‑goods exposure at a reasonable multiple. [53]
The bear case
Sceptics focus on:
- Legal overhangs with uncertain tails: The Indonesia cooking oil penalty is booked, but the China contract‑fraud case could lead to additional cash outflows and long‑lasting reputational damage, especially as ESG screens get tighter. [54]
- Valuation that’s not obviously cheap: With consensus targets clustering around the current price and at least two brokers at S$2.50, the market appears to be pricing in only a moderate legal discount, leaving limited margin of safety if things worsen. [55]
- Execution risk in India: AWL’s profits are under pressure even as revenue grows; integrating and scaling this business as a majority‑owned subsidiary could be earnings‑dilutive in the near term. [56]
- Complexity discount: Wilmar is a sprawling conglomerate spanning plantations, midstream processing, trading and branded foods across multiple geographies; such complexity often commands a persistent valuation discount. [57]
Key recent articles and filings on Wilmar
Latest Wilmar stock & corporate news
Bottom line: a legal‑risk stock with a real business underneath
As of 2 December 2025, Wilmar International is not a simple “cheap dividend stock” story.
- The operating business is solid, diversified and cash‑generative.
- The India expansion meaningfully boosts long‑term growth potential.
- The dividend yield is respectable, and the credit profile looks stable.
But:
- The Indonesia and China legal cases have turned Wilmar into a headline‑driven stock, where valuation and sentiment can swing sharply on court rulings rather than soybean margins.
- The latest Aletheia Capital downgrade to “sell” with a S$2.50 target underscores how seriously some investors now treat those risks. [77]
For long‑term investors, the decision from here is almost philosophical:
- If you believe the legal issues are finite, manageable and already largely reflected in the share price, Wilmar offers a way to own a critical piece of Asia’s food supply chain at a mid‑teens multiple with a 4%+ yield.
- If you think the China case could snowball into larger financial and reputational damage, or that regulators may keep turning up the heat, then today’s price may still not compensate for the tail risk.
Either way, any position in Wilmar in 2025–2026 is a bet on how the legal narrative unfolds, not just on how many noodles and rice bags the company sells. This article is for information only, not a recommendation to buy or sell securities; anyone considering exposure should combine these facts with their own risk tolerance and, ideally, professional advice.
References
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